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Foreword 
Reconciliation without Magic: 
Preface Honouring Nelson Mandela 
Foreword Honouring Nelson Mandela  
Donna Orange  
Faculty and Supervising Analyst 
At New York University Postdoctoral Program in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy 
and at the Institute for the Psychoanalytic Study of Subjectivity, New York 
The purpose of freedom is to create it for others 
(N. Mandela, Kani, & James, 2010), p. 270. 
Nelson Mandela learned Afrikaans. Neither by chance nor by brilliance, nor 
in the end by force, did he mitigate the fears of the ruling white minority in 
apartheid South Africa. He studied their language, their history, their culture 
and habits, even their sports. He practiced his language skills on his prison 
warders for many years. When he needed to negotiate in secret the freedom 
and full equality for his comrades and for all his people, he already spoke 
fluently1. Former New York Times Johannesburg bureau chief John F. Burns 
reported an act of “particular kindness” from his press conference at 
Desmond Tutu’s residence the day after Mandela came out of prison in 1990: 
…a white reporter stepped forward and identified himself as Clarence Keyter, the 
chief political correspondent of the Afrikaans-language service of the state-run 
broadcasting monopoly, SABC. Sensing Mr. Keyter’s unease, Mr. Mandela shook 
the reporter’s hand and thanked him, saying that in his last years in prison, when 
he had been given a radio, he had relied on Mr. Keyter’s reports to learn “what 
was going on in my country.” Mr. Keyter, stunned had tears welling in his eyes 
(Burns, 2013), p. A14. 
Such an act of kindness became possible, of course, only because Mandela 
had devoted years to learning Afrikaans, and then possessed the sensitivity to 
respond in the moment. Few have noticed, in celebrating the life of “the great 
reconciliator,” his disciplined attention to the specific proficiencies needed 
                                                          
1 Mac Maharaj: “When we went to prison most of us were not speaking Afrikaans. I argued 
with Mandela about whether we should study the language. He’d say: “Let’s do it together.” 
I’d say I’m not interested in this language, first of all it’s not even an international language, 
and second it’s the language of the oppressor. He’d reply: “Look, man, we’re in for a long 
struggle, a protracted struggle. It’s going to be a war of attrition.” He’d say: “How are we 
going to lead the enemy forces into an ambush? To do that we look at the enemy’s 
commander and try to understand him. To do that, we’ve got to read his literature, read his 
poetry. So shall we study Afrikaans?” (various, 2013) 
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for such peacemaking. To make war skilfully, as he had learned as a young 
man from Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo, demanded planning and 
preparation and a cool head. To stop war, to overcome hatred and fear, to 
build a functioning nation—these demanded different skills, and no less 
unrelenting effort.  
I begin with this concrete example—chosen not at random but because 
language itself both murders and welcomes—to introduce a book full of 
initiatives for justice and peace from South Africa and all across the world. 
This moment of Mandela’s recent “transition”—I am told that in the world of 
his origins, dying means he has transitioned into a state from which he can 
now speak to us more directly than before—gives those he has taught the 
chance to listen again to what he would be telling us now. In this foreword, I 
will emphasize several messages I hear coming through his life and words. 
Without directly summarizing the chapters in this book, I will try to make it 
clear how these authors’ work seems to me to channel Nelson Mandela. 
My own voice speaks, of necessity, from a humble place in this foreword. 
This book’s writers describe hard reconciliation—none of what Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer (Bonhoeffer & Fuller, 1949) called “cheap grace”—after 
extensive human rights abuses and explosive conflicts, and answer to the 
insistent demands of transitional justice (Huyse & Salter, 2008). Not only has 
my indirect contact with this giant of history whom South Africans 
affectionately call “Madiba”, his clan name, or “Tata” (dad)2 been limited to 
my three-day visit to Cape Town, including my visit to his cell at Robben 
Island, and to the District Six museum in Cape Town. Much more, I write 
from the United States, where the work of confronting our legacy of human 
rights violations—destruction of indigenous peoples, and hundreds of years 
of slavery—has scarcely begun. White Americans—who barely realize that 
we are white because we assume we are simply normal—almost never speak 
directly of our own crimes. 
May the courageous authors in this book find readers in my country, 
though their focus lies elsewhere. Each of them works with one or several 
situations of egregious historical violence, and helps us imagine what may be 
needed to make early steps toward reconciliation and healing. Some authors 
are theoreticians and teachers, some artists, some organize close to the 
ground, that is, to the wounded people. Some are themselves the wounded 
people, or their children, embodying the ghosts of the unconscious (Loewald, 
                                                          
2 For me a point of contact comes in his original name, Rolihlahla, tree-shaker or 
troublemaker, so appropriate in his early life, an epithet also applied disparagingly to me by 
my psychoanalytic teachers. One could only wish to have transformed one’s troublemaking 
as he did. 
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1960). Each horror seems uniquely atrocious and unsurmountable: 
Germany’s “final solution”, Burundi, Cambodia, Haiti, Belfast, the stolen 
children of the indigenous people of Australia, Israel/Palestine. Each effort 
can learn from the others.  
The book starts and ends in South Africa, with its visionary Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), envisioned by Mandela, led by Desmond 
Tutu—Mandela’s prophetic and passionate counterpart (Krog, 1999)―and in 
which the editor of this book, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, played a 
significant part. The TRC contributed and disappointed, in the view of most 
who write in this book, and forms a standard against which other similar 
approaches measure and challenge themselves. As my colleague Melanie 
Suchet writes, “I do believe that assuming individual responsibility, as a 
white South African, for the acts of apartheid committed while I lived under 
the system, even if not directly committed by me, is a necessary act of 
collective moral responsibility and part of what the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission hoped to achieve in broadcasting the horrors on national 
television” (Suchet, 2010, p 194). It framed the discussion of alternative 
attempts at transitional justice in other contexts besides South Africa, and 
leaves the tremendous open questions that intrigue, even torment, the writers 
of this book. 
What constitutes a “sorry” that truly makes a difference to the people 
offended, and to their descendants? Is there any kind of apology that actually 
changes the perpetrator (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003)? Does it help the victims 
to know, really know, the sadistic enjoyment of the perpetrator? Is it true, as 
my colleague Robert Stolorow often says, that “trauma recovery” is an 
oxymoron, or can people heal enough to interrupt some of the cycles of 
violence in the next generation, as some of our authors suggest? At the same 
time, can the achievement of crucial political objectives require so much 
official forgetting that time bombs sit ticking away, as for example our 
chapter on Belfast warns? In this question intersect the stories of South 
Africa, Germany, the United States, and possibly more. 
Mandela delegated the problems of human rights abuses to the TRC. He 
understood his own responsibility as the first president of all South Africans 
in a specific way, and believed it must fall to others to detail the injustices he 
had spent his life to overturn. But as several contributors to this book note, 
South Africa after apartheid has inherited overwhelming economic injustice 
and continuing mental apartheid, so that the silent rage of so many years has 
begun to explode. Without faulting Mandela’s trade-off—his clarity placed 
political equality before everything—South Africans now find themselves 
faced with his unfinished work even as we and they mourn his departure.  
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In another instance of official forgetting, British and American victors 
colluded to silence those who would have faced ordinary Germans with their 
responsibility for the massacre called holocaust or shoah3. In April 1945, 
British filmmakers accompanied the British and American soldiers who 
liberated Bergen Belsen and eight other concentration camps. They 
assembled 55 minutes of indescribably gruesome film in which well-fed SS 
guards were made to bury thousands of horribly emaciated bodies, while 
similarly very well-fed townspeople from no more than two or three 
kilometers away were made to watch. From other camps, also right next to 
towns, the film showed gas chambers and crematoria. In some camps there 
were survivors to be nursed back to life, survivors too ill to eat or drink, and 
in others evidence that survivors had been shot on the approach of the Allies. 
Alfred Hitchcock assembled all this extremely difficult film footage, 
prepared its narration by Trevor Howard, but then it was buried as too 
difficult for the German people to see. Someone made the decision that 
Germany’s post-war reconstruction was more important. Only now, in 
January 2014, has this film become available for anyone who wants to google 
“Memory of the Camps.” As in South Africa, we buried stories of atrocity in 
the service of important political objectives, but this decision has borne costs. 
A third instance: American slavery. Perhaps if we do not say these words, 
we can all just get along as if we all just fell out of the sky onto the North 
American continent, intended by a provident god to have the social and 
economic privileges that we have. Puzzling, then, why people seem resentful 
about their lower class status. If they would just work harder, stay out of 
prison, stay in school, they could do as well as my children do. All these 
bemused reactions make sense when history remains invisible: the atrocities 
of apartheid, memories of the camps, the daily indignities and violence of 
slavery.  
The contributors to the book, each in his or her own voice, demonstrate 
that transitional justice requires deliberate hard work, specific skills, and 
creativity. It belongs to no one approach alone, and has nothing magically 
transformational about it. Massive evils leave invisible and invasive scars 
that require the determination and faith that each voice brings. Both the 
writers and the protagonists in the humbling stories they tell us demonstrate 
courage that outstrips the traumatic strictures of the horrors they recount. But 
                                                          
3 I hesitate in naming this disaster, knowing that some object to either choice: holocaust 
(sacrifice by fire) or shoah (catastrophe). The choice of lower-case indicates its belonging 
with other historical massacres treated in this book; upper case would have recognized the 
uniqueness of this deliberate extermination. 
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let us pause, in this dedication, to consider a few more of the elements that 
Nelson Mandela brought.  
Madiba—here I use his South African name deliberately―accomplished 
something extraordinary that few have noticed: he articulated in English and 
acted out in Afrikaans the African communitarian philosophy of ubuntu―in 
the context of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. 
Misunderstood, even by philosophers as prominent as Derrida (Derrida, 
Mandela & Tlili, 1987), to be writing a new version of Rousseau’s social 
contract theory (a radical western individualism), Mandela instead assumed a 
fundamental human solidarity with egoistic behavior as a deviation 
(Bernasconi, 1993). When, in all his early writings, he contrasted law with 
conscience, he meant that laws like apartheid were unjust because conscience 
called everyone to struggle for basic human solidarity and equality. Born into 
the African assumptions, he could learn and love western culture and law 
without ever accepting its foundational ethics. Like his friend Desmond 
Tutu—poet Antjie Krog speaks of “the politician and his prophet”—Mandela 
could speak Western justice ethics while working from their own native 
communitarian ubuntu (we are what we are together). 
“This isn’t right.”4 Injustice bothered Mandela all his life. As a young 
man faced with the blatant injustice of more and more rigid apartheid laws, 
he channelled his rage into physical training and legal education, becoming 
South Africa’s first black attorney, and preparing himself to represent his 
people in the great trials and in the first truly representative government. For 
a time he willingly lived in hiding because his country regarded him as a 
terrorist. In prison, he calmly confronted the small injustices: the differences 
in food and clothing and privileges. Why should black political prisoners 
have to wear short pants when Indian and colored prisoners get the dignity of 
long pants? This isn’t right. He served nearly 20 years on Robben Island5, 
where his eyesight suffered from working in the limestone quarry without 
sunglasses, from 1982 to 1988 in Pollsmoor near Cape Town, and two more 
years at Victor Verster, where he was moved when he contracted tuberculosis 
from the dank conditions at Pollsmoor. Only once did he erupt in rage, over 
                                                          
4 According to Richard Stengel (Stengel, 2010), who assisted Mandela in the preparation of 
his autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela would often listen quietly to a long 
conversation, and then insert these words.  
5 On my 2009 visit to Cape Town, my day free from teaching took me to Mandela’s Robben 
Island cell, seven by eight feet, barely large enough for him to lie down. Our guide, also a 
former prisoner, explained clearly the differences in diet among the groups of prisoners, and 
described the daily routine and living conditions. The Africans who took me there asked 
about our elections and were amazed to meet a white person who had voted for a black man. 
Some remembered with pride Obama’s visit to Robben Island. 
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an insult to his wife Winnie. “I have mellowed,” he told Richard Stengel, 
who helped him to write his autobiography, “I was very radical as a young 
man, fighting everybody, using high-flown language” (Stengel, 2010, p. 51). 
By the time he emerged from prison twenty-seven years later (November, 
1962 to February, 1990), he had become the quietly dignified leader of his 
people. 
How did this happen? In prison Mandela learned to value self-control 
over self-expression. The “man without bitterness” whose measured style 
reassured white leaders and whose response prevented civil war when Chris 
Hani was assassinated in 1993, also hid his pain and anger. Just as he 
considered courage a choice to act in the face of real fear, he chose his calm 
and measured public style at a personal cost he rarely acknowledged. In 
prison, besides the “university” formed by his comrades there to study history 
and political science—particularly his mentor Walter Sisulu and his close 
friend Ahmed Kathrada—he developed his spiritual resources. 
Who belonged to Mandela’s internal chorus6? An intense sense of justice 
and human equality seems to have preceded all the voices—for him other 
elements (non-violence, socialism, etc.) served only as “tactics.” He had 
attended Methodist schools as a child, attended church with family, but kept 
any religious beliefs very much to himself. African tribal leaders remained 
important inspirations, but thinkers like Marx and Gandhi, so crucial for 
others, he refused to consider authoritative. Two voices clearly ring out as 
influences for him: Shakespeare, and Abraham Lincoln. 
When someone brought the works of Shakespeare to Robben Island in 
1980 (Stengel, 2010), and asked the prisoners each to choose a favorite 
passage, Mandela did not hesitate but turned to Julius Caesar: 
 
Cowards die many times before their deaths; 
The valiant never taste of death but once. 
Of all the wonders that I yet have heard 
It seems to me most strange that men should fear, 
Seeing that death, a necessary end, 
Will come when it will come. (Act 2, scene 2).  
 
                                                          
6 Sandra Buechler borrows this idea from the chorus of Greek drama: “The internal chorus we 
bring into our offices every day must be of comfort, and must be sufficiently stimulating, to 
encourage the creative use of aloneness. The feeling the chorus must give us is that whatever 
may go on today, with this particular patient, does not define us as analysts…We are not 
personally and professionally at stake with each new interaction with a patient.…An 
aloneness that doesn’t cost us a good connection with ourselves, with our chorus, or with the 
patient can be used creatively. A creatively used aloneness is not loneliness.” (Buechler, 
1998, p. 111) 
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Not only was Shakespeare a resource for him, but he had obviously engaged 
in the ancient philosophers’ meditation on death, the spiritual practice 
intended to help us to live in the present moment. Mandela often used this 
exercise to reduce fear, as we can also hear in his closing words at the 
Rivonia Trial of 1963-64, facing probable hanging:  
During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I 
have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I 
have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live 
together in harmony with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for 
and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die. 
So the meditation on death had begun before the Robben Island years. 
Shakespeare accompanied him too. 
Abraham Lincoln appears in Mandela’s image-conscious style of 
leadership, in his keeping rivals close (Stengel, 2010) and learning their 
Afrikaans language, and even in his speeches. In the 1993 crucial address to 
the nation on the death of Chris Hani, even before the first elections that 
brought him to the presidency, we can hear Lincoln: 
This is a watershed moment for all of us. Our decisions and actions will determine 
whether we use our pain, our grief, and our outrage to move forward to what is the 
only lasting solution for our country—an elected government of the people, by the 
people, and for the people. 
We could wish to know more of Mandela’s inner life and its inhabitants, but 
what we do glimpse provides continuity with his public life. His example of 
deliberate personal growth based on reflection on the example of others 
offers a way to reflect on the extraordinary work toward justice recounted in 
this book. 
Unexpectedly, Mandela developed his character by the examination of 
conscience. This spiritual exercise, taught to every monastic novice, one does 
not expect of a South African political prisoner. He described it, however, in 
detail in a letter from prison to Winnie, herself imprisoned in 1975. First he 
set out the values to be sought: 
In judging our progress as individuals we tend to concentrate on external factors 
such as one’s social position, influence and popularity, wealth and standard of 
education. These are, of course, important in measuring one’s success in matters 
and it is perfectly understandable if many people exert themselves mainly to 
achieve all these. But internal factors may be even more crucial in assessing one’s 
development as a human being. Honesty, sincerity, simplicity, humility, pure 
generosity, absence of vanity, readiness to serve others—are the foundation of 
one’s spiritual life. (N. Mandela et al., 2010 p. 271). 
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To refocus on these matters, however, would require discipline, and he had 
found himself a method: 
…you may find that the cell is an ideal place to learn to know yourself, to search 
realistically and regularly the process of your own mind and feelings… 
Development in matters of this nature is inconceivable without serious 
introspection, without knowing yourself, your weaknesses and mistakes. At least, 
if for nothing else, the cell gives you the opportunity to look daily into your entire 
conduct, to overcome the bad and develop whatever is good in you. Regular 
meditation, say about 15 minutes a day before you turn in, can be very fruitful in 
this regard. You may find it difficult at first to pinpoint the negative features in 
your life, but the 10th attempt may yield rich rewards. Never forget that a saint is a 
sinner who keeps on trying (pp. 271-272). 
His method reminds me that injustice thrives on prejudice and, as Gillian 
Straker writes, “stereotyped interchanges, which, at the level of their subtly 
choreographed prosody, interpellate us again and again as the homophobic 
and racist subjects we would wish not to be” (Straker, 2006, p. 750). She 
recommends relentless mindfulness as a corrective, much as he did.  
He developed a personal style that alternated between understatement and 
irony. In the face of injustice, he often spoke quietly only three words: that’s 
not right.  
Mandela emerged from prison a peacemaker, focused on one goal only, 
full equality for all South Africans, without retribution toward anyone: the 
white oppressors, or his African rivals. At his death, John Dramani Mahama, 
the president of Ghana, wrote of him: 
His utilization of peace as a vehicle of liberation showed Africa that if we were to 
move beyond the divisiveness caused by colonization, and the pain of our self-
inflicted wounds, compassion and forgiveness must play a role in governance. 
Countries, like people, must acknowledge the trauma they have experienced, and 
find a way to reconcile, to make what was broken whole again (Mahama, 2013). 
Mahami remembers his childhood, imagining that Mandela would never 
come out of prison. When he did, “we waited for an indescribable rage.” Had 
Mandela wanted retribution, who would not have understood? 
Twenty-seven years of his life, gone. Day after day of hard labor in a 
limestone quarry, chipping away at white rock under a merciless sun—
without benefit of protective eyewear—had virtually destroyed his tear 
ducts, and for years, robbed Mandela even of his ability to cry (Mahama, 
2013). 
In contrast with the letter to Winnie quoted above, here is another, 
reflecting the cost of his sacrifices for justice: 
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Yet there have been moments when that love and happiness, that trust and hope, 
have turned into pure agony, when conscience and a sense of guilt have ravaged 
every part of my being, when I have wondered whether any kind of commitment 
can ever be sufficient excuse for abandoning a young and inexperienced woman 
[Winnie] in a pitiless desert, literally throwing her into the hands of highway-
men. (Letter of 4 February 1985, pp 148-49, cited in W. Mandela, Benjamin, & 
Benson, 1985). 
 
But because his suffering, and enormous personal losses, had been for justice, 
Mandela saw no need for resentment. “To go to prison because of your 
convictions and be prepared to suffer for what you believe in, is something 
worthwhile. It is an achievement for a man to do his duty on earth 
irrespective of the consequences” (Mahama, 2013). 
In the face of blatant dishonesty, he tended to say, well, people act in their 
own self-interest. In his last years he sadly noted that “we have now learned 
that even those that fought beside us in the struggle for freedom can be 
corrupted” (Abuya, 2013). Whatever his private suffering, he refused to 
demonize those who had subjugated his people7, and as many have noted, 
invited some of his prison guards to his inauguration as the first president of 
all South Africans. Oppressors had never crushed his spirit. His critics may 
argue that government exists to protect people from those who disregard the 
common good, and that he ought to have done more to structure such 
protection from gross inequality. His private notes from 1993 show that he 
knew exactly where the crucial agenda lay: 
Priority is commitment to oppressed.  
Will fall or rise depending on our success or failure to address their needs, to 
accommodate their aspirations. Specifically we must get them houses and put an 
end to informal settlements; end unemployment, school crisis, lack of medical 
facilities (N. Mandela et al., 2010, p. 339).  
 
These responsibilities belong to us who remain, and have been ably and 
eloquently taken up by the authors of this book. Many of them have, like 
Mandela, learned languages so that they can reach and be reached by the 
suffering or oppressing other. These authors’ vulnerability, their creativity, 
their courage, their questions, their humility, their audacity, render them 
Nelson Mandela’s legitimate heirs in the spirit and work of ubuntu. 
                                                          
7 His “people” came to include for him, all who fought injustice. He wrote in 1976 from 
prison: “The first condition for victory is black unity. Every effort to divide the blacks, to 
woo and pit one black group against another, must be vigorously repulsed. Our people—
African, Colored, Indian and democratic whites—must be united into a single massive and 
solid wall of resistance, of united mass action” (SL, 191). 
XX Donna Orange  
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Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela 
How do societies characterised by a history of mass violence work 
through their traumatic past? In the aftermath of gross violations of human 
rights and genocide, when people have suffered collective trauma, how does 
the trauma play out in subsequent generations? How might we map out the 
arc of historical trauma as a nexus for the interweaving of individual and 
collective traumatic memories? These are not just rhetorical questions; 
answers to them are far from obvious. This presents salient challenges for a 
project that seeks to engage in scholarly reflection on historical trauma and 
memory as an area of exploration across disciplinary and national boundaries.  
I want to begin this introduction with a scene that I witnessed of the re-
enactment of violent events that took place in South Africa in the mid-1980s. 
The re-enactment, which I witnessed in Mlungisi Township in the Eastern 
Cape, was a game by a group of young girls who were not yet born when the 
events they were enacting took place. Mlungisi was one of many black 
residential areas affected by a wave of “necklace” murders committed against 
those who were suspected of collaborating with the apartheid government 
security. The “mob justice” meted out against victims involved burning a 
petrol-soaked tyre that was put around a victim’s neck. Victims of this 
gruesome crime rarely, if ever, had a chance to defend themselves, and soon 
after being identified as police informers, they were beaten and driven to a 
spot where these murders took place. There the tyre was thrown around the 
victim’s neck, doused with petrol and set alight. The accusing crowd and 
bystanders would then circle around the burning body, performing a macabre 
dance to some singing until the victim died. Here is what I witnessed in 1996 
during a visit to Mlungisi to organise the launch of the public hearings of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the township: 
"Let's play a game." It was strange, almost surreal, to see a group of 
young girls seven to ten years old laughing and cavorting in the streets of 
Mlungisi, the same township that between 1986 and 1988 had become the 
scene of so much misery, a tinderbox of inflamed emotion against the 
inhumanities of apartheid. But that was before these children were even born. 
Their squeals and cries were the very embodiment of joy. They looked like 
little tender shoots of foliage—little blades of life—poking out from under 
the cooled lava of the township once utterly devastated by apartheid's 
volcano.  
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"What game?" the others shouted back, skipping back and forth.  
"Let me show you," the first one said. She was about eight and looked as 
if she might be the informal leader of the group. She began to demonstrate. 
The other girls did not seem too enthusiastic about this new game. What was 
wrong with just playing skip? But slowly, they became intrigued.  
"It is called the ‘necklace’ game," the leader said. "This is just going to be 
pretend ‘necklace,’ not the real thing," she said. She pushed the other girls 
aside as if to open up the stage. Rotating through the role of victim, then 
killers, then bystander, she seemed to my amazement to recall virtually 
everything that actually happened in a real necklace murder, even though she 
had not been born when the last necklace killing occurred in Mlungisi 
Township.  
She flailed her arms, screaming in mock anguish as if being pushed 
around and beaten by an imaginary crowd, swaying back and forth, turning 
her head from left to right, and begging for mercy with eyes wide open to 
show mock fright. Then she switched roles and playacted someone going off 
to find petrol, then another person offering matches, then someone running to 
demand a car tyre from an imaginary passing motorist.  
"Give me your tyre," she ordered with mock hostility. She narrated the 
part of the motorist dutifully obeying, then the petrol man, then the matches 
man. Finally, she returned to her victim role, struggling against the make-
believe tyre placed around her neck. Nervously, she made a gesture 
simulating the striking of a match, as if her friends—now a crowd of 
executioners—had forced her to set herself alight.  
As make-believe flames engulfed her, she threw her arms wildly into the 
air. "Now sing and clap your hands and dance. I'm dying," she said. Her 
friends started clapping and singing in a discordant rhythm, moving in circles 
around her "body." Gradually, the high-pitched screams of the girl with the 
imaginary tyre around her neck faded into a whimper as her life ebbed away. 
Consumed by the flames, she slowly lowered herself to the ground and 
"died.” It was all make-believe.  
None of the girls I saw re-enacting the necklace game that morning had 
actually witnessed a necklace murder. The unspoken events of the past, 
however—the silence of Mlungisi's lambs—had become imprinted on their 
minds. It was not just the outward form of the game, but its inner meaning, 
and the sense of trauma to communal life that it carried with it. Re-enacting 
the death dance of the necklace victim may well have been a way of 
transforming the unspoken memory of it into something more accessible and 
less fearful for the girls.  
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This theatrically narrated scene provides an illuminating metaphor for the 
way in which trauma is passed on intergenerationally in subtle ways through 
stories or silences, through unarticulated fears and the psychological scars 
that are often left unacknowledged. It is a dramatic illustration of Prager’s 
notion (in this volume) of how unwittingly subsequent generations “can 
inhabit a past that preceded them.” The symbolic re-enactment may also 
represent a transformation of traumatic experience into ritual, perhaps a 
cathartic way of putting into action the struggle to find language that 
expresses not only the unspoken pain of the past. It is also a response to the 
crisis of the present, the frustrations, the helplessness, and the disempower-
ment of people whose lives still cry out for the fruits of transformation that 
have eluded them and their communities.  
Few topics stake a more compelling claim to Humanities research than 
the legacies of historical trauma – the impact of mass atrocity not only on 
individuals and groups that experienced the violence directly, but also across 
multiple generations of the descendants of survivors. Yet the most urgent 
question of the 21st century is how responses to historical trauma and their 
intergenerational transmission might be interrupted in post-conflict societies. 
In this book, scholars respond to, and explore responses to, historical traumas 
experienced in different cultural contexts, engaging with the question of what 
transformation and breaking cycles of repetition might mean in a post-
conflict environment.  
Breaking Intergenerational Cycles of Repetition is a product of an 
international conference that brought together an interdisciplinary group of 
scholars, researchers, practitioners and survivors at the University of the Free 
State (UFS) in December 2012. The conference drew nearly 350 participants 
from more than twenty-two countries, including survivors from ten post-
conflict and post-genocide regions. Papers presented at the conference 
explored the various ways in which societies and individuals have engaged in 
processes of “working through” historical traumas, from truth commissions, 
to using dialogue, cultural practices and the arts.  
The reference point for the canons of knowledge on historical trauma and 
memory has been either the Holocaust or other perspectives inspired by Euro-
American case studies. The authors in this volume are uniquely placed as 
socially engaged scholars in a changing global context who are interested in 
shifting the lenses to focus on other historical traumas in order to explore 
new intellectual frontiers in this field.  
In Chapter 1, Jeffrey Prager reminds us that trauma “is a memory illness,” 
and thus healing “can only be done in the present.” He considers the work of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa as a process 
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that created a moment in which the traumatic past could be “clearly and 
sharply demarcated from a new future.” Prager is careful not to suggest that 
the TRC has solved all the challenges of a post-apartheid South Africa. 
Apartheid’s “generational ripples” mean that the task of disrupting the 
intergenerational transmission of trauma is a formidable one. For Prager, a 
break with the past means instating “a full-blown humanity for all humans.” 
Elsewhere, he has argued that such a goal requires moving beyond memory 
in order to enable “a hopeful world of possibility for everyone” (Prager, 
2008, p. 418).  
There are echoes between Jeffery Prager’s views in Chapter 1 about the 
TRC, and the idea of empathy that develops in encounters between victims 
and perpetrators in the context of what Shults and Sandage (2008) refer to as 
“a broader horizon of humanness” (p. 61). Victim-perpetrator encounters at 
public hearings of the TRC are the subject of Chapter 2 by Juliet Brough 
Rogers. Brough Rogers focuses her attention on perpetrators’ expressions of 
remorse. One might expect discussion of remorse to follow a predictable line 
of argument: remorse as an expression of empathy that simultaneously 
presents the brokenness of the perpetrator and his recognition of the pain of 
the victim. Remorse, in other words, that is “other”-directed. Brough Rogers, 
however, wants to disrupt this “clean” view of remorse. Using a 
psychoanalytic lens, she examines the nature of the “full disclosure” of 
crimes committed by two of the most notorious torturers in the apartheid 
government’s security forces, Jeffrey Benzien and Eric Taylor. An 
acknowledgement of enjoyment of the scene of violence, Brough Rogers 
argues, is an important aspect of giving “full disclosure,” and may indicate a 
form of genuine remorse, albeit an “ugly remorse.” 
In Chapter 3, Jaco Barnard Naudé reminds us that remorseful apologies 
by perpetrators of apartheid atrocities and statements of acknowledgement 
and reconciliation by beneficiaries of apartheid are not enough to assuage the 
continuing pain of the still “dispossessed, the poor and the disenfranchised.” 
He calls attention not so much to past historical trauma, or responses to this 
trauma and its repercussions in contemporary South Africa, but is concerned, 
rather, with the crisis of the present – the traumas of the everyday faced by 
millions of South Africans who, still without the reparations that they were 
promised, continue to live at the margins of society.  
The past of the apartheid era was the most complex moment in the history 
of South Africa, characterised by spectacular forms of violence. It was a time 
when black people were relegated to second-class, or even third-class 
citizenship in their own country, their lives rendered invisible. Blackness was 
a marker of inferiority, and racial identity a framework that determined not 
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the plurality of human life, but the otherness of the “foreigner” – the one who 
does not belong – “the discarded,” in Jessica Benjamin’s (2014) turn of 
phrase. Despite the change of guard from a white repressive government to a 
“people’s government” of the African National Congress (ANC), for the 
majority of black people the dream of freedom has not yet been realised. The 
cruellest of all features of the current era of government leadership in South 
Africa is the continuing injustice of the failure of service delivery, the 
collapse of health institutions and the dire state of many schools. It is a 
paradox, Barnard Naudé observes in Chapter 3, that the ANC “as an agent of 
reparation, has as yet failed dismally to bring about large scale reparation 
through structural interventions in the economy.” The broken promises of 
politicians, is a traumatic pain that cuts deep and explodes the sense of hope 
and optimism that ushered in an imagined South Africa of opportunity. 
Barnard Naudé says it is time to shed “the cloak of denialism” with which the 
ANC government has covered up “post-apartheid disasters as if to render 
them invisible.”  
Yet when it comes to the question of who ultimately is responsible for 
reparations, for repairing the irreparable brokenness of the past, and “the 
‘now’ of the irreparable,” all South African are responsible. This sense of 
responsibility, Barnard Naudé argues, involves “a reparative approach to the 
irreparable” and “a process of becoming-human (again).” This involves “a 
conception of politics as creative potentiality … as reparative citizenship 
[which] is necessarily an inter-generational concept … that requires us to 
imagine a future generation to which we will stand accountable not simply 
for the Apartheid past that lies behind us, but also for the post-apartheid as it 
becomes a past in the ‘now’ of the irreparable.” 
Becoming human, or recognition of the other as a human being, are forms 
of reparation. These terms often emerge in the context of dialogue between 
individuals and groups from different “sides” of historical trauma. In Chapter 
4, Jessica Benjamin applies a psychoanalytic lens to explore the dialogue 
captured in the film Beyond Violence between a Palestinian man called 
Bassam, who was imprisoned for resisting the Occupation, and Itamar, a 
former soldier in the Israeli Army who grew up in a Zionist military home. 
Benjamin draws from the concepts she developed, including the ideas of 
recognition and of the “moral third” to explore the men’s journey of dialogue 
that led to their establishing the movement “Combatants for Peace.” 
Benjamin offers the psychoanalytic paradigm of recognition to “conceptual-
ize what it means to transform one’s view of a previously repudiated other 
and step into the space of dialogue – a space where both subjects are equally 
dignified and ethically obligated to respect the other.” The power of the 
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transformation of their relationship “beyond violence” is illustrated by the 
story of the shooting death of Bassam’s daughter by an Israeli soldier. 
Benjamin informs us that despite this incident, Bassam refuses to retaliate 
with vengeance and instead identifies “with the suffering of those who feel 
responsible for injury and want to repair it.” 
Björn Krondorfer continues on this theme of dialogue in Chapter 5. The 
chapter draws on his work as facilitator of intergroup dialogue in wide-
ranging contexts including between Israelis and Palestinians, Israelis and 
Germans, and third-generation American Jews and non-Jewish Germans. He 
proposes the term “unsettling empathy” as an ethical “posture” of “shared 
responsiveness … that leads to transformation.  
The discussion of dialogue as a response to historical trauma is also the 
subject of Chapter 6. Using a psychoanalytic framework, Pumla Gobodo-
Madikizela explores the relationship between remorse and forgiveness based 
on examples of encounters between victims and perpetrators drawn from the 
TRC. She argues that remorse, as in forgiving or mourning, involves a 
reparatory process in which there is an integration of self and other on both 
internal and external levels. This opens up the possibility of connection 
between victim and perpetrator and the transformation of the relationship 
between them. Exploring the empathy-remorse-forgiveness cycle in the 
context of the TRC, Gobodo-Madikizela argues, “might broaden our 
understanding of the construction of meaning, and strengthen and enliven 
psychoanalytic debates about the conditions that facilitate positive change 
after violence.”  
Building connections and reconciliation between former enemies after 
historical trauma is also the subject of Chapter 7. Graham Dawson takes us to 
the Northern Ireland “Troubles” and strategies aimed at “historical 
reconciliation” in Belfast, the “post-conflict city” as he refers to it. Dawson 
goes to the heart of the issues at the forefront of contemporary debates about 
historical trauma, its aftermath, and its expression in memory and other 
symbolic forms of expression in places that became the sites of violence – 
“the cultural landscapes and memoryscapes that construct the meaning of 
places and their pasts.” He engages with questions that are seldom explored 
in post-conflict contexts, shifting the lens from responses to historical trauma 
that focus on interpersonal dialogues, to addressing the central question of the 
complex interplay of the historical, political and traumatic dimensions of 
memory when former enemies live in the same city as neighbours, and how 
these memories are transmitted to the next generation. 
In Chapter 8, André Wessels brings us back to South Africa and discusses 
a historical trauma that predated apartheid-era violence, namely the Anglo-
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Boer War, or the “South African War” as it is now referred to in recognition 
of the countless black people, women, men and children, who were also 
killed in that war; a war waged by the British Empire in colonial times, 
which, according to Wessels, is “the most extensive and destructive war that 
has been fought in southern Africa.” Wessels’ chapter examines the shadow 
that this war cast on the future, and explores its multigenerational 
repercussions, including the yearning for re-enactment of the past in violent 
ways, the yearning to “refight the battles of the past.” Why is it, Wessels 
asks, that despite the important work of the South African TRC, 
“reconciliation is still a problem in South Africa? Why? Why all the 
bitterness, the hostility, the unresolved trauma?” 
Chapter 9, by Angeliki Kanavo, Kosal Path and Kathleen Doll, is a study 
based in post-genocide Cambodia in Anlong Veng, a community known to be 
the last stronghold of the Khmer Rouge. The authors explore the transmission 
not only of trauma, but also of patterns of unquestioning obedience among 
former cadres of the Khmer Rouge, and how these patterns have been 
transmitted to the younger generation within this Khmer stronghold 
community. Their findings suggest that young people in Anlong Veng have 
not been critical of the past and of their parents’ role in it, and that far from 
engaging in efforts to break the cycles of the repetition of the violent past, 
always strong in Anlong Veng, an environment in which cycles of 
destructiveness have thrived has been nurtured.  
The novel as a response to historical trauma is the focus of the next three 
chapters in the book. Chapter 10, by Rosanne Kennedy, takes a critical look 
at the public apologies and the discourse of reconciliation in Australia. She 
calls for new avenues of inquiry, new genres that will allow shifts “from a 
discourse of reconciliation to one of crisis … and from a poetics of reparation 
to a poetics of survival.” In Chapter 11, Sarah Cordova shows how two 
female novelists confront the silences around the traumatic period of the 
Duvalier years in Haiti. In Chapter 12, Ewald Mengel returns us to the South 
African context, and focuses on trauma novels written by Jewish authors after 
apartheid. Cordova and Mengel are interested in how the trauma novel is 
used by the authors symbolically to break the silence and to reclaim a sense 
of agency and wholeness.  
Chapter 13 is by Beata Hammerich, Johannes Pfäfflin, Peter Pogany-
Wnendt, Erda Siebert, and Bernd Sonntag, all members of the Psychothera-
peutic Study Group for People Affected by the Holocaust (PAKH) who are 
descendants of Nazi perpetrators and children of Holocaust survivors. The 
chapter is a reflection on the authors’ on-going dialogue about the impact of 
the Holocaust on their lives, how the themes of trauma, shame and guilt have 
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played out in their lives, and the challenges they faced over the years during 
their dialogue process.  
Chapter 14 is by Jeff Kelly Lowenstein, Dunreith Kelly Lowenstein and 
Edward Lowenstein. As a four-year-old in Essen, Germany in 1939, Edward 
Lowenstein was put on the Kindertransport to England to escape the 
imminent destruction of Jews in Nazi Germany. The chapter is about his 
journey of return to Essen for the first time in 2012 with two of his sons and 
his grandson, and how he and the community in the neighbourhood of his 
former home in Germany have found healing through confronting the 
Holocaust past and its transgenerational repercussions among both survivors’ 
children and the descendants of perpetrators and bystanders. Both Chapter 13 
and 14 are written with a rare honesty that will deepen readers’ understanding 
of what it means for children of survivors and of perpetrators to experience 
the “memory” of the past, and of the complex journeys of dialogue and the 
imperative for the inheritors of the past to confront it in order to transcend it 
and break its cycles of repetition.  
Marianne Hirsch (2001; 2012) refers to the emergence of traumatic 
memory at the level of the second generation as “post memory.” She 
describes “postmemory” as the relationship that descendants of survivors of 
collective trauma have with their parents’ traumatic experiences. 
“Postmemory” experiences are those that the younger generation “remember” 
from the images and stories with which they grew up, “but that are so 
powerful, so monumental, as to constitute memories in their own right” 
(Hirsch, 2001, p. 16). The importance of Hirsch’s analysis, based as it is in 
the context of exploration of transgenerational trauma within families, is that 
it opens up the possibility of broadening research in this field beyond 
individual experience, and provides theoretical insights on what is at play 
when children “inherit” their parents’ traumatic memories. What is still rare 
in the literature on transgenerational trauma and the Holocaust is research on 
societal strategies of “social repair” (Prager, 2011) or on dialogue processes 
as a way of interrupting the transmission of intergenerational cycles of 
trauma, shame and guilt associated with “memory” of the Holocaust. 
Chapters 13 and 14 are illustrative examples of what happens when 
individuals and groups confront this unspeakable past and forge links with 
people from opposite sides of history in order to transcend its debilitating 
repercussions.  
The chapters in this book represent perspectives from a wide range of 
disciplinary fields. Historical traumas are discussed that were experienced in 
different cultural contexts. Thus, we have moved away from what Michael 
Rothberg (2008) refers to as the “homogenization” of historical trauma (p. 
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230), and from marginalising traumatic events that have occurred in other 
part of the globe (Stef Craps & Bret Buelens, 2008). The diversity of voices 
we have maintained in the book – interdisciplinary voices and transnational 
voices – finds expression in Chapters 15 and 16. The authors’ contributions 
reflect a consciousness about the importance of using methodologies of 
healing responses to historical trauma, which are drawn from cultural 
contexts relevant to the groups in question. In Chapter 15, Wendy 
Lambourne and David Niyonzima show how integrating cultural practices of 
healing and reconciliation dialogue in Burundi with Euro-American 
approaches can facilitate meaningful transformation. In Chapter 16, Shanee 
Stepakoff discusses a counselling programme developed for different post-
conflict regions and refugee centres by combining indigenous approaches 
with traditional psychological counselling methods.  
The last chapter in the book, Chapter 17, by Polly Walker, discusses the 
use of performance arts in peacebuilding strategies after mass trauma and 
violence. The link between the arts and trauma was recognised in ancient 
Greece, where theatre was used as a way of reintegrating returning 
traumatised soldiers back into society. Jonathan Shay (1995), in his book 
Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character, 
discusses this sophisticated use of the arts in ancient Greece, and how the arts 
were brought into dialogue with trauma to help traumatised soldiers to 
reclaim their sense of humanity and to reconnect in a social world. 
Connecting with humanity – the humanity of the audience and the humanity 
of the other – is where the power of the performance arts lies. Used in the 
context of dealing with historical trauma and responses to it, performance 
theatre becomes a communicative tool that inspires public conversations not 
only about trauma and its repercussions in individuals and society, but also 
about its role as a tool that can be used to draw attention to the manifestation 
of destructive cycles of repetition of historical trauma in social context. Thus, 
performance as public narrative can become a “visual conscience of society” 
(Dorfman, 2006). As Polly Walker observes in her chapter, performance 
“engages more than verbal, rational analysis: it engages people’s bodies, 
emotions, and sense of spirituality” and opens up the possibility for 
conversations about the past on multiple levels, including with self and with 
others. 
Consider, for example, South African composer Philip Miller’s musical 
composition, Rewind: A Cantata for Voice, Tape and Testimony. Rewind is 
based on recordings of testimonies of victims and survivors who appeared 
before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In Miller’s musical, we 
encounter the interweaving of stories of victims, perpetrators and bystanders, 
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narrating the different roles they played. One of the stories in Miller’s 
performance is based on the testimony of Nomonde Calata, whose husband 
was murdered by Eric Taylor, one of the security police who is the subject of 
Juliet Brough Rogers’ discussion in Chapter 2. At the TRC hearing, 
Nomonde’s voice, replayed in Millers’ musical production, carried the 
original intensity of her emotions when she found out about the vicious 
murder of her husband. At one point during her testimony, she let out a 
piercing cry that shattered the stillness of the theatre where the hearing was 
held. 
Miller resurrects this wailing voice from the archives of TRC. A soloist 
then takes up Nomonde’s cry and re-presents it through her magnificent and 
electrifying soprano voice. Several other voices in the choir, with different 
levels of intensity, male and female voices, sing this wailing cry. The effect is 
a seamless repetition of this voice-cry that reverberates like a re-enactment of 
a wound that refuses to be silenced. Miller seems to be telling the audience: 
This is not yet past. Indeed, at the end of Miller’s show at one of the main 
theatres in Cape Town, the Baxter, a still and dead silence hangs in the hall 
after the curtain call. The audience, clearly moved by Miller’s unsettling 
stories, leaves the hall in reflective mood. 
  And here is the power of the creative arts: people did not leave after 
the performance of Rewind. Instead, they gathered around one another – 
around friends and strangers alike – weeping, talking, being silent and 
sharing the most tragic, shameful or confusing aspects of this collective past. 
Through these brief dialogue encounters, members of post-conflict 
communities can take some first steps into the light of hopefulness – hope, 
not as an abstract concept, but as a moment imbued with the possibility of 
deepening reflection that may lead to the kind of acknowledgement that 
gestures towards action, that inspires a wisps of a fresh breeze that awakens a 
sense of responsibility for the “‘now’ of the irreparable.” Performance theatre 
can transform public spaces into sites for ethical engagement, sites for 
forging human links across time and space with the Other – even an Other 
responsible for the irreparable.  
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Chapter 1 
Disrupting the Intergenerational Transmission of 
Trauma: Recovering Humanity, Repairing Generations 
Disrupting Intergenerational Transmission of Trauma 
Jeffrey Prager 
University of California, Los Angeles 
Introduction 
The entire world celebrated the end of apartheid. Since 1994, all eyes have 
watched hopefully as South Africa has struggled to forge for itself a new 
path. We have been witness to the nation’s efforts to establish a more just 
society, one not divided by racial distinction or by brutal practices of 
subordination and exclusion. We have applauded efforts to enact policies for 
a more inclusive civil society and stable democracy, and to overcome the 
moral stain of a shameful past. The world has also paid attention to the 
formidable challenges, setbacks and leadership failures faced by the nation in 
recent years, and the various economic, political and social challenges with 
which it has been confronted. But the fact remains that, although it shares 
many similar problems with other developing countries, the South African 
political experience is unique.  
There is no parallel to this country’s efforts to peacefully preserve 
democracy while explicitly acknowledging that the entire political and social 
system had been upheld by a system of tyranny and brutality. It was then a 
democracy maintained through an elaborate system effectively dividing the 
nation into either real or potential victims and real or potential perpetrators.  
And while the narrative accounts of the apartheid regime focus on these 
features of the past and the patterns of injustices resulting from the system, 
requiring an ever-developing system of rationalizations and justifications on 
behalf of black oppression and racially-defined domination, a new account 
beginning in the early 1990’s was coming into view. This version focuses on 
the ways the whole nation suffered as a result of apartheid, producing a 
modern nation-state locked into an old vision of itself and that finally with 
the help of the international community was able to break the stranglehold 
the system of apartheid held on its development. 
Twentieth-century South African history continues to be seen through this 
prism and shapes understanding of contemporary challenges. This narrative 
does not replace the former one but recognizes the ways in which the entire 
society—whites, blacks, and coloreds—has been deeply traumatized by the 
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system. Apartheid’s harm had been inflicted on all South Africans (though 
materially and psychically, of course, in different ways). Suspicion and 
mistrust of the other and the anxiety and fear of harm being done to oneself 
were common and everyday experiences shared by all. Apartheid, while most 
directly aimed to restrict the freedoms of South African blacks and coloreds, 
resulted in a national psychic trauma. No one was exempt from the anti-
human premises upon which the system was conceived and no one was 
exempt from the “apartheid mind” (Gobodo-Madikezela, 2004). 
 Following the end of apartheid, dramatic efforts were undertaken to 
implement a new post-racist, post-racial nation especially visible in the 
establishment of The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the 
drafting of the new South African Constitution. The TRC in particular 
constituted a genuinely novel institutional response to overcome the 
perceived impediments to national self-development. Through it, South 
Africans were being provided a vehicle to achieve forgiveness toward one 
another and reconciliation between all sectors of the population. The political 
leadership through these measures, especially those identified with the 
African National Congress but others as well, sought, against great odds, to 
break a likely cycle of violence, revenge and torture. The goal was to create a 
South African history in which its racist past might be clearly and sharply 
differentiated from its post-apartheid present. The TRC constituted the 
nation’s effort to reclaim for itself a common humanity long been denied. Yet 
despite some remarkable successes, the past still haunts the present. 
The Conundrum of Time 
A survivor of the European Holocaust describes her worry of passing on her 
experience to others. She writes, “Hitler is dead. Still, he may yet achieve his 
goal of destroying us if we internalize the hate, mistrust, and pain, all the 
inhumanity we were exposed to for so many years…I am afraid we might 
have come out of it lacking the human capacities we had before…to hope, 
love, and to trust. Have we acquired the wisdom to prevent such a terrible 
outcome (cited in Bar-On 1989:5).” In a quite different context, just prior to 
the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, J. M. Coetzee (1991) writes: 
It is not inconceivable that in the not too distant future, the major protagonists 
having agreed that apartheid has been ‘dismantled,’ the era of apartheid will be 
proclaimed to be over. The unlovely creature will be laid to rest, and joy among 
nations will be unconfined. But what is it that will be buried? The more cautious 
among us may want to draw lines between apartheid legislation, which indeed can 
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be dismantled, apartheid practices, which cannot be dismantled but can be 
combatted, and apartheid thinking, which is likely to resist coercion, as thinking 
generally does. The sensible course for future governors of South Africa to follow 
may be to concentrate on liquidating apartheid practices and to ignore apartheid 
thinking, allowing the latter to lead whatever forms of subterranean life it chooses 
as long as it does not emerge in action—treating it, in fact, very much as sin is 
treated in modern secular societies. Unfortunately, thinking does not always 
remain in its own compartment: thinking breeds action. There is thus reason to 
reopen the coffin and remind ourself of what apartheid looks like in the flesh. 
Coetzee’s point is an important one. In time, South Africans will only know 
of apartheid, not apartheid itself. Each generation will be further removed 
from its legislation and practices. Currently, more than 40% of the South 
African population has been born since 1993. The dehumanization that 
occurred during the apartheid era, certainly for its victims but for the 
perpetrators as well, will be remembered only through various narrative 
forms. For a while, there will be first-person accounts. Later, publicly 
sanctioned and un-sanctioned or non-formal personal narratives will 
predominate. In time, what will serve as memory will be laws making 
discrimination by race or ethnicity illegal. But Coetzee, of course, is correct 
in stating that apartheid thinking, an especially virulent form of racism, 
doesn’t die easily. It generated actions whose consequences were passed on 
over time and continues to do so.  
Racism, shared both by victims and perpetrators, becomes inscribed 
psychically and even bodily by all social members, and wittingly or 
unwittingly gets passed on long after the last survivor of the apartheid era 
dies. As Auerhahn and Laub write (1984), massive traumas, like those 
suffered at the hands of the apartheid system, continue to shape “the internal 
representation of reality of several generations, becoming an unconsciously 
organizing principle passed on by parents and internalized by their children.” 
Each generation stands to receive these past traumas of racialized distinctions 
and experience new ones as a result of them: thinking becomes action. The 
result is a life constricted by perceived difference, specific perceptions 
dominated by strong echoes of the past. Long after apartheid’s demise, the 
country is still required to reckon with, what Derek Hook (2008) describes as 
racism’s “psychic density…its extraordinarily affective and often eruptive 
quality, its visceral or embodied nature, its apparent stubbornness to social, 
historical, discursive change” (p. 672). Hook (2008) goes on to argue, “This, 
for South Africa, is the legacy of trauma” (p. 672). Like many other countries 
who struggle with their own version of a constricted humanity, South Africa 
continues to confront apartheid’s generational ripples: distortion, suspicion, 
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fear, violence and hatred. This describes the formidable task of breaking the 
cycle: how to insure or instate a full-blown humanity for all humans, what the 
Holocaust survivor captured as the capacity “to hope, to love, and to trust.” 
In what follows, three propositions are offered that may stimulate 
thinking on ways of breaking historical cycles of destructiveness, especially 
for those who have no specific memories of the trauma itself but also for the 
“first generation” of PTSD sufferers themselves. I describe individual 
psychological trauma and the challenges it poses for therapeutic treatment—
of those who experienced the trauma themselves as well as for their 
descendants—building upon both my clinical experience as a psychoanalyst 
and my previous research in psychoanalysis and sociology. From this, I 
extrapolate to describe particular social mechanisms intended to respond 
collectively to the damages inflicted by trauma. These strategies of “cure” 
should always be held against the backdrop of knowing that we are asking of 
trauma’s sufferers and their impacted descendants, in the end, “to forgive the 
unforgivable (Derrida, 2001).” 
 
1. Trauma is a memory illness. Healing can only be done in the present 
Trauma victims, to paraphrase Freud, suffer from their reminiscences. 
Psychic trauma has its origins in some event or series of events in the past 
(moments, hours, days, weeks, months, years ago), remembered after the fact. 
It manifests itself symptomatically in the present, triggered by a memory 
that typically remains unconscious. Ordinary timeliness suddenly gives way 
to timelessness, and the painfulness of the past is felt as if it is occurring now 
(Stolorow, 2003; Prager, 2006). Trauma, at times, may be felt by the trauma 
victim as a return to the original moment or moments of danger though, of 
course, it is not an actual return to the past. Rather some experience triggers a 
reminder of the feelings of helplessness, or fear, or of being overwhelmed, 
transforming the present from benign to both dangerous and affectively 
unbearable. The here-and-now is itself felt to be unsafe. Intrusive memory, in 
short, is the symptom that requires immediate attention. As Cathy Caruth 
(1991) describes this feature, “The traumatized person, we might say, carries 
an impossible history within them, or they become themselves the symptom 
of a history that they cannot entirely possess” (p. 3). Traumatic memories 
reflect the failure of defensive strategies to contain them. The challenge is 
how best to “re-tell the lost truths of pain among us” (Laura Brown, cited in 
Caruth, 1991, p. 8). 
Stated differently, trauma, as psychic illness, cannot be known until it 
surfaces in various symptomatic behavioral forms: suicide, homicide, or 
other kinds of anti-social behavior, intrusive memory, psychic paralysis or 
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shutting-down, and various expressions of repetitive interpersonal incapacity. 
The psychological responses of either fight or flight unfortunately capture 
too much of contemporary psychic reality, notably in South Africa but 
elsewhere as well. Either as an unconscious re-creation of the past or as 
earnest effort to ward off the memories of the past’s painfulness, these can 
have the unintended effect of helping to create an outer reality that conforms 
to the dangers of the past and confirms it. The traumatic past continues to 
intrude on current-day perception and shapes interaction between oneself and 
others, between parents and their children, and even between oneself and 
individual representatives of various institutional orders: teachers, 
bureaucrats, clergy, bosses, politicians, police etc. An interaction with 
someone in authority, for example, may trigger the memory of having been 
once demeaned, diminished or endangered. Unmetabolized remorse or guilt 
for past actions can also complicate interactions in the present, obscuring 
demands of the present by repetitive efforts to re-do the past. The trauma 
sufferer holds little or no capacity to distinguish whether the feeling is a 
product of a present-day interaction or instead a feeling of past abuses, now 
transposed into the present. Trauma possesses the person, the individual is 
not in possession of his or her history. It is often impossible, as Coetzee 
comments, for thinking not to be transformed into action. “Indirect 
knowledge,” as Jonathan Jansen (2009) characterizes it in his important book 
Knowledge in the Blood, often creates a reality-on-the-ground where the 
imagined past is re-lived and re-created as if it were the present (see also 
Prager, 2008). 
Following the end of apartheid, South African leadership appreciated the 
necessity to provide an institutional apparatus to combat apartheid’s lasting 
traumatic effect on South Africans. The leaders understood the necessity to 
insure that power and race relations were simply not inverted; that memory 
not be employed as a vehicle of revenge and fight, where what was done to 
one group would now not be done to the other. The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission was an inspired effort and, likely, a necessary one, in the words 
of Coetzee, for “reopening the coffin, and seeing what apartheid looks like in 
the flesh.” It was designed, of course, to promote healing for the first 
generation, those who had lived and suffered through various traumatic 
experiences—either as victims or perpetrators—a consequence of the 
apartheid system. There was no precedent, anywhere in the world, for the 
form it took—equating truth with justice (and amnesty). It relied on no 
already existing institutional apparatus—neither governmental nor 
religious—to achieve its intended goals. 
 Disrupting Intergenerational Transmission of Trauma 17 
The insight behind the formation of the TRC is a profound one, speaking 
directly to breaking the cycle of destructiveness a result of a traumatic past. 
The procedures of the Commission embraced the following postulate: It is 
not the past that needs to be forgotten but, rather, personal memory’s hold on 
the present that requires disabling. Without that, traumatic memory fails to 
lose its affective power or its capacity to dominate present-day interactions 
and social experience. In the words of the American psychoanalyst Hans 
Loewald, the TRC sought to transform a sense that individuals are currently 
haunted and possessed by the ghosts of the past to the conviction that these 
new South Africans are in possession of their ancestors and distinct from 
them. “Those who know ghosts,” Loewald (1960) writes, “tell us that they 
long to be released from their ghost life and led to rest as ancestors. As 
ancestors they live forth in the present generation, while as ghosts they are 
compelled to haunt the present generation with their shadow life” (p. 29). 
The public testimonies produced as the central feature of the TRC 
represented recognition that the apartheid past had to be remembered; yet it 
needed to become a memory emotionally distinct from the new Republic’s 
present. The categories of victims and perpetrators had to be retired by the 
end of the hearings; apartheid thinking required demarcation from a post-
apartheid citizenry, neither victims nor perpetrators but as post-apartheid 
survivors of trauma collectively forging a new society and a new politics. 
The genius of the TRC was its creation of a liminal moment in the history 
of the nation—neither past nor present nor really public or private; a moment 
in time that itself had neither past nor a future. For that moment in time, time 
was suspended. Only when time stood still could a traumatic past be clearly 
and sharply demarcated from a new future. It was to be a future when all 
individuals might become in possession of their pasts. All testimony was 
public, within earshot not only of those who attended the hearings but 
broadcast by radio to the whole country. It would have been difficult not to 
hear the proceedings: as such, all of South Africa constituted itself as 
community of listeners, neither victims nor persecutors but post-apartheid co-
equals.  
The aspirations of the TRC, of course, were utopian. It is easy to describe 
in detail the ways in which it failed to achieve these impossible goals. The 
TRC implicitly understood trauma as a memory affliction dominated by 
ghosts from the past, and its repair required that apartheid’s survivors take 
possession of their past and experience themselves as free from its hold. As 
the nation transforms itself by denouncing a shameful past, its citizens 
similarly need to take possession of their own past and possess it, clearly 
demarcating themselves from their discriminatory and exploitative ancestors. 
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Only then can memory loses its hold as a haunting, ghostly presence in the 
present (See also Gordon, 2008). 
 
2. Traumatic transmission across generation often occurs unconsciously 
and affectively. Traumatic experiences live beyond those who are the direct 
recipients. We know how unwittingly new generations, in fact, can inhabit a 
past that preceded them, can be carriers of it, can continue to live it, 
reproduce it, pass it on and, at the same time, imagine or think themselves 
free from their history. We know that persecution and victimization in one 
generation, as if being haunted, typically gets acted-out in the next. We know 
that violence toward and fear of others becomes communicated, both overtly 
and covertly, between parents and children: that whole sub-cultural 
communities are constituted on the basis of shared, painful histories on the 
one side, and fear of violence, retaliation and infiltration, on the other. We 
know that communities of distrust, alienation and hatred persevere even 
when legal and institutional measures are implemented to dismantle those 
collectivities. Paradoxically, even amid good intentions and explicit efforts to 
protect the next generation from the violence and human destructiveness of 
the past, the same patterns often prevail. Inhumane re-enactments occur from 
one human being to another, generation after generation after generation.  
How does this transmission occur? Studies of the children of Holocaust 
survivors reveal some of the unconscious processes at work that keep ghosts 
of the past alive (Bergmann and Jucovy, 1982; Auerhahn and Laub, 1998; 
Felsen, 1998; Kogan, 1995; Herzon, 1982; Pynoos, unpublished; Prager, 
2003). As a consequence of their parents’ experience, children differentiate 
less completely from their parents, see themselves as protectors of their 
parents rather than vice versa, and tend to inhibit their own impulse to 
establish independence and autonomy. Identity development, in short, 
becomes severely hindered because these children have not been able to 
experience themselves as persons occupying a particular discrete location in 
time and space. Auerhahn and Laub (1998), for example, in summarizing 
extensive research on Holocaust survivors and their children write, “We have 
found that knowledge of psychic trauma weaves through the memories of 
several generations, making those who know it as secret bearers” (p. 22). The 
researchers describe how children of survivors develop a sense that their 
parents often experience their activities of separation, differentiation and 
individualization as a reactivation of the original trauma. Such responses by 
their parents support their own identification with their parents’ 
victimization. Their own feelings and needs, it came to be felt, are murdering 
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their parents (Auerhahn and Laub, p. 38). Kogan (1995) writes, “The 
traumatized parent, in his own frantic search for an object which can be 
experienced as something which joins together desperate parts of his own 
personality, turns the child into a container. Thus, instead of fulfilling the role 
of an internal protective skin, the parent fosters a permeable membrane 
between himself and the child, through which he transmits depressive and 
aggressive tendencies which cannot be contained in himself (pp. 251-2).”  
Two French psychoanalysts, Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok (1994), 
have conceptualized this process of insufficient differentiation between 
generations by distinguishing between two distinct psychic processes: 
introjection and incorporation. For them, the critical role of parents in a 
child’s psychic development is to help enable him or her to structure external 
experience with inner need and desire. This process is described as a process 
of introjection, taking in the external environment as presented to the child 
and calibrating it with the features of her own inner world. As they describe, 
introjection is about the capacity, facilitated by the previous generation, to 
transform needs and desires into words, to develop a language of self-
discovery and self-fashioning and speak it to others. As they write, 
introjection, by its very nature, ensures independence between generations as 
it is synonymous with the articulation, through words, of inner desire with an 
outer world always different, always changing in time, always providing 
unique vehicles for self-expression. Introjection describes the process by 
which one generation moves coherently forward in time, facilitated by those 
from the previous generation who both tolerate and encourage that 
movement.  
But trauma, Abraham and Torok argue, interferes with the spontaneous 
work of introjection. When traumatic moments intervene, the facilitative 
environment provided by parents is thwarted. The disarray in the parents’ 
own state of desire—introjection frustrated—passes itself on to the children, 
who encounter caregivers distracted by their need to protect their secret. The 
trauma suffered by the one generation and unmetabolized or digested 
becomes “entombed” as an unspeakable—without words—and 
unconsummated desire, interfering with a capacity to pass on their whole 
world capable for introjection to the next. When words cannot be found to 
stand in for the person missing and unavailable to provide protection and 
guidance, introjection is replaced by the fantasy of incorporation, the 
insufficient provider now taken wholesale into the psychic life of those who 
encounter silence. Trauma distorts desire. Incorporation becomes an effort, 
through magical means, to regain a connection with the person who has 
failed, in fact, to fulfill their function: facilitating the introjection of desire in 
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an ever-changing world. Introjection might be more familiarly understood as 
identification in contrast to incorporation where, as a result of the fantasy, the 
parent does not encourage or allow separation but (unconsciously) demands 
obsequiousness; the child experiences little choice but to comply. The subject 
takes it upon herself to accept the secret as her own, and thus trauma makes 
its way from one generation to the next. “It is therefore the object’s secret 
that needs to be kept, his shame covered up…The fantasy of incorporation 
reveals a utopian wish that the memory of the affliction had never existed or, 
on a deeper level, that the affliction had nothing to inflict (pp. 131,134).” 
In this rendering, incorporation cannot be more strongly opposed to the 
aim of introjection. When an individual enters and speaks among a 
community of others—articulating personal desire—autonomy and 
independence is the result. Introjection promotes the creation of a new voice, 
uttering new words, fulfilling unique desire. Incorporation, in contrast, 
reinforces the imagined ties to the past as well as dependency on it. “Like a 
commemorative monument,” Abraham and Torok write, “the incorporated 
object betokens the place, the date, and the circumstances in which desires 
were banished from introjection: they stand like tombs in the life of the ego” 
(p. 114).  
But importantly, the secret, or the tomb that Abraham and Torok so 
vividly describe constitutes a foreign body, an alien object. As bearers of the 
secret, children protect their connection to their traumatized parents and 
preserve their dependence upon them. To be sure, the secret is a toxic force 
yet it remains outside “the kernel of the self.” It need not distort character; 
with appropriate conditions, when the secret comes to be revealed, it can be 
exorcised or eliminated from the inner world, allowing introjection or 
identification to resume its natural course.  
There is an intriguing and suggestive body or research about the children 
of Holocaust survivors in Israel that bears on these hopeful possibilities. It 
appears that the descendants of Holocaust survivors in Israel have been more 
successful in establishing independent lives as compared with similar 
populations of Jews either in Europe, the United States, or Latin America 
(Solomon, p. 79). Israel, of course, is a nation whose existence in large 
measure had been defined as a response to the Holocaust, and innumerable 
public rites, sites and rituals document the inextricable connection between 
the nation and the trauma. It might be said that the nation has taken the 
traumatic secret and assertively sought to expose it. In this sense, it might be 
speculated, there is far less need for any individual to hold the secret 
privately, to internalize it, and to unconsciously fear the autonomy and 
independence that comes from no longer being the secret’s bearer.  
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We are living in an age, throughout the world, of collective remembering, 
in which political agents and various organized publics are gingerly 
attempting to find a way of undoing the secrets, passed from one generation 
to the next, without irreparably opening old wounds. This is no easy process 
and, it is also true, considerable effort is also being expended to forget and to 
protect a traumatic past from full-scale exposure. From Chile and Argentina, 
to the Republic of South Africa and Rwanda, from Serbia, Croatia to 
Indonesia, these debates about remembering are now central to national 
politics. The debate in many of these nations has focused on the delicate 
political balance between remembering, and thereby creating a healthy 
distance between the present and the past, and forgetting, thereby not 
bringing to center stage the bitter divisions and experiences that divide the 
nation. Much of this debate has centered on the political costs incurred when 
the secret is uncovered, to “reopen the coffin.” But there is also much to be 
said when, through public rites of remembering, mourning, and 
accountability, traumatic secrets are allowed to see the light of day. 
Conditions are established, it might be said, to recover childhoods for the 
children and to enable subsequent generations to claim the world as their 
own. 
 
3. Traumatic symptoms surface as a result of an in-the-present 
interpersonal and/or societal failure. I have been suggesting that the 
repetition of cycles of destructiveness depend on the intrusion of memories 
of a traumatic past—either as mediated in subsequent generations through an 
over-identification (incorporation) with the generation that preceded them or, 
for the first generation, by remembering events or experiences that happened 
earlier in one’s life. These incursions powerfully blur the present day from 
the past. As important as the past figures in all of this, trauma can only be 
overcome in the present. Freud, in discussing the importance of the 
transference relationship between patient and therapist for cure to occur, 
writes “one cannot overcome an enemy who is absent or not within range,” 
and trauma “must be re-created not as an event in the past but as a present-day 
force…For when all is said and done, it is impossible to destroy anyone in 
absentia or in effigie (Freud 1961 [1912], p. 108).”  
Intrusive memory, in short, signifies not so much the events of the past 
that predispose survivors to pass on their experiences repetitively but rather 
failures occurring in the present. Intrusive memories indicate an 
instantaneous loss of contact with the present, an experience in which a sense 
of one’s own isolation in the world, the absence of a caring and protective 
environment and consequently the fear of annihilation have been revived and 
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insufficiently contained. The defensive purposes such memory serves, i.e. 
never to re-experience the life-threatening experience again, are undermined, 
and traumatic repetition seems close at hand. The psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut 
(1984) describes intrusive memory as a reminder of the traumatic experience 
itself characterized by the absence of empathic contact between self and 
other. It becomes the principal task of the analyst (as a stand-in for the 
present-day larger environment), he argues, to provide for the patient, to 
demonstrate cognitively and affectively the capacity in-the-present to hold, 
contain and protect the patient’s experience, including those that feel to be 
life-threatening, annihilative, infuriating. And as Winnicott emphasizes, the 
analyst must be able to sustain the destructive rage that becomes mobilized in 
the unfolding relationship; rage the patient holds as a contemporary tribute to 
the profound loss of self-centeredness that was traumatically stolen, and 
whose loss he or she continues to mourn and yearns to be restored 
(Winnicott, 1971). 
The defensive quality of traumatic memories leads to a rethinking of the 
narrative account itself, the retelling of the story of what happened. Telling 
the story constitutes a cognitive acknowledgement of historical wrongs and 
an effort to demarcate present from past while understanding oneself in 
relation to that past. Yet one must also be alert to its likely use, person to 
person, as a form of defensive distancing from the affective or emotional 
experience and inner personal conflicts of oneself and of others who have 
been traumatized. Narratives of past wrongs tend to externalize conflict to the 
outside world and, paradoxically, protect defensive denial, preserve others as 
villains, and promote oneself as a victim. Moreover, they are easily passed on 
from one generation to the next, oftentimes, as I have described, generating 
unintended consequences for subsequent generations. For second and 
subsequent generations, the narrative can also be employed as a defense 
against any ambivalent feeling of pleasure that it was they and not I who 
suffered the trauma. As the case of Israel suggests, it is important for the 
public sphere or the state to continue to tell the story of from whence the new 
state came. When the nation acknowledge the past through ritual, rites and 
memorial sites, it repeatedly articulates for all the citizenry the difference 
between present and past. In doing so, individuals who comprise the nation 
are better provided the possibility of freeing themselves from “private” 
memory, and “to forget” traumatic personal histories.  
Public remembering holds an important place in breaking the cycle of 
destructiveness that trauma so often produces. Yet its achievement requires 
too the development of new patterns of social interaction in each post-
traumatic social institution. Prior categories—victim or perpetrators, white, 
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black or coloured—can no longer be relied upon—even for benign goals—to 
organize interaction in the present. By working to erase these categorical 
distinctions from contemporary consciousness, the possibility exists for 
contemporary interactions not to serve as constant reminders, or triggers, of 
past traumatic exchanges. New patterns of inclusion and equality require 
implementation, different from the old racially-based criteria. Since 
exclusionary and hierarchical principles inevitably operate in all social 
institutions, it becomes critical to create criteria non-reminiscent of prior 
principles of inequality. Race and linguistic categories through which the 
society, in every respect, had been organized now requires wholesale 
replacement. The challenge for new beginnings, as I have described, is to 
have a public sphere as container and holder of memories of past wrongs. 
Every institution in civil society meanwhile resists the temptation to reinforce 
social distinctions from the past, either in unconscious and unreflective 
patterns of thought that reproduce the past in the present, or in their own 
affirmative efforts to “remember” by attempting to undo the past but still 
employing the same categories of social distinction. When that temptation is 
not resisted, and when the past injustices and inequities too powerfully effect 
the thinking of these institutions, the necessary oxygen is provided for those 
distinctions—either in action or thought—to reproduce themselves from 
generation to generation. 
South Africa is in a unique place to lead the way in these new forms of 
remembering. As a new Republic, born from the remains of a not-so-distant 
apartheid, it is possible to build into the civic structure ways of acknowledg-
ing its traumatic past. With the TRC as its inspiration, various social 
institutions can continue to develop their own strategies and vehicles to 
promote mutual recognition, forgiveness and reconciliation. As this process 
develops over time, the onus becomes increasingly lifted from each 
individual to remember on behalf of his or her ancestors. Rather, the social 
collectivity itself bears that burden. 
In sum, what is required is the birth of new social circles—new patterns 
of relatedness—in each institution, responsive to the on-going, present-day 
challenges faced in today’s world. Post-apartheid South Africa, in short, is 
confronted not with racial differences, exacerbated over time by the 
domination of one race over others. Rather, South Africa today contends, in 
every sphere of social life, with the crisis of mistrust between the citizenry. 
Past history, of course, bred profound mistrust between members of various 
groups. But in this post-racialized, post-victimized society, the restoration of 
trust between human beings becomes the over-riding concern. Each 
institution needs to confront the problem as it is uniquely expressed within its 
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confines and to implement strategies best designed to achieve greater trust 
between its members. The answer is new and stronger friendship circles that 
self-consciously bear little resemblance to apartheid South Africa. 
In an important book Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since 
Brown v. Board of Education, Danielle Allen (1994), an American moral 
philosopher and political theorist, notes that, at least in most modern 
societies, one of the first lessons taught to children is “don’t talk to 
strangers.” Don’t trust the world, in other words, because it is a dangerous 
place. Allen persuasively argues that one’s natural sense of trust in others 
must be contravened through instruction. In the United States, the institution 
of slavery and racism, as determinative features of its history, intensified the 
distrust between “whites” and “blacks.” For Allen, the constitutional 
abolition of racial segregation in 1954, unleashed intensifying anxieties of a 
new post-segregated society and profound national uncertainty about dealing 
with it. 20th Century South Africa’s history, too, had been one of inculcating 
in its citizenry the unsafety of the world. The apartheid-era succeeded in 
creating in the real world what the South African elite had most vividly 
imagined, conjured and feared, namely, racially defined animosities. Now, 
the challenge is to reverse the causal chain: to treat one another in the world 
as if there is mutual trust. The presence of two distinct groups, “whites” and 
“blacks” reproduces into the present, in the US and South Africa, the 
“unsafety of the world”. Allen insists that good citizenship in America 
requires the on-going work of political friendship: a sense of obligation and 
responsibility to fellow citizens, not unlike those we feel toward our personal 
friends. This includes an understanding of why we might not be trusted by 
others, just as we might try to imagine why a friend might be angry at us at 
any given time. Through processes promoting recognition, forgiveness and 
reconciliation, the “apartheid mind” may in time be overcome. Every 
contemporary social institution bears responsibility in moving toward that 
goal. Only then, as I have argued, might the dream of breaking the cycle of 
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Chapter 2 
Rethinking Remorse: The Problem of the Banality of 
Full Disclosure in Testimonies from South Africa 
Problem of Banality of Full Disclosure in Testimonies in South Africa 
Juliet Brough Rogers 
University of Melbourne 
Introduction 
A remorse that does not disclose the enjoyments, affiliations and excitements 
of the perpetrator in the execution of violence may be less helpful to victims. 
When the perpetrator denies or does not acknowledge their own enjoyments 
in the scene of violence, when a perpetrator only tells the clinical facts, this 
may be frustrating or even debilitating for the victim in assisting their re-
integration into reality in the world. When the perpetrator tells only the facts 
then the affective witness no longer exists, where the perpetrator does not 
display who s/he was in the past, that is, where the perpetrator’s story reflects 
very little of the victim’s own experience, the re-externalising capacity for 
witnessing is diminished and the agonizing between fantasy and reality for 
the victim may insist. In this chapter I apply a psychoanalytic discussion of 
the Amnesty Hearings in the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Jeffrey Benzien and Eric Taylor to consider whether a 
display of the enjoyments of the perpetrators may be an important part of full 
disclosure for the victims and may be considered a form of remorse, albeit an 
ugly one. 
The remorse of the perpetrator can be a gift to the victim of trauma, but 
not always. And the quality of that gift is not as obvious as we might think. 
As a gesture―or many gestures―remorse can be an acknowledgement of the 
reality of what happened, as the reality of the death, destruction, humiliation 
and agonies that the victims endured. The remorse of the perpetrator in this 
form is an opportunity to legitimate the story of reality, for the trauma victim 
and for those left behind. However, while remorse is commonly thought of as 
an emotional experience for the perpetrator who feels sorrow, guilt or 
responsibility, I suggest here that remorse may consist of all these feelings, 
but that the remorseful gesture can be so much more, and, I tentatively 
suggest that for the purposes of social and psychological healing, it should be 
so much more. Gestures of remorse, to function as a legitimation of the 
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stories of victims, need to entail a witnessing function for the victims that 
may exceed or even contradict the feelings usually attached to ideas of 
remorse. In this sense the gestures and the perpetrators may appear less 
compassionate, less gentle and less desirable than gestures that are 
traditionally or standardly thought of as remorseful. Gestures of remorse can 
go further than simple apologies―no matter how heartfelt―and can entail an 
act of witnessing that holds nothing back of the perpetrator, as a way of 
holding forth the story of trauma for the victim. A story that, by its very 
nature as traumatic, is difficult to tell. 
In a condition of trauma the symbols used to communicate, the symbols 
which, when arranged into language, tell the story of history, experience and 
identity, disintegrate. When this occurs the victim can lose the capacity to 
witness for themselves. The victims then have no thing to tell, no symbol to 
exchange with another, no story which can be understood in the world 
outside themselves. To heal from trauma, this story needs to be―as Dori 
Laub describes―‘re-externalised’ (Laub, 1992, p. 69). That is it needs to be 
told, to be understood, to be accepted into the reality of the day and to bring 
the victim into that reality so they can live in the present rather than the past. 
Remorse, as a form of telling all of what the perpetrator did to the victim- to 
her friends, family and home―can precisely speak to the problem of the 
acceptance of the victim’s story into reality. This is because a full disclosure 
from perpetrators who were there, as a full disclosure of the violence 
committed―in all its enjoyments, excitements and even in its banalities―can 
hold the pieces of the story of what happened out to the world and thus 
reinforce the victim’s story as reality. 
The demands of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion―in its efforts to gain the ‘truth’ of what happened through the granting 
of amnesty only on the condition of perpetrators offering a full disclosure of 
the violence they committed―were an obvious effort to enable the telling of 
stories. This form of story-telling is one form of witnessing the violence for 
victims. But the ‘full disclosure’ of facts, of participants―even of one’s own 
participation―is not a full disclosure in a psychoanalytic sense of narrative. 
A full disclosure, as the recounting of facts, is unlikely to provide the victims 
with the witnessing function required to know or to hold a story of trauma as 
reality. A full disclosure of facts is not a full disclosure of the fantasies, 
identifications and excitements that often accompany the practices of 
violence. That is, facts do not tell the whole story, and are thus an 
impoverished form of witnessing. Fact telling, without an acknowledgement 
of what I am calling the “enjoyments” of the perpetrator―as the awful, 
agonizing and sometimes exciting feelings that Jacques Lacan associates with 
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an experience he calls ‘jouissance’ (2007, pp. 14-15)―is unlikely to assist 
the victim feeling like there was a witness to the event who can offer their 
experience of the perpetrator’s violence as a story to the world. Fact telling, 
as a mode of narrating violence is thus unlikely to provide a witness who can 
bring the reality of the violence into the reality of the day. 
In this paper I’ll consider one aspect of remorse―that of narrating the 
perpetrator’s enjoyments in the scene of violence―as a narrative that may 
be helpful in providing a witnessing, as a form of full disclosure, for the 
survivors of legally sanctioned (if not actively encouraged) violence. I am 
not suggesting that all perpetrators enjoy violence in the sense that Lacan 
considers enjoyment, nor do I suggest that the acknowledgement of 
enjoyment is the only quality required of a perpetrator to either enact what is 
often called ‘genuine remorse’ or ‘sincere remorse’. What I suggest is that 
when perpetrators do experience such an enjoyment―as an enjoyment of the 
act, the effects, even an enjoyment if the legal sanction and the 
accompanying accolades―that the experience of this enjoyment, no matter 
how socially or legally distasteful, is an important offer from a perpetrator 
as one of the ugliest elements of their act. This acknowledgment of 
enjoyment is unlikely to endear a perpetrator to a judge or jury, indeed, it is 
very unlikely to secure a lighter prison sentence and may even contribute to 
a verdict as “guilty” (see Gobodo-Madikizela, 2002, and Proeve & Tudor, 
2010, pp. 78-81, 95-96, 124). Even if it does not influence the legal 
outcome, it would not be a disclosure which would gain the perpetrator what 
we have come to call ‘forgiveness’ or any social capital in a country, like 
South Africa, where the dominant narrative is of the wrongness of the 
violences committed under the Apartheid regime. However, it is this very 
act of showing the ugliness of their actions, I suggest, that can be understood 
to perform a kind of, what we might call selflessness, that further indicates a 
form of ‘genuine remorse’. A form of remorse that risks a great deal and 
retains little for the perpetrator’s self; but, a remorse that may offer a 
substance beyond measure for the victim. 
I focus in this chapter on two well known cases of the complexities of 
‘full disclosure’ in post-apartheid South Africa. That of the often discussed 
performance of Jeffrey Benzien at his Amnesty Hearing in Cape Town in 
1997, including his reenactment of torture, in many forms, and the responses 
of his victims at the Hearing and afterwards―particularly that of Ashley 
Forbes, Gary Kruser, Peter Jacobs and Tony Yengeni. I then consider the 
case of Eric Taylor―one of the perpetrators in the killing of the men known 
as the ‘Cradock 4’. I examine the subtext and seeming dissatisfactions that 
emerged in this case, documented in both printed media and in the film Long 
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Night’s Journey into Day (Hoffman & Reid, 2000). There is much, I believe, 
that the film and the interviews―beyond the official Hearings in these 
cases―display that was certainly distasteful, but also very helpful in 
understanding what gestures of remorse may mean beyond the calls for either 
full disclosure or evidence of sincerity. 
Part I―The Importance of Acknowledgment 
Before we consider these scenes a distinction needs to be made between 
victims who were in the scene of violence and those who were not, but were 
and are nevertheless left behind when a family member or friend is killed. 
Both, I understand, as victims of the violence, but there is likely to be a 
difference in their relations with the perpetrators, and, consequently, a 
difference in what they require from the perpetrators as gestures of remorse. 
Often victims who were not in the scene of violence require, first and 
foremost, an acknowledgement of the event’s occurrence as a wrong. In 
examples of apology such as that practiced by Eugene de Kock―as 
discussed by Pumla Gobodo Madikizela in the context of post-Apartheid 
South Africa―the function of acknowledgement is possible and often of 
great solace to survivors. In one of Gobodo-Madikizela’s accounts of De 
Kock’s ‘remorse’ he approached the mothers of two men he had killed and 
apologized to them. For these women that gesture appears to have forcefully 
legitimated their reality of loss. Similarly, although without the sentiment, the 
showing of the police video made of the aftermath of the killing of the 
Gugulethu Seven in the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in South 
Africa offered, at least in one Truth Commissioner’s account, a witnessing 
function for the mothers of those killed. As Commissioner Mary Burton 
describes, ‘they felt so much better’ because they knew ‘so much more’ of 
what happened. In the context of Northern Ireland during The Troubles the 
well documented acknowledgment offered to Alan McBride for the 
wrongness of the killing of his wife in the Shankill Road bombing in 1993 
might be similarly understood as a gesture of acknowledgement, but largely 
as an acknowledgment of wrong and a legitimation of the feelings of pain 
and loss (Rowan, 2009). This is an acknowledgement, in Martha Minow’s 
terms, of ‘[the victims’] humanity and the reaffirmation of the utter 
wrongness of its violation.’ (1998, p. 146). These gestures may be crucial as 
a beginning point, they may also, in Gobodo-Madikizela’s account, offer the 
victims and the perpetrators an avenue for a return to humanity. However, 
they differ in my discussion of remorse here in that they are not a witnessing 
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function in the ways I highlight in this chapter, and, I believe, are limited in 
what they can provide victims of trauma beyond a crucial feeling of knowing 
that they were wronged and that this is also known by others. Thus, while 
these forms of acknowledgment are undoubtably crucial to healing―as part 
of the restoration of one’s reality into the reality of the day―they are not in 
conflict with, but sit alongside other possible gestures of remorse, such as the 
one’s I am considering. 
In terms of the capacity to provide a witnessing function, there is also a 
distinction to be made between institutional perpetrators who did not 
intimately participate in the violence―which is not to say they do/did not 
benefit from it in ways that further legitimate their lives―including through 
the acquisition of financial, political and social resources. Acknowledgement 
of wrong from institutional perpetrators brings a form of moral reality to the 
event, often for the victim’s left behind, and allows for what might be a 
catharsis that determines the platform for reality in which one was victim and 
one was perpetrator. This form of acknowledgment also determines that the 
one(s) left behind were subject to an institutional wrong that need be 
addressed by the institutions in the present―but isn’t always. Arguably, 
gestures of apology such as that practiced in Australia in 2008 by then Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd toward the Indigenous people known as the ‘Stolen 
Generations’, a similar apology in 2008 by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 
Canada to the First Nations’ Peoples for the Indian Residential Schools 
programs, and perhaps even Former British Prime Minister David Cameron’s 
apology in 2010 to survivors of the 1972 ‘Bloody Sunday’ killings in 
Northern Ireland, offered an important acknowledgement of reality and the 
determination of “rightness” and “wrongness” for those who were victims of 
the practices of these regimes. The experience of violence actioned by 
perpetrators who were intimately involved in scenes of violence is 
qualitatively different from that of those who benefited after the fact (and 
may be still benefiting) and requires a different form of acknowledgment as a 
different form of remorse. In short, “sorry” and even acknowledgment of 
wrong may be important in some contexts, but sometimes what is required is 
confrontation, with the perpetrator, with the full account of the enjoyments 
that accompanied the act of perpetration. This requirement, I believe, is part 
of what occurred in the Amnesty Hearing of Jeffrey Benzien in South Africa.  
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Part II―An Ugly Event 
In the now well documented event of the assessment of the application for 
amnesty of Security Branch Police Operative Jeffrey Benzien during the 
hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, we see 
the importance of perpetrator as witness, and also the importance of a 
particular type of witness; an unpleasant and uncertain witness offering a 
very unpalatable account of his brutal and ugly work. When Benzien is 
confronted by four former victims of his torture techniques―Ashley Forbes, 
Tony Yengeni, Gary Kruser and Peter Jacobs―about what he did to them, 
and the question of who he is, we see the very specfic demand for a full 
witness as a full accounting of perpetration and its enjoyments. As 
Wüstenberg states of an understanding of the meeting of Benzien and his 
victims ‘in the case of Benzien, the personal and inter-personal dimensions of 
reconciliation hang together; Ashley Forbes needs the recollections of 
Benzien in order to get more clarity on his own story...’ (2009, p. 353). This 
desire for clarity, as a desire for Benzien as witness, can be heard in Forbes 
moving account of his disappointment after the Hearing. As Forbes says of 
his experience of hearing Benzein’s account at the Hearing: 
it was also a bit difficult because for numerous reasons he couldn’t remember the 
details. He couldn’t remember what had happened. And for us that was a bit 
important to just, [sic] for him to be able to say that these are the kind of things 
that we did to people, even if he doesn’t remember the detail, but he could have 
explained the kind of process that we went through, a whole systematic process 
where you’re physically, psychologically, tortured for a long period. And up to 
the kind of period for three months that I tried to commit suicide…  
Forbes commentary on what was a journey, initially from pity for Benzien in 
his isolation, to seemingly a feeling of frustration at his lack of capacity to be 
a witness for the victims, indicates powerfully the importance of what 
Benzien could have offered; a witness as not only someone who can ack-
nowledge what was done, but who can say that what Forbes experienced did 
actually happen. Even though Forbes was there, even though it was done to 
him, Forbes requires a witness beyond himself. This is why he wants the 
filling out of ‘the kind of things that [they] did to people’ and the ‘whole 
systematic process’. His own story is not enough and even his own 
experience is not enough―he wants Benzien’s account because it was 
‘[Benzien who] could have explained the kind of process.’ Similarly, one of 
Benzien’s other victims―Gary Kruser―may have found it, in the words of 
Antjie Krog, ‘too much for flesh and feeling: that [his] experience [of 
torture], which has nearly destroyed his life, made not the slightest imprint on 
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Benzien’s memory’ (1998, pp. 94-96). The reality of the experience for the 
victim needs to be thought to make a mark in reality, and this is sometimes 
exemplified in the mark it makes on the perpetrator. What Benzien’s account 
suggests is that what he did made no mark on him or perhaps in him, unlike 
the marks it seems to have left on (physically) and in (psychologically) his 
victims.  
In one sense the particular demands of Benzien’s victims seem counter 
intuitive. Of course Forbes and Kruser know what was done to them. They 
were there. But such is the nature of trauma that it introduces a doubt about 
reality, and thus often requires a further witness. Therefore it is Benzein’s 
recounting of the ‘whole systematic process’, or of the arrest and ‘hanging 
up’ of Kruser, that can offer them a narrative, both political and 
psychological, to fill out the scene for those in the room, and indeed for 
themselves. Benzien was there too, and Benzien was not tortured or arguably 
traumatised beyond recollection. Benzien, for them, should be able to 
remember, to recount. Benzien could meet their partial, fragmented, 
narratives. Narratives that are so rife with the trauma that torture can inflict. 
Benzien could offer a sanction to their reality―a reality that is always so 
tentatively maintained for victims of trauma.  
The Reality of Trauma 
Victims of trauma struggle to hold onto their own stories, which are fraught 
with gaps and confusions. These effects are partially caused by their own 
efforts to hold onto alternative realities and to fix their minds onto objects 
that are secure―that are reality―for them at that time. This can often render 
them locked in what we might think of as an exclusive reality, but one which 
is disabling to their capacity to live in the reality with others. Sometimes for 
healing to happen their exclusive reality needs to cohere with a public reality, 
or in Kruser’s terms, the reality of their trauma needs to make an ‘imprint’ on 
others outside themselves. As Dori Laub says of the healing from trauma: 
a therapeutic process …of re-externalising the event―has to be set in motion. 
This…can occur and take effect only when one can articulate and transmit the 
story, literally transfer it to another outside oneself and then take it back again, 
inside. Telling thus entails a reassertion of the hegemony of reality and a re-
externalization of the evil that affected and contaminated the trauma victim. (1992 
p. 69, my emphasis). 
This therapeutic process of re-externalisation does not necessarily need to be 
with a therapist, it may be through an engagement with what Douglas has 
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called ‘narrative jurisprudence’ (2011, p. 112), or through what Hackett and 
Rolston discuss as ‘storytelling’ (2009, p. 355), as a means to have the story, 
in Laub’s terms reasserted as the hegemony of reality. Benzien may have 
been able to offer the meeting of Forbes’ and Kruser’s exclusive realities 
with his own, if only it had made ‘the slightest imprint’ or if he had been 
prepared to share that imprint. But Benzien, for Forbes and for Kruser, could 
not, or would not, offer the re-externalising of the event, even in his efforts 
toward ‘full disclosure’. I suggest, however, that the much recounted 
brutality of what Benzein did to, and with, Tony Yengeni at this hearing, may 
have gone further toward a re-externalisation of the scene of violence―at 
least as Yengeni may have experienced it―than is often discussed of this 
scene. 
For Antjie Krog this particular meeting of victim and perpetrator ‘seizes 
at the heart of truth and reconciliation―the victim face to face with the 
perpetrator―and tears it out into the light.’ (1998, p. 93). It is this bringing 
into light the heart of reconciliation that we can understand also as an 
assertion of the hegemony of reality. Not quite a ‘reassertion’, as Laub would 
have it, because the (political and legal) hegemony of Apartheid rule is not 
the hegemony of South Africa post Apartheid. However, the process of 
tearing-out-hearts and bringing them to light are precisely what bringing 
trauma to the reality of the present requires. And sometimes it is brutal. The 
telling of what happened to Benzien’s victims, what he did to them and the 
details of that damage, if we take Laub’s point, could have enabled a 
transition from the reality of the past in which it was performed to the reality 
of the day. This means explaining it in all its processes and conditions, in 
precisely the reality of Apartheid rule which sanctioned and encouraged the 
torture of Yengeni, Kruser, Forbes, Jacobs and so many more. This reality is 
what the victims need to have known by others and not, I suggest, clouded in 
a post Apartheid hegemony that (at least socially) requires Benzien to be 
apologetic for his actions; to not be the torturer he was.  
The victims, in order to have their experience in reality, may require 
Benzien to be the perpetrator he was―the brutal, ugly and violent perpetrator 
that enacted the sanctioned violence of the state upon them in its, as Forbes 
suggests, ‘whole systemic process’. They may require him to be the 
apparatus of the Apartheid regime as both an indication of what they 
experienced at the hands of the man and at the hands of the state. These are 
not mutually exclusive under any oppressive regime which employs law’s 
sanction to justify―and law’s zealots to enact―its practices. And we can see 
Forbes’ desire to have the ‘whole systemic process’ brought into light, as part 
of both the political and personal narrative that Benzien can supply. In 
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supplying this narrative Forbes perceives that it will show why it was that he 
and they behaved in the victimised manner that they did; why they broke, 
why they betrayed, why they―and in this example, he―tried to commit 
suicide. 
For Forbes the need for Benzien to be the torturer sanctioned by the 
Apartheid state, is particularly evident when he wants to counter Benzien’s 
narrative of their ‘friendship’, with the knowledge that he (Forbes) tried to 
kill himself during his incarceration. Forbes’ suicidal reality seems, on the 
surface, incongruous with Benzien’s description of their: ‘not friends as 
such’, but having a ‘special relationship’ characterized by Forbes’ being 
allowed to go ‘playing in the snow along the N1’ and eating ‘Kentucky Fried 
Chicken’ (TRC, 1997). Torture makes no sense in the context of Kentucky 
Fried Chicken and ‘playing in the snow’. But Forbes remains dissatisfied 
and, while the factual narratives coincide, Forbes’ and Benzien’s emotional 
narratives offer little by way of making sense of what Forbes experienced at 
the hands of Benzien. It is Yengeni, however, who makes sense of Forbes’ 
reality at the same time as he exhibits his own, with the successful request 
that ‘Benzien demonstrate the wet bag method’ (Krog, 1998, p. 93). And it is 
this demonstration which then offers all Benzien’s victims the truth of the 
torturer from the past as an indication of the reality of the past. 
The presentation of the reality of what Forbes, Yengeni and many others 
experienced at the hands of Benzien was painfully reenacted in two ways in 
the Benzien Hearing. Firstly when, as du Bois-Pedain describes the events 
after Benzien agrees to perform the reenactment: ‘A volunteer then lies down 
on his stomach, and Benzien sits on the small of his back. A cushion stands 
in as the wet bag….’ (2007, p. 227). Benzien becomes the torturer again and 
reenacts the relation, as Krog suggests, ‘where he has the power and they the 
fragility.’ (1998, p. 95). Both these enactments return the victims, the 
audience and the event itself back to the realities of the past. The presentation 
of the wet bag method is hard to watch and undoubtably awful to experience 
for Yengeni, the volunteer on the floor at the Hearing, and seemingly for 
Benzienwho begins to cry while still sitting on the back of the volunteer). 
The physicality of this scene, its visceral tropes and its disturbance has been 
much commented on and much condemned. However, I suggest that the 
scene and the practice of Benzien serves as an important form of disclosure 
for perpetrators as the perpetrators they were.  
The importance of the reenactment is not only as a mode of factual 
disclosure, or even as gratuitous spectacle to titillate some of the audiences to 
the Commission, but as an important return for Benzien and Yengeni in to the 
reality of the past while enabling a reinscription of that past in the hegemony 
36 Juliet Brough Rogers  
of the day. The same can be said of Benzien’s general behavior toward the 
torture victims who confront him. As Krog says:  
A torturer’s success depends on his intimate knowledge of the human psyche. 
Benzien is connoisseur. Within the first few minutes he manages to manipulate 
most of his victims back into the role of their previous relationship―where he has 
the power and they the fragility (1998, p. 95). 
This all takes place in the sanctioning eyes of the Commission, that is, this is 
also a legal scene; one sanctioned in the reality of the (post apartheid) day. To 
note this is not to suggest, however, that the Commission makes the torture 
possible―in the most cruel sense of this criticism―but that the Commission, 
its reality as a legal presence, makes sense of the reenactment. This is 
because Benzien reenacts the hegemony of the previous regime through his 
‘techniques’ and in doing so goes part way to showing who and what he was, 
with all the (legal) sanctions. Indeed it is in this moment that we begin to see 
the ‘whole systemic process’ at work in how it may have worked on his 
victims. Benzien as torturer in the Hearing is a form of real flashback to the 
previous experience for the victims and to the previous regime’s system of 
sanctions and prohibitions. A flashback, however, that is no longer only in 
the mind of the victims but is now in the mind of audience, the Commission, 
the public. This is a flashback that has become reexternalised as reality. 
The flashback effect of the torture and the torturer, which brings the 
reality of the past into the reality of the day, is fraught with the ordinary (and 
important) ambivalences that need be brought to any scenes of violence 
reenacted in the present. We should ask the questions as to what effect this 
has on the victims? On other victims in the room? Or on the audience as now 
submitted to such awful knowledge? However, perhaps contentiously, I want 
to suggest that this reenactment―in all its ugliness―may not have been as 
brutal and violent in the present as it seems. Contrary to Krog I want to 
suggest that it may not have been entirely a ‘manipulation’ without any form 
of agency on behalf of the victims. To say the victims―Forbes or Yengeni 
particularly―were not pressing Benzien to show what he did to them, even 
beyond the ‘wet bag’ reenactment but right into his ‘manipulation’, as Krog 
describes it, or his ‘torture’ as Henry describes it, in the courtroom is, I 
suggest, a misreading. Benzien’s behavior does not seem unwelcome to the 
victims, indeed they wish he told more (and perhaps wish he showed more). 
Even Krog follows her interpretation (assessed as a one-sided power 
dynamic) with her description of Yengeni’s reaction to Benzien’s recounting 
of his betrayal of other comrades under torture as him ‘sitting there―as if 
begging this man to say it all, as if betrayal or cowardice can only make sense 
to him in the presence of this man’ ( 1998.p. 94, my emphasis). And making 
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sense is the point here. Yengeni makes sense to himself, to this world, to the 
reality of the day only when the reality of the past is fully recounted in all its 
sanctions and enjoyments.  
I want to be careful not to suggest that this form of sense making is 
actively desired by the victims. It may be extremely painful and, in the case 
of Benzien’s recounting of Yengeni’s betrayal, as Krog says ‘For this 
moment, Yengeni has to pay dearly’ (1998.p. 94). Yengeni’s political profile 
as an activist, a courageous freedom fighter who can now hold a leadership 
position, is at stake. However, it is the excess of this payment, the 
‘aneconomics’ of the moment, in the sense that Derrida might suggest (1992, 
p. 7) that offers more than perhaps Benzien intended or what Yengeni asked, 
but nevertheless offers an excess that may be useful or helpful to the victims. 
Specifically, Yengeni pays dearly but receives an excess of what he seems to 
desire―to know “what kind of man [Benzien is]?”. This is an excess 
embodied in the spectacle in which Benzien offers himself as torturer and 
shows the brutality of his methods and his lack of concern for the ‘political 
profile’ of Yengeni (a lack of concern that compliments his obvious lack of 
regard for Yengeni’s life in the past). It is this lack in Benzien that exceeds 
the payment. Yengeni pays, but what is not demanded in the exchange is 
what Yengeni secures: the gift of a return to reality in which Benzien is 
shown to be the brutal figure that he was, and Yengeni: a torture victim who 
was at the mercy of this man who was obviously capable―because now we 
all see it―of being so brutal, and of disregarding the ‘kind of man’ that 
Yengeni was.  
In the light of the sense-making needs of victims in the scenes of 
violence, we can read the question from Yengeni to Benzien ‘what kind of 
man are you?’ as not simply, as du Bois-Pedain suggests, a ‘clear 
implication’ in respect to the unveiling of a ‘personal inclination towards 
violence and abuse’ (2007, p. 227), or in Christodoulidis’ frame of this 
Hearing as an indication of the ‘ethics’ of communication (2000, p. 181-2). 
The question may be a plea for the man who tortured him to come forward, 
for the kind of man he was to be presented, indeed, it is only after this 
question from Yengeni is answered―in a manner that is more apologetic 
than explanatory―that Yengeni then demands the demonstration of torture. 
And then we all see what kind of man Benzien was. Although, now the 
audience may not be sure if this is, in fact, who he (still) is. This is perhaps 
where the audience’s ambivalence about Benzien, now, can meet Yengeni’s 
own ambivalence. Because, for Yengeni, an apology is not enough. 
What we know of Yengeni is that he is certainly ambivalent about 
Benzien’s remorse in its appearance as a form of apology. Yengeni asks his 
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question and then asks for the demonstration of torture even after Benzien 
has apologized ‘to any person or persons to whom [he] has harmed’ (TRC, 
1997). Benzien as an apologetic man may not be unhelpful as a figure of 
acknowledgment of wrong, but, if he only performed this role―no matter 
how sincere―I suggest he would be of little use to Yengeni, and perhaps to 
his other victims. An apology is no flashback. An apology shows little, if 
anything, of the scene to the audience. It shows nothing of what was done to 
Forbes, Yengeni, Jacob, Kruser and others such as Ashley Kriel, who died 
being tortured by Benzien. This is not to say that the willingness to come 
forward and say what perpetrators did as an account of fact, is of no use. The 
importance of information about where bodies are located is another 
question, and the role of acknowledgment of wrong also has its value―as I 
discussed above―and can compliment the containing function of the TRC. A 
function that enables reenactments such as these to be done in the safety of a 
new hegemonic inscription. One where the legal sanction of torture 
reenactments may help with offering the context of the torture, while holding 
it in a forum of transition. That is, while holding it in a context that no longer 
sanctions anything more than a reenactment in the interests of full disclosure. 
However, the role of reenactment, the role of perpetrators being something of 
what they were, is what may be required to enable a full witnessing, as a full 
disclosure, of what happened in the intimacies of the scene of violence. 
Benzien, as torturer, as manipulator, as ‘connoisseur’ of other people’s 
psyches, may be what is required in this Hearing if he is to be a witness, one 
who can tell something of the ‘whole systemic process’, for the victims.  
Part III ‒ When Fantasy becomes Reality 
To extrapolate on the emphasis I place above―on the legal sanction of the 
Hearing and the demonstration―and the crucial role of (legally sanctioned) 
perpetrators as witness, I’ll examine now the relation between the perpetrator 
in intimate scenes of violence and the subject (understood through 
psychoanalysis) who gains its facilities and coordinates for making sense, 
through a relation between self and Other. This is not any other, but, for 
Jacques Lacan it is a (big O) Other―as a location inhabited by people, 
doctrine and decision-makers that exist, for the particular subject, in a 
location in which it is perceived that ‘knowledge’―as the universal and often 
moral truth―is held and dispensed (Lacan, 2007, pp. 14-17). That is, the 
Other is not a person, but a location which may be inhabited and is imagined 
by subjects to hold the capacity to say what is right and wrong, or, in the 
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terms I am discussing, of authoring reality. Of specific concern in instances 
of intimate violence―this location may be readily and violently inhabited by 
perpetrators sanctioned by the law of the day.  
In situations of violence where torture, detention, death and destruction 
are enacted at the hands of perpetrators sanctioned by law then the figure of 
judgment―the figure that haunts the reality of infants and children―emerges 
from the world of fantasy and is embodied in the living. This is not usually 
the case. In an ordinary neurotic state the figure in the place of the Other, in 
psychoanalytic terms, is a fantastical figure because in such a location they 
neither wield real judgment, nor absolutely know what is good or bad. 
Beyond the fragile parameters of childhood the ordinary neurotic subject 
becomes more ambivalent about the force and fundamentalisms of the Other. 
For the subject not under duress or not in a situation of violence, they only 
imagine that this knowing and authoritative power is located in someone, and 
even then they are dubious and tentative about the possibility that anyone, 
any doctrine, any law or any regime, could be all-knowing. But in intimate 
and immediate events of violence―perhaps particularly in instances of 
torture―when perpetrators become able to decide on life or death, torture or 
release, pain or freedom―then the omniscient judge of our childhood 
fantasies becomes real. That is, when life and death are truly held in the 
hands of a perpetrator―such as Benzien―then that perpetrator is often 
elevated to the position of the Other in a mode that most resembles a 
psychoanalytic configuration of psychosis (Lacan, 1993). It is then that 
confusions about reality emerge for the victim of trauma. Indeed, this, we 
might say, is precisely what trauma is. The characteristic of scenes of 
violence which produce trauma is that fantasy becomes reality; reality 
becomes fantasy. What is believed and believable is confused. Simply put, 
the boundary between one’s sense of reality and an external reality becomes 
uncertain. This confusion is precisely because the figure of judgment of 
which authored what is considered ‘reality’―the figure which previously 
jostled for place between the parent, the law and self―is externalized and 
fixed in situations of violence into an all deciding, all powerful perpetrator. In 
a psychoanalytic sense we can say that―particularly in intimate scenes of 
violence such as torture―the castrating presence of the paternal figure for the 
child, who usually exists in the realm of fantasy, becomes not imagined, but 
real. This is further exacerbated when the perpetrator in scenes of violence is 
sanctioned by the law of the day, and thus enables the imaginary figure of the 
omniscient judge of fantasy to be brought into the realm of reality as 
persecutor and as judge, jury, and as executioner.  
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The implication of the relocation of fantasy into reality is (at a minimum) 
twofold. Firstly, it positions the perpetrator as the judge and thus disables, or 
damages what we might call one’s own internal witness. The second effect is 
that of the relocation of the omniscient judge into the realm of reality. This is 
what produces a broader confusion as to what is fantasy and what is reality. 
This relocation dislodges the necessary split between those two registers. Just 
as what was fantasy becomes reality, reality itself can become fantasy beyond 
simply the re-positioning of the perpetrator. Having experienced the trauma 
of the loss of identity at the hands of the now real judge who was supposed to 
remain a fantasy, one becomes uncertain as to the reality of an event or 
experience, or we could say that one becomes uncertain of representation 
itself, in all its necessary definitions, categories and quantifications. As Laub 
and Lee suggest of the traumatic event:  
[it] produce[s] feelings of absence and of rupture, a loss of representation, an 
inability to grasp and remember the trauma, and a loss of coherence. Libidinal 
binding to associative links, to meaning, and to words, as well as to the internal 
object and to oneself, becomes at least temporarily suspended. There is a profound 
sense that structure and representation—the ability to tell one’s story to oneself or 
to another—are missing from the survivor’s experience. (2003, p. 144). 
The combined effect of the omniscience of the perpetrator in the scene of 
violence becoming a very real judge, while the victim’s associative links and 
experiences are suspended, is that the perpetrator becomes a, if not the, 
crucial witness to the event.  
The example of the Hearing of Jeffrey Benzien’s application for amnesty, 
the response of his victims, and Benzien’s own accounts, shows us something 
of firstly the effects of intimate violence, and how what should always 
remain in the realm of imagination―the absolute judgment of the 
Other―becomes a real judgment embodied in the figure of the perpetrator. 
But it also shows us the importance of the perpetrator performing as a 
witness for the victim. I do not suggest that Benzien was a perfect witness, 
however. Nor, obviously, that he was a generous or forgivable one. His 
actions may even have done other forms of harm to the process of 
‘reconciliation’. But Benzien’s actions were not only for the audience or the 
nation. And we can see in the interactions with him―through the words of 
Forbes and Yengeni―the desire for a witness, and a few fleeting moments of 
what might be called relief, for his victims. Benzien’s apologies were not, I 
suggest, particularly valuable for the victims. The form of his remorse might 
be understood as embodied in the demonstrations of his actions and in his 
own―arguably unintended―capacity to show himself as a brutal man, who 
still seemed to be the man he was, the manipulator, the torturer. With this 
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understanding we can allocate him the status of some form of useful witness 
for the victims. 
Part IV ‒ An Ambivalent Remorse 
The perpetrator who performs as witness for the victims, in the sense of 
Benzien’s performance, however, is not easy to find. This is because 
examples of accounts of the perpetrators’ visceral realities in the moment of 
violence are not well told, they are painful to hear, they are likely to be 
distressing for their victims and for the families of their victims. Short of the 
fictional accounts and some helpful illustrations from the enjoyments of Dr 
Miranda in Ariel Dorfman’s play Death and Maiden there is little public 
account of the real enjoyments of perpetrators. Perpetrators tend to protect 
the judges of the day from their previous personae, (personae which victims 
are intimately familiar with, of course). Perpetrators before the courts tend to 
behave toward the judge as they did before the law that sanctioned their 
violence, as obedient contrite subjects, displaying the personalities their 
superiors’ desire. We can see this identification played out in the sentiment of 
Nazi War Criminals such as Hans Frank, who, as Lacan commented ‘felt 
remorse stir his soul at the dignified appearance of his judges, especially that 
of the English judge who he said was “so elegant”.’ (2006, p. 110). Only 
when the new judge is in place, for some perpetrators, do we then see their 
tendency for contrition as another form of obedience. But this very obedience 
to the new regime―if it holds no residue of the perpetrator’s violent 
enjoyments of the past―can disable their capacity as an effective witness for 
the victim. 
In another case before the TRC in South Africa we can see the problems 
of a form of remorse that looks to a sanction from the new judge rather than 
indicating the enjoyments of the sanction of the old judge. In the example of 
the Hearing on the killing of Mathew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkhonto 
and Sicelo Mhlauli―the men known as the ‘Cradock 4’―one perpetrator, 
Eric Taylor, applies for amnesty because, as he states, he believes his actions 
were ‘wrong’ (Hoffman, 2000). The story of Taylor’s application for amnesty 
and his rationale are helpfully illuminated in the documentary Long Night’s 
Journey into Day where Taylor justifies a good deal of his contrition over the 
deeds based on an affiliation with God. He saw himself as enacting God’s 
work in the killing―as he says in the film ‘One of the elements of 
communism is atheism. That is the outstanding point as far as I’m concerned 
that actually justified the kind of work we were doing’ (Hoffman, 2000). 
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And, the recognition of the unchristianness of his actions, is also, at least in 
part, what brings him to apply for amnesty. Taylor’s Christian-ness informs 
him and, in a characteristically Christian sentiment, he wants forgiveness 
from the wives of the men he killed, specifically, from Nomonde Calata and 
Nyameka Goniwe. The meeting that took place between the women and 
Taylor, is described by one reporter in this way:  
It seemed to the widows that Taylor envisioned a brief and perfunctory encounter. 
He seemed to want to apologize, receive absolution, and leave. 
“He was expecting us to say, ‘Oh, you are forgiven,’ ” said Nomonde Calata, 
Fort’s widow. “We made him tell us what happened that day. We didn’t come all 
the way from Cradock just to see his face.”’  
But they all went away unsatisfied.  
The families were unmoved. The meeting lasted five hours, but even after all that 
time they thought Taylor was holding back, masking the truth. When they parted, 
the white man and the black women were in tears, but for different reasons. 
(Maykuth, 1998) 
As Nyamaka Goniwe says in Long Night’s Journey into Day: ‘We need an 
inside person, we need a witness’ and, for her, despite Taylor’s supposed 
efforts toward full disclosure, he is not a witness. And as she says of his 
testimony ‘I can’t make peace with that’. (Hoffman, 2000) 
Why, we can speculate, can’t Nyamaka Goniwe make peace either with 
Eric Taylor, his actions or his testimony at the hearing of his amnesty 
application? Of course, the matter of forgiveness and of peace is a profoundly 
personal one, and Nyamaka Goniwe may have moments of peace beyond the 
making of the film, or she may have never known peace. We do not know. I 
do not know. What we can say is that at the time of the hearing the woman 
who wanted an inside person, a witness, did not find one in Eric Taylor. A 
man who was there, a man who described what he did, a man who―by the 
filmmaker’s standards―‘is tormented by his violent involvement in 
upholding the apartheid system’, a system he believes ‘was wrong’ 
(Hoffman, 2000).  
If he is tormented about his actions and believes the system wrong, then 
what is it, we can ask, that Taylor cannot say or do which might give 
Nyamaka Goniwe peace? The filmmakers of Long Night’s Journey into Day 
may have, perhaps unintentionally, given some insight into what may be of 
use for Mrs Goniwe. In one interview in the film we get a sense of Taylor’s 
actions at the time of the killing that he does not disclose in the Hearing. 
Taylor states to the filmmakers that his journey toward admitting his actions 
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to the TRC and applying for amnesty began with his viewing of the film 
Mississippi Burning (Parker, 1988). In this film he saw policemen murder 
four men in a car―not dissimilarly to the murder of the Cradock 4―and he 
recognizes himself in this gesture. He identifies with the men and their 
actions in Mississippi Burning. As Taylor discusses, an identification with 
the killers in the film was his first awakening to the problem of his actions. 
Taylor’s identification with the police in Mississippi Burning divulges more 
than he may care to admit, however. In the film the scene of killing is an 
excited, frenzied event where the police evidently enjoy the killing. His 
interview is interspersed with scenes of the film which helpfully illustrate 
what Taylor does not say. After Taylor notes his identification with the film 
we are shown by Hoffman the first moment of the shooting in Mississippi 
Burning. It is a nighttime scene and is almost all black, but we hear a gun 
shot and then a very enthusiastic ‘whoah hoh, we’re in it now boys’ from the 
policeman, and then some laughing. This, it seems, is how Taylor saw 
himself, but it is not how he represents himself or his actions in his Amnesty 
Hearing. In the Hearing he very clinically depicts his assault and burning of 
the bodies in these words:  
I hit Mr Calata from behind with this heavy object, approximately where the 
head joins the neck. He fell to the ground. I cut the petrol pipe from the 
Honda to pour over Mr Goniwe’s and Mr Calata’s bodies, and I set both 
these bodies alight.  
While this may go some way toward a ‘full disclosure’ as a criteria for 
amnesty, it does little to disclose his experience at the time of the killing. 
There is no excitement, no ‘boys’ who were all in it together, sanctioning 
even encouraging each other and perhaps even celebrating the kill, as the film 
depicts later. What we can imagine in hindsight and what Fort Calata and 
Matthew Goniwe’s wives can imagine, is that this man experienced some 
kind of an excitement and perhaps a collegial pleasure over the killing. His 
actions were not, given Taylor’s identification with the police in Mississippi 
Burning, a clinical matter of a hit on the head, a pouring of petrol and a 
setting alight. There was a kind of excitement in the scene of violence and 
there was identification with both law and his colleagues.  
Taylor did not receive amnesty for his actions (IOL, 1999). Ostensibly 
this denial was because he did not disclose the actions of others who were 
there. He withheld information and did not fulfill the criteria for ‘full 
disclosure’ on this basis. As he said: ‘I was just talking for myself…I was not 
going to implicate my colleagues.’ (Maykuth, 1998) And here, of course, we 
see the identification as collegial allegiance with those in the scene. This is an 
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identification which also has its satisfactions, even excitements. As Zizek has 
noted: 
the only way―to have an intense and fulfilling personal (sexual) relationship is 
not for the couple to look into each other’s eyes...but, while holding hands, to look 
together outside, at a third point (the Cause for which both are fighting, in which 
both are engaged). (2002, p. 85). 
This is not only a sexual relationship―in the sense of being coital―but a 
fulfillment which brings the colleagues into a love relationship with each 
other, a form of ‘whoah hoh, we’re in it now boys’. A form of relation in 
which all are gazing and imagining the gaze returned; imagining themselves 
in the loving sanction of the Apartheid regime―the Cause.  
The sanction of the regime, the enjoyment of enacting violence with one’s 
colleagues―in the gaze of the law, the Cause or perhaps God―is certainly 
one version of a jouissance described by Lacan as an enjoyment through 
being in the proximity of a form of perfect obedience (or perfect 
significance); an enjoyment at being in the proximity of knowledge (Lacan, 
2007). This, in Lacanian terms, may produce an excitement, but it is an 
excitement, which, not surprisingly, is hard to articulate in testimonies designed 
to plead for and secure amnesty. Nevertheless, as I have suggested, 
articulations such as these, may be thought about as a gesture of remorse. A 
remorse as accountability of who the person was (and perhaps still is), and a 
remorse as a kind of selflessness which does not look to the judge, the regime 
or even to God for the sanction of their actions. This is a remorse which looks 
only to what the perpetrator was and what s/he did in the scene of violence. A 
remorse which declares the reality of what the victim would have experienced 
at the hands of the perpetrator. A remorse which looks only to the victim and 
what they need, and not toward to the third point―the Cause, the regime, or the 
judge of the day. 
Conclusion 
What is the ‘making sense’ that one can get from a perpetrator who stands 
for, and arguably believes, in an ideology, a world, a reality that is apposite to 
that of victim? What could enable the victims to ‘make peace’ with such a 
perpetrator? What could such a perpetrator possibly offer? The answers, I 
suggest, are more than full disclosure as fact, and more than ‘genuine 
remorse’ as sorrow, pain or regret. Such disclosures and sentiments are 
profoundly steeped in the investments and imaginations of the perpetrator 
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and their identifications with the regime―both past and present. What I 
suggest is required for some victims of intimate violence―even if it is not 
actively desired―is a witnessing as cathexis from the perpetrator. A 
witnessing infected with the interpersonal and intersubjective relations and, 
indeed, fantasies that saturate scenes of violence; a witnessing that sometimes 
highlights the perpetrators fantasies, in all their identifications and 
enjoyments. This kind of witnessing is hard to watch, sometimes awful, 
painful and may even be destructive for some―as Yazir Henry notes of his 
own experience of watching Benzien: ‘I struggled with my anger and 
resolved not to participate in any further amnesty proceedings’ (2000, p. 
171). However, what I suggest here, tentatively, uncertainly―with the 
backing of psychoanalytic thought―is that there may be something 
necessary for the victims in having the perpetrator be or certainly perform, 
for a short time and for an audience which already acknowledges the wrongs 
of the past, exactly who there were in the scene of violence.  
The usefulness of the perpetrator enacting the scene of violence as a 
method of witnessing for the victim is precisely because the perpetrator, who 
emerges from the primal scene into the reality of the scene of violence, brings 
with him or her the capacity to author reality. This capacity is not eroded 
through time for the survivor. Time, in its usual chronological ordering, has 
no meaning for survivors, who live with the trauma in the present. This is 
because trauma itself has a timeless quality (Laub, 1992, p. 69) and when it 
exists in the survivor’s exclusive reality―when it cannot be brought into 
reality in the world―the survivor, in very somatic and cognitive ways, lives 
in the scene (the past). Because the scene of violence is alive for the victim 
then the perpetrator too is imagined (by the survivor) to be as in the scene as 
the survivor, many years later. It is from this location―in the scene―that the 
perpetrator can bear witness for, or with, the survivor. The perpetrator can 
acknowledge the reality of the flashback. That is, the perpetrator can perform 
what no one else can, which is to reflect the victim back to themselves, or 
perform the function of internal witness from an external position. This is 
more than a companion function, it is the capacity to sanction what happened 
as reality, and bring it into the reality of the day for all to see, while 
definitively placing it in the past―never again.  
Any legitimate witnessing of the scene of violence by the perpetrator 
must, however, ensure that the perpetrator is put back into reality (while the 
omnipotent judge is put back into the realm of fantasy). The veneration of 
perpetrators who are apologetic or traumatised themselves is unlikely to help 
this process. The perpetrator needs to be ugly in the present, disliked and 
certainly socially and politically judged as such. For this to take place a 
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disclosure of facts is rarely enough. The perpetrator needs to show who they 
were and disclose their enjoyments, excitements and identifications with, at 
least some of the affect that was displayed in the execution of the violence. 
This affect is what the victim endures, what those left behind―such as 
Nyamaka Goniwe and Nomonde Calata―would suspect, and what Ashley 
Forbes, Tony Yengeni, Peter Jacobs and Gary Kruser know all too well.  
An acknowledgment of the enthusiasms and pleasures of the perpetrator 
in the scene of violence can enable the victim to show the reality of their 
experience as a reality for others. In an account of the reality of the 
perpetrator’s enjoyment the victim can say “You were the person that I 
believed you to be.” Which is arguably precisely what Benzien showed in 
both his demonstration of torture and his reenactments of his power as a 
torturer. As unpalatable as Benzien was, the retelling of narratives that 
collapse the enjoyments and affiliations of perpetrators and the particularities 
of the experience of victims into simplistic or even clinical stories, unilateral 
truths or cathartic displays can render victims further unable to locate a 
language to share with the living. The victims experience the enjoyments of 
the perpetrator in the flesh, and this enjoyment, no matter how ugly, may be 
an important part of the full disclosure of the perpetrator and constitutes a 
gesture of remorse not confined to the demands for forgiveness, amnesty or 
social acceptance. An ugly, but perhaps selfless, form of remorse is a point 
from which the victim may be able to symbolize the event in the reality of the 
day, and thus return it to the past, where it belongs.  
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Towards the Poetic Justice of Reparative Citizenship 
Towards the Poetic Justice of Reparative Citizenship 
AJ Barnard-Naudé 
University of Cape Town 
“[T]he literary imagination is an essential part of both the theory  
and practice of citizenship” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 52). 
“When all is said and done, the fact remains that  
what is at issue in all of this is ‘poetry’”  
(Nancy, 2006, p. 13). 
Introduction: The Irreparable 
Much has been written about the successes and especially the failures of 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) model and the reconciliatory 
project in general. Of late, the discourse has moved to an increased emphasis 
on symbolic and especially material reparation and it has, generally speaking, 
linked reconciliation to reparation, positing the one as a condition of the other 
(Doxtader & Villa-Vicenzio, 2004; Langa, 2006, p. 359). This shift in the 
discourse was primarily occasioned by a growing sense of frustration with 
the many broken promises of reparation in the aftermath of the TRC’s 
report―a frustration that, like Freud’s repressed, doesn’t fail to return (De 
Wet, 2012).  
Moreover, the ANC in government, while clearly albeit paradoxically 
tasked as an agent of reparation, has as yet failed dismally to bring about 
large scale reparation through structural interventions in the economy, 
leaving liberal market policies to address South Africa’s enormous wealth 
gap (Terreblanche, 2002), marked so starkly by sudden and uncontrolled 
eruptions, onto the scene of politics, of the dispossessed, the poor and the 
disenfranchised. These are the unenviable heirs of the apartheid economy. 
Indeed, a peculiar liberalism (harnessed to an abarrent notion of formal 
equality, on the one hand, and precious little more than lip service to 
substantive social and economic equality, on the other) seems to harbour the 
preferred instruments of the ruling hegemony’s amnesic toolkit―a toolkit 
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that has resulted in atrophy and paralysis which, in turn, has of late produced 
the cloak of denialism with which this hegemony attempts to cover up South 
Africa’s post-apartheid disasters as if to render them invisible. There are stark 
indications that gaping holes in this cloak are beginning to show. Recent 
incidents in South Africa, most prominently the massacre at Lonmin’s 
Marikana mine, underscores that the Emperor’s robes are now undoubtedly 
coming apart at the seams (Jika, Ledwaba, Mosamo, & Saba, 2013, p. 2-5). 
Against this background, the state of the lack of reparation in South 
Africa raises anew the question of what is to be done and of what remains 
possible. In this contribution I want to take seriously, as a point of departure, 
the 2003 statement by former President Thabo Mbeki that reparation is a 
responsibility for all of us, that everyone in South Africa is interpellated by 
the question of reparation (Doxtader & Villa-Vicenzio, 2004, p. 26-28). This 
is not to dismiss government’s ongoing and irreducible responsibility for 
reparation, but rather to consider the South African people’s responsibility 
alongside that of government. If we are all responsible for reparation, then it 
seems to me that it would be important to consider the modality in which 
such a responsibility can be assumed and here I argue that this modality 
involves a departure from the “business as usual” approach that seems to be 
the order of the day―an approach in which we are subtly but powerfully 
encouraged to think of each other exclusively in terms of utilitarian 
considerations; an approach in which the Kantian ‘dignity’ of ‘everyone’ as 
proclaimed and legally guaranteed by the post-apartheid Constitution, indeed 
becomes, as critics of dignity have warned, an empty signifier. Against this 
approach, I will suggest, following the work of Giorgio Agamben, that the 
alternative mode of being (which is constitutively a being-with) in which the 
responsibility for reparation can be assumed, relates to a certain becoming: a 
becoming aware again of and affirming once again this ‘dignity’, which 
Agamben describes as man’s poetic status on Earth. 
From the outset, it needs to be underscored that I share Mark Sanders’ 
reading of the question of reparation as constituting an aporia: whilst 
reparation is called for and affirmed as urgently necessary, reparation remains 
strictly impossible (Sanders, 2007, p. 116). As Sanders argues, an aporia calls 
for decisions, decisions that are, moreover replete with what Derrida has 
called the “ghost of the undecidable” (Derrida, 1990, p. 963). Whatever such 
decisions on reparation may entail, whatever actions are to be taken in the 
name of reparation, they cannot, precisely because they arise from or through 
the structure of an aporia, escape the givenness of the irreparable. The 
irreparable is, to follow Agamben (2005), what is given and what 
remains―the world broken as it is. Yet, as Derrida (1986, p. 133) argues, the 
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aporia “provokes a leap of memory and a displacement of thinking” which 
leads to a new thinking of the disjunction, new decisions, decisions of a 
different nature. 
Moreover, as Sanders indicates, if reparation is a relation to the 
irreparable, then all reparations are “symbolic” (including those made by use 
of the “symbol” of money) (Sanders, 2007, p. 119). In turn, this means that 
reparation cannot do what it promises, namely the literal or direct repair of 
that which has been broken. In this aspect, reparation presents as thoroughly 
un- or non-economic in that it does not admit of something like equivalent 
exchange. At best, reparation can be viewed as involving acts and gestures of 
which the wager is that it provides the possibility of making the breach as it 
exists irreparably, less unbearable. Obviously, we cannot go back in time, we 
cannot undo the wrong or the suffering, we cannot give back a severed limb, 
a dead loved one or unscar a child. While we can provide shelter to the 
homeless, we cannot undo the trauma suffered as a result of a forced removal. 
Facing the aporia of reparation, however, does not mean that reparation 
(and the responsibility before it) is foreclosed, that nothing can be done to 
“pour oil on wounds”, as Archbishop Tutu once put it (Du Bois & Du Bois-
Pedain, 2008, p. 198). As Van Riessen has argued, Agamben’s acknowl-
edgement of the irreparable does not lead to an abandonment of “the 
possibility of redemption” (Van Riessen, 2010, p. 91). Approaching the 
world from the point of view of the irreparable, allows for the perspective of 
seeing it not just in terms of its “being thus” but also in terms of its 
“unfulfilled promises”. What would be at stake for reparation, then, would be 
the redemption of “what is not” (yet), the redemption of what remains 
possible. This would entail coming to terms with the irreparable in a 
reparative way, that is, in a way that will make it possible to endure and 
inhabit the irreparable differently. 
I must confess that I do not know what, exactly and practically, a 
reparative approach to the irreparable would entail in relational situations in 
South Africa that are as manifold as they are complex. But I want to suggest 
that they require a change in the quality or character of action, that they 
require work that proceeds from an acknowledgement of suffering but that 
they certainly cannot end in mere acknowledgement as a nod of the head to 
the one who has suffered untold injustice. Sanders has drawn attention to the 
fact that reparation involves “a setting forth, a making” (as in “making 
good”) and has argued that restoration undertaken in the name of reparation 
unites responsibility with the kind of making and remaking that is involved in 
the production of intellectual and artistic work (Sanders, 2007, p. 132). I want 
to argue here that we will be better equipped to imagine what is required of 
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us to “make” reparation when we become aware (again) of and orientated to 
the disposition or mode of being that would attune us to a creative 
engagement with the irreparable―an engagement that would allow us to 
search for something new, to begin again by challenging the stagnant and 
dominant given of the irreparable through imagining what, in the face of the 
unfulfilled promises, needs to be done and can be done; to imagine what 
“making good” on the unfulfilled promises would entail. 
As regards the processual character that such a making would entail, Van 
Marle (2010, p. 350-353) has explicitly invoked the notion of “becoming” in 
the general legal and political discourse around the South African transition 
and the understanding of the term “post-apartheid” in that discourse. Relying 
on the work of Deleuze and Guattari, Van Marle argues that the post-
apartheid question would involve a “double movement” in politics “one in 
which an identity (stability) is asserted, but in the same move, one in which a 
becoming, a ceaseless challenge is asserted” (Van Marle, 2010, p. 351). As 
Van Marle argues, at stake here is what Antjie Krog calls the “kind of self I 
should grow into in order to live a caring, useful and informed life—a ‘good 
life’—within my country in southern Africa” (Krog, 2009, p. 95).  
It is my contention in this chapter, relying on the work of Agamben, 
Nancy and Nussbaum that a reparative approach to the irreparable would 
entail a process of becoming-human (again) and that such a becoming human 
involves the adoption of a certain poetic attitude towards the world from 
which a conception of politics as creative potentiality (and a “poetic” 
engagement with the political question of reparation) would ensue. I refer to 
this political stance harboured in an ontology of the poetic, this being-
member or inhabiting of the polis poetically, as reparative citizenship. This is 
an articulation of citizenship that would face the aporia of repairing the 
irreparable. It is an articulation of citizenship that would in fact adopt the 
aporia of reparation as a face. Reparative citizenship as the face of this aporia 
can only be a product of man’s poetic status, because it is constitutively 
reliant on the uniquely human potentiality to create, make or give oneself a 
world, precisely in the face or in full view of the irreparable. 
Man’s Poetic status  
In her celebrated book, Country of my skull, Antjie Krog (1998) describes 
the involvement of her fellow South African poet, Adam Small, in the heated 
arguments about the justifiability of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission at the time of its inception. Krog, accounting the appearance of 
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Small before the government panel that was tasked with the appointment of 
the Commission’s staff, writes as follows: “Considering the enormous task 
ahead, it is clear that Adam Small’s ambivalent rambling is not appreciated 
by the panel” (Krog, 1998, p. 18). She goes on to quote Small’s address to 
the commission: “‘I am a man of two hearts and not of this world. This truth 
Commission thing is useless―it wastes hard-earned money to listen to a 
bunch of crooks. Only literature can perform the miracle of reconciliation’” 
(Krog, 1998, p. 18) Krog continues: “After three quarters of an hour in this 
vein, Fink Haysom [from the panel] asks ‘But you are so critical―do you 
want to serve on this commission?’ [Small answers:] ‘If there is space on the 
Commission for an independent, critical, stubborn, sometimes naughty 
voice―then I will be there with my heart―but I will always remain critical’” 
(Krog, 1998, p. 18). Years after accounting this anecdote, Krog would write 
at the conclusion of the third instalment of her reflections on and experiences 
and accounts of the South African transformation process, in a book entitled 
Begging to be black, that “once again, poetry has taught me how to live a 
lived life” (Krog, 2009, p. 274). 
It is clear from the above that both Small and Krog think of literature as 
transformative. For Small, literature performs miracles and the description of 
reconciliation as a “miracle” implies that the mode of being that would be 
implicated in the possibility of reconciliation would be exceptional and 
extraordinary. Similarly for Krog, poetry is what transforms mere existence 
into a “lived life”. In this section I explore Agamben’s description of man’s 
“poetic status”, motivated by a reading of Small and Krog as alluding in their 
statements to access to such a “poetic status” as the condition of an 
experience of the transformative processes that are indicated when we invoke 
terms such as “reconciliation” or, more pertinently for my purposes, 
“reparation”. 
Agamben’s articulation of man’s unique poetic status and its possible 
meanings and implications are primarily articulated in his book, The man 
without content (1999a, p. 68). One of the challenges as regards the 
“readability” of Agamben’s argument in this book is that it relies, to a great 
extent, on familiarity with Heidegger’s earlier essays on poetry and 
specifically the discussion of Hölderlin’s question, “What are poets for in a 
destitute time?” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 87-140), the “destitute time” here 
referring not only to the flight of the gods from the Earth without the 
possibility of their return, but also to the absence of what Heidegger calls the 
“divine radiance” that would have given ground to the world (Heidegger, 
1971, p. 89). The “destitute time” is the age of the night of the world in 
which “the abyss of the world must be experienced and endured” (Heidegger, 
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1971, p. 90). Agamben’s name for this abyssal world is, of course, the 
irreparable and he relates humanity’s destitute time explicitly to the 
subjection, in modernity, of his poetic status to his practical status, the status 
that primarily involves her in the maintenance of a strictly biological notion 
of life. 
Heidegger argues that the return of the shine of divine radiance in 
“everything that is” is the precondition of any abode to which a god could 
return (Heidegger, 1971, p. 90). I read the references to a god and to the 
divine here as Heidegger’s way of articulating a non-technological / artful 
relation to Being, thus the aspect of Being that first has to do, precisely, with 
the literary, namely the creative (and thus godly) potentiality of our human 
existence. Read with Heidegger (1971, p. 90), the inference can be drawn that 
it is only through a revivification (if not a resuscitation) of man’s poetic 
status that the destitute time of abyssal life / the irreparable can creatively be 
endured although never overcome. 
In order to understand better what Agamben means with his reference to 
man’s unique poetic status (suppressed to the point of loss in the destitute 
time), we need to know a little bit more about his understanding of life in 
general and human life in particular. As Claire Colebrook (2008, p. 109) 
points out, for Agamben the difference between animals and humans is not 
biological per se. The difference is rather between biological life and poetic 
life. Whereas biological life “lives only to maintain itself”, poetic life belongs 
to the potentiality of human life to give itself a world, that is, “a life that does 
not just circle around and maintain itself,” but rather “a life that creates and 
brings forth what is not itself”, a life that brings forth an end which is not yet 
given (Colebrook, 2008, p. 109).  
Agamben’s notion of human life as poetic life or potentiality challenges 
the notion of life as simply willing to maintain itself as what it is. Through 
this challenge he asserts “a supposedly lost higher sense of life as that which 
creates from itself in order to be more than itself: divine, poetic life―the life 
of man” (Colebrook, 2008, p. 109). What we are dealing with here is thus in 
the first and last place not a conception of human life as directed towards a 
telos that posits the future return of some metaphysical and transcendental 
god from some unknown, external, mystical non-space or non-time, but 
rather the re-awakening of the divine in man through a re-awakening of his 
poetic status as his creative potentiality. Put differently, what is at stake is an 
understanding of the human being not simply “as a being alongside the 
animal” (Colebrook, 2008, p. 109), but rather as the being that emerges from 
animality through poetic speech and the work of art. 
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For Agamben, it is the work of art that should disclose the potentiality of 
human life, but in modernity we are precluded from recognising art as 
disclosive of potentiality, because the work of art has come to be understood 
in terms of praxis―a mere “object created by a will” (Colebrook, 2008, p. 
108). In the modern age, poiesis (or man’s productive capacity) has come to 
be understood in terms of, or as dominated by, praxis. But it should be 
clarified that here praxis is no longer understood in its frail, unpredictable, 
nascent and innovative Greek sense―in the sense that Hannah Arendt used 
and celebrated it as authentic political action (Arendt, 1958, 175-247). 
Rather, for Agamben praxis refers to the rise of the determinist will to power. 
In the modern age, he argues, praxis becomes, in essence, the “manifestation 
of a will that produces a concrete effect” (Agamben, 1999a, p. 68). Agamben 
writes that the original distinction between praxis as the manifestation of a 
will “that finds its immediate expression in an act” and poiesis, as a mode of 
“truth as unveiling” completely disappears with the rise of Western 
metaphysical thought (Agamben, 1999a, p. 69). 
This disappearance is accompanied by the rise to central value of the 
activity of work. Praxis now becomes the name of the manifestation of the 
will producing a concrete effect overwhelmingly calculated at the 
maintenance of a merely biological form of life. Praxis simply becomes 
work: “Today this pro-ductive doing, in the form of work, determines 
everywhere the status of man on earth, understood from the point of view of 
praxis, that is, of production of material life” (Agamben, 1999a, p. 59). Under 
these circumstances, poiesis becomes eclipsed because it does not fit within 
the scheme and priorities of work as the maintenance and sustenance of that 
which relates to the material condition of life as consumption.  
Jean-Luc Nancy indicates that poiesis, in contradistinction, “produces 
something not with a view to another thing or a use, but with a view to its 
very production, that is, its exposition” (Nancy, 2006, p. 191). With the term 
“exposition” Nancy is alluding to the opening up of a non- or un-economic 
space or world―a world in which the activity of making is good for its own 
sake, precisely because such a making is a “making good” of life in that it 
discloses or ex-poses to human beings that they are more than (and can bring 
forth more than) the material production and economic exchanges on which 
their biological life depends. The age of praxis, however, affects the work of 
art in this age in such a way that it increasingly itself acquires the character of 
the industrial product standing ready to be consumed (Colebrook, 2008, p. 
109-110). Agamben is very close to Heidegger on technology here when he 
describes this character of the product as a “mere being-available” 
(Agamben, 1999a, p. 66). As Colebrook (2008, p. 108) puts it: “Art today 
56 AJ Barnard-Naudé  
either is mere potential for enjoyment or is valuable only insofar as it is the 
product of an irreducible will; there is no sense of the (once essentially 
human) power to produce art as other than mere life, as the opening of a 
world other than the human as it already is, but nevertheless of human 
making”. Below, I turn to the particular engagement with time on which “the 
opening of a world other than the human as it already is”, would depend. 
The Time of Poetry and the Time of Law 
Agamben opposes this mere availability of the work of art for aesthetic 
enjoyment to what he calls the obscured “energetic” character of the work of 
art, its “being-at-work” (Agamben, 1999a, p. 65-66). The remainder of The 
man without content is devoted to the thinking of a return to the time of the 
origin of the work of art in order to rediscover man’s poetic status. This 
course is motivated by Agamben’s conviction (inspired by the Greek heritage 
on art) that it is only in the work of art, the poetic, that man truly experiences 
his being-in-the-world (Agamben, 1999a, p. 101). For Agamben this origin or 
essence of the work of art, its energetic character, is closely connected to 
what he calls the “rhythm” of the work of art: “rhythm is not structure […] 
but is instead […] the principle of presence that opens and maintains the 
work of art in its original space. As such it is neither calculable nor rational; 
yet it is also not irrational” (Agamben, 1999a, p. 98 (emphasis provided)). 
Rhythm must be understood not as the linear flow of time, but as introducing 
a split or interruption (one could also say a hesitation) in the flow of 
chronological time, rhythm as “the presence of an atemporal dimension in 
time” (Agamben, 1999a, p. 99). Rhythm, thus, as the arrest of time: “we 
perceive a stop in time, as though we were suddenly thrown into a more 
original time. There is a stop, an interruption in the incessant flow of instants 
[…] and this interruption, this stop, is precisely what gives and reveals the 
particular status, the mode of presence proper to the work of art” (Agamben, 
1999a, p. 99).  
This does not mean that rhythm can be outside of time. But if we are to 
have an experience of a world that is not yet given, if we are to interrupt the 
irreparable, then we have to start from rhythm “which opens up for man the 
space of his world, and only by starting from it can he experience freedom 
and alienation, historical consciousness and loss in time, truth and error” 
(Agamben, 1999a, p. 100). Nancy describes this atemporal temporal 
dimension of the work of art with reference to what he calls the “present of 
poetry”. For Nancy “the present of presence is not in time but ahead of time, 
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before it. […] It is pure time, time shielded from temporality: the space in 
which pure time opens out and is unexposed” (Nancy, 2006, p. 192). “Poetry 
[…] is technique productive of presence. Presence is not a quality or a 
property of the thing. It is the act through which the thing is brought forth: 
prae-est ... [T]he present in time is nothing; it is pure time, the pure present of 
time” (Nancy, 2006, p. 191-192).  
Both Agamben and Nancy describe the time of the work of art in terms of 
presence, but it is crucial to note that this is not a presence in time as the 
givenness of time, presence simply as that which is the “incessant flow of 
instants”. It is, rather, a description of presence in terms of an activity or a 
being-at-work, or to follow Nancy, a pro-duction of presence. Poetry depends 
on a bringing into being, the creation of a presence (and a present) that is not 
(yet) given.  
I want to suggest that the time of reparative citizenship as rooted in man’s 
poetic status depends upon creative acts of “presencing” the aporia or 
abnormality of repairing the irreparable, of not coming to terms with it, but 
rather of being interminably confronted with the difficulty that it engages us 
in. Reparative citizenship will understand that the “now” of the post-
apartheid is not equal to presence, that presence as the time of reparation 
depends on an appreciation of the precariousness of the now. It will 
understand that the post-apartheid now as irreparable stands in urgent need of 
a “technique productive of presence” that would bring forth, give birth, to a 
future that will live up to the promise of “never again”.  
In its focus on a non-rectilinear relationship between past and future, 
reparative citizenship is necessarily an inter-generational concept―a concept 
that requires us to imagine a future generation to which we will stand 
accountable not simply for the Apartheid past that lies behind us, but also for 
the post-apartheid as it becomes a past in the “now” of the irreparable. 
Reparative citizenship, then, does not belong to the time of the mere being 
available, rather it has to be brought into existence―presenced. As such, it 
involves a coming to terms with the past (the irreparable) by way of the 
imagining, in the present, of a future that remains radically, but urgently, to 
come. It thus cannot merely be given or “in” existence, conceived as a “now” 
in terms of a rectilinear concept of time. It is a bringing forth from the future, 
rather than a challenging forth of what is already given as standing in reserve 
from the past (Heidegger, 1977, p. 14). As such, reparative citizenship will 
understand that “politics finds its place neither in the romanticism of the past 
nor in the yearning for a utopian future but, rather, in a profound presentness, 
in the realization that within the present lies the possibility/potentiality of 
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change and transformation. Radical change must begin with the time of the 
present and in this world” (Salzani, 2012, p. 224). 
In this respect, there is a crucial dimension of the rise of praxis that 
Agamben neglects in his discussion but that is a dimension which Heidegger 
before him had realized as an essential characteristic of the technological 
mode of revealing that Heidegger called the enframing. With reference to a 
line from Rilke where man is described as being “before the world” 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 108), Heidegger reasons that “[t]o put something before 
ourselves is to represent it for ourselves: Nature is brought before man by the 
positioning that belongs to representation (Heidegger, 1977, p. 110). This 
implies that “where Nature is not satisfactory to man’s representation, he 
reframes or redisposes it” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 110). Heidegger thus 
recognises that this willing has, as he puts it, “the character of command” 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 110). 
The time of the rise of the will that has in it the character of command is 
the time of the enframing―the time in which law becomes the supreme 
medium by way of which man commands the challenging forth of the 
enframing. This is the linear time of capitalist utilitarianism and exchange 
coupled with a thoroughly bureaucratic version of law―a faceless form of 
law that has become the handmaiden of utilitarian means-end administration, 
a form of law that Arendt (amongst many others) did not even recognise as 
law (Klabbers, 2007, p. 10-11). For the Arendt of On Revolution thought of 
law as “what relates”. Indeed, she goes as far as saying that “without human 
law the space between men would be a desert, or rather there would be no in-
between space at all” (Arendt, 1965, p. 302 (emphasis provided)). 
Rhythm in the authentic experience of the work of art, then, gives us to 
think the possibility of a world that truly relates, that is, relates in a post-
apartheid way and a law that is not yet given or, as Rose refers to it, a 
“poetics of law” that would permit us to rediscover politics as the 
“recognition of our failures of full mutual recognition, of the law which has 
induced our proud and deadly dualisms” (Rose, 1996, p. 76). If it is true, as 
Small contends in his statement above, that reconciliation, and by my 
extension, reparation, is a miracle that only literature can perform, then 
reconciliation and reparation involves a mode of being-together that do not 
or, at least, do not primarily, proceed from the force of law as command, but 
are, rather questions of “differential force” (Derrida, 1990, p. 929), of what 
Derrida calls a counter-law, an a priori counter-law which is the condition of 
possibility of law itself, an “axiom of impossibility that confounds law’s 
sense, order and reason” (Derrida, 1980, p. 57). 
 Towards the Poetic Justice of Reparative Citizenship 59 
In earlier work (Barnard-Naudé, 2012), I have argued that the name of 
this force, this counter-law, is poetry, if this word is strictly understood in 
terms of its Greek heritage as poiesis―the generic name of all art (Nancy, 
2006, p. 191), which originally included the art of law-making. Agamben’s 
argument that man’s ontological status, that is, his status as a unique being 
amongst beings, is a poetic status, implies then that it is to be considered in 
terms of or as this counter-law (Barnard-Naudé, 2012, p. 468) which is 
nevertheless the condition, as Derrida argues, of the law as such. Below, I 
argue that the poetic as this counter-law, invites us to inhabit the political 
reparatively, which is to say, transformatively. 
Poetic Justice, Politics and Poetry’s Resistance 
Viewed in this light, poiesis could be considered to be the name for the time 
and space in which questions of the argumentative (law and politics) and the 
poetic overlap and resonate; where the poetic stands the chance of 
“transforming” or “abnormalizing” the argumentative. Jacques Rancière has 
remarked that “[p]olitical invention operates in acts that are at once 
argumentative and poetic, shows of strength that open again and again, as often 
as necessary, worlds in which such acts of community are acts of community. 
This is why the ‘poetic’ is not opposed here to argument” (Rancière, 1999, p. 
59). This is where the notion of “poetic justice” becomes helpful as a phrase 
that articulates the coming together or the “community” of the convergence 
between the poetic and the argumentative. Small and Krog’s observations 
above clearly link the poetic or the “literary” to the question of transition as an 
ethical, political and legal―thus argumentative―project. As such these 
statements are both argumentative and poetic in the sense described by 
Rancière and thus open up a space in which the confrontation of the 
argumentative with the poetic could lead to something that is productive and 
transformative in ethics, law and politics. 
The poetic justice of reparative citizenship would recognize that it is only 
by way of a revival of our uniquely human poetic status that we access the 
realm of sense (the realm of the spectator) in which light it is possible to 
imagine a bringing forth (into Being) of a political practice of reparation. 
Reparative citizenship is thus and can only be strictly a work of art in 
Agamben’s sense of that phrase. Moreover, from our exploration of the time 
of the work of art, we have seen that reparative citizenship as poetic is always 
a work in progress―a presencing―in the face of the givenness of the now. 
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As such it is a kind of hesitation and a difficulty, a “sense that is always still 
to be made” (Nancy, 2006, p. 4).  
Moreover still, reparative citizenship depends on a notion of politics not 
simply as a means that would produce given ends, but rather as a creative 
realm―a realm in which potentiality can be seized to produce and maintain 
something more than mere life, that is, a “fuller life” (Colebrook, 2008, p. 
108), thus, a becoming-human of life through “creating and bringing forth an 
end that is not yet given” (Colebrook, 2008, p. 110).  
In what follows, I draw heavily on Martha Nussbaum’s celebrated plea for 
the literary imagination in public discourse as articulated in her book, Poetic 
Justice (1995) in order to claim that such a bringing forth of reparation through 
actions harboured in reparative citizenship requires acts of the imagination. 
Although Nussbaum’s focus is explicitly the existential and political 
importance of the genre of the novel, I believe that her argument can be 
appropriately expanded to cover a truth about poetry as art in general or in the 
generic sense. I find support for this belief in Nussbaum’s own (at least partial) 
reliance in Poetic Justice on poetry (that of Walt Whitman in particular 
(Nussbaum, 1995, p. 79))―I also believe that without unduly stretching the 
interpretation, her argument for the literary or “metaphoric” imagination in 
political life, resonates with Valéry’s celebrated definition of poetry: “The 
poem: a prolonged hesitation between sound and sense” (Agamben, 1999b, p. 
109). The metaphoric imagination would involve a hesitation in which the 
sound of political speech would not simply precipitate an instinctual or visceral 
reaction, but rather a response that would be informed by consideration and 
reflective judgment. 
The successful case for the connection between Nussbaum’s argument for 
the literary imagination in politics and Valéry’s description of the poem as a 
hesitation between sound and sense, also depends on the understanding, first 
articulated by Hannah Arendt (1995, p. 208) and later developed by Nancy 
(1997), that sense is profoundly a matter of the public or political sphere as 
the realm of the space of appearance, of the creation of a world, of 
witnessing; the realm, then, of the spectator. For as Arendt writes: “Nothing 
and nobody exists in this world whose very being does not presuppose a 
spectator” (Arendt 1971, p. 19). For Nancy, we accede to such a dawning of 
sense, only poetically, that is, artistically (Nancy, 2006, p. 3).  
In Poetic Justice (1995) Nussbaum opposes the literary imagination to 
political utilitarianism. She points out that one of the key characteristics of 
utilitarianism is that it does not leave room for the space of appearance, for 
the separation that makes all relation possible and therefore for the 
Agambenian idea of man as world-creating. To quote Nussbaum (in turn 
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quoting Sen and Williams): “Essentially, utilitarianism sees persons as 
locations of their respective utilities―as the sites at which such activities as 
desiring and having pleasure and pain take place. Once note has been taken 
of the person’s utility, utilitarianism has no further direct interest in any 
information about him […] Persons do not count as individuals in this any 
more than individual petrol tanks do in the analysis of the national 
consumption of petroleum” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 14-15).  
As Nussbaum points out, from the utilitarian point of view, this means 
that the qualitative distinctions and differences between persons and the 
boundaries between them, will not count as salient (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 20-
21). Ultimately, the picture of humanity that utilitarianism paints is one that 
“effaces personal separateness as well as qualitative difference” (Nussbaum, 
1995, p. 21). It sees persons as “mere containers or sites of satisfaction” 
(Nussbaum, 1995, p. 28). 
Against this version of human science, Nussbaum pleads for the literary 
imagination which, by contrast, “sees the boundaries between one person and 
another as among the world’s most salient facts” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 28). It 
is important to point out that she explicitly does not reject economic science 
and does not see her project as antiscientific (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 11). 
Rather, she argues in favour of the literary as an essential part of economic 
science’s quest for a “more complicated and philosophically adequate set of 
foundations” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 11).  
Thus, Nussbaum defends the emotions that are foregrounded in the 
literary imagination as an essential part of social rationality. And, perhaps 
more explicitly than Agamben, she argues that the ends that man produces 
through his poetic status or through what Nussbaum refers to as “fancy”, are 
ends that serve no end beyond themselves, they are “good and delightful for 
themselves alone” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 42). And it is this poetic stance 
towards the world that in turn allows us to see the complexity, worth and 
importance of things and human beings outside ourselves. It is, in other 
words, the literary imagination that allows us to see the Other as Other and to 
engage the Other as Other. For Nussbaum, it is literature that represents to 
the spectator-reader the “complex cast of mind” that “is essential in order to 
take the full measure of the adversity and suffering of others, and that this 
appraisal is necessary for full social rationality” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 66). 
Whilst I am here largely in agreement with Nussbaum, I would character-
ise her emphasis on the literary in somewhat different terms. I do this in order 
to show that her arguments can be read specifically as a resistance or 
Derridean “dangerous supplement” to the utilitarian enframing of late 
capitalist public discourse. My fear is that if this resistance is not repeatedly 
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emphasised, Nussbaum’s argument could be appropriated in the service of 
the kind of “aestheticisation of politics” that worried Walter Benjamin and 
continues to worry the contemporary influential philosopher, Slavoj Zizek 
(2012, p. 31), an aestheticisation of politics that ultimately amounts to the 
fascist adornment of power. This is a view to which Benjamin (2009, p. 
228)―in the afterword to his famous essay, The work of art in the age of 
mechanical reproduction―refers to as “the kind of aestheticization of politics 
that Fascism pursues” (Benjamin, 2009, p. 259). Benjamin sees Fascism as 
the political movement that depends ultimately on the aestheticisation of 
political life; without changing the ownership structure, it consists in giving 
the masses a voice, but not giving them their due (Benjamin, 2009, p. 257). 
The resistance that I would claim for Nussbaum’s defence of the literary 
imagination is that which Jean-Luc Nancy identifies specifically as poetry’s 
resistance, a resistance that belongs to it, that is as old as it. This constitutive 
resistance that belongs to poetry is exemplary in Western philosophy’s most 
celebrated work, the Republic in which poetry is from the outset in trouble, 
precisely because it sets itself against and is perceived as a danger for the rule 
of the instrumental totalitarian reason of rational discourse in the ideal city 
state. It is for this reason that it is exiled from the Republic in Book X, only 
to resist this exile by returning, like Marlee’s ghost, in the guise of the myth 
of Er at the end of the work (Plato, 1993, p. 371-379).  
Nancy’s explanation of the twofold nature of poetry’s resistance can 
perhaps explain to us why poetry always comes back to so-called “rational” 
discourse in this haunting, subversive way. The first resistance Nancy 
identifies in poetry is what he calls its resistance to “exhausted discourse” 
(Nancy, 2006, p. 16). Exhausted discourse is tired discourse, discourse that 
has run out of breath, that has reached its limit: banal discourse. It is most 
often accompanied by thoughtlessness, marked by what Arendt has called the 
repetition of “truths” that have become trivial and empty (Arendt, 1958, p. 5). 
It is characterised by attempts to finalise and still all contestation, dissent and 
dissonance in language, the attempt to silence and finally solidify meaning.  
An excellent example of exhausted discourse is that of Apartheid at the 
end of the eighties when no amount of discursive ruses in defence of its 
necessity, no more obscene pleas of its benignness, of its “good 
neighbourliness”, could breathe life into its already decaying body. This 
exhausted discourse marked, extraordinarily, the return of poetry when 
Nelson Mandela inaugurated the new South Africa with Ingrid Jonker’s 
poem, Die kind wat doodgeskiet is deur soldate by Nyanga (The child that 
was shot dead by soldiers at Nyanga), a poem which, when it was written, 
itself marked a profound resistance to the political hegemony of Apartheid, a 
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resistance, moreover, from within the language of Apartheid dis-
course―Afrikaans. 
Poetry’s resistance to exhausted discourse is closely associated with the 
second iteration of its resistance, which is its insistence on “that which, in or 
within language, announces or keeps more than language” (Nancy, 2006, p. 
17). For Nancy, this “more than language” “is not any ‘superlanguage’ or 
‘overlanguage’ but the articulation that precedes language ‘in’ itself (and that 
might equally be termed ‘affection,’ ‘praxis,’ or ‘ethos’) […] I would go as 
far as to say, […] that it insists in the ‘unconscious’ and as the ‘unconscious’ 
that language is” (Nancy, 2006, p. 18). Essentially Nancy is writing here 
about the fact that language is never simply instrumental or cybernetic, not 
simply a means of conveying information or news, that language 
constitutively has an affective dimension harboured within it which reaches 
beyond its use value. It is this resistance of poetry that makes all literature 
and all arguments for literature possible in the first place. In the end, then, 
Nancy’s argument is that poetry’s mode is constitutively a mode of resistance 
to the technologico-utilitarian mode of Being that Heidegger called the 
Gestell (the Enframing). 
Here I want to return to Hölderlin’s question “what are poets for in a 
destitute time?”. Heidegger tells us that “to be a poet in a destitute time 
means: to attend, singing, to the trace of the fugitive gods” (Heidegger, 1971, 
p. 92). And what does it mean to attend, singing, to the trace of the fugitive 
gods? What are the fugitive gods if they are not the flight of justice from our 
world? What is the destitute time if not the time of injustice? As Žižek has 
asked: “Couldn’t the entire history of humanity be seen as a growing 
normalisation of injustice, entailing the nameless and faceless suffering of 
millions?” (Žižek, 2009, p. 152). What is the destitute time if not the time of 
what Nussbaum so beautifully describes as the time of the blindness of the 
economic mind of equivalent exchange? “[T]he economic mind is blind: 
blind to the qualitative richness of the perceptible world; to the separateness 
of its people, to the inner depths, their hopes and loves and fears; blind to 
what it is like to live a human life and to try to endow it with a human 
meaning. Blind, above all to the fact that human life is something mysterious 
and extremely complicated, something that demands to be approached with 
faculties of minds and resources of language that are suited to the expression 
of that complexity” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 27). 
What, then, are poets for in a destitute time if not for the return of Justice? 
What are poets for in a destitute time if not for poetry? The poet attends to 
the trace of justice that is left in our world and in her attending (which is also 
to say in her presencing) she prepares the space, holds open the possibility 
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and hopes for the perhaps of justice. This is poetry’s resistance, its quarrel, its 
ethico-political protest―it always says “perhaps for justice” (Derrida, 1990, 
p. 971). 
Reparative Citizenship as a Praxis of Poesis 
In the context of South Africa, which is after all what most concerns us here, 
Krog (2012) has argued that in this country “each creative work makes a 
political point”. Quoting Nobel prize winner Horace Engdahl, she writes that 
“one is either part of […] ‘the great dialogue of literature about the 
improvement of humanity’, or suggesting that one doesn’t particularly care 
for it.” Krog movingly pleads for contemporary power in South Africa to 
listen, once more, to its poets, that is to say to its artists. And the reasons she 
provides are compelling: “[L]iterature inflects the anguish of reality in a way 
that theoretical discussions of the same issues cannot achieve, making 
possible a kind of understanding not accessible by other means” (Krog, 2012 
(emphasis provided)). It provides a “visionary vocabulary”, its continuous 
presencing of the world “creates reflexivity and nuanced knowing” (Krog, 
2012). 
Let me turn now to post-apartheid citizenship as reparative citizenship, 
that is, as an active being-member of the polis. I claim that the success of 
South Africa’s reparative efforts crucially depends on an understanding of 
post-apartheid citizenship as civic friendship but have insisted that it is better 
rendered in South Africa as reparative citizenship and furthermore, that 
reparative citizenship is not possible without the literary imagination or what 
I would call a poetic stance towards the world. Reparative citizenship is the 
phrase I use to describe what is needed for the South African demos to move 
towards an Aristotelian or Arendtian version of civic friendship. Reparative 
citizenship is indeed a need in this sense, for I believe that without it the ideal 
of civic friendship cannot be approximated.  
In a lecture delivered at the University of Stellenbosch law faculty in 
2006 the former Chief Justice, Pius Langa, explicitly invoked the work of art 
as the medium through which reconciliation (and by extension, reparation) 
could come to be, by asserting that “[a]ll South Africans, beneficiaries, 
victims and perpetrators, must work together to create a climate of 
reconciliation. There are many ways to foster that climate: through public 
dialogue, art and music” (Langa, 2006, p. 359 (emphasis provided)). By 
situating public dialogue within the series, Langa emphasizes the potentiality 
of political speech as itself disclosive―a work of art―and here comes close 
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to Agamben’s argument that it is through the fact of speech (the saying) that 
the subject is in existence as such, that is, as pure potentiality and as such 
capable of the creation of a free, open, not already actualised space 
(Colebrook, 2008, p. 114-117).  
In the same lecture, Langa stated unequivocally that the processes 
implicated in transitional justice (reconciliation and forgiveness) is “beyond 
the power of the law. We cannot legislate reconciliation and we cannot order 
forgiveness” (Langa, 2006, p. 358). But he added that reconciliation requires 
material reparation, what he called “an improvement of socio-economic 
conditions” a levelling of the socio-economic playing field (Langa, 2006, p. 
359). This is the case because where socio-economic conditions are such that 
they can barely maintain bare life, potentiality is lost in advance. Where there 
is nothing more than bare life, there is no potentiality, no language and no 
creative speech, only the expression of desperate material need. (Agamben 
illustrates this with the example of the silent Muselmann who is neither 
simply deprived of humanity nor fully human, marked by “the absence of 
saying as such” and thus non-existent, evacuated potentiality (Colebrook, 
2008, p. 115)).  
In invoking Langa’s emphasis on “material” reparation as the improve-
ment of socio-economic conditions I want to emphasize that I am not arguing 
that the plea for becoming aware again of our poetic status amounts to an 
argument that we should all become poets, but rather that proceeding from an 
awareness of our poetic status can give us to imagine our responsibility for 
“material” reparation in ways that would direct it away from yet again 
reducing the Other to a unit of material utility to whom we, in this instance, 
owe a debt. The direction in which the becoming aware again of our poetic 
status would point is the direction of engaging the Other from the point of 
view of her own uniquely human potentiality. Such an engagement would 
pivot on engaging the Other from the point of view of her potentiality as a 
friend who is not, as Aristotle would have it, another self, but is, rather, an 
Other the realisation of whose potentiality is a condition of the realization of 
my potentiality. In this respect, Agamben argues that friendship is an 
awareness of the pure fact of my existence simultaneously with yours. As 
Agamben puts it: “The friend is not another I, but an otherness immanent in 
self-ness, a becoming other of the self” (Agamben, 2004, p. 6). 
It was Arendt who, in modern political theory, resuscitated and defended 
a “politics of friendship” relying heavily on but ultimately taking its leave 
from the work of Aristotle. Arendt’s theory of civic friendship offers an 
account of politics that is both post-individualist and post-utilitarian. In fact, 
Arendt’s theory of civic friendship invokes an understanding of citizenship as 
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a radically “horizontal allegiance to friends”. Reparative citizenship starts 
here, for Arendt sees in this understanding of political life the possibility of 
“words that are not empty and deeds that are not brutal” (Stortz, 1994, p. 
417). In other words, As Martha Stortz comments on Arendt’s concept of 
civic friendship: “Civic friendship of all sorts emphasises the interdepend-
ence of citizens in public life. It articulates a horizontal understanding of 
citizenship, which prizes the relationship to another citizen and places that 
relationship at the centre of civic life” (Stortz, 1994, p. 414). 
But it still needs emphasis that the form of citizenship envisioned here is 
not at all about allegiance to the self and the same. At its heart, Arendt’s 
understanding of civic friendship turns on the underlying notion of plurality 
— that is, difference — because it is plurality in Arendt that is constitutive of 
the political. And plurality conditions us in the sense that our very 
individuality only takes shape through our recognition that we share the 
world with others. 
In a very real sense, then, there can be no authentic politics without the 
literary imagination, for, as Nussbaum shows, it is the literary imagination 
that makes us alive to the fact of alterity, to difference, the plight of the 
Other. It is a poetic stance towards the world that reveals others to us in their 
singularity and reveals us to them in ours. Civic friendship as reparative 
citizenship is a way of signifying that there can be no healing for the body 
politic without reparation, without this recognition, empathy, compassion that 
the poetic stance can attune us to see. It is a way of being-in-the-world that 
allows one not just to hear the voice of the Other but to respond to her voice / 
call. In this sense, it is not just a being-in-the-world as passive spectator or 
onlooker. It is also a being-involved, a being that demands outcry and 
resistance in the face of the injustices that crude utilitarian economic 
calculations perpetrate and perpetuate. 
What I think former Chief Justice Langa brings to the table in this 
creation of reparative citizenship involves Karl Jaspers' notion of 
metaphysical guilt. Jaspers writes: “metaphysical guilt is the lack of absolute 
solidarity with the human being as such―an indelible claim beyond morally 
meaningful duty. This solidarity is violated by my presence at a wrong or a 
crime. It is not enough that I cautiously risk my life to prevent it; if it 
happens, and I was there, and if I survive where the other is killed, I know 
from a voice within myself: I am guilty of being still alive” (Jaspers, 2000, p. 
65). This means, obviously, that for Jaspers we are all guilty and therefore 
responsible, even though some are more guilty and therefore more 
responsible than others.  
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From this point of view, reparative citizenship requires also the duty to 
speak out creatively against ongoing injustices perpetrated in the material or 
economic sphere. Sanders invokes in this context Émile Zola’s famous 
“J’accuse!” letter concerning the Dreyfuss affair in France and makes two 
observations: first, that the duty to speak arises from the desire or will not to 
be complicit in injustice: “The duty to speak out is linked with a will or 
desire not to be an accomplice. Responsibility unites with a will not to be 
complicit in injustice. It thus emerges from a sense of complicity — […] the 
actively assumed complicity of one whose silence could allow crime to go 
undiscovered” (Sanders, 2002, p. 4). 
Reparative citizenship as a way of being-politically-in-the-world thus also 
acknowledges and supports the need for peace-driven, dialogical processes of 
healing, while emphasizing the crucial importance of reparation in the face of 
the irreparable.  
The question remains, in conclusion, where reparative citizenship, 
grounded as it is in the metaphorical imagination, leaves the role of 
government. To this question, I will give Nussbaum’s answer: “Government 
cannot investigate the life story of every citizen in the way [literature] does; it 
can, however, know that each citizen has a complex history of this sort, and it 
can remain aware that the norm in principle would be to acknowledge the 
separateness, freedom, and qualitative difference of each in the manner of 
[literature] […] [G]overnments, wherever they are, should attend to citizens 
in all their concreteness and variety, responding in a sensitive way to 
historical and personal contingencies” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 44-45). Or as 
Krog puts it: “Because a government hears only its own voice, it knows it 
hears only its own voice, yet it likes to harbour the illusion that it is hearing 
the voice of the people, and it demands that the people too should harbour 
this illusion. That is why a cabinet should read literature. Neither the state 
which it controls, nor the good plans to turn the country around, would help 
in the absence of a visionary vocabulary (produced best by writers and poets) 
to create what Martha Nussbaum described as an inspired emphatic social 
cohesion” (Krog, 2012). 
Conclusion 
I started this chapter with a reference to the troubles that are plaguing the 
South African body politic. I do not know whether poetry can achieve the 
reconciliation and reparation that this country so desperately longs for. But I 
am convinced that, to the extent that poetry educates what Nussbaum calls 
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the “capacity for humanity” (Nussbaum1995, p. 121) it is a crucial aid in the 
pursuit of restorative justice through reparative citizenship. Nancy remarks 
that poetry is the “praxis ... of difficulty itself” (Nancy, 2006, p. 5). “It sits 
there” he says, “and refuses to go away, even when we challenge it, cast 
suspicion on it or detest it” (Nancy, 2006, p. 15). Poetry’s justice, therefore, 
is not the easy full and finite justice of law, but rather, the difficult justice 
that Derrida identifies―the justice that is always still to be done and still to 
come (Derrida 1990). Towards the pursuit of this justice I have relied in this 
piece on Agamben’s hope for the restoration/presencing of man’s poetic 
status through which the opening of a world other than the irreparable world 
as it is given, becomes possible. What is fundamentally at stake then is a 
change of perspective: “What restores the human being as ‘a potential being’, 
or, to be more precise, what restores the poetic status of man in the world, the 
potentiality that we are, is not the world, which confronts us in its 
unfathomable givenness, but a perspective which opens us to the 
transformation of the world that is presented to us precisely as given and 
immutable into a space in which the possibility of the world being otherwise 
than it is, indeed, the possibility of another world, can be brought to 
presence” (Šumič, 2011, p. 142).  
Such a change of perspective would proceed from an acute awareness of 
the urgency of justice precipitated by the abyssal precariousness of what is 
given by the post-apartheid now. It would be harboured in a willingness to 
become otherwise through a process of action-as-risk, participation-as-
discomfort, intervention-as-dissent―the justice of difficulty, of difficult 
becoming and becoming difficult. It is poetry’s justice then―a poetic justice 
without which reparation is destined to remain but an evasive impossibility. 
With which, it bears the true potentiality of becoming and bringing into being 
something reparative. 
References 
Agamben, G. (1999a). The man without content (Giorgia Albert, Trans.). Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Agamben, G. (1999b). The end of the poem: studies in poetics (Daniel Heller-Roazen, 
Trans.) Stanford: Stanford University Press 
Agamben, G. (2004). “Friendship”. Contretemps, 5, 2-7. 
Agamben, G. (2005). The coming community (Michael Hardt, Trans.). Minneapolis: 
 University of Minnesota Press 
Arendt, H. (1958). The human condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Arendt, H. (1965). On Revolution. London: Penguin. 
Arendt, H. (1971). The life of the mind. Florida: Harcourt. 
 Towards the Poetic Justice of Reparative Citizenship 69 
Barnard-Naudé, A.J. (2012). “A law of impurity or a principle of contamination”: poetry’s 
resistance. Stellenbosch law review, 3, 462-475. 
Benjamin, W. (2009). One-way street and other writings (J Underwood, Trans.). London: 
Penguin. 
Colebrook, C. (2008). Agamben: Aesthetics, Potentiality, and Life. South Atlantic 
Quarterly, 107(1), 107-120. doi: 10.1215/00382876-2007-058 
Derrida, J. (1980). The law of genre. Critical Enquiry, 7(1), 55-81. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343176 
Derrida, J (1989). Memoires for Paul de Man: Revised edition. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Derrida, J (1990). Force of law: the “mystical foundation of authority.” Cardozo Law 
Review, 11, 920-1045. Retrieved from http://cardozolawreview.com 
Derrida, J. (1994). Specters of Marx: the state of the debt, the work of mourning, & the new 
international (Peggy Kamuf, Trans.). New York: Routledge. 
Du Bois, F., & Du Bois-Pedain, A. (2008). Justice and reconciliation in post-Apartheid 
South Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
De Wet, P. (2012, November 16). Reparations still on the back foot. The Mail & Guardian. 
Retrieved from http://www.mg.co.za 
Doxtader, E., & Villa-Vicenzio, C. (2004) To repair the irreparable: reparation and 
reconstruction in South Africa. Claremont: New Africa Books. 
Heidegger, M. (1971). Poetry, language, thought (Albert Hofstadter, Trans.). New York: 
HarperCollins. 
Heidegger, M. (1977). The question concerning technology and other essays (William 
Lovitt, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row. 
Jaspers, K. (2000). The question of German guilt (E.B. Ashton, Trans.). New York: 
Fordham University Press. 
Jika, T., Ledwaba, L., Mosamo, S., Saba, A. (2013). We are going to kill each other today: 
the Marikana story. Cape Town: Tafelberg. 
Klabbers, J. (2007). Possible islands of predictability: the legal thought of Hannah 
Arendt. Leiden Journal of International Law, 20, 1-23. doi:10.1017/S092215650600 
389X 
Krog, A. (1998). Country of my skull. Cape Town: Random House Struik. 
Krog, A. (2009). Begging to be black. Cape Town: Random House Struik. 
Krog, A. (2012, September 26). Should power listen to poetry? The Guardian. Retrieved 
 from http://www.guardian.co.uk  
Langa, P. (2006). Transformative constitutionalism. Stellenbosch Law Review, 3, 351-360. 
Retrieved from http://www.journals.co.za/ej/ejour_ju_slr.html 
Nancy, J-L. (1997). The sense of the world. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 
Nancy, J-L. (2006). Multiple arts: the muses II. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Nussbaum, M.C. (1995). Poetic justice: the literary imagination and public life. Boston: 
Beacon Press. 
Plato. (1993). Republic (Robin Waterfield, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rancière, J. (1999). Dis-agreement and philosophy (Julie Rose, Trans.). Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.  
Rose, G. (1996). Mourning becomes the law: philosophy and representation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Salzani, C. (2012). Quodlibet: Giorgio Agamben’s Anti-Utopia. Utopian Studies, 23(1), 
212-237. 
70 AJ Barnard-Naudé  
Sanders, M. (2002). Complicities: The Intellectual and Apartheid. Durham and London: 
Duke University Press. 
Sanders, M. (2007). Ambiguities of witnessing: law and literature in the time of a truth 
commission. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Stortz, M. (1994). Beyond justice: friendship in the city. Word & World, XIV(4), 409-418. 
Retrieved from http://wordandworld.luthersem.edu/content/pdfs/14-4_City/14-
4_Stortz.pdf 
Šumič, J. (2011). Giorgio Agamben’s godless saints: saving what was not. Angelaki: 
journal of the theoretical humanities, 16(3), 137-147. 
Terreblanche, S.J. (2002). A history of inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002. Scottsville: 
University of Natal Press. 
Van Marle, K. (2010). Reflections on post-apartheid being and becoming in the aftermath 
of amnesty: Du Toit v Minister of Safety and Security. Constitutional Court Review, 3, 
347-367. Retrieved from http://web.up.ac.za/research/2011/Faculties/Law/REGR/ 
Researcher/26700.html 
Van Riessen, R. Community and its other: Remarks on Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming 
Community from a Levinasian point of view. Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie,  
5, 79-98. 
Žižek, S. (2009). Violence: six sideways reflections. London: Profile Books. 
Žižek, S. (2012). Less than nothing: Hegel and the shadow of dialectical materialism. 
London: Verso. 
   
Chapter 4 
“Moving Beyond Violence:” What We Learn from Two 
Former Combatants about the Transition from 
Aggression to Recognition 
Transition from Aggression to Recognition 
Jessica Benjamin 
Psychoanalyst and Clinical Professor, New York University Postdoctoral Program in 
Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis 
Introduction 
In the summer of 2009 while participating in a conference on relational 
psychoanalysis I was approached by a British-Israeli Psychotherapist, Irris 
Singer, with the request to comment on a film she was currently putting 
together on the stories of two founding members of the organization 
Combatants for Peace in Israel-Palestine. This film, with the working title 
“Moving Beyond Violence,” was meant to explore how the two men stepped 
into a framework of rejecting violence as a means of solving the conflicts or 
dealing with the enemy, indeed how they came to redefine the entire relation 
between the two sides as one of cooperating for peace rather than enmity. 
Bassam Aramin, a Palestinian who had spent time in prison for acts 
committed as a teenager resisting the Occupation and Itamar Shapira, an 
Israeli who grew up in a Zionist military household but came (along with his 
brothers) to reject the kind of actions he had taken in the Israeli military, 
present their stories through interviews with Irris Singer.  
Singer asked them not only to describe how they reached the unconvention-
al and radical conclusions of standing for peace while surrounded by violence, 
but also to describe their childhoods and families. Her initial purpose was to 
demonstrate for educational purposes the developmental history of attachment 
(Bowlby, 1969) social and personal, that enable individuals to transgress 
against the conventional rationalizations of violence in their own societies and 
take a step into a different peace-oriented world view. The tragic events that 
occurred during the period of filming as well as the deeply meaningful self-
reflective processes that Singer, a psychoanalytic therapist, was able to 
stimulate in her interviews led to a much broader narrative with wider 
implications. These in turn necessitated going beyond the paradigm of 
attachment. Perhaps what would be useful was a psychological paradigm of 
recognition that could conceptualize what it means to transform one’s view of a 
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previously repudiated other and step into the space of dialogue—a space where 
both subjects are equally dignified and ethically obligated to respect the other. 
The version of intersubjective psychoanalytic theory I had developed, 
which offered a paradigm based on the idea of recognition (Benjamin, 1988, 
1998, 2004), seemed to Singer and her colleague Graham Lucas appropriate to 
conceptualize and give meaning to the story. Singer and Lucas worked with my 
commentary on the film and adopted my use of the concept of the “moral 
third,” (Benjamin 2004, 2009) which is a particular version of a more general 
idea. The general idea of the third has multiple usages, and has lately been 
finding currency in psychoanalytic thought. The term appeared as a useful way 
to refer to the space or position that holds opposites in tension, that transcends 
the binaries of good and bad, victim and perpetrator, that are based on 
psychological splitting.  
Translated into practice, we can think of the third as a space of dialogue 
in which clashing views of reality, antagonistic claims and aims can be 
negotiated. The effort to create a space that can contain such antagonism in 
the context of violence and enmity is part of the story of the film, or let us say 
the background against which we see the subjects struggling with both their 
own vulnerability and that of the ones who they may be responsible for 
injuring. This paper will touch on some themes in relation to the stories of 
these two men who renounced war and use them to illustrate the opening of 
dialogue in terms of the ethical space of the third, or what I call the Moral 
Third.  
The Idea of the Third 
I (Benjamin, 2004) have used the term third generally to designate a position 
that originates in the experience of thirdness―the experience of a co-created 
space of shared rhythms, attunement and collaboration, of human 
cooperation, that begins with early relations between infants and caregivers. 
It is thus seen as a psychological position founded in the infant’s capacity for 
attachment and mutual recognition and developed with the mother or 
mothering one. But more significant for our purposes, it is on the basis of this 
rhythmic, primary third that a differentiating third evolves that includes the 
capacity for a different kind of recognition: to see from the other’s 
perspective, perhaps through the other’s eyes; and, as well, to hold in mind 
more than one reality or self state. The moral third, a term I use more 
specifically, denotes a position that recognizes the equal value and dignity of 
the other, the meaning of the golden rule, the validity of the other’s 
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viewpoint, the possibility of dialogue. It is the position that transcends the 
duality of doer and done-to, the inevitability of kill or be killed, power and 
submission (Benjamin, 2004). In theorizing about the third we understand 
that moving out of the alternatives Doer and Done-To means giving up the 
contest for who can best legitimate their actions by claiming victim status and 
instead recognize the suffering on all sides as deserving recognition. This 
recognition is concretized in the idea of the witness (Gerson 2009, Ullman 
2006)—an embodiment of the moral third.  
Implicit in positing the need for such recognition of suffering by a larger 
witnessing world that cares (Gerson, 2009)is the principle that the Other, all 
others, deserve to be seen as equivalent and worthy centers of being. The 
absence of this caring, acknowledging world—a function played by those 
personally known or globally identified witness—and the ensuing sense of 
abandonment has been noted in many studies of trauma (Laub & Auerhahn 
1993; Levi, 1988; Gerson, 2009; Herman, 1992) In the larger sense, the 
moral third is the lawful principle or principles that sustain the possibility of 
such dignity and recognition. Equally important, the concept of the moral 
third contains within it the notion of rupture and repair (Tronick, 1999), 
bridging the gap between what should be and what is, between recognition 
and breakdown. That is, it contains within it the notion that recognition will 
break down but that the renewal or restoration of recognition remains at least 
a theoretical possibility. 
This notion of repair or restoration relates to another important aspect of 
the concept, that of acknowledging violations of expectancy, which I base on 
the perspective of infancy research (Beebe and Lachmann, 2002). From the 
beginning of life, patterns of expectation are built up between child and 
caretaker (Sander, 2002), but expectations are also inevitably violated or 
disappointed and it is the acknowledgement of the violation that affirms our 
sense of right and wrong—in other words, of what is moral. Moral in this 
usage refers not to moralizing judgments, not to oppositions between good 
and bad, but more specifically to those affirmation of rightness, fittedness, 
that serve to create the sense of lawfulness. The lived experience of the moral 
third is that of being able to depend on a lawful world, that is, a world in 
which, to which, you can safely be attached to others because ruptures are 
repaired through acknowledgment (Benjamin, 2009; 2013; Tronick, 1989). 
Thus it fosters connection between self and other; and likewise it is a 
condition for a sense of agency, as one’s ability to affect others requires this 
relationship to expectancy/violations of expectancy. In other words, the early 
experience that the other can be relied upon to act in a way that makes one 
feel safe means that one’s need for a secure social attachment is mirrored and 
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met; the pattern of predictable responses that recognize one’s actions and 
intentions then affords a person the possibility of acting on her own behalf. 
This notion is exemplified by the child who, when something goes wrong or 
is caused pain, can count on their elders doing their best to acknowledge and 
remedy the hurt, the mistake, the failure, the lack. 
Based on this general, developmental idea of the moral third we then 
extrapolate that the acknowledgement of things gone wrong, expectations 
violated, and the consequent pain and suffering, is a crucial and indispensable 
part of developing the belief in a lawful world. Conversely, lack of 
acknowledgment engenders a lack of such belief and indeed often a failure to 
be able to represent the idea of the third and access it as a psychological 
position in relation to others.  
When we move from the level of the individual to the global and social, 
this means that acknowledging and witnessing of suffering and violence 
affirms the sense that the world can in some way be counted on to make 
sense, to be lawful, even when bad things happen. Clearly, the demand for 
some form of justice relates to this notion of acknowledging violation, 
recognizing wrong that has been done. When for any number of reasons 
wrongdoing and suffering are not acknowledged, when those who should 
witness instead turn away, when denial and dissociation cover up the 
wrongdoing and the pain associated with it, the sense of a meaningful lawful 
world also breaks. This loss of meaning may become pervasive and 
undermine most functions associated with the third, even those not directly 
involved with ethical issues—for instance the ability to take account of an 
other’s feelings and point of view. This very tendency of breakdowns in 
lawfulness to undermine the third is part of what makes it difficult to define 
where isolated experiences leave off and general psychological damage and 
despair related to loss of thirdness begin. This leaves open many questions as 
to how to define and delineate terms, but this seems to me an unavoidable 
part of the process of developing complex concepts such as the third. With 
this caveat in mind, I use the term moral third to refer to this whole 
constellation of witnessing and recognizing, of repairing breakdowns and 
acknowledging violations, of maintaining the existence of the lawful world—
as well as the overarching ability to contain oppositions that underpins those 
functions.  
This brings us to the matter of what occurs in loss of the third, what 
happens when recognition fails and violations must be survived in the 
absence of acknowledgment (Gerson, 2009). Denial and dissociation are both 
the result of that absence, and they in turn perpetuate and pass it on. They 
result in individual and widespread social refusal to acknowledge violations 
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and often to even recognize the humanity of those who suffer. Dissociation 
opposes acknowledgement and is a crucial obstacle to any effort to de-
escalate violence or recover in its aftermath. Dissociation (Howell, 2005), 
that which psychologically separates us from feeling or recognizing the pain 
and suffering of others, escaping into rationalization and denial of the reality 
(Cohen, 2001), is inversely related to our developed capacity for thirdness in 
the form of emotional identification and connection with the other’s 
experience. In this sense there is a complex intertwining of the capacity to 
bear pain, accept the reality of life as it is, witness and relate to others 
suffering, and by the same token the mental space that allows dialogue, 
thirdness, awareness of the injuries committed in our name. Where do we 
enter this complex circle of functions that lift dissociation, foster 
acknowledgment of suffering, recognition of the other, and acting in the 
framework of the third to recreate lawfulness and respect for the other? This 
is in part the value of the stories we see in “Moving Beyond Violence,” that 
we can try to see how this kind of personal, moral development occurs; what 
are its preconditions, what paths does this development take? How is it linked 
to the all important matter of feeling connected to other human beings?  
Ultimately denial is not as self-serving as it appears, even if this is not 
immediately apparent, because it is so dependent on forms of disconnection. 
There is a feeling of personal helplessness associated with abdicating moral 
responsibility, the sense of being passive bystanders in the face of violence 
(Staub, 2006). From the standpoint of certain philosophies, and this is notably 
true for the ubuntu perspective, those who are not directly involved as 
perpetrators are affected by shutting off their connection to the suffering and 
violent injury that they experience second hand because it affects their 
attachment to the larger social world. This position was articulated at 
Engaging the Other (Cape Town, 2010) in statements by Antje Krog and the 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu explicitly reflecting on the ubuntu philosophy.  
But the experience of violence first hand, which is reflected upon in this 
film, can become a crisis that affords some individuals an opportunity to re-
establish connection and reconsider their relationship to a way that allows us 
to feel more human and connected to the world at large, perhaps even more 
able to take action on behalf of ourselves and others? It is thus illuminating 
for those thinking about violence and collective trauma to witness the 
experience portrayed in “Moving Beyond Violence”. 
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Narratives of Violence and Transformation 
Notably, Itamar’s narrative in the film begins with his presenting the iconic 
Yad Va Shem museum of the Jewish Holocaust, which he claims has become 
a kind of sacred site in a nationalist religion, formalizing the relation to 
victimhood and suffering. We see him walking near the young armed soldiers 
outside the building, as a symbolic example of how formalizing the relations 
of doer and done to becomes the basis for dissociation of how one has moved 
from a victim to a perpetrator position. As he walks he describes how this 
state religion that one is indoctrinated or inculcated into as a child becomes 
the basis for one’s social belonging and military participation. A monstrous 
horror that in turn becomes the basis for denial of being in the position of 
perpetrator and refusal to engage with the Other. How does a person become 
liberated from the entanglements of such a legacy of suffering and horror so 
as not to justify inflicting suffering oneself? Itamar tries with Singer’s help to 
reflect upon and analyze this process. 
The story of this disentangling Itamar will tell in the film begins with the 
ringing of the phone. A cell phone that belongs to a stranger, the “other,” the 
enemy. We watch him describe this in a way that seems matter of fact, his 
speech slow and ruminative, yet his body movements uneasy and anxious. He 
is part of a group (an Israeli military squad in the Occupied territory), he tells 
us, assigned one night to set up a roadblock and stop everyone passing out of 
a village. But a jeep of Palestinian security police fails to stop soon enough, 
and whether they planned to stop, did not think they had to stop, Itamar and 
his companions fire at the jeep, the men in the jeep fire at them. Unclear who 
starts firing, but Itamar’s group fire until the jeep stops and all its passengers 
are silenced, dead. One officer fell out of the jeep onto the road where he lay 
wounded. Itamar describes how his superior commander “confirmed the 
kill”—delivered the coup de grace—and then how he remained all night, 
watching the body lying in the road. And next to the body of this man was his 
cell phone, ringing and ringing. “Someone is trying to reach him, perhaps his 
wife, his child, his mother…” Itamar thought. A phone ringing said that this 
man had a life, loved ones, someone waiting for him, and so was also 
human—this ringing opened a crack in his consciousness, and eventually, 
after much struggle, this crack became an opening he could step through.  
Itamar wrapped this memory of killing carefully, placing it consciously into 
his memory bank and then waited for a long time, numb and uncertain, 
wondering when he might feel. When would he realize what it meant to have 
killed another human being—and what does it mean that the other whom we 
disdain, deplore, even try to destroy is from another point of view a human 
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being just like me. His story chronicles that journey through numbness, a less 
drastic symptom than some of the form of dissociation that occurs after trauma, 
into a place of confrontation, self-reflection and realization about people he had 
been surrounded by throughout his whole life but never noticed or recognized.  
For instance, he begins to think about his co-worker on his grandfather’s 
farm, the Palestinian man who came from Gaza, departing in the wee hours 
of the morning, traveling hours as he passes through the checkpoints, 
working all day and then returning home for a few brief hours at night, trying 
to support his large family. The man describes his family depending on one 
donated sack of flour in hard times. He begins to picture the intense hardship 
of this man’s life compared to his own family, to wonder, What if he had 
been sent to invade this man’s village, enter his house, arrest someone in his 
family? Itamar also finds himself troubled by thoughts about having blood on 
his hands. He thinks, what if I had a daughter and she brought home a young 
man to marry whom I knew had killed? Then he realizes, I have killed. He 
sees a film where two enemies out of many remain at the end, fighting to the 
death, and he thinks: Why bother fighting now, after such killing your life is 
already ruined? Again, he realizes, this may be a thought about himself. 
Obviously, having been raised with a defining narrative of how his own 
people were slaughtered by the millions, it takes enormous strength to 
confront the idea that he has now become a murderer…but as he paces 
outside Yad Ve Shem he considers that the Palestinian children must look at 
him (and by extension the other soldiers of the Occupation) and see a Nazi. 
And he wonders about how would he hold his own daughter, how would 
he hold his lover knowing that he has the stain of this blood on his hands. As 
the film evolves he develops the thought that being the person who performs 
the killing is a way of being sacrificed, being turned into a murderer by your 
own social system, becoming compromised and stained in a way that he 
rejects. His rejection relates to the moral third, that he himself does not want 
to be part of an immoral lawless system, and is thus an effort to protect his 
own internal goodness. While he does not entirely renounce violence, he 
rejects the surrender of his moral agency to the imperatives of the collective; 
it should be his own decision whether and how to defend himself or others.  
Itamar’s gradual awakening from the fog of killing illustrates how the 
attainment of the third position requires that a person transgress against the 
conventional response to a socially shared threatening situation (war, 
occupation, terror), which is deeply understandable, certainly not to be judged or 
condemned from a position of righteousness—yet it is also one of accepting a 
terrible choice we must try to visualize. The conventional but ultimately 
destructive solution can be felt as horror when we cease to numb ourselves, 
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because it involves the terrible choice between killing and dying. Recognizing 
that he does not want to be placed in this exigency, forced into this choice by a 
power he submits to, is a crucial part of Itamar’s awakening to a position of the 
moral third.  
As I suggested earlier, there is a resonance between Itamar’s story and the 
psychoanalytic insight that conventional acceptance of terrible choices results 
from and perpetuates what we call dissociation. Dissociation involves form 
of splitting off some knowledge or felt experience—placing it outside the 
zone where we would otherwise have to act on and think about what we 
realize. Relational psychoanalysis emphasizes how we cut ourselves off from 
the knowledge and sensation of pain—“the escape when there is no 
escape”―and that this dissociation actually perpetuates suffering in many 
other forms (Bromberg, 1998, 2006; Ogden, 2006). Reconnecting with the 
pain that we have tried to escape, deny, refused to know—lifting 
dissociation—is the first step in reconnecting with our humanity and that of 
the other. That first step usually involves a connection with others, which 
enables us to restore the position of the witness, inside or outside ourselves, 
who sees the suffering (Ullman, 2006).  
Bassam’s story illustrates this process of connection. It begins with a 
prison sentence, at the age of 17, for engaging as many youth in Palestine did 
in the first Intifada of the 1990’s, acts of resistance to the Israeli occupation. 
He was sentenced to jail for seven years, not even a grown man when he 
entered prison. One day a guard, Shimon, said to him “You seem very quiet, 
you don’t seem like a terrorist.” Bassam replied, “I am not a terrorist, I am a 
freedom fighter—YOU are the terrorists, settling on my land.” Shimon 
replied, “No, we let you live here, but you don’t let us live in peace.” 
Bassam, understanding that each believed in his own rightness, proposed that 
they begin a dialogue, learn about each other’s point of view, and see who 
convinces the other. “If you convince me I will declare it to the whole world, 
and likewise with you if I convince you.” Bassam read and studied, he tried 
to understand the history of Palestine and Israel, so he could ask the right 
questions. In the end, it was Shimon who was convinced that he was the 
occupier—but Bassam even as he appeared to “win” the argument was 
converted to a different way of looking at the struggle between himself and 
his jailor in a whole other way. Shimon became his friend, not his enemy, a 
human being rather than simply an oppressor and occupier.  
He said “I used to look at the Jews as the other; I saw a Jew, a Zionist, an 
Israeli, the enemy. …all the same; women, children, settlers, citizens, 
soldiers… all the same. We have to kill them all… I used to believe in the 
total extermination of the other side.” How does a young man, angry and full 
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of memories of being humiliated, chased or slapped in the streets by 
occupying soldiers go through such a profound change? Being listened to and 
having the chance to argue with the enemy as an equal, a chance to defend 
his own thinking and perceptions, gave Bassam a new set of tools.  
For Shimon, who remained friends with Bassam for many years (until 
Shimon’s death), this connection brought him to accept the realization that he 
was the opposite of what he had believed, that he was an occupier not a 
victim. It allowed him to hold a position that others in his community found 
incomprehensible. What kind of recognition and connection did Bassam give 
Shimon that made this transformation possible? How do we think about the 
spark in Shimon that made him, a settler, notice the special emanation that 
came from Bassam rather than merely dismissing him as the Other? In the 
end we see that this process is a mutual, one in which each person’s move to 
recognize the Other as more than a cut-out encouraged the other person. 
Perhaps Shimon was also moved by seeing how his action changed 
Bassam, how through his agency another was transformed. As he gradually 
felt his humanity to be recognized by his captor, he began in turn to recognize 
his captor as human, and this meant that he could become curious about him, 
his motivations, his history. He could begin to think, to formulate questions 
and answers about his enemies. During his time in prison he studied the 
history of the Jews, and so came to a deep understanding of the suffering and 
fears of the Jews, the horrors they had experienced. At some point, when the 
prison showed the film Schindler’s List, which made a deep impression and 
moved him to tears, he felt the horror of the dehumanization in the genocide 
and began to struggle with this intimate knowledge of his enemy. In the 
moment he hid his tears from his comrades, as he could not yet find a way to 
embody and express safely what he was coming to know. But later, he would 
have the confidence and ability to lead others into this understanding, to 
show them that their enemy had also suffered violence in the conflict 
between the two peoples. 
Bassam had found through his prison experience, as did many other 
Palestinians imprisoned for resistance who later joined the Combatants for 
Peace, a new way to think about the oppositions between the two sides in 
which a possible third position replaced the extremes of annihilate or be 
annihilated. The process of dialogue in which each person’s reality is 
respected, appeared to him as a more powerful way of pursuing freedom and 
at the same time working for peace. Recognizing the humanity of the other, 
the weakness and suffering that was not so different from his own, allowed 
him as a grown man to find a strength and resilience that helped him go 
beyond the boyhood position of angry, helpless victimhood, into dialogue 
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and even cooperation. He developed a position of agency rather than 
helplessness in relation to the social trauma he suffered. 
Recognition, Identification and Empathy for Suffering 
As we follow the development of such threads of recognition between people 
we are invited to reflect on the process by which recognition begins with a 
thin strand and grows into a thick and complexly woven cord of conviction, 
strong enough that it serves for people to pull themselves out of the violence 
and destruction of their past. When this recognition process attains that level 
of conviction, it supports individuals or groups moving into a place of action 
on behalf of peace and social healing. This process of attaining conviction, 
which occurred so powerfully in Bassam’s process with Shimon, may be 
understood as a function, the process of building what we are calling the 
third, the virtual position that allows us to step out of the relation of doer and 
done-to, perpetrator and victim (Benjamin, 2004). This position of the third, 
the one that allows a person even in the midst of struggle to step outside the 
victim-perpetrator opposition, may be thought of in terms of going from the 
oppositional principle “My way or the Highway,” to the Third Way such that 
the idea of having to eradicate the threatening Other is recognized as the 
source of the very problem it is intended to solve. Thus Bassam, in the most 
affecting act of self-assertion imaginable, repudiates violence as a solution, 
seeing in it the cause of the very suffering that is so agonizing. As have so 
many of the Bereaved Parents, another group of Palestinians and Israelis in 
which he participated, he came to realize the only existential act of freedom 
that feels lawful in an internal sense, that is, producing a sense of internal 
cohesion and power rather than chaos and fragmentation, is the rejection of 
violence.  
The actual psychological process of making a shift from enmity to 
identification is stirring, often rupturing a person’s whole world view, a 
shattering that requires them to rebuild from scratch their life, their sense of 
right and wrong, that is, their narrative of group identity and history. Even if 
less dramatic, such a shift always has profound ramifications for our 
interactions with all people, including those nominally on “our side.”  
What Bassam’s story about his dialogue with Shimon illustrates is how a 
third position grows from the process of dialogue between two different, 
opposing voices that initially seem as though they can only cancel each other 
out. A process that embodies that principle in vivo, in an actual interaction 
between opposing groups or different voices. So the shift we make when we 
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come into the arena of the third is not only that we may have different 
perceptions, a different idea of how to treat an enemy or opponent but in 
terms of the pattern of interaction—from the reactive position that is typical 
of hyperaroused states associated with trauma where the perception narrows 
to pure self-defense and flight-fight response to a wider pattern of social 
engagement (Ogden, 2006). In empathic witnessing (Orange, 2011) such as 
we practice in psychotherapy, our identifications rely not merely on narrative 
understanding but on the attunement and responsiveness of the rhythmic third 
(Aron, 2006; Benjamin 2009) and serve to modulate the distance and 
differentiation that conflict introduces. 
As the film continues we have the opportunity to follow the stories of 
Itamar and Bassam. But as I said earlier, something shattering and 
unexpected happened not long after Singer began filming: Bassam’s daughter 
Abir was shot. A soldier inside a tank parked outside his 9 year old 
daughter’s school shot a bullet into her brain as she, with her older sister, was 
about to walk home. There was no combat in the area, no apparent reason for 
the shooting, and its motivation (was there a deliberate attempt to provoke 
Bassam) has never been revealed. But her violent death bears us into acute 
grief and loss, out of abstractions about conflict. We watch as Bassam and his 
wife Salwa struggle with this incredible loss amidst the support of friends and 
family. We see Bassam bearing his grief, talking with his younger daughter 
about why he doesn’t cry about Abir in front of her, forswearing revenge. In 
live scenes from Israeli television news we see how Israeli members of 
Combatants for Peace gather at the hospital. In particular two parents who 
had lost their daughter in a bus bombing some years before, Bassam’s friend 
Rami Elkhanan and his wife Nurit Peled, extend their support. 
Bassam’s Palestinian friends and family at first don’t understand why the 
enemy is there, in the hospital, trying to join them: “What do they want 
here?” Even in this moment Bassam exerts his leadership, explains that the 
Israeli friends are suffering too. Later his wife Salwa describes how she, in 
her grief, felt utter despair and exasperation with all this peace activity, “I 
don’t want this job,” she protests. However, what changes her position is the 
support she receives from the members of the enemy side who have 
experience with the loss of children to violence and persist in offering her 
help and friendship. The motivation to repair the injury and loss, to create a 
different world for her children by calling for an end to killing, is stronger 
than the feeling of wanting to withdraw.  
An important theme thus emerges—not only Bassam’s renunciation of 
violence and unwillingness to taint his call for justice with personal 
retaliation and vengeance—but his ability to identify with the suffering of 
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those who feel responsible for injury and want to repair it. He has attained an 
understanding of how the causing of pain is a source of suffering for the one 
who causes it. Earlier in the film we see him describe how terrible he feels 
when his mother walks through the snow to visit him in prison, when his 
father breaks down upon seeing him after months where Bassam was shipped 
to an unknown location and held in solitary. Bassam describes the shift in his 
identification as well when he is tormented by the non-stop crying of his first 
baby, his son, and asks his father if he caused him such pain, to which his 
father laughingly replies, “You always caused me suffering.” Bassam’s 
embodiment of the victim’s understanding of the perpetrators suffering and 
guilt—mediated by his sense of guilt for his parents’ suffering when they saw 
him be imprisoned and punished by the occupiers—shows us an interesting 
turn in the identification with a witnessing third position.  
The intersubjective perspective on the third would show how Bassam’s 
ability to hold the dual positions—knowing that he can be a person who 
causes suffering as well as a person who suffers―contributed to his sense of 
agency. Using the categories of Kleinian psychoanalysis, we could say that 
his ability to tolerate his own potential for destructiveness rather than 
splitting it off and projecting it onto the other was in part made possible by 
the way his parents both acknowledged that he caused them suffering while 
demonstrating their forgiving acceptance, thus allowing him to make 
reparation to them.  
The ability to bear the pain of knowing they can hurt the ones they love—
albeit in very different ways—is an essential part of each man’s process and 
is intrinsically associated with taking up a third position in which different 
parts of self and different identities can be held in tension. In following 
Itamar’s story, we see a similar story of suffering and reparation. Itamar’s 
mother in fact describes how frightening was the position that Itamar and his 
brothers put her and her husband in, as members of their community were 
infuriated by their transgressive refusal to serve the military occupation. The 
ability to recognize that he felt cut off from other human beings by the 
thought “I have blood on my hands” at the same time separated Itamar from 
his parents, represented a challenge to his father, a former pilot, whom he 
describes as essentially dissociated from the damage any of his military 
actions did to other human beings. In order to bear this knowledge and 
confront his parents, Itamar has to bear the pain of knowing that he is hurting 
those he loves and that they in turn are leaving him alone with his sense of 
guilt and responsibility, which they cannot fully understand. 
In our discussion of the film at the Engaging the Other conference in 2012 
we had a striking moment of disagreement around this presentation of 
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Itamar’s mother, as I expressed an awareness of feeling annoyance, almost an 
irrational outrage, at her response to the death threats against Itamar’s brother 
after he initiated the “Pilot’s letter,” a public declaration of military pilots that 
they would no longer engage in missions in the Occupied Territories. The 
mother describes how the father returned home white and shaking after 
hearing their own next door neighbor carrying on in the local market about 
how he didn’t know who it was, but he would like to put a bullet through the 
man who wrote that letter. Almost as soon as she describes this frightening 
moment, she shifts into another state (dissociates) and declares proudly 
smiling how amazing her husband is, how liberally he accepted his sons 
decisions to rebel. While some group members rushed to defend the mother, I 
asked the group to instead help me hold and analyze my reaction, to see the 
anger as a transference to the mother and reflect on its meaning—a way of 
using the enactment of transference to expose otherwise dissociated 
experience that relational analysis emphasizes (Stern, 2010). The anger 
seemed to be caused by my identification as a protective mother of sons, 
which for me, as a non-Israeli who is not subject to their conventions or their 
fears of being attacked, gave rise to the fantasy of confronting the neighbor 
with his shameful aggression. As a psychoanalyst, I could understand that the 
mother was trying to relieve her own fear by dissociating, by switching to a 
soothing image of a good protective and powerful Dad/husband. But as I was 
not an abstract witness, as I felt drawn in to suffer the fear and pain with her, 
I must have also felt left alone by her sudden dissociation and withdrawal 
from those feelings; and consequently I found myself plunged into my own 
defensive position of outrage and counterattack. In effect, her switch into 
denial triggered in me the reactivity of the outraged victim who feels she is 
left unprotected, without acknowledgment, causing a fight-flight reaction that 
is actually another kind of dissociation (Howell, 2005). 
It is crucially important to realize that even when we are committed to 
witnessing and conscious of the moral third as a potential, it is easy to lose 
ourselves in dissociation from pain, to have reactions we can’t understand 
until they are expressed. To feel shame about this, or fall into despair, does 
not allow us to repair the connection we have thus lost. It requires for most of 
us constant effort to acknowledge the truth of our own suffering and not 
merely that of others, for the feedback loop of violation, non-
acknowledgment, dissociation becomes an internal process in which we 
separate ourselves from pain of self and other. To overcome denial or 
indifference and replace them with empathy is, then, not a one-time act but 
rather follows this loop logic, and is itself a process of breakdown and 
restoration of recognition. But insofar as we consciously move along the 
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process, we are simultaneously creating a third position that holds or contains 
all the moments in this movement.  
The third position likewise lies beyond strife about which side is right or 
wrong. This conscious resistance to descent into moralizing has been 
exhibited in so many arguments about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Part of 
the mad indignation displayed is actually a response to the fact that there is 
has been a history of victimization on both sides that cannot be escaped by 
outrage and moral indictments. The witnessing position that seeks to grasp 
“What does it mean to feel this suffering, cause this suffering, see this 
suffering?” lies beyond facile or bitter judgments and insists instead on 
feeling, on the painful embodiment of this third position (Ullmann, 2006). In 
relational psychoanalysis this requires finding another self state, in which by 
accepting the connection to the other there is a bridge between pain and 
meaning. 
Acknowledging Multiple Identifications 
As I found in the experience of “The Acknowledgment Project,” a series of 
dialogue meetings I helped to organize some years ago between Israeli and 
Palestinian mental health workers, these kinds of reactivity, taking up one-
sided positions against opposite sides, are incredibly common in relation to 
violent conflict. But I also noted that eventually there developed an 
identification with the group as a whole, holding the chorus of opposing or 
different voices, in dialogue, a multiplicity of self states. This ability to hold 
multiple identifications and states within the self, or identify with the other 
alongside the self, allowing them to relativize, modify, each other in content, 
is one that the relational analyst Philip Bromberg (1998) referred to as 
“standing in the spaces”. The capacity evolved based on an attachment to the 
group as a whole, a separate identity than the national and group identities 
each individual already held, whose process contained enough acknowledg-
ment and sense of lawfulness to allow this safety of attachment—although it 
often ruptured and had to be restored.  
Thus in situations marked by the challenge of seeing the “enemy” other’s 
experience such as Itamar described, the capacity to hold multiple positions 
and identifications becomes part of the capacity to uphold lawfulness. 
Staying aware of the other’s humanity while in the grip of fear, where each 
side sees the other as not merely as someone negating but actually potentially 
destroying one’s identity and world, even one’s life, requires the not only a 
different sense of You as human, but a different sense of Me as complex. I 
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have to see myself as containing different parts, good and bad, violent and 
peaceful, have to have an emotionally integrated sense of the Third as a 
position holding the multiplicity not only of me and you but the many parts 
of me. So, for instance, in my role as relational analyst I could notice how my 
identification with Itamar’s mother broke down and was countered by my 
other maternal identifications, yet I could restore my sense of compassion for 
her suffering and fear by committing to repair, through analysis, by engaging 
a group process in which we identified with multiple positions, including her 
fear and efforts to escape it by turning back to restore her ideal object, her 
now frightened husband in his other inflated incarnations. 
No doubt my reaction, and those of many others, reflect despair and 
repugnance at precisely the way in which such fears have been used to bolster 
triumphalist or aggressive actions on the part of former victims—the way in 
which the history of victimization has led to the justification rather than 
moral repudiation of occupation and oppression of an entire people. This 
inflated triumphalism leads those observing to lose their grasp of the 
underlying fear that drives those violations. Yet, when we observe the acts of 
sadism, revenge, power-driven destruction it does call for an analysis that 
recognizes the fact that perpetrators feel pleasure in inflicting injury, that 
those in power enjoy their triumph. It is certainly undeniable that torturers 
express enjoyment, that military victors express triumph over their enemies’ 
humiliation, that people who understand themselves as righteous patriots 
express satisfaction in repaying the enemy whose resistance they experience 
as a challenge to their own power and superiority. All these ugly 
manifestations of entitlement to power have been virulent in the United 
States especially since the beginning of the retaliatory response to the 
September 11th attack on the World Trade Center. 
The origins of genocide, oppression, and mass transports of lust in violent 
transgression have been studied and much could be said about them; but the 
collapse from such inflated states into deflated, frightened and vulnerable 
states is also well known and documented. I want to be clear that I am only 
focusing on this latter transition and how to use it to create new relationships 
based on lawfulness, empathy and recognition of the other. There is no 
question that some perpetrators, especially those who initiated and organized 
violent crimes, who most benefited from their exploitation of power, never 
deflate. Further, my remarks here do not address what it takes to change the 
political power relations of oppression. But the majority of human beings 
seem to be capable of being both victims and perpetrators. The issue 
addressed by the film and in this paper is how to create a vision that goes 
beyond punitive retaliation and reversal, which perpetuates splitting and 
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dissociation, and denies this duality of our nature. This is the question 
Bassam asked himself, how will we liberate ourselves without in turn 
becoming like our oppressors who were once themselves victims.  
In fact, there is a psychoanalytic understanding based on the view of the 
duality of doer and done-to in each psyche. In this view, perpetrators’ 
assertions of superiority and pleasure in defensive triumph (in Kleinian 
language, the manic defense), can be seen as efforts to repel identification 
with helpless vulnerability, mortality, the human condition; and then, as 
inability to bear the shame of having committed crimes against other humans. 
This shame and attendant horror in fact cause trauma and severe illness in 
soldiers who return from war. Although far easier to grasp than evil itself, it 
is far less common to recognize the pain suffered by perpetrators who 
awaken from the dissociated state of the manic defense to realize their actual 
condition. We might consider the psychohistorical distance traveled from 
Aeschylus’s early play The Persians where the enemy’s humiliation is a 
source of rejoicing for the Greeks to the Bacchi where the mother awakens 
from the blood thirsty ecstasy induced by Dionysus to realize it is her own 
son’s dismembered head she is holding. This agony turns into horrific irony 
the chorus’ final chant, “the greatest pleasure is to hold a knife to the enemy’s 
throat and we want it forever.” And yet, in displaying the Persians weeping 
like despised women or children, a display over which the Greeks apparently 
made merry, they also enacted the very vulnerability that was split off and 
dissociated from themselves.  
The awakening from horror in fantasy, to its very reality, comes when the 
split off identification with the agonized other suddenly perhaps forcibly 
comes back into the self. It is a transformation that can occur when the 
victims assert their human dignity and force a breakthrough of dissociation. 
While this is often only possible by actually defeating or depriving 
perpetrators of their power and thus often requires not merely the witnessing 
but the active intervention of other world powers, that is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. The confronting of perpetrators with their actions in a 
way that transforms the relations of kill or be killed into a more lawful 
system is not guaranteed by such power interventions; it needs a moral 
dimension of bringing truth and witnessing to bear on crimes in which the 
victims can represent their demand for justice rather than retaliation. While 
there are many writings on and arguments over the success of transitional 
justice, and many of them rightly hinge on the role of economic power, I am 
limiting this discussion to the psychological. The process by which victims 
change the terms and create the third is has been discussed by Grand (2002) 
and beautifully documented by Gobodo-Madikizela (2003) in the story of 
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former security chief de Kook who after his imprisonment for crimes against 
black resisters to Apartheid comes to the realization of his guilt and his 
identification with the victims and their surviving wives and mothers. The 
move Gobodo-Madikizela describes from helpless victimhood to moral 
agency in embracing the moral third and re-establishing the lawful 
community is one of the most powerful statements ever made on behalf of 
moral strength and conviction upholding the third in the service of non-
violent social transformation. It shows the capacity required to grasp the full 
meaning of the dictum that we are all human. This comprehension was 
embodied in the action of the Gazan psychiatrist Eyad el Sarraj, my 
collaborator and the inspiration for the Acknowledgment Project, who was 
able to say to one of the Israeli soldiers with bayonets who were abusing a 
helpless victim in his presence, “Let me see your face, I want to know it is a 
human being who is doing this.”  
Gobodo-Madikizela (2003) is very clear in her observation of the impact 
of the victim’s forgiveness in restoring the sense of humanity to the 
perpetrator, as when she describes the effect of the mother of a slain young 
woman, Gin Foure forgiving the murderers who were involved in armed 
resistance to apartheid. These young men explained that Gin had given them 
back their humanity, their sense of the right to belong to the world of human 
beings who are not criminal outcasts, sinners. She shows us how the mothers 
of the informant who turned the boys in the Gugeletu 7 over to be killed by 
the police are able to forgive by saying, we are all sinners.  
I have been trying to show what it is that makes the principle “I am 
human because you are human; we can only be human when we recognize 
each other as human” a foundational principle of the relational entity I call 
“the moral third”―not a banal slogan but a representation of a complex 
psychological process within and between individuals. The idea of the moral 
third is an attempt to conceptualize a transformational process that enables 
the step out of a socially accepted narrative that justifies violence based on 
one’s own victimhood and thus causes further violence. I have been using the 
film “Moving Beyond Violence” to elaborate the idea of the moral third as a 
basis for ethical action as well as a psychological position that is healing of 
the trauma caused by violence. I have tried to show how the action of 
respecting others, connecting to others suffering and needs, meeting 
aggression with non-violence and conflict with negotiation can actually 
strengthen the part of the self that holds oppositions and tensions without 
collapsing into states of disorganization and fear of threat, without splitting 
off the knowledge of one’s own damage or ability to be aggressive and 
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damage others. Ultimately this reinforces the capacity for social attachment 
or social engagement that play a role in living with trauma differently.  
I have also tried to show how the concept of the third can be used to 
signify the actual incarnation and expression in human interaction of a stance 
that helps us to preserve agency, maintain empathy and compassion for 
others’ pain, and hold onto the idea of multiple positions and realities in 
human conflict. At the same time, the third can be seen specifically as a 
moral principle which transcends and takes us out of the binary, the either-or, 
in which only one person is human, worthy of respect, deserving of living 
rather than dying (Benjamin, 2016).  
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Chapter 5 
Unsettling Empathy: 
Intercultural Dialogue in the Aftermath of Historical and 
Cultural Trauma 
Intercultural Dialogue and Historical and Cultural Trauma 
Björn Krondorfer 
Northern Arizona University 
Introduction 
In my work as facilitator of intercultural encounters, I often straddle the line 
between different understandings of trauma as they variously apply to the 
repairing of broken relations between social groups in conflict. I am not 
trained to treat traumatized individuals medically or therapeutically, but I am 
working with dialogical models in group settings in which we address the 
long-term effects of endured wounding and culpable wrongdoing. We 
particularly pay attention to the eroding power of injurious and traumatic 
memory on social relations, with the goal to open pathways for improved 
communicative patterns and restorative visions. In this sense, the theoretical 
frames of historical and cultural trauma are relevant for both my conceptual 
comprehension and my practice of group facilitation.  
In this chapter, I will describe and reflect upon my work with intercultural 
groups in conflict. Embedded within an awareness of the power of historical 
trauma and set within the dynamics of reconciliatory processes, I will argue 
for the value of unsettling empathy. I understand unsettling empathy to refer 
to a posture that needs to be learned and practiced by people who, because of 
identifying with “large-group identities” (Volkan, 2013), have come to 
distrust each other based on historical and present antagonisms.  
I am calling unsettling empathy a posture because it best articulates what 
I have observed it to be. Unsettling empathy is not just a pedagogical tool in 
reconciliatory processes or a didactic element of dialogue, although it can be 
those things as well. I would also hesitate to call it a skill or a method, 
although unsettling empathy can be learned. Instead, I think of it as a kind of 
practiced awareness, as a relational commitment to caring responsiveness. 
The posture of unsettling empathy is a deliberate ethical stance which, ideally 
and over time, might become something akin to habitus—an acquired 
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disposition and sensibility that eventually informs, guides, and structures 
one’s attitude toward life.  
Trauma Discourse 
The current ubiquity of the usage of “trauma” in academic writing, public 
discourse, and the media requires a few words of clarification. This brief 
exercise is helpful on two accounts: For one, it helps to distinguish medical 
and psychological definitions of trauma from investigations that speak of 
historical and cultural trauma; second, it helps to differentiate between 
traumatic experiences with respect to severity, duration, and agency.  
Trauma definitions generally agree on two elements: Trauma is caused by 
a severe violation of integrity (often described as a shattering of self and the 
world), and it has a lingering, long-term impact. But beyond this general 
agreement, descriptive and theoretical investigations differ significantly. For 
example, does the violation of integrity only concern the physical and 
psychological wounding of the individual (as medical and a majority of 
therapeutic models suggest), or does it equally apply to social groups and 
communities in the form of transmitted injurious memories and sustained 
malicious discrimination (as historical and cultural theories argue)? Is 
traumatization a uniform and universal reaction to violence-induced rupture 
(akin to a biologically innate regulatory mechanism), or is it a culture-
dependent response? In the case of the latter, theorists in the humanities and 
social science argue that trauma gets crystallized through existing cultural 
frames that give the severity of an assault its specific meaning.  
What, then, determines the gravity of the harm experienced: individual or 
social factors? In the mental health field, on the one hand, the authoritative 
tool to diagnose disorder (the DSM) remains focused on the psychobiological 
timelessness of trauma’s destructive impact, independent of the individual’s 
ethnic or cultural background. Theorists of cultural trauma, on the other hand, 
emphasize that it is the social environment that largely determines whether an 
event is experienced as traumatic. Disparity of theoretical perspective can 
also be observed between those that see trauma as the result of a single, 
forceful event (like the medically defined sudden, blunt, radical impact on the 
body) and those that look at trauma as the result of an insidious web of 
abiding social injustices, such as colonialism, apartheid, or racism (see Craps, 
2013).  
Despite differences, there are multiple overlaps among the definitional 
fields. For example, historical and psychological trauma theories can find 
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common ground on the question of whether secondary traumatization is 
possible—for example, through witnessing someone else’s trauma.1 As to the 
possibility of transmission of trauma across generations, some psychoana-
lysts and therapists have joined historical and cultural theorists in affirming 
that the effects of trauma can transcend individual life-spans and continue on 
as subterranean anxieties and pathologies in subsequent generations. Such 
continuities can be traced intergenerationally (traumatic patterns and 
memories transmitted within a family system) as well as transgenerationally 
(traumatic patterns and memories transmitted across unified social identities, 
independent of personal family histories).2  
Finally, there is the issue of agency. Agency, here, refers to the situational 
and social position that people inhabit vis-à-vis trauma-inducing events. This 
is particularly relevant in terms of treating people and communities suffering 
from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). It is known that extraordinary 
violence does not only threaten, disrupt, and shatter the integrity of victims, 
but that it also disintegrates people who are actively participating in violent 
events (such as soldiers in war). Even the culpable wrongdoer—the person 
inflicting severe harm—can suffer from PTSD in a post-violent or post-
genocidal situation. Thus, ironically, the whole spectrum of agency vis-à-vis 
world-rupturing and self-shattering violence—victims, witnesses, bystanders, 
accomplices, perpetrators—may require therapeutic treatment or rely on 
broad support systems for their social reintegration.  
While medical and mental health professionals (and also clergy) are, to a 
large extent, required to treat everyone equally and independent of their 
agency, historical and cultural trauma theorists pay attention to the ethical 
and political dimensions of the long-lasting social impact of traumatized 
communities. Those theorists remind us not only of the staying power of 
trauma but also of the danger of the ubiquitous use of trauma terminology. In 
the case of the latter, undifferentiated trauma-talk may lead to a facile 
equation of all traumatized people, thus erasing the ethical difference 
                                                          
1  The current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) recognizes that 
exposure to trauma can come about direct experience to self or witnessing such harm to 
others: “The person has been exposed to a traumatic event ... [when] the person experienced, 
witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened 
death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others” (DSM-IV-TR, 
p. 467). On witnessing, see Felman & Laub (1992); for critical views, see Weissman (2004) 
and Craps (2013). 
2  For a good discussion of inter- and transgenerational transfer of memory and associated 
terms such as “postgeneration,” see Hirsch (2012, pp. 1-36); she also speaks of “familial 
postmemory” (a memory that, in my nomenclature, is passed on intergenerationally) and 
“affiliative postmemory” (passed on transgenerationally) (p. 36). 
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between harm inflicted and harm endured. They also remind us that the 
contemporary fixation on trauma in Western academic circles and public 
parlance may lead to treating someone else’s wound as a public spectacle at a 
non-threatening distance. Such voyeuristic consumption turns trauma into a 
“sentimental political discourse” (Craps, 2013, p. 125), which prevents an 
effective call to political action to get articulated. To mitigate such ethical 
dilemmas, a critical trauma theory would need to negotiate the right balance 
between fostering (individual) healing and pursuing (communal) justice. It is 
a quandary that requires sustained transnational discussions about the value 
of retributive justice versus restorative justice, especially in transitional 
societies (e.g. Amstutz, 2005). 
Intercultural Memory Work 
I have elsewhere described my facilitation of groups that have been or 
continue to be in conflict with each other as “intercultural memory work” 
(Krondorfer, 2013b). In situations of communal conflicts that stretch over 
generations, memory work is particularly important, but also particularly 
difficult, since memory motivates us to act in particular ways in the present. 
Unchallenged, memory can serve to fortify our communal borders, defend 
our social group identities, make us cling to stories of suffering and 
victimization, or make us hold on to tales of a heroic past.3 In contrast to 
simply having memories that get reiterated in families and communities, 
memory work is the attempt to actively engage troublesome memories. It 
moves us toward a place where we are no longer prisoners of the past but 
freed to relate anew to people like us and people not like us. 
In intercultural memory work, various facets of traumatic content 
characterize the interactions of and between the participants. Groups I have 
facilitated over the years include encounters between third-generation 
American Jews and their non-Jewish German counterparts, seminars for 
Christian clergy and Jewish educators/rabbis at sites of atrocities (e.g. the 
Nazi concentration camp of Buchenwald), artistic cooperation with visual 
and performance artists (Krondorfer, 2013a), racial reconciliation retreats for 
U.S. undergraduate students, or trilateral trust-building workshops for 
Israelis, Palestinians, and Germans.  
The particular goals for each of these groups differ, but the guiding 
paradigms for facilitation remain the same. They include: 
                                                          
3  National/communal hero and victimhood narratives are “nostalgic constructions . . . clinging 
to idealized images of the past” (Gobodo-Madikizela 2012, p. 255). 
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• engaging in alternative forms of communication that require risk-taking, 
vulnerability, honesty 
• practicing careful listening, straightforward responding, and empathic 
imagining 
• attending to the impact of family biographies, of communal memories, 
and of national histories 
 
These seminars, workshops, and retreats meet within a circumscribed, 
condensed timeframe. A meeting could be as short as two days or as long as 
four uninterrupted weeks; they can also be offered as a series of weekend 
seminars spread over several months. Whether these encounters take place in 
retreat centers or include travel components, the framework remains that of a 
protective space conducive to personal and social exploration. In this space, 
participants are encouraged to challenge their perceptions of themselves and 
others through affective and cognitive levels of communication, including 
creative, body-centered, and nonverbal components. Though the work is 
deeply interpersonal, the focus is always on the dynamics of the whole group, 
a process I have called “reconciliatory” (Krondorfer, 2012) and described 
elsewhere as “cultural therapy” (Krondorfer, 1992, pp. 72, 91).  
Although the concept of historical trauma informs strongly the intercul-
tural memory work I am engaged in, other forms of trauma also come into 
play. Sometimes, the traumatic or traumatizing experiences are severe and 
direct, at other times hidden and subtle. They reach from individually 
endured severe harm (victims of torture; victims of rape) to the psychological 
effects of secondary witnessing;4 from cultural memories of genocide to 
personal exposure to paralysis in damaged families; from repetitions of 
politicized communal trauma narratives to unacknowledged losses passed on 
intergenerationally; from the postmemories5 imprinted by family members to 
the felt-memory of continuous threats to one’s physical and emotional 
integrity.  
At times, we have participants in our groups who are traumatized without 
them being aware of it. The lack of individual awareness is often rooted in a 
lack of communal language because social and political circumstances are 
such that any acknowledgment of damage to one’s own soul and body is 
communally spurned as aggrandizing self-pity. This is particularly true for 
individuals and groups that are in the throes of current conflicts and for 
whom any trauma-talk seems like an emotional luxury they cannot afford. It 
                                                          
4  On secondary witnessing, see Felman & Laub (1992) and Apel (2002). 
5  On postmemory and witnessing, see Hirsch (2012). 
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is therefore important to distinguish between historical trauma and cultural 
trauma in intercultural conflict settings. To put the difference succinctly: 
 
• in settings where historical trauma is the primary source of contentious 
social relations due to differing memories, there is generally a stronger 
willingness to use trauma as a paradigmatic model for restorative efforts. 
The temporal distance to the past serves as a buffer that allows the 
conflicting parties to interact with greater emotional and political freedom 
of social exploration 
• in settings where ongoing unresolved conflicts determine large-group 
identities, there is a less-developed ability to understand the situation 
through trauma. People who live in such volatile situations rely, instead, 
on political modes of communication to voice their grievances and seek 
for solutions. It is the latter setting where we speak of cultural trauma. 
Trauma in this setting is akin to a diagnostic (and sometimes external) 
comprehension of the severity of threats and harm to integrity, independ-
ent of whether the affected individual actors or communal bodies 
acknowledge it as such.  
 
Further below, I will illustrate the difference between these two settings 
(historical trauma/cultural trauma) by describing two particularly remarkable 
occasions from my intercultural work. But before getting to these specific 
cases, I need to address yet another set of terms so as to fully flesh out the 
conceptual framework within which I operate.  
Dialogue, Reconciliation, Empathy 
At first sight, the call for dialogue seems antithetical to trauma discourse. 
Since trauma is a severely destructive, disruptive, and disorienting force, any 
restorative effort would seem to work best if done in a safe space, where 
caretakers can pay undivided attention to repairing the physical, mental, and 
emotional integrity of the survivor, and survivors can learn to mobilize their 
own resources for healing and reintegration. Bringing in other agents would 
only cause detrimental emotional reactions (like anger, guilt, self-blame, etc.) 
or trigger retraumatizing flashes that would delay the process of restoring 
trust in oneself and the world. 
Though such safety is crucial in the medical and psychological treatment 
of traumatized individuals, it does not equally apply to historical and cultural 
trauma settings. Here, dialogical principles can become part of the restorative 
efforts. As a matter of fact, Cathy Caruth, one of the early pioneers who 
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expanded trauma theory to cultural, literary, and ethical investigations, claims 
that trauma does not only root us in our historical situatedness but also calls 
us to acknowledge the ways in which historical trauma links individuals and 
cultures. “[T]he notion of trauma . . . is aimed not at eliminating history but 
at resituating it in our understanding,” she writes in Unclaimed Experience. 
“[H]istory, like trauma, is never simply one’s own.” Rather, “history is 
precisely the way we are implicated in each other’s trauma” (Caruth, 1996, 
pp. 11, 24). In other words, communicating across cultural divides about the 
effects of trauma not only crystallizes the perception of our boundedness to 
our respective histories, it also reaches beyond the one-sidedness of parochial 
history-retelling in order to seek ways of cross-cultural understanding. 
Applied to working through historical and cultural trauma, we can say then 
that the realization of being “implicated in each other’s trauma” calls for 
dialogical engagement. 
Once we allow for the insight that dialogue is not antithetical to working 
with mixed groups in the presence of traumatic content, we need to think 
about the nature of dialogue we wish to pursue. In my own work, I want 
dialogical encounters to be deliberate about going 
 
• beyond the surface of friendly conversation 
• beyond the limitation of a culture’s master narrative 
• beyond the comfort zones of rehearsed opinions  
• beyond loyalties that communities impose on our large-group identities  
 
Of course, the three “guiding paradigms for facilitation” identified above also 
contribute to successful dialogue. I call such dialogical encounters 
“reconciliatory processes.”  
When I speak of reconciliation, I am not speaking of forgiveness or 
repentance. I would not even summon the words healing or compassion 
without further qualification. I understand reconciliation to be a process that 
is open-ended. Reconciliatory efforts are not measured by the attainment of a 
pre-determined end but by the transformative power of the path we walk. A 
reconciliatory process is not so much a result as it is a mode of working 
through injuries, discrimination, social injustice, wrongdoing, guilt, and 
traumatic memories. Importantly, it needs to include the multiple dimensions 
of suffering and accountability, or what I have called above the dual 
dimension of “endured wounding” and “culpable wrongdoing.” To engage in 
reconciliatory efforts requires parties with different experiences and 
grievances to be fully present to each other. The intent is to go beyond merely 
describing how each party perceives reality and, instead, to adjust and revise 
each other’s perception of one’s being-in-the-world in pursuit of 
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(re)establishing trust. Reconciliatory processes, to use Caruth’s words, 
require us to get implicated in each other’s histories and traumas. 
The posture of unsettling empathy plays a crucial role in these processes. 
For an encounter to be transformative, one must go beyond a discourse of 
politeness and, at times, even beyond a discourse of civility, as long as safety 
for and respect of each participant is guaranteed. I would also say that 
compassionate listening alone is not sufficient, if by that we mean a method 
in which each group in turn can air their grievances while the other group 
listens attentively without interrupting or contradicting the narrated 
experience. Compassionate listening works well as an initial step in bringing 
groups with antagonistic histories together, but it falls short of actually 
working through the tensions that divide them. Compassion by itself can too 
easily be mistaken as the kind of civil discourse that uses polite forms of 
rhetoric to mask underlying tensions. In Trauma and Recovery, Judith 
Herman reminds us that “remembering and telling the truth about terrible 
events are prerequisites both for the restoration of the social order and for the 
healing of individual victims” (1992, p. 1; emphasis added). As a 
“prerequisite,” truth-telling is an important component, but it is only an initial 
step in the process of recovery.  
Compared to compassion, the posture of unsettling empathy signals that 
our dialogical engagement may cost us something. It requires risks. It 
requires the risk of vulnerability, of courage, of being shaken in one’s 
foundation and assumptions about the world and the Other. Having worked 
for the last three decades with people impacted by the upheavals in Europe in 
the 1930s and 1940s (Holocaust, Second World War, dictatorships, 
occupation, massive population transfers, etc.), I am aware of how long it can 
take before affected communities and their descendants are able to start 
dialogic exchanges. Effective reconciliatory processes begin where it matters, 
and where it matters, it might hurt, and where it hurts, it leads (when 
carefully managed) to transformation.  
By suggesting the importance of unsettling empathy, I gesture conscious-
ly toward Dominick LaCapra’s concept of “empathic unsettlement,” which is 
central to his theory on trauma and narrative. According to LaCapra, it is not 
sufficient to respond to historical trauma merely through the lens of 
“objective reconstructions of the past” (2002, p. 41), as many historians do. 
Equally problematic would be to appropriate historical trauma through a 
“vicarious” and “unchecked identification” (p. 40) by secondary witnesses. 
While the first (objective) response errs on the side of neglecting the 
subjectively experienced traumatic impact, the second (vicarious) response 
errs on the side of a well-intended, but ultimately facile “surrogate 
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victimhood” (p. 40). Empathic unsettlement, according to LaCapra, avoids 
these traps by responding to trauma without seeking closure, for it recognizes 
“unsettling possibility” (p. 41) contained in traumatizing events—for both 
victims and perpetrators.  
My own guiding assumptions about reconciliatory processes share several 
affinities with LaCapra’s ideas. LaCapra, like Cathy Caruth, points to the 
dialogical value of responding to trauma, walking a fine line between cognitive 
levels (objective history) and affective levels (empathic responses) of 
comprehension. This “dialogic exchange with the past” (LaCapra, 2002, p. 41) 
requires a self-reflective awareness of the “subject position” (p. 40) of anyone 
trying to comprehend the past. When entering into a responsive relationship 
with traumatic history, we need to know who we are, where we come from, and 
how we are identified with large-group identities. It matters whether I am 
German, Israeli, or South African, or whether I am a direct descendant or a 
professional historian, and so forth. Rather than declaring an amorphous “we 
are all humans” approach, intercultural memory work depends on the 
willingness and ability of participants to clarify their agency (or “subject 
position”) vis-à-vis the historical trauma that defines contentious social 
relations. 
A final affinity with LaCapra is his insistence that empathic unsettlement 
is a response that seeks no closure but accepts unsettling possibilities, which 
parallels my assertion that reconciliatory processes must be open-ended 
(Krondorfer, 2013b).  
Roger Simon et al. also refer to the notion of unsettlement when speaking 
of the need for a critical pedagogical practice of remembrance that “initiate[s] 
a continual unsettling” (Simon, Rosenberg and Eppert, 2000, p. 6). I therefore 
should briefly explain why I speak—in reversal of LaCapra’s wording—of 
“unsettling empathy.” I do so because I wish to be attentive to the actual 
dynamics of empathy in intercultural group settings. I want to point to an 
active practice of a particular kind of empathy that triggers the “unsettling” 
(rather than using “empathic” as a modifier for a noun/concept). The posture 
of unsettling empathy is less a theoretical concept analyzing trauma in 
relation to another problem (like historiography or representation) than it is 
an ethical practice that can be learned and acquired. It must be actively 
incorporated (referring here also to its embodied dimension, given the Lat. 
root corpus) within a protective space. 
The protective environment that needs to be provided has been variously 
referred to as third space, liminal space, transitional space, or intermediary 
space. Importantly, it is an intentional space created outside of ordinary rules 
that individuals and communities impose on themselves. It is conducive to 
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holding high social tensions while creatively exploring what Caruth might 
call a “resituating [of] our understanding,” or Simon et al. would call a 
“reworking [of our] notions of community, identity, embodiment, and 
relationships” (2002, p. 6). In a similar vein, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela—
with respect to apartheid’s historical trauma—speaks of the necessity for 
dialogical engagement with “unsettling testimony” within a frame of 
“making public spaces intimate” (2012, p. 262; also 2008). Her spatial 
metaphor mirrors what I consider essential when working with groups in 
conflict: the necessity to express and reveal the intimate wounds of historical 
and cultural trauma in spaces that surpass the purely intersubjective in order 
to include a “public” domain, insofar as it is essential to bring large-group 
identities to the table. “At the core of what unfolds in these encounters,” 
Gobodo-Madikizela writes, “is a reciprocal mutual engagement” (2012, p. 
262; emphasis in original).  
The posture of unsettling empathy has yet another advantage over a less 
differentiated notion of compassion. A compassionate attitude has the 
tendency to erase some of the objective differences of agency vis-à-vis 
traumatic history. In the name of a common humanity, compassion too 
quickly glosses over the ethical difference between harm inflicted and harm 
endured, presenting all sides as victims of circumstances they could not 
control. Unsettling empathy, on the other hand, calls us into the presence of 
objective differences without negating the vitality of human interaction. For 
example, when a secondary witness, who is a descendant of a perpetrator 
society, cannot fully acknowledge the extent of pain inflicted (note: not 
endured!) and, hence, fails to address the issue of vicarious accountability, 
the injustices and abuses of the past remain ignored, with the result of 
potentially stalling dialogic engagement in the present. When, on the other 
hand, a secondary witness who is a descendant of a victimized community 
identifies vicariously with his or her family’s trauma to the extent that it 
disallows the full humanity of the Other to emerge, then dialogic engagement 
is equally blocked. The posture of unsettling empathy, however, allows for 
the inclusion of both a critical perspective on power asymmetries (regarding 
historical and cultural trauma) as well as compassion with the Other despite 
historical injustices and contentious memories. Unsettling empathy blends 
the critical/political dimension with the affective/interpersonal dimension of 
working through historical and cultural trauma, and as such it is a vital 
element in reconciliatory processes. 
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Let me summarize the central features of unsettling empathy: 
• Unsettling empathy costs something, whereas compassion can too easily 
be mistaken as the kind of civil discourse that uses polite forms of 
rhetoric to mask underlying tensions 
• Unsettling empathy requires the risk of vulnerability, of courage, of being 
shaken in one’s foundation and assumptions about the world and the other 
• Unsettling empathy calls us into the presence of objective differences 
without negating the vitality of human interaction, whereas compassion 
may tempt us to erase some of the objective differences in the name of a 
common humanity 
• Unsettling empathy allows for the inclusion of both a critical perspective 
on power asymmetries as well as the compassionate stance toward the 
Other despite historical injustices 
• Unsettling empathy describes a posture that blends the critical/political 
with the affective/interpersonal 
 
We are now ready to look at two select examples of intercultural conflict 
situations, where the posture of unsettling empathy can be observed. The first 
focuses on a setting that falls into historical trauma. Here, we will get a 
glimpse at how “memory work” can be intensively personal while 
simultaneously calling upon large-group responses to trauma. In this 
example, we will encounter the presence of a haunted past that becomes 
temporarily embodied in a returning “ghost.” The second example 
foregrounds cultural trauma. Here we will walk with the participants the fine 
line between collective narratives and the immediacy of political uncertainty.  
Haunting Presence of a Ghost: A Case of Historical Trauma 
In the fall of 2011, a group of German and Israeli educators, therapists, 
teachers, and community organizers invited me to conduct a three-day 
seminar in Germany on the effects of the Holocaust and the Second World 
War. The group—which ranged in age from mid-twenties to seventies—had 
already worked together for some time on peace-related activities. But the 
repercussions of disruptive and traumatic memories kept obstructing their 
present-day relations. They hoped that this seminar on “Restorative 
Forgetting/Necessary Remembering” would allow each side to explore the 
complexity of memory’s abyss.  
I often bring a material object to my workshops, representing in a 
symbolically dense, polyvalent, and evocative form the main theme(s) to be 
tackled. For this meeting, I brought a simple cardboard container, painted 
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pitch-black inside and outside. During the next four days, this black box 
accompanied our work. Often placed in the middle of our circle, it initiated 
and guided discussions and interactive exercises. It was our memory box—
and, as memory goes, it contained as much of what was remembered than 
was forgotten. It functioned as storage and archive, as advocate for the 
forgotten and uncomfortable companion for what needed to be remembered, 
as retainer of familial remembrances and a black hole into which memory 
disappeared. 
Because the participants of this German-Israeli encounter showed an 
extraordinary ability to take personal risks and to respond to each other with 
honesty without breaking the trust that had been built up over time, I knew 
they were ready to confront directly the ghosts of the past. In the evening of 
the last day, I proposed to enter with them hitherto uncharted territory. When 
we met after dinner, the November darkness had already descended around 
us, hushing the sounds ascending from the small town at whose edge the 
retreat center was located.  
During the seminar’s previous sessions, some of the German participants, 
who were born during the war years, talked about their conflicting emotions 
toward their fathers and about their wish that these fathers should be present 
in this mixed Israeli-German encounter. There was a sense of anger about 
their parent generation not confronting the past sufficiently and, instead, 
delegating it to subsequent generations. They also bemoaned their fathers’ 
lack of courage to expose themselves to the presence of Jews/Israelis. Their 
fathers, they surmised, might have benefited from such an encounter—a 
subtle wish, as I understood it, to redeem the fathers and a desire to break 
through the unyielding silence that encased so many post-war German 
families whose fathers had been implicated in National Socialism.  
The fathers of these particular German participants had been identified 
with the Nazi regime to various degrees. It included, for example, one 
participant’s step-father who, until his death in the 1960s, remained an 
unrepentant Nazi. As an accused war-criminal he had escaped the clutches of 
justice and kept sheltering Nazis on-the-run for many years after the war. 
These fathers remained invisible figures in the midst of our Israeli-German 
encounter, absent and present at the same time. Despite their uncanny 
presence, they remained elusive. Without flesh-and-blood, without name and 
identity, we could not get hold of them.  
Now, on this last evening, I suggested that we need to visit them, or 
better, for them to visit us. After making sure that there was consensus for 
moving into a dimension I had not dared entering previously, we placed the 
black box in the wide open circle. The task was simple: let us invite one of 
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these German fathers into our midst. Nervousness and incredulity spread: 
how should this be done? We unfurled a blanket next to the black box, and 
then asked for a German participant to step forward. A woman, who had 
experienced the war as a child in the Eastern German provinces, volunteered. 
When she was comfortably resting on the blanket, we dimmed the lights and 
opened the top of the box—symbolically representing the opening of buried 
memories or of a grave. I slowly guided the woman into letting go of her own 
self and to imaginatively take on the figure that she felt might emerge from 
the black box. 
She took time to transition into her role. She closed her eyes; her body 
eventually began to squirm, wriggle, and twist. She seemed to resist a 
presence that was taking over her being. When she finally opened her eyes 
and looked around in the circle, she was no longer play-acting. Rather, she 
appeared to be—for the lack of a better term—possessed: a ghostly presence 
had taken hold of her. If a ghost is “something lost or invisible or seemingly 
not there [but that] makes itself known or apparent to us,” as Avery Gordon 
writes in Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (1997, 
p. 63), then we were visited by the ghost of one of the German fathers. The 
woman volunteer had become a German soldier returning from the grave. It 
was not her own father, though, and the ghost remained nameless throughout 
the evening. She/he stared into space and asked: “What do you want from 
me? Why did you call me?” Slowly, the group began to verbally interact with 
the ghost. 
The specific questions and answers do not really matter here, and I am not 
sure they really mattered during the session itself. The eerie presence of a 
resurrected soldier-father filled the room, putting everyone under a spell. 
Questions were asked, but many remained unanswered. The ghost reluctantly 
offered fragmented bits of information but stubbornly refused to provide 
specifics. He had returned from the grave with his silence intact. This 
frustrated and infuriated the group. Hypnotized by the ghost’s unsettling 
aggressiveness, we were in the presence of a dead man teasing and 
threatening us by hinting at a secret and violent past.  
When he unexpectedly led us to an execution site, putting bullets into his 
victims, we almost preferred his previous silence rather than having to 
imagine this scene. In a matter-of-fact style, almost catatonically, the soldier-
father told of “things” that just needed to get done. He showed no emotional 
remorse. The group prodded but failed to elicit any small gesture of sorrow or 
any recognition of culpability. Now that a door had opened to a scene at the 
killing fields, how could any meaning emerge from this? The group grew 
impatient. 
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As is always the case when reporting about the dynamics of such group 
sessions, words cannot adequately describe what transpired during that 
evening. Time stood still (we were in the presence of the ghost for more than 
an hour). It seemed the group had been transposed to a historical trauma that 
felt in the imagination so real that it took on an aura of reality. We came close 
to what religious language knows as spirit possession.  
In the context of my reflections on historical trauma and unsettling 
empathy, I want to share just a few observations that characterized the 
German and Israeli interactions with the ghost.  
First, the German group was split in half regarding its attitude toward the 
ghost. One half was angry at his refusal to speak and his unrepentant attitude; 
the other half was supportive, gently prodding the ghost to show signs of 
insight and regret. Both sides, it seemed, acted on the two primary impulses 
that descendants of perpetrator generations have at their disposal when 
responding to culpable wrongdoing: on the one hand, taking a firm and angry 
stance toward their parents’ generational silence about the past (which is also 
an angry reaction to being burdened with the atrocious legacy of their fathers 
and their nation); on the other hand, adopting a soft and sympathizing stance 
toward their parents’ shameful silence, perhaps hoping to find points of 
connection. The ghostly father, however, remained as immune to his 
“children’s” angry rejections as to their tenuously therapeutic gesture of 
inclusion—which made his appearance so hypnotically powerful and 
threatening. 
Second, the Israeli group remained mostly silent throughout the whole 
sequence/séance. A few dared to ask him questions but largely left the 
inquiry to the Germans. The Israelis felt the need to put distance to the ghost, 
reducing their engagement with him to a minimum, and skeptically observing 
the Germans efforts to interacting with him. The longer the German 
interaction lasted, the more anxious and threatened the Israelis became. For 
them, it was time to bring the session to an end. 
But how do you return a ghost? How do you exorcise “die Geister, die ich 
rief”?6 This leads me to my third observation: Unexpectedly, the father-ghost 
refused to go back into the box. His resistance was strengthened by those in 
the German group who also did not want him to leave yet because they were 
still trying to reach out to him. My suggestion to relieve the German woman 
from her ghostly possession was simply ignored. Those Germans that sought 
some entry into the entombed emotional state of the ghostly father protested 
                                                          
6  Translated as "the spirits that I called," this line from Goethe’s Der Zauberlehrling (1797; 
The Sorcerer's Apprentice) is frequently used when someone is summoned to help who then 
cannot be controlled. 
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my attempt to end the session. They felt that I was interrupting their 
psychopolitical efforts of understanding the mentality and soul of the 
perpetrator generation.  
The ghost himself, now that he was among us, had begun to enjoy 
himself. He seemed to get a certain pleasure from the fact that he was 
emotionally attended to without having to change. He yielded power as a 
bearer of terrifying secrets (which he hinted at sparingly) and held sway over 
us by revealing little about himself. I reminded the group several more times 
that we had already exceeded the allotted time for the evening, but each 
attempt to bringing the session to a closure was unsuccessful. I eventually 
had to physically recapture the space that the ghost inhabited, assertively 
asking for a moratorium on further questions. I put my hands on the ghost’s 
shoulders, gently but firmly making him/her to lie down on the blanket. 
Slowly, the woman’s body relaxed. She sighed. Finally, we were able to 
close the lid of the black box. 
Fourth, the issue about putting the ghost back into the box remained 
contentious in subsequent discussions. The one half of the German group that 
had wanted to extend the session voiced frustration, because they felt I had 
deliberately ignored a critical moment. They argued that we missed out on a 
chance to approach Germany’s legacy not with the usual confrontational 
attitude but with a more nuanced view of their fathers’ mentality. They felt 
that their valiant efforts to moving toward a platform of shared grief were 
prematurely interrupted. The other German half, however, felt that it made no 
sense to keep investing so much energy and effort into the ghost. In their 
view, he was as irredeemable as the history he represented. It was time to 
stop the ghost from spreading anymore of his poison. They felt more than 
ready to have the ghost disappear. 
The Israelis had yet another response. For them, the ghostly presence had 
become unbearable. Had the situation continued any time longer, they 
confessed later, they would have left the room. For them, what was 
threatening was not only the appearance of the ghost itself but also the 
German group’s seemingly tireless efforts to engage him. They viscerally 
began to understand how frustratingly difficult it is for a perpetrator society 
to work through the past. But they also wondered whether, by trying so hard 
to understand the ghostly father, Germans began to err on the side of 
sympathetic identification rather than historical and moral judgment. They 
felt like uninvited guest witnessing a family feud, like eavesdropping on an 
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intense moment of cultural intimacy. It frightened them, and yet they were 
grateful for it.7  
When we finally asked the German woman who had volunteered to 
“channel” the ghost, she started crying. Although she could not put words to 
her tears at the time, she later communicated in emails that these were tears 
of grief for her father and his generation.  
 
The ghost session contained many of the elements I introduced conceptually 
above, but here I limit myself to some reflections on the power of unsettling 
empathy. Clearly, the ghost had managed to unsettle just about everyone that 
evening, though not for the same reasons. For some, the dialogical and 
emphatic engagement with the ghost unsettled them because they tried but 
failed to understand the perpetrator’s mentality; for others, it was the 
secondary witnessing of a re-imagined and re-enacted scene of harm inflicted 
(and, by extension, harm endured) that was deeply disturbing; for yet others, 
a posture of unsettling empathy allowed them to share a fragile moment of 
cultural intimacy.  
The posture of unsettling empathy also led to particular investments into 
present relationships. For example, those Germans who had reproached the 
ghostly father with anger quickly grasped the Israeli sense of threat, for both 
groups were ready to end the session. But those frustrated about the too early 
disappearance of the ghost had lost touch with the emotional state of the 
Israelis. Deeply absorbed in their own history and in their attempts to find an 
empathic (though not exonerating) understanding of their fathers’ generation, 
they were too busy with their own Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to 
terms with the past) to notice the upheaval of their Israeli peers. They were 
surprised to hear how frightened the Israelis had been. 
These fluctuating layers of unsettling empathy demonstrate that memory 
is multidirectional and that such multidirectionality must be valued in 
intercultural encounters. The many attitudes toward memory and 
remembrance do not cancel each other out but enrich each other in a “shared 
moral and political project” (Rothberg, 2009, p. 132).  
Lest I be misunderstood, I want to make clear that I do not advocate 
inviting the ghosts of the past on a regular basis. In fact, I would rather 
caution about such an approach in intercultural groups that work through 
historical trauma. In exceptional circumstances, one might dare making a 
haunted, invisible past known in some embodied form, but one needs to 
                                                          
7  The next day, we put the Israeli group into the center of our attention. A young Israeli man 
volunteered to impersonate his grandmother, a Holocaust survivor. He too seemed possessed 
by a returning spirit, so much so that she seemed literally present in our midst, channeled 
through her grandson’s body. 
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know one’s limits. Certainly, the intellectual criticism about bringing ghosts 
back from the past relates both to the problem of vicarious identification8 as 
well as to the ethical conundrum of trying to redeem and rehabilitate the 
memory of former perpetrators. Calling on ghosts, however, does not 
inevitably lead to attempts at reconciliatory exoneration or at healing a 
genocidal past. To the contrary, it may be conducive to pursuing justice. 
“Ghosts are about a possibility of justice,” argues legal scholar Christiane 
Wilke, “They are reminders of a need for justice and can point to the 
impossibility of justice within the constraints of the law” (2010, p. 77) 
The ghostly appearance may demonstrate how complex and difficult 
intercultural memory work can be. Questions of large-group identity and 
family loyalty are raised, and one’s sense of belonging may become unsettled 
in the face of the Other. Intercultural meetings bring up defensiveness, fears 
of betrayal, and a desire to withdraw into protected and familiar mental 
territory. But when they work well, they compel us to reconsider our 
assumptions and renders us vulnerable in the presence of the Other, which is 
an indispensable seed for any personal and social transformation to happen. 
To return to troubled times is not meant to re-inscribe what is already known 
historically but to change and transform contemporary relations. The goal is 
not to fortify entrenched communal identities, but to soften these borders, 
move into territory of unsettling empathy, and risk a transformed 
understanding of each other.  
Walking a Fine Line: A Case of Cultural Trauma 
In the fall of 2013, I conducted a trilateral, four-day seminar for Israelis, 
Palestinians and Germans, who have been engaged in peace-building 
initiatives in the Middle East. The seminar—bearing the title “Between 
Trauma and Politics”—was billed as a mentor-training program. It offered 
participants a chance to explore and reflect upon the multidirectional ways 
that traumatic memories impel and impede open communication and social 
trust between these three national groups.  
The fine line we needed to walk in this seminar was between dialogic 
engagement with historical trauma and being attentive to the urgency of the 
political situation. We negotiated the variously triangulated bonds between 
Palestinians, Israelis, and Germans.9 Both individual and large-group 
                                                          
8  On vicarious witnessing, see Zeitlin (1998); see also Weissman (2004). 
9  The idea of triangulation stems from psychology, where it is used to diagnose and treat 
family systems that are marred by dysfunctional communication shifting between three 
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identities crossed and overlapped at the axis of historical and cultural trauma. 
Indeed, the participants of this meeting were strongly individuated people as 
well as representatives of larger social identities: grandchildren of Holocaust 
survivors, children of Nazi war criminals, Palestinians living under the 
occupation in the West Banks, Israelis having served in the military, etc. 
Furthermore, the participants brought a number of generational and age 
perspectives to the table, stretching across a whole spectrum of unresolved 
past and present tensions. Deeply personal experiences that were marred by 
traumatic content blended with collective narratives of suffering and guilt. 
Since the Israeli and Palestinian participants came from living situations 
marked by acute anguish, discrimination, violence, death, and mutual 
recriminations, the dialogic exchange was volatile and fragile. 
I suggest that we need to understand settings that straddle the line 
between historical trauma and unresolved political conflicts through the lens 
of cultural trauma. As mentioned above, describing a particular situation as 
cultural trauma does not dependent on whether it is recognized as such by the 
affected individuals or communities. People in politically explosive situations 
may speak about the suffering they endure—for example as result of unjust 
treatment by a superior power, or as the inevitable price one pays for 
resistance—but the use of the term “trauma” is hardly pervasive in these 
settings or is carefully sidestepped. Claiming traumatization for oneself might 
actually erode social solidarity, since it could be perceived as undue self-
pride in one’s injuries over against the commonweal, or as an excuse for not 
fully participating in the defense of one’s people/nation.  
Our trilateral meeting included participants who had been in Israeli prison 
for years, who witnessed neighbors being fatally shot, who served in the 
Israeli army, who were involved in the militant Palestinian resistance, who 
survived rocket attacks launched from Gaza, or who, on the other side of the 
border, were faced with the war-wounded in understaffed Gaza hospitals. 
Previous trilateral meetings also included Israelis who had lost friends to 
suicide bombings and Palestinians who had been tortured. 
When we asked the group during our four-day meeting to recall and share 
individual stories of traumatizing or near-traumatic experiences, several 
Palestinian men looked quizzically at first. But they did tell us about their 
                                                          
parties. Depending on who is talking to who defines the nature and strength of bonds (of 
loyalty) between people caught in a triangle. When applied to trilateral encounters, 
“triangulation” helps to reveal the psychopolitical dynamics between Israe-
lis/Palestinians/Germans: alliances between them shift depending on whether issues of 
historical trauma (such as the Holocaust), cultural trauma (such as ongoing Mid-East 
conflict), individual traumas (such as torture), or generationally transmitted traumas (such as 
Naqba, Shoah, expulsion) are foregrounded. 
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experiences: about being struck by a rubber bullet that is still lodged in the 
neck, threatening to paralyze him any time; about being arrested at age 14 
and spending the next ten-years in an Israeli prison; about witnessing the 
incineration of a whole family when a rocket hit an apartment building in 
Gaza. They hastened to add that they never thought about these experiences 
as traumatic. “It’s just how it is; everyone is exposed to it.”  
In cultural trauma settings, wounds are still fresh and fear is ever-present, 
with little hope for any immediate improvement. In these settings, one 
frequently meets people who have been exposed to recent traumatizing 
incidents that fall squarely into the medical and therapeutic definition of 
trauma. There is immediacy of trauma that historical trauma settings do not 
have to deal with to the same degree. At the same time, cultural trauma also 
refers to “chronic psychic suffering” (Craps, 2013, p. 26) due to the ongoing 
nature of a conflict. The root cause of such chronic conditions is not a 
sudden, blunt force threatening to disintegrate a person (like a car accident or 
rape), but collective structural violence (like slavery or apartheid). Hence, 
another fine line that needs to be attended to in cultural trauma settings is to 
work with people who may recover from recent medical trauma or suffer 
from untreated mental trauma while also being attuned to the trauma-
inducing structures that are long-term and chronic.  
Communities living under the daily stress of politically volatile and 
violent environments tend, as a psychic defense, to tell nostalgic tales of 
innocent suffering or heroic tales of resistance (see also Gobodo-Madikizela, 
2012). To move away from these tales toward an understanding of cultural 
trauma requires an active framing of such events. “Disorganization, 
displacement, or incoherence in culture,” writes Piotr Sztompka, are the 
conditions that lead to “cultural trauma” (2000, p. 453); but those conditions 
need to be framed by social actors before they get recognized as trauma. “The 
condition of cultural disorientation, accompanied by social concern and 
expressed by intensified emotional, intellectual, organizational activism, 
provides a necessary background for the cultural trauma to appear” (p. 456).  
At the 2013 trilateral meeting, we could observe how such emotional and 
intellectual awareness coalesced around the recognition of cultural trauma. I 
want to illustrate this briefly with respect to the Palestinian participants, who, 
each in their own way, had the ability to act and think in non-linear ways, 
that is to say, in ways that were not predetermined by loyalty to a particular 
political agenda. The readiness to try out new communicative patterns 
became obvious early on in the seminar when a Palestinian man did not only 
recall his years in Israeli prison, but also explained why he had been arrested. 
As a teenager, he had plotted to grab a weapon from an Israeli soldier in the 
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occupied territories by stabbing him with a knife. In other words, he took the 
risk of revealing a part of himself related to accountability, and he did so in 
the presence of Israelis and fellow Palestinians. He abandoned the frame of a 
national master narrative, in which Palestinian suffering is almost always 
couched in terms of innocence. He admitted to be part of a wider system of 
violence, locked into a fatal cat-and-mouse game between an occupying army 
and an occupied population.  
Recalling stories about one’s own suffering and listening to stories of the 
suffering of others are important steps on dialogic engagement. What is 
missing in such compassionate listening exercises, however, is the possibility 
of gaining insight into the complicity of one’s own community. In our 
seminar on “Between Trauma and Politics,” we went, hence, a step further 
and asked each group to think about obstacles in their own community. We 
wanted each group (Israeli, Palestinian, German) to think about their own 
issues that impede intercultural understanding, and to name three such 
obstacles, none of which could explicitly or implicitly blame anyone but 
oneself. This is, admittedly, a difficult task in volatile situations of prevailing 
power asymmetries. And yet, in this seminar each group was able to name 
three such obstacles. To everyone’s surprise, one of the internal obstacles the 
Palestinian group identified on a note card read, “National Aspirations.” Both 
the Israelis and Germans had assumed that “national aspirations” were a non-
negotiable corner stone of the Palestinian large-group identity.  
In a later session, we invited the Palestinians to unfold the meaning of this 
obstacle for us. We asked them to sit together in the center of our circle, 
allowing the German and Israeli participants to eavesdrop on their 
conversation. It quickly became a lively debate among the Palestinians, 
especially since not everyone had agreed to pick “National Aspirations” as an 
example of an internal impediment to peace. When listening to their 
discussion, it occurred to the outside observer that it veered around two 
separate issues, namely “national identity” and “political aspirations.” When 
made aware of this, the Palestinians agreed. In a next step, we wrote these 
two phrases on separate cards and placed them apart in the room. I then 
invited the Palestinians to create a group sculpture for each phrase by using 
their bodies. Improvising spontaneously, they represented “National Identity” 
as a close circle of interlocked bodies, arms around each other shoulders, and 
backs turned to the outside world. It was an image of internal unity and 
solidarity. The sculptural representation of “Political Aspirations,” however, 
showed a very different image. Every Palestinian quickly scattered in the 
room, and there was absolutely no contact and connection between them. 
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The Palestinians themselves seemed most surprised by the striking 
difference of their improvised sculptures. They were equally surprised that 
they had taking the risk to show these sculptures in the presence of 
Israelis/Jews and Germans. It unsettled them. It caused a profound moment 
of cultural disorientation—the very condition that sociologist Sztompka 
theorized as essential for the active framing of a cultural trauma. A shift from 
“disorientation towards cultural trauma,” he argues, manifests itself when 
“tensions and clashes are perceived and experienced as problems, as 
something troubling or painful that demands healing” (2000, p. 455). It was 
as if we just witnessed a resituating of understanding of history and a 
reframing of grievances by an oppressed group. The sculpture “National 
Identity” anchored the Palestinians in a tight-knit circle of communal 
support; but “Political Aspirations” split them apart, literally displacing them 
and leaving them in a state of political incoherence.  
Revealing an internal tension in the social body of one’s own community 
in the presence of those with whom one lives in enmity is part of the posture 
of unsettling empathy. It requires risk-taking. It unsettles what one perceives 
as reality as it also unsettles what others expect of you.  
Unsettling empathy, as I tried to demonstrate with these examples, is 
different from a mere act of compassion. Compassionate listening may just 
confirm what one already anticipates: to listen to the other’s master narrative 
of national suffering (and Palestinians and Israelis have mastered the art of 
telling such stories to each other in mutual indignation). Unsettling empathy, 
however, leaves people shaken up in their assumptions about themselves and 
others, and this is precisely what is needed for transformation to occur.  
Outlook 
There are no miracles in reconciliatory processes. There are likewise no 
magic bullets in dialogic engagement with the past in the presence of those 
perceived as Others. When, a few years ago, I facilitated a weeklong seminar 
in Beit Jalah, West Banks, no one could claim that it brought peace to the 
Middle East. Yet, evidence of transformative change does not lie in miracles. 
Rather, it reveals itself in small signs, such as the exchange of a brief gesture 
between a Palestinian young man from Ramallah, who had been angry and 
spouting politicized phrases for much of the time, and an orthodox young 
woman from the suburbs of Tel Aviv, who never had met Palestinians before 
on a personal level. As these two young people were standing in line for 
lunch, they exchanged a friendly poke with their elbows and smiled at each 
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other. If success were measured by standards of grand political solutions 
alone, such dialogical exchange would be disappointing. And yet, such a 
gesture captures the effectiveness of creating dialogical frames in intractable 
situations: the little poke with the elbow (with no further words exchanged) 
was all that these two people were able to muster at that time. Amidst 
cultivated mistrust and political hatred it signaled the possibility of a different 
symbolic order. 
We have to seek out opportunities where we can cultivate different 
symbolic orders and practice caring responsiveness. Unsettling empathy is 
part of our responsiveness toward each other. To the degree that injustices, 
trauma, and injuries are unequally distributed, the posture of unsettling 
empathy may, at times, make firmer moral and political demands on people 
who find themselves in a privileged position or who are beneficiaries of past 
and present injustices. Yet, unsettling empathy can never function as a one-
way exchange. We must proceed in mutual recognition of our shared 
responsiveness to each other. It is mutual responsiveness that leads to 
transformation.  
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Chapter 6 
Interrupting Cycles of Repetition: Creating Spaces for 
Dialogue, Facing and Mourning the Past 
Facing and Mourning the Past 
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela 
University of the Free State 
Introduction 
This chapter explores how a psychoanalytic framework might deepen 
understanding of some aspects of the work of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission that facilitated moments of transformation in the 
relationship between victims and perpetrators. The aim of the chapter is 
twofold. First, I will argue that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) was a unique dialogic space that enabled the emergence of new 
subjectivities in the encounter between victims and perpetrators. Second, I 
will use the TRC context as a frame of reference for psychoanalytic reflection 
on the complex dynamics of what I refer to as the empathy-remorse-
forgiveness cycle and its relationship to mourning and working through the 
past. A key element to be discussed is the aspect of concern and care for “the 
other” that is linked to this transformative cycle in the dialogue between 
victim and perpetrator. The overall goal of the chapter is the re-envisioning of 
psychoanalysis in a way that responds to social issues that affect the 
contemporary world. The discussion contributes to a growing body of work 
that aims to employ psychoanalysis outside its traditional clinical context to 
deepen understanding of processes of transformation and change in social 
context after systematic oppression and political violence.  
My discussion of the TRC in the following pages is in no way meant to 
ignore the problems South Africa faces today—crowd violence that often 
leads to brutal killings, xenophobic violence, unspeakable forms of rape, and 
reports of violence committed by the police against civilians. Some may 
attribute the violence in South Africa to the “failures” of the TRC, and may 
say that South Africa has not lived up to the dazzling image of change and 
transformation that the TRC promised. Yet I believe that the answer to the 
question “What is going on here?” is more complex than these views would 
suggest. One area of concern is the abuse of power by government officials, 
accompanied by patronage and corruption, rather than actions that would 
contribute to the development of communities in order to break the cycles of 
114 Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela  
poverty and humiliation. The issues of mourning I will discuss here do not 
address the deeper issues of the daily humiliation faced by the majority of 
Black people, who live at the margins of South African society. Some of the 
most destructive acts of violence to the human soul are the subtle, systematic 
acts that undermine the dignity and sense of worth of individuals, the 
insidious acts of violence that destroy their psychological and spiritual 
integrity. Brown (2008) refers to the “insidious trauma” that results from 
ongoing depravity, humiliation, and degradation, rather than from spectacular 
and extraordinary violence. The problem in South Africa cannot be explained 
solely as the result of unmourned trauma transmitted from the parents’ 
generation. The post-apartheid generation is living through its own traumas 
of a life of humiliation. The work of the TRC is perhaps what needs to 
happen again in South Africa, while at the same time addressing these 
problems of humiliation.  
The Birth of an Idea: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
In February 1991, a year after Nelson Mandela’s release from prison, the 
ANC began releasing prisoners being held in its various detention camps. 
Reports about some of the grave maltreatment suffered by detainees at the 
hands of the ANC soon emerged in the press. Later that year, the ANC set up 
a commission of inquiry to investigate these allegations. Heated debates 
raged within the ANC about how to respond to these damning reports of 
abuse committed by its members in violation of a code of conduct adopted in 
June 1985 (see Sachs, 2009; Ellis, 1994). It was in the context of these 
debates that the idea was put forward to extend investigations of gross human 
rights violations to atrocities committed by state functionaries under the new 
regime. According to the commission that investigated these crimes, most of 
the witnesses who testified about the severe ill-treatment they had suffered in 
the detention camps sought mainly “simple justice: a recognition that they 
have been wronged and assistance to rebuild their lives” (Report of the 
Skweyiya Commission, 1992). When the TRC was established to investigate 
gross human rights violations, the need for such recognition was one of the 
central principles guiding its work. Thus, the public element of the TRC and 
the issue of accountability were key features of its work, features 
distinguishing it from the dozen other truth commissions convened in other 
parts of the globe. As a “victim-centered” space, the TRC made the trauma of 
victims visible, allowing them to break their silence. Perhaps more important, 
as a public process “performed” on the national stage, the TRC served a 
narrative function that went beyond the individual victims’ testimonies. 
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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission as Emotional 
Container 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established through an act of 
Parliament, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995. 
This was the culmination of a series of debates within the ANC during the 
negotiation process following Nelson Mandela’s release. At the heart of these 
debates was the question of how to deal with human rights abuses committed 
in the past under the apartheid regime, and whether to prosecute perpetrators 
of these crimes or grant them blanket amnesty. There was consensus among 
the negotiators that prosecutions would undermine the already fragile 
peaceful transition to democracy. Violence by extremist groups both left and 
right was already evident: bombings by right-wing organizations and armed 
attacks on civilians by the Pan-African Liberation Army. Moreover, the 
outgoing apartheid government, the National Party, wanted assurance that 
those who carried out its policies of human rights abuses would not be 
prosecuted. As one of two main parties in the negotiations, the National Party 
refused to support the transition to democracy and the holding of all-race 
elections without the constitutional guarantee of amnesty for security police, 
members of the South African Defence Force, and other perpetrators of gross 
human rights violations who were part of the apartheid machinery of 
violence. The negotiating political parties agreed to establish a mechanism 
for granting amnesty under specific conditions. Those conditions included the 
requirement that applicants testify in public about the crimes they committed, 
fully disclosing the nature of the crimes and those who ordered them. The 
rationale for the provision of amnesty was outlined in the post-amble of the 
Interim Constitution of 1993 in the section “National Unity and 
Reconciliation”: past violations of human rights should be “addressed on the 
basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for 
reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation. 
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be 
granted in respect of acts, omissions and offenses associated with political 
objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past.” 
 It is worth noting that the reference to the need for understanding and 
for ubuntu suggests a particular orientation to the work of the TRC, one that 
is specific to the South African cultural context. The concept of ubuntu is an 
ethic based on the understanding that one’s subjectivity is inextricably 
intertwined with that of others in one’s community. From the perspective of 
ubuntu, all people are valued as part of the human community and worthy of 
being so recognized. This entails not blind acceptance of others, no matter 
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what they do, but rather an orientation of openness to others and a reciprocal 
caring that fosters a sense of solidarity. Ubuntu is often associated with the 
concept of self “I am because we are,”1 which stands in contrast to the 
Cartesian “I think, therefore I am.” While recognizing the role of the 
individual, ubuntu values a sense of solidarity with others—the individual 
always in relation—rather than individual autonomy.  
It seems to me, however, that the meaning of ubuntu is best captured in 
the isiXhosa2 expression Umntu ngumntu ngabanye abantu. Literally 
translated, this means, “A person is a person through being witnessed by, and 
engaging in reciprocal witnessing of other persons,” or “A person becomes a 
human being through the multiplicity of relationships with others.” The 
meaning conveyed by the expression is twofold. First, subjectivity depends 
on being witnessed; the richness of subjectivity flows from interconnected-
ness with the wider community, and from the reciprocal caring and 
complementarity of human relationships. Second, the phrase conveys the 
kind of reciprocity that calls on people to be ethical subjects. Mutual 
recognition is fundamental to being a fellow human being, a relational 
subject in the context of community. A person with ubuntu “is open and 
available to others, is affirming to others. . . . My humanity caught up, is 
inextricably bound up, in yours” (Tutu, 1999, p. 31).  
Evoking the ethic of ubuntu in the post-amble of the Interim Constitution 
at the beginning of the transition to democracy conveyed a central message in 
the work of the TRC. The message pointed toward the building of a society 
in which people could come together and be fellow human beings sharing in 
the vision of a more humane society, one inspired by an ethic of ubuntu. In 
this vision, the pursuit of reconciliation was a moral imperative, because in 
South Africa victims and perpetrators live in the same country. After the 
genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, similar processes were established, 
including the National Reconciliation Commission and the gacaca “courts,” a 
traditional process of dealing with conflict between people and within 
communities. In the majority of cases in Rwanda, after the genocide 
survivors continued to live as neighbors with perpetrators or, in cases where 
the latter are serving long prison sentences, with their families. In South 
Africa, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act was passed 
in 1995, after the country’s first democratic elections. The TRC was formally 
                                                          
1  This expression, “I am because we are” has become parlance for ubuntu. Yet it is impossible 
to translate the expression in any African language, certainly not in any of the ten of the 
eleven official languages in South Africa. 
2  IsiXhosa is the African language mainly spoken in the Western Cape and Eastern Cape 
regions of South Africa. 
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established under the leadership of Archbishop Desmond Tutu in December 
1995. 
Tutu was an important presence and central figure in the “holding 
community” and facilitative environment of the TRC, what Prager (2008) 
refers to as the “redressive community” in which “lovingness and 
protectiveness can become reactivated” (p. 415). The TRC provided this 
Winnicottian “holding” function, by virtue of its public nature and the diverse 
and trusted group of South Africans that presided over it.  
Concern about victims was central in debates about the TRC, and the 
negotiating parties clearly recognised the significance of public testimony as 
an important step in the restoration of victims’ dignity. This public aspect of 
the TRC was unique among truth commissions at the time, most notably the 
Chilean truth commission on which the TRC was loosely modeled. 
An Exchange of Identifications: Making Public Spaces Intimate  
The complex field of relational encounters and the possibilities unfolding at 
public hearings of the TRC extended far beyond the actual stage of TRC 
hearings.3 It encompassed the wider audience “present” as witnesses to what 
was happening on the national stage through the live broadcast of the 
testimonies, and through the weekly televised programs that re-presented the 
trauma testimonies. Elsewhere I have used the metaphor “making public 
spaces intimate” (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2008b; c) to describe how the internal 
and external overlapping of a matrix of emotions and memories in the TRC 
fostered the emergence of new forms of subjectivity extending to a much 
wider terrain than the audience actually present at the hearings. The power of 
this broader relational context in the wider social milieu paved the way for a 
range of identifications and reciprocal influences that are difficult to imagine 
in prosecutorial responses to historical trauma (e.g., the Nuremberg trials in 
the aftermath of the Holocaust). The TRC approach was unique in that by 
adopting an invitational stance—rather than an adversarial one—perpetrators 
were asked to “give full disclosure” of the crimes they committed in 
exchange for amnesty. Without the threat of punishment, and with the 
                                                          
3  For a poignant example of the impact of the trauma testimonies beyond the halls where the 
hearings were held, see the story of the (White) South African artist Judith Mason and her 
artwork titled “The Blue Dress” (discussed in Gobodo-Madikizela, Fish, and Shefer 2014). 
Mason was moved to tears by the testimony she heard over the radio while working in her 
studio about a black woman activist who was murdered because she refused to succumb to 
torture. This story, which was related to the TRC by the perpetrators responsible for the 
murder, inspired Mason’s artwork. 
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promise of amnesty for truth telling, perpetrators were inspired to admit guilt 
rather than disown it. Thus, it was possible to face and, for some at least, to 
feel their guilt. This is an important distinction, because one can simply “face 
up” to what one has done, acknowledging it at an intellectual level, without 
taking responsibility for the horrific deeds committed, and instead 
externalizing blame. It is as if the person were saying, “I give you what you 
want, full disclosure. Here is the list of evil deeds in which I participated 
under orders.” I will revisit the points I make here in my discussion of 
splitting as a characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position.  
In contrast, feeling the burden of guilt goes beyond acknowledgment to 
recognize that one’s actions have caused injury and led to a rupture in one’s 
human community, and that by the very fact of one’s participation in those 
acts, one excluded oneself from the realm of humanity. It is this recognition 
of alienation from the bonds of human community, and a deep sense of guilt 
about it—a feeling of brokenness at one’s inner core of humanness—that 
makes remorse possible. Perpetrators’ subject position of guilt for the crimes 
they committed—rather than the position of innocence “until proven 
guilty”—is the context within which a new perpetrator subjectivity unfolds, 
one that seeks integration of the uncomfortable reality within the self at a 
deeper internal level. Remorse can be a painful affect (Gobodo-Madikizela, 
2002; 2003), because it involves facing the past and its uncomfortable and 
internally unsettling truths. Remorse is also an important moment of 
recognition of the self in relation to the other, a crucial step in the mourning 
process. 
Remorse: The “Royal Road” to Forgiveness  
Most scholars discussing forgiveness from a psychoanalytic perspective 
recognize the crucial relationship between remorse and forgiveness. While 
most of this literature on forgiveness identifies mourning as a central element 
in forgiveness (see, e.g., Akhtar, 2002; Horwitz, 2005; Alford, 2013), the link 
between mourning and remorse has not always been explicit. “Probably the 
most significant psychoanalytic contribution to forgiveness is to see it as one 
possible outcome of grief and mourning over loss” (Alford, 2013, p. 320). 
Similarly, Horwitz (2005) refers to mourning as one of the “antecedents of 
the capacity to forgive” (p. 494). Horwitz makes no mention of remorse in 
his elaboration of the role of mourning in forgiveness. Alford engages in a 
profound discussion of forgiveness by linking it to Winnicottian transitional 
experience. He mentions remorse without necessarily linking it to mourning. 
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A possible reason for the paucity of psychoanalytic research on remorse and 
its relationship to forgiveness is that psychoanalytic discussions of 
forgiveness are mainly of the kind that occurs either as self-forgiveness or 
between patient and analyst (Doyle, 1999; Lansky, 2007; Benjamin, 2004; 
Horwitz, 2005; Person, 2007). Very rarely is forgiveness discussed in the 
literature as a response to gross human rights violations, between victims of 
historical trauma and perpetrators of mass atrocity, the kind I am concerned 
with here.  
Mourning is associated with the “working through” of loss, which 
requires acknowledging and taking in the loss and confronting the negative 
aspects of the subject’s experience, as well as the subject’s self- and object 
representations. At the core of the inability to mourn is splitting, an 
intrapsychic mechanism by which contradictory thoughts, feelings, or aspects 
of the self (and the other) are kept apart. The Kleinian concept of “making 
reparations” is useful in explaining how the inability to mourn can be 
resolved. “Making reparations” is also a fitting expression for the 
unconscious internal dialogue that unfolds when perpetrators of gross human 
rights violations break away from the splitting that perpetuates states of 
denial. In their own process of mourning, perpetrators reflect on their deeds 
and the destruction they have caused the victim. They express acknowledg-
ment based on a clear sense of appreciation and understanding of what the 
victim has gone through because of their actions. This enables perpetrators 
genuinely to confront their guilt. Remorse emerges in this reparative state of 
mind. 
In her discussion of shame and guilt, Klein (1975) argues that the 
grievances we harbor against our parents for the wrongs they have 
committed, and for having frustrated us with their denial of those wrongs, 
give rise to feelings of hate and revenge against them. These feelings are 
internalized, and they become internal representations of the problematic 
relationship with our parents. At the same time, these feelings of hate and 
revenge lead to guilt and despair for the injury that they have caused the 
parents we love. Klein then argues that the process of undoing this labyrinth 
of conflicting emotions requires making reparations to the internal objects: 
“by playing at the same time the parts of loving parents and loving children . 
. . we make good the injuries which we did in phantasy, and for which we 
still unconsciously feel very guilty” (pp. 312–313). The capacity for making 
reparations in the internal object world, integrating the split-off “good” and 
“bad” of experience into a reasonably coherent whole is the basis on which 
mourning is established.  
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Splitting is more than simply rendering separate the disparate parts of self 
and other. It is holding on to, and identifying with, one aspect of the 
narrative. In the context of gross human rights violations, a victim’s hatred is 
sustained because the external reality offers nothing else—the other is evil 
because he or she represents the evil system. In Kleinian terms, splitting is 
characterized as the paranoid-schizoid position. The notion of “position” is a 
useful one, as it suggests the possibility of movement toward transformation 
and perhaps transcendence. The “opposite side” of the paranoid-schizoid 
position is the depressive position, and, accordingly, the depressive position 
points to the resolution and working through of splitting. This is when the 
reparative process of mourning unfolds. 
Following Klein, Durham (2000) has argued that the capacity for making 
reparations in the internal object world is the basis on which empathy for 
others is established. I consider empathy central in both remorse and 
forgiveness. Both involve a “working through” of the depressive position. 
The perpetrator must own his destructiveness and come to terms with the loss 
of a lifelong identity as an agent of destructive laws in a repressive state. 
Remorse, a phenomenon imbued with the capacity to hold the ambivalence of 
both the good and the bad of the subject, is a sign of mourning, a working 
through of the depressive position and movement away from paranoid-
schizoid splitting. In the context of victim-perpetrator dialogue, then, and if 
the victim is sufficiently open to an awareness of the good—or “good-
enough”—that is emerging in the perpetrator through expression of remorse, 
the dialogue can lead to internalization of the perpetrator as a good object, 
which is a foundation of the victim’s own work of mourning. The work of 
“repair” in these dialogues therefore entails a reciprocal, mutually facilitative 
process that leads to the acceptance of loss and a coming to terms with it. The 
intersubjective collaboration that evolves in this context expands the victim 
and perpetrator’s awareness of each other. Benjamin (2004) describes this as 
“a relation in which each person experiences the other as a ‘like subject,’ 
another mind who can be ‘felt with,’ yet has a distinct, separate center of 
feeling and perception” (p. 5).  
The perpetrator’s remorse conveys genuine concern; no longer is the 
victim seen as a dehumanised object to be destroyed. For the victim, 
mourning involves the “working through of one’s anger, and putting the 
offense into the context of an integrated view of the whole person of the 
offender” (Horwitz 2005, p. 485). What Horwitz suggests here is that the 
underlying process that inspires forgiving involves reflection and developing 
an understanding of the other, as well as gaining some degree of insight into 
what motivated one to engage in the painful and cruel action. Horwitz wants 
 Facing and Mourning the Past 121 
to draw our attention to the intrapsychic dynamic at work in the process of 
forgiving and, in particular, to the pivotal turn to unconscious perspective-
taking, which leads to an integrated view of the other. Within this frame of 
reflective engagement with the past and coming to terms with it, we find the 
essence of a stance similar to the empathic mode of observation, which 
Kohut (1977) says is essential for understanding a patient’s inner life in a 
way that can influence change. This is an example of how a psychoanalytic 
framework can deepen understanding of aspects of the TRC that facilitated 
change in the relationship between victim and perpetrator, such as the 
emergence of remorse and forgiveness. My application of psychoanalytic 
theory also includes moments of empathic failure, or resistance to change in 
the TRC. These are questions rarely ever explored in contexts outside the 
consulting room, such as the social or even the literary context. 
Examining the psychoanalytic dynamics of phenomena like forgiveness 
using literary texts instead of clinical vignettes is a common practice among 
psychoanalysts and scholars who apply psychoanalytic theory to their 
research. For instance, Shakespearean plays feature prominently in 
psychoanalytic journals as subjects of psychoanalytic investigation; Lansky’s 
illustration (2001) of the relationship between shame and forgiveness in The 
Tempest is an excellent example. Engaging both literary texts and real-life 
stories as a frame of reference for psychoanalytic reflection on the complex 
dynamics of human action in social contexts can bring us closer to ways in 
which we might broaden our understanding of the construction of meaning, 
and strengthen and enliven psychoanalytic debates about the conditions that 
facilitate positive change after violence.  
In presenting the TRC as a context for examining the psychoanalytic 
dimensions of remorse and forgiveness, my aim is twofold. First, the 
discussion contributes to a growing body of work that aims to employ 
psychoanalysis outside its traditional clinical context to deepen understanding 
of processes of transformation and change in social context in the aftermath 
of political conflict. For example, in June 2015, the opening plenary session 
of the American Psychoanalytic Association (APsaA) meeting in San 
Francisco addressed the problem of psychoanalysts’ blind spots with regard 
to racism, and the silencing of issues of race within APsaA. With the 
establishment of the South African Psychoanalysis Initiative (SAPI), now 
IPA-accredited, and the South African Psychoanalytical Association (SAPA), 
similar introspective reflections and discussions about a “socially relevant 
psychoanalysis” are now under way in South Africa. As a response to the 
issues raised in these debates about the need for a socially relevant 
psychoanalysis, conferences organized by SAPI have addressed topics such 
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as race, embodiment, trauma, and remorse and forgiveness. Raphael-Leff 
(2014) describes the 2013 SAPI conference titled “Trauma, Remorse, and 
Forgiveness” as “a heady mixture of new discovery and troubled self-
examination in the context of a slowly recovering traumatised society” (p. 
118). Here I use a psychoanalytic lens to highlight real-life experiences that 
might yield insight into what “coming to terms with the past” means, and 
how change and transformation in a social context might be facilitated.  
Intergenerational mistrust, hatred, and resentment born out of violence—
both the physical kind and the kind that results from decades of humiliation, 
carried across generations—create boundaries between self and others in 
relationships both in the external world and in the world of internal objects. 
My second aim is to explore how dialogue can facilitate the emergence of 
unexpected moments that might create connections instead of deepening and 
widening these boundaries. These connections open up new relational 
experiences that can help heal historical ruptures. Connection with others is 
fundamental in the theory of intersubjectivity (Stolorow & Atwood, 1996), 
and experience and subjectivity are shaped by these relationships of 
interaction with others. 
Jordan (2001) and her colleagues at the Wellesley Stone Center have 
observed that the need and proclivity for “connection” is central to human 
development. They are correct in arguing for the primacy of interconnected-
ness, a concept of development of self in interaction with others. Debunking 
the “separate self” model of human development, Jordan notes that Freud 
(1920) once wrote that “protection against stimuli is an almost more 
important function for the living organism than reception of stimuli” (p. 27). 
“Yet,” she writes, “from a relational perspective, a ‘boundary’ could be 
conceived of as a place of meeting and exchange with the surrounding milieu 
rather than as a place of protection from it” (Jordan, 2001, p. 93). 
Jordan provides a crucial counterposition to a bias that has dominated the 
field of psychoanalysis for too long, and I suggest (though with some 
reservations) that the reconception of “boundary” as “a place of meeting and 
exchange” recognises certain ethical potentialities and draws attention to 
Martin Buber’s notion of the “vital reciprocity” of human relationships 
(Agassi, 1999, p. 84). I would certainly agree with Abram (1997) that “the 
boundaries of a living body are open and indeterminate; more like 
membranes than barriers, they define a surface of metamorphosis and 
exchange” (p. 46).  
The intersubjective epistemological model has broadened the notion of 
the intrapscyhic realm beyond its individualistic confines. Going beyond this 
idea of the “internal unconscious/intrapsychic” as a concept that refers 
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exclusively to what is happening inside the mind of the subject, 
contemporary psychoanalytic thought now views the development of the self 
as occurring in relation to the other. The subtleties of the dynamic at play in 
the dialogic interaction between victim and perpetrator are shaped by the 
reciprocal influence and mutual awareness that develops in the intersubjec-
tive field created by the victim-perpetrator dyad. Thus, the resonance that 
unfolds in this interactive process, the capacity to enter into the other’s 
feeling state, and the intrapsychic transformation that evolves profoundly 
influence the emergence of remorse and forgiveness.  
What of Arendt’s canonical argument (1998) about acts of “radical evil” 
that are neither forgivable nor punishable? This is a question posed by 
Young-Bruehl (2009), a psychoanalyst and Arendt’s biographer. In her 
reflection on insights from Tutu (1999), and from my analysis (Gobodo-
Madikizela, 2003) of interviews with both the apartheid government’s most 
notorious perpetrator, Eugene de Kock, and families of his victims who 
expressed forgiveness for him after meeting him following his testimony 
before the TRC, Young-Bruehl concludes that the potential to forgive cannot 
be radically destroyed. She explains her departure from the Arendtian 
canonical stance as follows:  
When Arendt said of radically evil deeds that all we know about them is that ‘we 
can neither punish nor forgive such offenses and that they thus transcend the 
realm of human affairs . . .,’ she, who had the most profound understanding of the 
nature of human power and its distinction from violence, was, I think, underesti-
mating the potentialities of human power, which includes the power to forgive. A 
person always has the power to forgive, acting in relationship with the one 
forgiven . . . (p. 122). 
“Acting in relationship”—the intersubjective encounter—makes possible the 
moments of acknowledgment, recognition, and validation of victims. 
Arendt’s insights about “the unforgivable” were developed at a time when the 
transformative possibilities that have come to be associated with the TRC, 
where victims/survivors could confront perpetrators and demand answers, 
and perpetrators in turn could experience remorse—was unthinkable. Debates 
in the twentieth century about dealing with the past were dominated by 
responses to the Holocaust. By the end of the twentieth century, the work of 
the TRC had introduced new language that opened new avenues of inquiry. 
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On Witnessing, TRC Testimonies and their Transformative 
Possibilities  
In cases of political trauma, where the trauma has a collective or shared 
aspect, individual trauma testimonies transcend the individual—they extend 
beyond the personal to the collective and cultural. Exposure to psychological-
ly traumatic events leads to a profound disruption in the capacity to organize 
aspects of one’s experience into a narrative. Narrative and storytelling are 
important means by which individuals and communities make sense of their 
experiences. Traumatic events are too painful to be integrated into the overall 
landscape of one’s life. They cannot be contained within the normal linguistic 
and narrative structures. Instead of assimilation into narrative memory, 
traumatic experiences often take on a timelessness (Langer 1993), living on, 
being relived and acted out in various ways that reflect fragmented 
temporality, or “time out of synchrony . . . [where] the present is without 
end,” to appropriate Blanchot’s phrase (1992, p. 44).  
In their testimonies, survivors who suffered under apartheid want to lay to 
rest the memory of the pain and abuse of the past, not in order to forget, but 
rather to heal their own brokenness and that of their community, to reclaim 
the dignity of the living and the dignity and respect of loved ones who 
suffered dehumanization in life and in death. In this sense, then, the 
testimonies are not just to get the listeners’ “affirmation and validation,” as I 
have suggested elsewhere (Gobodo-Madikizela 2012, p. 253). Felman and 
Laub (1992) have applied a similar interpretation in their discussion of 
testimonies. They suggest that the testimonies are deployed “essentially in 
order to address another, to impress upon a listener, to appeal to a 
community” (p. 204). This formulation of the purpose of trauma testimonies 
gives power to the listener as the one to bestow recognition on survivors and 
their suffering. This, too, happens. Viewed as assertion of agency and 
assertion of the dignity of one’s community, however, trauma testimonies 
seek a response from the witness, but in order to wrest away from 
perpetrators and from the dominant culture the fiat power to destroy. It is part 
of ridding oneself and the collective memory of one’s community of the 
subject position of the dehumanized other.  
Although Holocaust testimonies still occupy center stage in the literature 
on testimony, scholarly debates on testimony cover a range of historical 
traumas globally (in Latin America, American slavery, and in stories of “the 
stolen generation” in Australia). Since publication of works by Felman and 
Laub (1992), Langer (1993), and Caruth (1995; 1996), and especially since 
9/11, discussions on trauma testimonies in the United States have gained 
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great prominence. Some of the insight gleaned from this literature is, 
however, not generalizable to other contexts. Laub, for example, in his 
discussion of the relationship between trauma testimonies and the listener, 
describes the role of the listener: “The listener, therefore, is a party to the 
creation of knowledge de novo. The testimony to the trauma thus includes its 
hearer, who is, so to speak, the blank screen on which the event comes to be 
inscribed for the first time” (Felman & Laub, 1992, p. 57). 
The notion that a listener—or “secondary witness” (LaCapra, 2001, p. 
97)— participates as a “blank screen,” requires critical examination. In 
countries like South Africa and Rwanda, where victims, perpetrators, and 
beneficiaries of oppressive regimes are present in the audience as “secondary 
witnesses,” victim testimonies confront not only perpetrators with their guilt, 
but also stir up the conscience of beneficiaries about their complicity. In the 
case of beneficiaries of oppressive regimes, victims’ testimonies cannot be 
regarded as falling on a “blank screen,” because beneficiaries know about the 
traumas suffered by victims under the repressive regimes in which they, as 
beneficiaries, led a life of privilege.  
LaCapra’s reflections on secondary witnessing (2009), and the distinction 
he makes between identification, empathy or compassion, and “empathic 
unsettlement,” raise important questions regarding the unavoidably 
problematic nature of witnessing and also indicate the limits of understanding 
the experience of an other: “I would argue that there may well, perhaps even 
should, be a form of empathic unsettlement in the commentator who 
addresses the traumatic experiences of others . . .” (p. 65). 
LaCapra (2004) distinguishes two forms of impact of traumatic 
testimonies on the listener. In the first, the listener is vicariously affected by 
the trauma testimony. The problem with vicarious traumatic impact, argues 
LaCapra, is that the listener identifies so strongly with the witness that he or 
she takes on the role of “surrogate victim,” and that this blurs the line 
between the trauma of the witness and the secondary witness’s vicarious 
experience of this trauma. The other way the secondary witness may be 
affected is the “virtual” experience of trauma, in which the secondary witness 
puts him- or herself in the victim’s shoes “while respecting the difference 
between self and other” (p. 125). LaCapra then refers to this “virtual” 
experience of trauma as “empathic unsettlement,” which he considers the 
desirable kind of empathy because it recognizes “that one cannot take the 
victim’s place” (p. 125). It is respectful of the other and “does not mean 
identification . . . appropriation or incorporation” (LaCapra, 2009, p. 66). 
On the one hand, Laub’s concept of the “blank screen” (Felman & Laub, 
1992, p. 57) suggests a blank slate on which the story of the victim’s trauma 
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becomes inscribed on the listener without the listener’s agency. On the other 
hand, LaCapra’s “empathic unsettlement” suggests that the listener responds 
empathically to the victim’s trauma testimony while at the same time 
engaging reflectively with his or her response in order to distinguish between 
the witness’s trauma and the listener’s virtual traumatic experience. Yet there 
is something in both Laub’s and LaCapra’s formulations that falls short of an 
adequate explanatory framework for the transformative possibilities 
witnessed at TRC public hearings. The “empathic unsettlement” that emerges 
goes beyond the notion of “virtual” experience, a term that is problematic 
because it suggests an event that manifests only in the brain, rather than 
through shifts in the intrapsychic and intersubjective relational realms. It is a 
response that, to borrow a phrase from Stern (1985), arises from affective 
attunement with the other.  
Empathy and Caring-For: Victims’ Responsibility to the 
Perpetrators 
Kohut (1984) defined empathy as “the capacity to think and feel oneself into 
the inner life of another person” (p. 82). Other definitions of empathy are 
aligned with this view of empathic responsiveness (e.g., Stern’s “affect 
attunement”). Neuroscientific insights on empathy have largely dealt with the 
biological roots of this resonant connection in the worlds of self, objects, and 
others. Yet an aspect of empathy that has received scant scholarly attention is 
the component of care for the other that sometimes emerges in the context of 
empathic responsiveness. Caring goes beyond “mirroring” or feeling into the 
mental state of an other. It arises from the moment-by-moment negotiation of 
the intersubjective relationship between actors, as well as from introspection 
and ongoing mutual reflection, and it involves making sense of the 
intersubjective experience of empathic resonance. In this desire-to-care-for-
the-other aspect of empathy, the empathic response of the victim is imbued 
with a quality of wishing to “rescue” the remorseful perpetrator, as if to 
affirm his identity as a member of the human community (instead of a 
“monster” or “evil one”). This desire to rescue the perpetrator, I argue, 
constitutes the fundamental moment, a pivotal point in the intersubjective 
context in which forgiving feelings emerge.  
The word forgiveness, I argue further, is the wrong word for describing 
what unfolds in these victim-perpetrator encounters. Forgiveness seems to 
suggest a fixed position, or a coming to an end—“I offer you forgiveness so 
that I can have closure and move on.” There is a subtext here that seems to 
 Facing and Mourning the Past 127 
signify an act of leaving something behind, moving on without looking back. 
This is evocative of the notion of “letting go” in the stages theory of 
forgiveness advocated by Enright and North (1998). The notion of “letting 
go” has also been used in psychoanalytic explications of forgiveness. 
Horwitz (2005), for example, associates letting go with the process of 
mourning. However, if we consider the movement toward a forgiving attitude 
as inspired by mourning, then forgiveness should be seen as a transition from 
the paranoid-schizoid position and a working through of the depressive 
position. Accordingly, a characteristic of the latter is the integration of 
disparate aspects of one’s self- and object representations. These aspects must 
be owned as part of the self, the loss that brought about the rupture must be 
mourned, and the transition to forgiveness must be worked through. 
Something else grows in the place of whatever it was that prevented 
connection to the other—anger, resentment, desire for revenge, etc. “Letting 
go” does not capture this subtlety.  
Perhaps we might think of what takes place in victim-perpetrator 
encounters as “the emergence of the unexpected.” A certain degree of caring 
for the other evolves from being witnesses to each other’s pain—the 
“witnessing dance” (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2008c) that brings survivor and 
perpetrator into step with each other, into the spiral movement of a new 
intersubjective context that edges them toward the center of possibility, and 
then upward toward the apex of transformation. The new intersubjective 
context that emerges allows for integration and containment, rather than 
“letting go.” Acknowledgment that bears responsibility, that conveys 
compassion and care, and that is prepared to enter the pain of the other: this is 
what is crucial for this transformative process.  
The development of the capacity for empathy is deeply embedded in early 
childhood development, and Fonagy and Target (1996; 1997) refer to this 
developmental process as mentalization, the capacity to reflect on one’s 
mental state and that of others. Mentalization might also be considered the 
capacity to engage imaginatively with the mental state of an other. While I 
would hesitate to reduce empathy to an imaginative act, there does seem to be 
something in considering the part that the human capacity for imagination 
plays in the desire to understand the experience of others. More extraordinary 
is the idea that the imagination is necessary even to recognize the existence, 
the human beingness, of the other. This is what seems to be suggested by 
Benjamin’s conceptualization (1990; 1999; 2004) of “mutual recognition” as 
the core of intersubjectivity through which “the subject gradually becomes 
able to recognize the other person’s subjectivity” (Benjamin, 1990, p. 33). 
The idea of a “gradual” process that leads to recognition is suggestive of an 
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ongoing dialogue with self and with the other (as well as with internal 
“others”) in a way that allows one to continually test, through multiple levels 
of reflective engagement, one’s perceptions of the other. The process occurs 
both internally and externally, through language and other, more subtle forms 
of nonverbal dialogue.  
Linda and Peter Biehl’s work with the killers of their daughter, Amy 
Biehl, illustrates the idea of expression of care beyond empathic resonance. 
Amy Biehl was a Stanford University student on a Fulbright scholarship in 
South Africa. She was stabbed to death when, as part of her work with a 
nonprofit organization, she visited a Black township in Cape Town with a 
group of colleagues from the nonprofit. Her killers’ remorseful submission to 
the TRC led the Biehls to support their amnesty application. When the TRC 
granted amnesty to the men, Peter and Linda Biehl arranged skills training 
for them and offered them positions in the Amy Biehl Foundation, which 
they had established in their daughter’s memory. “I have no hatred in my 
heart,” Linda said in an interview I conducted with her and her husband. “All 
I am concerned about is how these young men can reenter their community 
and rebuild their lives” (interview, June 2000).  
This kind of response presents a paradox. Yet it is this stance of hearing 
the perpetrator’s desire—expressed through remorse—for readmission into 
the world of shared moral humanity, and a caring-enough, that helps sustain 
the perpetrator’s remorse and prevents disintegration and a regression to the 
paranoid-schizoid position. I am beginning to think about this act or 
“gesture” of reparation on the part of victims as a “position” that goes beyond 
forgiveness, and that serves two possible functions. First, it seeks to “restore” 
the survival of the lost loved one who was murdered by the perpetrator. 
Second, by showing the kind of caring and containment that can help prevent 
disintegration in the perpetrator, the victim creates a new relational 
experience with him, which reconstitutes the memory of the loss as a positive 
narrative.  
The “caring-for” element in empathy is the result of a deeper level of 
imagination and understanding of the other’s experience. This deeper level of 
imagination takes “feeling into” the mental state of the other to another level, 
and asks the question, What should I do about it? Thus, rather than empathy 
considered simply as “resonance,” the notion of “empathic repair” (Gobodo-
Madikizela 2008a) might usefully be applied to capture the transformation 
and potential for healing that emerge from dialogic encounters between 
survivors and perpetrators. The perpetrator’s transformation stands as a 
symbol of the victim’s capacity (and, more generally, of the human capacity) 
for imagination and understanding, and of the power of empathic care that is 
 Facing and Mourning the Past 129 
inherent—always a potentiality (Young-Bruehl 2009)—in dialogic 
encounters between victims and perpetrators. The transformative possibilities 
may also be seen as pointing to the more general horizon of an ethics of care 
and responsibility for the other in the context of “dealing with the past.”  
For Kearney (1993), “imagination is indispensable to ethics,” a claim 
resting on what he regards as imagination’s “empathic powers of receptivity 
to the other” (p. 224).  
While the role of imagination in understanding pertains to its productive and 
projective powers, its role in sensible intuition expresses its ability to remain open 
to what is given from beyond itself. . . . Imagination is ethical to the extent that it 
suffers the other to be other while suffering with the other as other (p. 225).  
One might hesitate to impute to empathy and the imaginative capacity too 
many ethical potentialities (and, at best, that is what they are: potentialities). 
Regardless of the breadth of one’s conceptualization of empathy, however, 
what might one reasonably expect empathy to “do” at minimum? Edith 
Stein’s phenomenological analysis of empathy (1964) provides a possible 
point of entry:  
We could proceed from the complete, concrete phenomenon before us in our 
experiential world, the phenomenon of the psycho-physical individual. . . . This 
individual is not given as a physical body, but as a sensitive, living body 
belonging to an ‘I,’ an ‘I’ that senses, thinks, feels, and wills. The living body of 
this ‘I’ not only fits into my phenomenal world but is itself the centre of 
orientation of such a phenomenal world. It faces this world and communicates 
with me (p. 6). 
Stein is pointing here to the importance of a deeper level of recognition, one 
that goes beyond acknowledgment (which may at times simply recognize the 
other as a mere object). Reciprocal recognition of the other’s humanity, 
acknowledging the reality of each other’s pain and suffering, whatever its 
source, is the kind of empathy that creates pathways to caring for the other as 
a fellow human being—remorse cannot be evil. The words of Cynthia 
Ngewu, whose son Christopher Piet was lured, along with six other young 
men from the Gugulethu Township, into a death trap by a Black police 
collaborator (they came to be known as the Gugulethu Seven), illustrate this 
point. In response to a question I asked her when I facilitated a public 
dialogue in Cape Town on the sidelines of TRC hearings, she explained her 
position on reconciliation: “This thing called reconciliation—if I am 
understanding it correctly—if it means that this man who killed Christopher 
has a chance to become human again, so that I, so that all of us... so that our 
humanity can be restored, then I agree with it. I support it” (November 1996).  
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This brings me to the point I made earlier about forgiveness being the 
wrong word. Cynthia Ngewu and other mothers of the Gugulethu Seven 
victims met with their sons’ killer, Thapelo Mbelo, at his request. The 
women expressed strong emotions, including anger at Mbelo and disdain for 
his actions, calling him a wolf in a sheep’s clothing. Yet when Mbelo 
addressed the women as he would his own mother, referring to them as “my 
parents,” and using language imbued with cultural nuance, this gave his 
expression of remorse resonance and meaning for the mothers of the victims.4 
By addressing the mothers in this way, Mbelo was drawing on the relational 
bonds in the African cultural context, and reclaiming his own sense of 
belonging within a wider community. The women’s words of forgiveness, 
with one of them referring to Mbelo as “my son,” seemed like a gesture of 
acceptance of Mbelo back into the community fold.  
Winnicott (2005), one of the first psychoanalysts to introduce “the third” 
or potential space, offers us language to reflect on the deeper significance of 
the “cultural layer” in the language used in this dialogue between the remorse 
of the perpetrator and the forgiveness of the victims’ mothers. Winnicott 
explains that human experience cannot be defined solely in terms of the polar 
realities of the internal and external worlds. There is an “intermediate area of 
experiencing,” a potential space “to which inner reality and external life both 
contribute” (p. 3). Cultural experience is linked to this “intermediate” space, 
which is the location of “the inherited tradition”; this is “the common pool of 
humanity, into which individuals and groups of people may contribute, and 
from which we may all draw if we have somewhere to put what we find” (p. 
133).  
Engaging in dialogue about the past is a multifaceted terrain. In 
considering encounters between survivors and perpetrators of gross human 
rights violations, what is perhaps necessary is shifting the lens from a focus 
on forgiveness and reconciliation (concepts that imply a goal) to 
“experience” – complicated, enigmatic, muddy, elusive, and unpredictable – 
because I think that much of what happens in these encounters remains 
implicit, and the word forgiveness falls short of adequately capturing this 
complexity.  
                                                          
4  For an extensive discussion of this encounter see Gobodo-Madikizela (2008b). 
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Conclusion  
Expressions of remorse and forgiving emerge from reciprocal recognition in 
the context of dialogue about historical pasts between victims and 
perpetrators. Remorse performs a range of other responses to historical 
trauma that are crucial in the process of mourning and working through the 
past (its traumatic as well as its guilt- and shame-inducing aspects), including 
accountability, admission of complicity, and acknowledgement (of the pain 
of the “other,” and of the guilt and shame for having caused the pain). The 
disruptive feelings of historical trauma, such as a sense of injustice, 
humiliation, and a diminished sense of identity at individual and collective 
levels, tend to persist across generations. However, as discussed in this 
chapter, historical trauma also points to the possibility of interrupting these 
cycles of repetition, when, through honest dialogue, the authenticity and 
legitimacy of another’s pain is acknowledged, and when compassion emerges 
unexpectedly, opening the door for new relational experiences to unfold.  
Creating space for dialogue that might lead to interrupting transgenera-
tional transmission of trauma may be easier to achieve in interpersonal or 
familial contexts than at the wider collective level of a society affected by 
massive collective trauma and systematic oppression. The stories of remorse, 
forgiveness and even reconciliation that came out of the South African 
TRC’s report illustrate this point. Despite the important example of the 
historical moment of the TRC, the transformative possibilities that emerged, 
and the global model of “transitional justice” that the TRC came to represent, 
a question that remains urgent is how to deal with the deep feelings of 
injustice that continue to persist among the younger generation almost 25 
years after the fall of apartheid? The urgency of this question pertains in 
almost all countries with a history of mass trauma and violence where 
victims, perpetrators and beneficiaries of oppressive regimes continue to live 
as compatriots after the end of protracted wars or internal political conflict. In 
Australia, for example, scholars like Judy Atkinson and Rosanne Kennedy 
have discussed the intergenerational repercussions of historical trauma of the 
“stolen generation” at length in several studies. Kennedy in this volume (see 
Chapter 10), sums up the challenge faced by young Aboriginal people in 
contemporary Australia with the metaphor “the poetics of survival.” 
Similarly, Jaco Barnard Naudé (this volume, Chapter 3), explores what it 
might mean to repair “the irreparable” in post-apartheid South Africa. He 
concludes that what is required is action that “proceeds from an 
acknowledgement of suffering” that goes beyond a simple “nod of the head 
to the one who has suffered untold injustice.” The kind of action that is 
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needed, he suggests, is one that begins with a “reparative citizenship … that 
would bring forth, give birth, to a future that will live up to the promise of 
‘never again’” (italics added).  
 Creating spaces for dialogue matters; the encounters between former 
enemies provide points of identification, entryways into the experience of 
others. This might open up the possibility for engaging in the kind of action 
that Barnard Naudé calls for in his chapter, action that reaches out beyond 
mere acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past, and toward a new vision of 
a reparative citizenship.  
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Introduction 
The reproduction of historical trauma and associated memories of the 
conflicted past are closely entwined with the spaces and sites where violence 
took place. In critical analysis of ‘post-conflict’ cultures, there is now a 
growing interest in these spatial manifestations and legacies of the past and 
their implications for work concerned with transforming the aftermath of 
violence, breaking cycles of trauma, and promoting reconciliation. In this 
chapter these issues are explored in relation to post-conflict spaces shaped by 
the conflict known as ‘the Troubles’ in and over Northern Ireland since 1969 
and the peace-building initiative begun in 1993-94, focusing specifically 
upon the ‘post-conflict’ city of Belfast. Since the paramilitary ceasefires of 
1994, the re-imagining and regeneration of Belfast has involved official 
strategies and a range of initiatives engaging with the spatial consequences of 
the city’s history of sectarian violence and armed political conflict. This 
activity is integral to the task of ‘deal[ing] with the legacy of the past’ in a 
context where members of the ‘divided communities’ of Ulster loyalism and 
Irish Republicanism ‘carry different experiences and understandings of the 
past in their minds’ (and in their bodies), account for the conflict in contested 
narratives of memory that attribute responsibility and blame to other parties, 
lay claims to victimhood inflicted by their enemies, and pursue historical 
justice for the wrongs they have sustained (Consultative Group on the Past, 
2009, pp. 16, 24).  
Reconciliation, defined as ‘the process of addressing conflictual and 
fractured relationships’ after conflict (Hamber & Kelly, 2005, p. 7), is always 
historical in the sense that ‘acknowledging and dealing with the past’ is one 
of its fundamental aspects. However, the process of reconciliation has a 
complex temporality, being necessarily both ‘backward– and forward–
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looking’. It is directed towards ‘developing a shared vision of an 
interdependent and fair society’ to be achieved in the future, but this requires 
breaking down ‘the culture of suspicion, fear, mistrust and violence’ 
bequeathed by past conflict, so as to enable ‘engag[ement] with others who 
are different from us’ and with whom we must work to bring about 
‘substantial social, economic and political change’ (Hamber & Kelly, 2005, 
p. 38). This work of future-oriented conflict transformation takes place within 
post-conflict spaces where legacies of the traumatic past continue to exert a 
hold and make themselves felt. How are we to understand the intertwining of 
these spatial and temporal dimensions of conflict transformation in a city 
such as Belfast?  
In recent debates in heritage studies and cultural geography, a number of 
new concepts have been proposed to inform analysis of this kind. One of the 
most suggestive is Tumarkin’s (2005) concept of ‘traumascapes’. This refers 
to ‘a distinctive category of place [...] marked by traumatic legacies of 
violence, suffering and loss’ where ‘the past is never quite over’ (pp. 12-13). 
Here, an analysis of temporal disturbance, associated with the psychic and 
physical experience of ‘[t]raumatised people [who] have to live with the past 
that refuses to go away’, is transferred to particular geographical spaces 
‘where events are experienced and re-experienced across time’ (p. 12). 
Tumarkin writes: 
Full of visual and sensory triggers, capable of eliciting a whole palette of 
emotions, traumascapes catalyse and shape remembering and reliving of traumatic 
events. It is through these places that the past, whether buried or laid bare for all 
to see, continues to inhabit and refashion the present (12) [...] At traumascapes 
[...] neither the past nor the present is disposable or infinitely malleable (p. 14).  
Tumarkin’s ‘traumascape’ evokes a sense of something residual or 
reproduced from the past in embodied geographical form; a quality of place 
that ‘elicits’ emotional responses from those who go there. Yet she also 
suggests that traumascapes are produced by cultural practices―of witnessing, 
mourning, memorializing and so on―undertaken by individuals, social 
groups and organizations that may have diverse interests in a site, and 
different or even conflicting responses to it. This question of agency in the 
production of place–based significance and affect―whether it is seen as a 
property of the space itself, or located in those who encounter or inhabit 
it―remains ambiguous.  
The problem reappears in a related concept developed to think the 
relationship between memory, space and affect, that of ‘memoryscape’. 
Rowlands and de Jong (2008), for example, use this term to refer to spaces 
and sites―such as ‘memorials, neighbourhoods, city centres’―that are 
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inscribed with ‘old’ meanings and memories, but may be ‘reworked’ or 
reinscribed, becoming ‘palimpsest memoryscapes that are both real and 
imaginary’ (p. 133). Such ‘reinscription of new memories in established 
places’ is associated by Rowlands and de Jong with their concept of ‘heritage 
[that] heals’ (p. 133). This refers to heritage sites (and practices) which, they 
suggest, offer ‘recognition [of loss, suffering and injustice] and a space from 
where to work through memory and achieve reconciliation’ (pp. 131-132). In 
this way, ‘heritage may provide a technology for healing’ (p. 133), enabling 
‘a reworking of past traumatic experiences [... that] is particularly needed in 
post-conflict societies’ (p. 131). In a memoryscape, a dialectic of hurting and 
healing maps onto the temporal interaction of past and present, figuring a 
place where the painful and damaging affective legacies of conflict in the 
past become subject to post-conflict transformative processes of recognition, 
reparation and reconciliation.  
Such concepts of traumascape and memoryscape are valuable in focusing 
analytical attention on the infusion of affect, emotion and memory within 
post-conflict spaces. Yet they tend to collapse together elements that ought to 
be distinguished analytically when considering the relation between space 
and subjectivity and the mediating role of cultural representations and 
practices. Such conceptual distinctions are crucial to understanding the 
complexity of post-conflict geographies and their significance for conflict 
transformation and historical reconciliation, for four main reasons. Firstly, 
sites of violence that are marked by memorial cultures ought to be 
distinguished from those whose marking is less visible or indeed invisible. 
Not all places where traumatic violence has occurred are memoryscapes 
inscribed with tangible meanings of the past. Some are invisible and subject 
to material erasure and redevelopment, and to silencing and forgetting within 
cultural practices; yet they may remain significant in the psychic and somatic 
experience and living memory of victims and perpetrators, witnesses and the 
bereaved. Secondly, interpretive differences and conflicts may occur between 
plural cultural landscapes that construct alternative or competing versions of 
the same place and its past. These require analysis. Thirdly, sites of violence 
are not necessarily transformable into ‘healing heritage’, as concepts of 
traumascape and memoryscape may be taken to imply. Finally, analytical 
tools are needed for consideration not only of those sites that principally 
concern Tumarkin, where spectacular violence manifests in a singular event 
such as a massacre, a bombing or a siege, having an intense and overt 
affective impact and giving rise to various kinds of memory-work and the 
negotiation or contestation of significance. In other post-conflict spaces, 
everyday life continues without overt signification of the conflicted past; 
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strategies are deployed to transform sites of violence by re-integrating them 
into the spaces of everyday ordinariness rather than marking them as special 
(Switzer & McDowell, 2009, p. 343); and psychic or affective legacies are 
reproduced and lived in often intangible ways, over longer temporal spans 
and across generations. In the case of Northern Ireland, memoryscapes 
marking sites of spectacular violence, such as the Bloody Sunday shootings 
and the Enniskillen bomb, exist in close proximity to less visible sites like 
many of those derived from the war in rural border areas (Dawson, 2007, pp. 
214-217, 229), and Republican and loyalist memoryscapes produce selective 
and antagonistic versions of the past. Belfast is the location not of one but 
thousands of violent incidents, in the course of a war that lasted for thirty years 
and was itself the latest episode in a longer history of violent political conflict 
which has produced multiple traumatic legacies.  
A useful, threefold conceptual schema that enables distinctions of this 
kind to be made is proposed by the anthropologists, Stewart and Strathern 
(2003, cited in Dawson, 2005, p. 155). They use the term ‘place’ to refer to a 
specific and ‘identifiable’ material environment and its constituent spaces and 
sites, as shaped socially and historically by human activity. A ‘cultural 
landscape’ occurs when a place is represented and made meaningful by social 
groups in specific ways, as signifiers and affective associations become 
attached to it through ‘creative and imaginative’ cultural practices. These 
may inscribe or mark the place in situ but may also be produced, circulated 
and received at other cultural locations where meanings of that place are 
constructed. The ‘inner landscape of the mind’ refers to the subjective sense 
of both place and cultural landscape that is internalized within the psyche 
(and, it should be added, ‘felt’ within the body) as a result of lived experience 
informed by cultural knowledge. Using Stewart and Strathern’s schema, I 
have argued in previous work that traumatic experiences of political violence 
give rise to ‘psychic “sites of trauma” [...] within the internal landscape’, that 
are derived from―and complexly related to―the material sites of violence 
within social environments, together with the meanings and memorial 
markers that constitute cultural landscapes of violence, horror and mourning 
(Dawson, 2005, p. 156). The term memoryscape is best reserved to signify a 
particular type of cultural landscape where cultural practices and forms of 
representation overtly mark the history of a place and construct the 
significance of its past for the present. 
In what follows, I utilize a framework derived from Stewart and Strathern’s 
threefold schema to investigate places that became sites and spaces of 
Troubles-related violence in Belfast, the cultural landscapes and 
memoryscapes that construct the meaning of places and their pasts, and their 
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subjective significances and affective resonances within psychic geographies 
during both the time of conflict and that of post-conflict transformation. This 
analysis will provide the basis for exploration of the traumatic spatial 
legacies of the Troubles in the ‘post-conflict’ city, and the tensions and 
contradictions that must be negotiated in strategies for ‘dealing with the past’ 
and ‘historical reconciliation’ in these spaces.  
Belfast: City of Conflict and the ‘Post–conflict’ City 
Throughout its history, Belfast has been a city deeply divided by the 
segregation of its population. Two ‘ethno-sectarian’ groups, one Irish 
nationalist or Republican and largely Catholic, the other British Unionist or 
loyalist and largely Protestant, inhabit an urban space consisting of a 
patchwork of predominantly ‘single identity’ enclaves or areas (Shirlow and 
Murtagh, 2006, pp. 57, 60). The boundaries or ‘interfaces’ between them 
have been, in Shirlow and Murtagh’s words, ‘rigidified by violence’ (p. 66) 
in the course of a conflicted history of British colonial rule and the industrial 
and commercial development of the city, as well as political conflict over 
national belonging and the form of the State. A.C. Hepburn has argued that: 
‘Rioting, the fear of it, and the bitter memories associated with it, have been 
the main determinant of community relations in the city’ (quoted in Dawson, 
2007, p. 12). During the nineteenth century, interface tensions stemming 
from Catholic rural migration and settlement in the growing city, regularly 
erupted in violence including major outbreaks of inter-communal rioting, and 
by 1914 ‘the frontier zone between the main Protestant and Catholic 
enclaves’ in north and west Belfast was being described as ‘the seismic area 
of the city’ (Bardon, 1992, p. 306). These same locations saw anti-Catholic 
pogroms by the police and loyalist paramilitaries during the war over Irish 
independence and partition 1919-22, in the 1930s, and in August 1969 when 
a repetition of this historic pattern of violence, in an attack by police and 
loyalists across the ‘Orange–Green line’ separating the Shankill area of West 
Belfast from the nationalist Falls, sparked the recent conflict (Dawson, 2007; 
Farrell, 1980).  
During the first years of conflict, spatial division was consolidated by 
large population movements out of ‘mixed’ as well as interface areas into the 
relative safety of more homogeneous communities, such that by 1972, 70% 
of Catholics and 72% of Protestants lived in streets which were almost 
exclusively segregated (Jarman, 1993). This historical process of segregation 
was given material form within the physical organization of the city through 
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the construction by the State, under pressure from local communities, of 
some forty-one so-called ‘peace-line’ barriers ranging from back-garden 
fences of brick or barbed wire to the 30-foot high concrete and steel wall that 
runs for one and a half miles along Cupar Way on the Shankill/Falls interface 
(Jarman, 2005). Erected by the British Army as a short-term measure to 
separate the conflicting parties, the Cupar Way peace-line was extended 
westwards after a further wave of rioting and house-burning in 1971. As the 
peace-line became permanent, its consequence, predicted by the Republican 
Clubs movement in 1977, was to ‘irrevocably split the city into two sectarian 
ghettoes’ (Conspiracy, 1977), to the benefit of the State’s conflict 
management strategy and to the detriment of effective, sustainable cross-
community activism on common socio-economic problems by the working-
class communities on either side of the divide.  
The launch of the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) bombing 
campaign targeting commercial properties in 1970 caused widespread 
destruction in the city centre, while the intensification of counter-insurgency 
measures by the State led to a militarization of space through the construction 
of a ‘ring of steel’ (security gates with checkpoints across forty-one streets), a 
range of other security measures, and the high-profile presence of the Army 
and police monitoring everyone entering the controlled zone (Jarman, 1993). 
Militarization spread across the city, especially into Republican enclaves, 
through the construction of heavily fortified Army and police barracks, a 
system of barriers and checkpoints that augmented the peace-lines, visible 
technologies of surveillance, and routine Army patrolling. Sustained over 
more than thirty years, the violence of the armed conflict transformed the 
spatial co-ordinates of social life. In the city centre, ‘[t]he places of the 
everyday―a hardware shop, newspaper offices, bars, a post office, an 
amusement arcade, a restaurant, a car park and public streets―[...] became 
sites of violent death’ (Switzer & McDowell, 2009, 339). Nearly 1,700 
people, 66 per cent of whom were civilians, died in Belfast between 1966 and 
2006. Over 1,200 of these lost their lives in the enclaves of North and West 
Belfast (McKittrick et al, 2007, pp. 1559-1560), and one third of all 
Troubles-related deaths in the city occurred within 250 meters of an interface 
boundary (Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006, p. 72).  
Perceptions of Belfast as a place transformed by war into a battlefield or 
fortress were articulated in metaphors drawn from the cultural landscapes of 
other well-known conflict zones such as the Berlin Wall and the Western 
Front (Switzer & McDowell, 2009, p. 339). Local knowledge of specific 
locations associated with violence circulated in a culture of fear that shaped 
patterns of movement around the city according to an imaginative landscape 
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whereby safe zones became demarcated from zones imbued with otherness 
and threat, ‘the spaces of fear’ (Mapping the spaces, n.d. 2003?). Internalized 
in psychic landscapes, this splitting of the cityscape produced ‘mental maps’ 
imbued with affective as well as cognitive significance (Shirlow & Murtagh, 
2006, p. 70). In the memoryscapes of the Republican and loyalist enclaves, 
plaques, monuments and murals memorializing the dead―whether 
paramilitary fighters or martyred victims―became integrated into broader 
commemorative cultures centred on symbolic political events from the 
historic past, such as the 1690 Battle of the Boyne for loyalists and the 1916 
Easter Rising for Republicans. Articulating antagonistic histories of violence 
inflicted and suffered, these competing memoryscapes embedded ‘social 
recognition of [traumatic] psychic realities’ (Dawson, 2007, p. 74) into the 
places of everyday life, whilst also coalescing with geographical assertions of 
political identity through the marking of local territory as well as national 
belonging, in the form of flags, murals, painted kerbstones and lamp-posts 
(Jarman, 1993). In these interface zones, ‘grief and mourning, as well as 
politics, have been split in two, polarized across the axis of violence’ 
(Dawson, 2007, p. 3).  
Launching the Irish peace process in December 1993 with their Joint 
Declaration on Peace, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Ireland, pledged to work together to ‘remove the causes of conflict, to 
overcome the legacy of history, and to heal the divisions which have 
resulted’ (Dawson, 2007, p. 21). Since the Declaration, political negotiations 
have delivered the paramilitary ceasefires of 1994; the Belfast ‘Good Friday’ 
Agreement of 1998―this established the basis for an agreed political 
settlement including institutions to enable devolved, ‘power-sharing’ 
government and equality of citizenship underpinned by human rights 
legislation; the so-called ‘decommissioning’ of the IRA’s military arsenal in 
2005, accompanied by ‘demilitarization’ by the British State; and in 2007, 
democratic elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly and the 
establishment of a governing Executive led jointly by a Unionist First 
Minister and a nationalist Deputy First Minister. While political violence 
continues, the armed conflict has largely been brought to an end, and a basis 
created for working towards new political and social relationships in what the 
devolved, power-sharing government has called a ‘shared future’. 
It is in this context that the transformation of Belfast and debates about its 
future as a ‘post-conflict’ city have developed. Three main strategies have 
guided the ‘slow transition from “troubled” city to a less violent city’ 
(Shirlow, 2006, p. 105). Firstly, a significant reduction in the scale and 
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intensity of political violence, due to the ceasefires and the gradual 
implementation of decommissioning and demilitarization established by the 
Agreement, have made Belfast a broadly safer city. These measures have 
eradicated the architecture and technologies of military occupation and 
promoted the closing of British Army barracks and return of these occupied 
spaces to ‘peace-time’ use, an ongoing programme that is continuing twenty 
years into the peace process. Secondly, a strategy of economic ‘normaliza-
tion’, driven by public policy to attract large-scale inward investment by the 
private sector, focusing on business development, tourism and place 
promotion of the city’s ‘brand’ within global markets, has transformed the 
city centre and harbour–side areas through the construction of prestigious 
new buildings like the Waterfront Hall and the Hilton Hotel; the opening-up 
of riverside walkways; the regeneration of the old, largely derelict 
commercial district and parts of the old shipyard; a proliferation of new bars, 
clubs and restaurants in what has become the ‘Cathedral Quarter’; the 
construction of shopping malls and other retail sites; and the marketing of a 
Belfast cultural heritage. Thirdly, a strategy led by Belfast City Corporation 
in alliance with a range of social and economic organizations. working within 
the wider political framework established by the Office of the First Minister 
and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) and, since 2007, the Northern Ireland 
Executive, has sought to re-imagine post-conflict Belfast as a ‘shared city’, 
and to introduce policies aimed at the transformation of the ethno-sectarian 
divided space that is the legacy of its conflicted history into the ‘safe and 
shared space’ of the future (OFMDFM, 2005, 21). In order ‘to establish, over 
time, a shared society defined by a culture of tolerance [...] equity and 
diversity’ (OFMDFM, 2005, 10), this strategy envisages ‘reclaim[ing] the 
public realm for people who are living and working in, or as visitors to, 
Northern Ireland’, by freeing it from ‘displays of sectarian, racist or any other 
form of aggression’, threat and intimidation (OFMDFM, 2005, 21-22), and 
replacing symbols that endorse ethno-sectarian identities and belongings with 
others that elaborate ‘a shared heritage’ (Shirlow, 2006, 106; Graham & 
Nash, 2006).  
 This transition towards the peaceful, shared city is fraught with a number 
of significant tensions and contradictions centred on the projection of a 
future-oriented ‘post-conflict’ image and experience in relation to the city’s 
engagement with unresolved legacies of its troubled past and (unfinished) 
history of violence. Driving these contradictions are the dynamics of what 
Murtagh and Keaveney (2006, 188) describe as a ‘twin-speed economy’. 
This, they argue, has produced ‘an increasingly bifurcated place’ 
characterized by a ‘new socio-economic cleavage’; between the ‘modern, 
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outward-looking and progressive’ Belfast of the redeveloped central area, and 
another Belfast ‘stratified by poverty, ethno-religious segregation and fear 
[...] spatially fixed in the sink estates’ in the city’s enclaves (pp. 187-188). 
The contradictions driving this new post-conflict bifurcation constitute the 
terrain on which the significance of the conflicted past is negotiated between 
the various organizations and groups with an interest in the future of the city. 
Hegemonic leadership of the transition by capital and the policy-making elite 
encounters contradictory needs and interests articulated by grass-roots 
community organizations which continue to grapple with unresolved legacies 
of conflict that are acknowledged in politicized memory cultures and 
reproduced through the workings of a ‘logic of spatial separation’ (Shirlow, 
2006, p. 105) in interface areas. These contradictions give rise to competing 
approaches to the question of historical reconciliation, to be explored next in 
each of Murtagh and Keaveney’s contrasting zones in turn.  
‘New Belfast’: Heritage, Development, and the Erasure of the 
Conflicted Past 
In the zone characterized by Murtagh and Keaveney as ‘modern’ and 
‘progressive’, the ‘New Belfast’ of the redeveloped city centre where visitors 
are attracted to spend time and money, public commemoration of the 
Troubles is absent or ephemeral, and there are no permanent memorial 
markers on any of the sites of Troubles-related killing. As Switzer and 
McDowell (2009) argue, the erasure of ‘site[s] of death and trauma’ from the 
cultural landscape of the city centre is a result of material reconstruction of 
these places, most commonly due to practices of ‘rectification’ that restore a 
damaged site and often return it to its original use ‘without reference to what 
has occurred there’ (p. 345); and in some cases, to practices of ‘obliteration’, 
which ‘involves not just removing the immediate signs of traumatic events 
but effectively effacing the evidence from existence’ through demolition and 
redevelopment (pp. 343, 345). These processes usually occurred in the 
immediate aftermath of the violent event―a reminder that normalization 
predates the peace process―but have continued in the context of the 
redevelopment of the post-conflict city centre. The creation of a 
memoryscape dedicated to commemoration of the Troubles has no place in 
these strategies. On the contrary, they have led directly to further obliteration 
of previously rectified sites. One example is the Oxford Street bus station, a 
location of the IRA’s ‘Bloody Friday’ bomb attacks in 1972, which was 
returned to use thereafter but demolished in 1996 to establish the footprint for 
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the Waterfront and Hilton development (345). A memoryscape has been 
constructed on this site, drawing its motifs from earlier layers of history―the 
use of this space as a cattle market, its role in the industrial and maritime 
economy, the associated forms of social and working life―that are less 
charged by affect within the living memory of the city’s current residents. 
The creation of this heritage memoryscape is the mechanism whereby ‘the 
violent aspect of the site’s history has effectively been erased’ and rendered 
‘invisible in the urban landscape of present-day Belfast’ (Switzer & 
McDowell, 2009, p. 346), overlaid by another historical narrative made 
present in its place. 
The origins of this strategy lie in 1987, whilst the conflict was ongoing but 
violence in the city centre had been largely eradicated, in a plan ‘to transform 
completely the environmental quality of a vital part of the City, and by this 
means to help transform perceptions of Belfast at an international level’ 
(quoted in Neill, 2006, p. 109). In 1989 the British Government established the 
Laganside Corporation, a regeneration agency with a remit to develop several 
sites spanning both sides of the River Lagan (and later extended to include the 
‘Cathedral Quarter’). Until its dissolution in 2007, the Corporation secured 
some £900 million of investment for the construction of hotel and housing 
accommodation, business and entertainment facilities, and ‘distinctive and 
memorable public places’ (Laganside Corporation website). An important 
aspect of this strategy was its role in the regeneration of tourism, once a 
significant sector of the city’s economy but badly damaged by the Troubles. 
Laganside pioneered the construction of a city heritage linking the ‘New 
Belfast’ to a version of its past centred on images of economic prosperity and 
civic pride, through the restoration of historic buildings such as the Custom 
House and St George’s Market, and the creation of ‘art trails’ featuring a range 
of public art-works, some of which ‘reflect Belfast’s great industrial history 
while others celebrate its changing face’ (Laganside Corporation website).  
While often interpreted as an expression of nostalgia for the lost past, ‘the 
construction of heritage is a means for the definition of the contemporary, 
which it reveals in a fantastic or fetishised form’ (Brett, 1996, p. 8). This 
fantastic refraction of history is closely linked in mainstream heritage 
practice to the celebration of what is taken to be the positive inheritance from 
the past, inculcating pride in a social group by establishing allegiance with its 
forebears and inviting identification with their achievements. The attraction 
of heritage in this mode lies in its capacity to affirm for its consumers a 
subjective sense of their own identities (both individual and collective) as 
essentially positive, virtuous and firmly rooted in the past. The narratives and 
images encountered at conventional heritage sites tend to avoid or sanitize the 
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complexities of power, conflict and suffering that would unsettle or disrupt 
such identifications; and thus are relatively undemanding on their audience, 
and ripe for commodified consumption. Driven by an alliance between 
private enterprise in the culture industries and public policy initiatives 
promoting capital investment and a particular agenda for ‘moving the city 
forwards into the twenty-first century’, heritage development in post-conflict 
Belfast has tended towards commodified constructions of ‘the past’ (Neill 
2006), the erasure of the city’s recent (and unfinished) history of violent 
conflict, and what Brett (1996, p. 2) terms ‘“deproblematised” story-telling’.  
This strategy has come to further fruition in the development of the city’s 
new Titanic Quarter situated on Queen’s Island, the former shipyard area, and 
its centrepiece, Titanic Belfast, which is now established as one of the city’s 
foremost visitor attractions. This development has transformed the infamous 
ocean liner RMS Titanic―built between 1909-11 in Belfast’s Harland and 
Wolff shipyard and sunk after its collision with an iceberg in the North 
Atlantic with the loss of 1,490 lives on its maiden voyage in 1912 (Bardon 
1992, p. 438)―as the city’s emblematic, visitor-friendly and unificatory 
heritage symbol. Launched in 1999 in the wake of James Cameron’s (1997) 
film which stimulated increasing popular interest in the already mythic story 
of the Titanic, this initiative brought together Laganside, the Northern Ireland 
Tourism Board and Belfast City Council with the aim of ‘bringing the legacy 
of the Titanic home’ (Neill 2006, pp. 114-15). Historically a source of 
embarrassment and shame in Belfast (Titanic town, 2012; Neill, 2006, 
p. 114), the project reclaimed the Titanic for the city by focusing on the 
engineering achievement represented in its construction. In 2002 Tom 
Hartley, Chair of the Councils’ Tourism and Promotion of Belfast Sub-
committee, placed the commemoration of the ninetieth anniversary of its 
sinking at the centre of the city’s new cultural tourism strategy:  
For far too long, Belfast has been content to ignore the positive aspects of its 
history―a history which has a vibrant and vital role to play in its development as 
a tourist destination. The story of the Titanic highlights this: for too many years, 
Belfast shied away from her, almost in shame, while other cities around the world 
have made capital out of her. But Titanic belonged, and still belongs, to Belfast 
[...] What happened to RMS Titanic was a disaster of historic proportions, and it is 
right that we remember and commemorate the tragedy that befell her and the 
1,500 souls who lost their lives. However, the creativity and ingenuity that 
brought Titanic to life was an achievement equally as great, and we are wholly 
justified in acclaiming that achievement (Titanic tourism, 2002). 
Detaching the city from the disaster―a stance captured later by the 
marketing slogan, ‘It was fine when it left Belfast’―enables the 
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transformation of a shameful legacy into a ‘positive’ heritage; and of deathly 
destruction into life-giving creativity and ingenuity.  
The ‘biggest property development scheme ever undertaken in Northern 
Ireland’ (Neill, 2006, p. 114), the Titanic Quarter is a thirty-year project still 
under construction on a 185-acre site that was formerly part of the Harland 
and Wolff shipyard. First established in the 1850s, by the 1890s the shipyard 
had grown into ‘the most important single employer of male labour in Ulster’ 
and ‘headed the list for the largest number of vessels built by any shipyard in 
the United Kingdom’, at the height of Britain’s imperial power (Bardon, 
1992, pp. 334-338, 340). Confronted in 2004 by the threat of terminal decline 
in its shipbuilding and repair business, the shipyard owners sold part of its 
leasehold to a subsidiary established by a Dublin-based development 
company. In 2005 Titanic Quarter Ltd launched an ambitious plan to ‘provide 
Belfast with a new urban quarter’ comprising a ‘futuristic mix of residential, 
commercial, tourism, education and retail space’, which, it is claimed, ‘is 
redefining what it means to work, live, play and stay in central Belfast. We 
can help you build your future among the inspiring legacy of Belfast’s 
maritime and industrial past’ (Titanic Quarter website, 2014).   
The centre-piece of the development is the £97 million Titanic Signature 
Building, home of Titanic Belfast, situated beside ‘the atmospheric places 
where Titanic was designed, built and launched’. These sites of ‘world 
significant’ marine and industrial heritage preserved from the former 
shipyard include the Thompson dry dock, once the largest in the world; the 
twin slipways of Queen’s Yard with their adjacent waterways; and the 
famous gantry cranes, Goliath and Samson, Belfast landmarks since their 
construction in 1969 and 1974 respectively (Titanic Quarter website, 2014).  
The striking architectural form of the building ‘conjures up a mass of 
maritime metaphors’, from ‘ships prows ploughing their way through the 
North Atlantic swell’, to the five-star logo of the White Star Line, and the 
iceberg itself (Civic Arts, 2011). Titanic Belfast and associated sites was one 
of five ‘signature projects’ identified by the Northern Ireland Tourist Board 
(2003) as national priorities for investment with the capacity to attract 
significant numbers of international visitors to Northern Ireland. In its first 
Programme for Government after taking office in 2007, the new Northern 
Ireland Executive invested £60 million of public money (Northern Ireland 
Audit Office, 2011) and established an independent charitable organization, 
the Titanic Foundation, to run the visitor attraction and to ‘develop and 
promote Queen’s Island as an authentic maritime heritage destination and 
shared space for Belfast and Northern Ireland’ (Titanic Foundation website).  
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Titanic Belfast was opened by the First Minister, Peter Robinson, and the 
Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, on 31 March 2012 to coincide 
with the centenary, not of the ship’s launching, but of its maiden voyage and 
sinking. Its centre of attraction, the ‘Titanic Experience’ exhibition, offers a 
technologically sophisticated sensory journey into ‘the past’, telling a story 
that principally concerns the development of the shipping industry and the 
work of shipbuilding within the Harland and Wolff yard, the construction of 
the Titanic, its fitting-out and interior design, launch, and maiden voyage. 
The galleries at the core of the exhibition evoke ‘the sights, sounds, smells 
and stories of the shipyard and its most famous creation’ (Titanic Stories 
website), while the sinking is addressed more cursorily. It concludes with an 
exploration of cultural representations and myth-making about the disaster, 
and a final gallery about the discovery and exploration of the wreck site. The 
centenary was marked by extensive coverage in the global media, and in 
Northern Ireland by a Festival with 120 events (Northern Ireland Executive, 
2012). The extent of initial interest in the memoryscape constructed by 
Titanic Belfast is suggested by figures indicating that, during its first year, it 
was visited by over 700,000 people from 128 countries and contributed £43 
million to the economy (Titanic Foundation website), with, according to its 
CEO, ‘new emerging markets of China, India and Australia [...] showing 
significant interest in us as a product’ (Addley and McDonald, 2012). 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that local visitors are also attracted, and when I 
visited in May 2012, considerable numbers of school children in organized 
parties were in evidence. With an extensive outreach programme involving 
schools across the city, Titanic Belfast is clearly engaged in a process of 
cross-generational heritage construction and transmission.  
However, there are also indications of local alienation from the attraction. 
John Keenan, owner of the Union Jack Shop on the nearby Newtownards 
Road in the loyalist Ballymacarrett area of East Belfast, suggested that the 
local community has been ‘badly left behind’ by the Titanic commemoration: 
‘Obviously in this part of Belfast, if you go back in your family history 
there’s someone who worked in the shipyards back then. But all the 
pensioners who live on this road, they are not going to trek over to see a 
Titanic museum. The tourist buses go about here, they slow down at the 
murals, click click click click click, but they don’t stop. So how is that 
helping East Belfast?’ (quoted in Addley and McDonald, 2012). Keenan’s 
criticism points to a nexus of contradictions generated by the Titanic heritage 
project: between the needs of local communities and the transformation 
brought about by city planners and developers; between generations―the 
older people of Ballymacarrett and the children whose presence has been 
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orchestrated through institutional links and funding programmes; and 
between the past of the shipyard and surrounding area, and its present 
circumstances and planned future. As Neill (2006, p. 114) puts it, the post-
conflict transformation envisaged for the Titanic Quarter implied the 
‘decommissioning of the [ship]yard as Protestant space’, which it has been 
throughout its previous history. At its origins in the 1860s, only 7.5 per cent 
of the shipbuilding workforce at Harland and Wolff were Catholics―a 
situation that had barely improved by 1911, the year RMS Titanic was 
launched when Catholics constituted 24 per cent of the city’s population and 
the yard’s largely Protestant labour force of skilled shipwrights and engineers 
and unskilled manual workers were staunchly loyalist and organized in 
Orange lodges (Farrell, 1980, p. 16; Bardon & Burnett, 1996, pp. 77-78). In 
1970, only 400 Catholics were employed at Harland and Wolff out of a 
workforce totalling ten thousand (Bardon, 1992, p. 641). The maintenance of 
the shipyard as a Protestant space was secured through restrictive 
employment practices but also by violence, with the expulsion of Catholic 
workers a recurring theme of history at moments of heightened political 
tension in the city, including 1912 when 2,000 Catholics were driven out 
during city-wide rioting in loyalist protest against the Home Rule Bill, and 
1970 when the entire Catholic workforce was expelled in the context of fierce 
sectarian rioting across the city and a loyalist attack on the Short Strand 
enclave in East Belfast, which drew the newly formed Provisional IRA into 
its first major armed engagement (Bardon & Burnett, 1996, pp. 61-62, 75; 
Farrell, 1980, pp. 28, 139, 173; Bew and Gillespie, 1993, p. 28).   
There is no trace of this history of sectarian division and violence in the 
Titanic Experience. Only the first of its nine galleries, ‘Boomtown Belfast’, 
considers the labour-force that built the ships and touches on differences 
between Catholic and Protestant workers in displays on living in the city and 
working in the shipyard and docks. However, the historical account presented 
here is a superficial simplification that emphasises working-class 
commonalities and is uninterested in analysing the significance of the 
political and sectarian divide within the shipyard or the wider city. In order to 
secure its signification of Belfast’s pride in the construction of the Titanic, 
Titanic Belfast explicitly avoids fundamental realities of the shipyard 
experience, as if ‘decommissioning the [ship]yard as Protestant space’ 
requires the suppression of all reference to its history as such. This 
representational strategy is consistent with the Titanic Foundation’s 
obligations regarding the development of Queen’s Island as a ‘shared space’ 
accessible to all city-dwellers and visitors; this goes hand-in-hand with a 
shared heritage whose ‘fantastic and fetishised’ form (Brett, 1996, p. 8) 
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requires the erasure of all signs of sectarian division and violence from the 
memoryscape of the former shipyard.  
Interface Memoryscapes, Spaces of Fear, and ‘Post Conflict’ 
Subjectivities  
In contrast to the ‘modern’, future-oriented New Belfast a very different 
relation between past and present exists in Murtagh and Keaveney’s (2006) 
second zone of the twin-speed, ‘post-conflict’ city. Twenty years into the 
peace process, ‘the majority of persons from a Catholic or Protestant 
community live in places that are at least 81 per cent Catholic or Protestant’, 
and access not only to housing but also to education, employment, and all 
kinds of urban facilities and services, as well as opportunities for social 
mixing, are structured by ‘ethno-sectarianized space’ (Shirlow & Murtagh, 
2006, p. 71). For much of the city’s population, belonging and identity is still 
constituted in relation to largely segregated local areas and enclaves; some, 
like loyalist Ballymacarrett and the nationalist Short Strand, half a mile away 
from Laganside and the Titanic Quarter; others, including the Falls and 
Shankill, as well as the outer-city estates of North and West Belfast, at some 
geographical remove. These are the living spaces of many of the local 
children who are taken on educational visits to Belfast Titanic and involved 
in its outreach work; and of the older generations who have lived through the 
conflict and remember its impact in family histories.  
Whereas the memory of conflict has been largely erased from public 
space in the modernizing central region of the city, post-conflict memory-
scapes engaged with the Troubles have continued to flourish in the ethno-
sectarian areas and enclaves, ‘establish[ing] powerful symbols representing 
and commemorating significant aspects of the past that has been lived here, 
and testifying to its compelling hold on present-day life’ (Dawson, 2007, p. 
1). These Troubles memoryscapes function to reproduce the political and 
affective lines-in-the-sand of the ongoing memory wars that continue to be 
fought out in ‘post-conflict’ times over the responsibility for, and effects of, 
the violence since 1966. They also establish necessary loci of continuing 
engagement with the unresolved traumatic legacies of the past, establishing 
sites of mourning and of struggle, where the dead may be honoured within 
their ‘own’ community and the persistent psychic as well as political affects 
of the conflict acknowledged (Dawson, 2007). Both these aspects, and their 
intertwining in a particular discourse of victimhood, can be seen in the case 
of the Bayardo memorial, erected by the Bayardo Somme Association on 
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Easter Sunday 2008 (Belfast Forum website; CAIN, 2009)―less than a year 
after the restoration of devolved government in May 2007―at a prominent 
location on the junction of the Shankill Road and Argyle Street in the Middle 
Shankill area of West Belfast. A brick and steel structure the size and shape 
of the gable-end of a house, the memorial marks the site of the Bayardo Bar 
destroyed in a gun and bomb attack by the PIRA thirty-two years earlier. It 
comprises the photographs and names of the five civilians who died, 
photographs of the bar before and after the attack, and a memorial stone with 
their names and the dedication to what is described as a ‘forgotten atrocity’: 
‘In memory of five innocent Protestants slaughtered here by a Republican 
murder gang on 13th August 1975’. A notice attached to the memorial 
(CAIN, 2009) identifies ‘this spot’ as the site where ‘five Protestants were 
killed and up to sixty injured’ by ‘homicidal’ Republicans in the course of 
their ‘vicious campaign of genocide [...] against [...] you and I, the Protestant 
people’. The political significance of the Bayardo Bar memorial, established 
by this language, lies in its challenge both to the justificatory discourse of the 
PIRA which avows that the actions of its Volunteers were ‘non-sectarian’ 
and directed not at Protestants per se but at British State forces and the 
loyalist paramilitary groups, and to pro-Agreement claims that theirs is now 
‘a message of peace’. At the same time, for the family and friends of those 
(including a 17-year-old girl) who lost their lives in August 1975, the 
Bayardo memorial functions (in the words of the attached notice) as a ‘place 
[...] that hold[s ...] the bitter sweet memory of loved ones and how those 
loved ones met their premature end’, and ensures that the affective legacy of 
hurt and loss is not ‘forgotten’ by a society too eager to put the past behind. 
As part of the wider memoryscape, it bears witness, within the spaces of 
everyday life along the Shankill Road, to a past that has not gone away but 
requires acknowledgement and redress for unresolved questions of truth and 
justice, the so-called ‘legacy issues’ that have now become central to the 
complex and uneven process of ‘coming to terms with the past’ in Northern 
Ireland.  
In interface areas of the still-divided city, twenty-five of which existed in 
2005 (Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006, p. 64), the unfinished business of the past 
makes itself felt not only in memoryscapes but also through the reproduction 
of traumatic spatial legacies of the Troubles. Interface areas have continued 
to be experienced as ‘spaces of fear’ (Shirlow) plagued by routine sectarian 
violence―the bombardment of houses across the peace line, regular rioting, 
and dangers associated with moving out of ‘sanctuary space’ (Shirlow & 
Murtagh, 2006, 58)―that has increased since the paramilitary ceasefires of 
1994. The prevalence of such violence has created a ‘dynamic of fearfulness 
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[...] associated with perceptions of threat and the twin forces of resentment 
and incomprehension’ (Shirlow & Murtagh 2006, p. 71). In one significant 
manifestation of this dynamic, the desire of interface communities for 
security in their lives has led to grass-roots campaigns for further peace-line 
barriers to be built; Jarman (2005) found that over half of the forty-one 
barriers he identified in the city had been either extended or newly built since 
1994. The reproduction of fear within the city continues to be driven by 
rioting. Controversial parades provide annual flashpoints of violent 
confrontation, like the 12th July march by the Orange Order past the 
nationalist Ardoyne area of North Belfast that is opposed as triumphalist and 
inflammatory by local residents’ groups, and triggered days of serious rioting 
again in summer 2013 after it was banned by Northern Ireland’s Parades 
Commission (Harte, 2013). Fierce rioting involving gunfire broke out in 
summer 2011 on the Ballymacarrett and Short Strand interface in East 
Belfast, only eight months before the opening of Titanic Belfast just half a 
mile away (Bowcott, 2011). Further rioting on this interface occurred 
between January and March 2013 in the context of sustained loyalist protest 
right across Northern Ireland against the decision by Belfast City Council to 
limit the number of days when the Union Jack will be flown on City Hall, 
which itself became the scene of violent confrontation between protesters and 
police at the heart of the city centre (CAIN, 2013).  
Over fourty years after the construction of the first peace-line, the 
polarization of identities remains deeply inscribed into the spaces of everyday 
life and the subjectivities of those who inhabit them. Mental maps that 
encode and reproduce the traumatic past and psychic defences against it are a 
legacy of fear that is inherited by children in the form of ‘sectarianized spatial 
practices’ (Mapping the spaces, n.d. 2003?), acquired and lived out in the 
course of everyday social interactions. The ‘Mapping the Spaces of Fear’ 
project (n.d. 2003?), points to the ‘complex body of information about the 
relative dangers of particular spaces’ that working-class children draw on ‘to 
negotiate their daily life choices’ and ‘manage their own behaviour’. One 
interviewee, a Catholic woman in her early forties, vividly illustrates this 
point:  
My youngest daughter is 9 and she goes to school on the Falls Road (Catholic 
area) and her name is Maebh (Catholic name) and I have never, ever once said 
that she had to take her school uniform off, or explained it, but she always knew 
that if she was going to Connswater Shopping Centre (located in a Protestant 
district) with me she couldn’t say her name was Maebh, and she had to put a coat 
over her to cover her school uniform. (Parentheses are editorial insertions in the 
original; italics are mine.) 
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What this 9-year-old girl, one of the ‘cease-fire generation’ born since 1994 
(Leonard & McKnight, 2011, p. 572), has ‘always known’ is the vulnerability 
that follows from her own visibility whenever outside sanctuary space the 
consequent need to practise identity-masking.  
Such knowledges are learned through children’s largely segregated school 
and street cultures. Leonard and McKnight (2010, 31) found that nearly one 
quarter of her sample of school students from across the city ‘felt unsafe’ 
wearing uniforms whilst travelling to and from school, an affect linked in 
many cases to ‘perceived or actual sectarian abuse/attack’. The young people 
shared common understandings of the ‘invisible barriers [...] utilised to mark 
off Catholic from Protestant areas (Leonard & McKnight, 2011, p. 579). 
These local knowledges become internalized in modes of ‘self-regulation’, 
reinforced by peer-group judgements and the ‘censure’ of behaviours 
considered naive (Mapping the spaces). So deep are these internalizations 
that the divided landscape itself appears ‘normal and natural’ to the extent 
that, for some young people, the peace-line walls overshadowing their streets 
have become invisible within the interior landscape, unnoticed ‘because they 
had always been there’. This normalizing of spatial division is accompanied 
by a lack of curiosity about ‘those living on the other side of the wall’ 
(Leonard & McKnight, 2011, p. 579). Those on ‘the other side’, of course, do 
feature in the mental maps of young people in the form of the threatening 
other who may be encountered outside sanctuary space.  
Since 2007, a debate opened up by the community organization, Belfast 
Interface Project, together with the Northern Ireland Community Relations 
Council, has begun to consider how ‘the removal of all interface barriers across 
the city of Belfast over time’ might be undertaken, without disregarding ‘the 
perceptions of safety and security of the people living near to [them]’ 
(Community Relations Council, 2008, p. 9). In May 2013 the Office of the 
First Minister and Deputy First Minister proposed working towards the 
dismantling of all Northern Ireland’s peace-line walls by 2023 in order to 
promote integration across the ethno-sectarian divide in accordance with the 
‘shared future’ agenda (OFMDFM, 2013). This aspiration involves 
transformation not only of the city’s physical space but also of the interior 
landscapes that have developed in response. Research (Byrne, Gormley Heenan 
& Robinson, 2012) into the attitudes and feelings held by interface residents 
about the peace-line walls discovered high levels of persistent anxiety, with 69 
per cent wanting the walls maintained to give continuing protection from feared 
violence, and for Protestants especially, from a perceived threat to their culture 
and identity. Yet the study also detected considerable ambivalence, with 58 per 
cent simultaneously stating their desire to see the walls come down. 
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Expressions of hope associated with this possibility were qualified by ‘a 
sizeable degree of pessimism about what the future physical landscape might 
look like’ and the likelihood of positive change ever occurring (Byrne et al., 
2012, p. 24). Leonard and McKnight (2010, p. 29) found that one third of her 
school-student sample considered Belfast to be an ‘unsafe city’ due to sectarian 
violence and rioting, especially when orchestrated by paramilitary 
organizations. this signifies that the time of conflict is by no means seen as 
‘over’. Among the young people involved in Leonard and McKnight’s (2011) 
research, nearly half believed that the Troubles had not yet fully ended and a 
further 45 per cent were unsure, while for Protestants in particular, the periodic 
resurgence of gun and bomb attacks by paramilitary groups leads to increasing 
levels of insecurity and anxiety about the possible return of ‘a big war again’ 
(Leonard & McKnight, 2011, p. 575). For some, the ‘stories told by older 
generations’ (Leonard & McKnight, 2011, p. 579)―a transmission of popular 
memory encoding common sense about recurring cycles of violence within the 
city―endorse the rationality of these fears and the consequent logic of 
continuing separation. 
Initiatives concerned with ‘historical reconciliation’ in the context of the 
spatial politics of Belfast must also negotiate such contradictions in 
considering ways in which antagonistic narratives of the conflict, that are 
reproduced within the polarized memoryscapes and subjectivities of the 
interface areas, might be transformed. One approach, adopted here as in the 
city centre, advocates replacing any potentially divisive commemoration with 
symbols of ‘shared heritage’. The Arts Council of Northern Ireland’s ‘Re-
imaging Communities’ programme, for example, aims to utilize public art in 
challenging racism and sectarianism, and has promoted the removal of murals 
with militaristic themes and their replacement with less controversial images; 
George Best and CS Lewis as well as the Titanic have all featured in East 
Belfast (Troubled walls, 2013). An antithetical approach seeks to open the 
conflicted history of the interfaces to engagement and dialogue with ‘dark 
tourists’ (Sharpley and Stone, 2009) who are fascinated precisely by ‘the 
“dangerous” parts of the city’ and want ‘to hear the history of the violence’ 
(Holland, 1994), constituting audiences for stories by members of the 
communities on either side of the peace-line, passed on by tour guides, who 
may themselves be ex-combatants or former prisoners (Reynolds, 2001; 
McKittrick, 2004). Responding to the protests of 2013, the Northern Ireland 
Assembly established all-party talks chaired by the former US Presidential 
envoy to Northern Ireland, Richard Haass, that led to the Stormont House 
Agreement of 2014, seeking consensus on how to tackle divisive parades, 
flag-flying and other expressions of identity. Developing ways, through local 
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negotiation of the kind pioneered in Derry/Londonderry, to acknowledge and 
allow space for the different cultural symbols and commemorative traditions 
of the other, whilst removing their potential for inflammatory provocation, is 
now widely understood to be central to reducing divisiveness and building 
new relationships. 
The careful negotiation of difference through dialogue also lies at the 
heart of cross-community history-making that engages people from local 
communities in collaborative work with others across the divide. One 
pioneering example of this is the Bridging Oral History Project, established 
in 2009-10 as a cross-community collaboration between the Dúchas Oral 
History Archive, a Republican project based at the Falls Community Council, 
and the Lower Castlereagh Community Group in loyalist Ballymacarrett, 
East Belfast, under the auspices of the Belfast Conflict Resolution 
Consortium (Moloney, 2013). Drawing on the expertise developed in ‘single 
identity’ local history and archiving projects in nationalist communities, the 
Bridging Project took participants from both groups into the space of the 
other where they worked together, first to hear and discuss interviews from 
the Dúchas Archive, and subsequently to record a number of oral history 
interviews with loyalists. Moloney (2013) notes that anxieties amongst the 
Republican participants on their initial visit to Ballymacarrett―due to ‘the 
geography of this part of the city [being] unfamiliar’, recent tensions on the 
Short Strand interface, and uncertainty about how their stories would be 
received―was alleviated by actually meeting the loyalists, who demonstrated 
‘particular interest in hearing the stories of IRA activists’. A reciprocal visit 
brought loyalists to the Falls Road, and ‘The Voices from the Yard’ project 
was initiated, focusing on the loyalists’ stories of the shipyard but exploring 
conflicting interpretations across the two communities: ‘There was explicit 
acknowledgement that the issue of discrimination in the shipyard could raise 
tensions. However, what was also acknowledged was the respect for the 
broader history of the shipyard within the loyalist community as well as the 
Catholic experience’ (Moloney, 2013). Disagreements and differences were 
‘openly and respectfully discussed and where possible resolved’. In this way, 
the Bridging Project made a small beginning in opening up the more complex 
and difficult history of the shipyard concealed by the memoryscape of the 
Titanic Quarter. 
‘The Voices from the Yard’ project broke down after five months due to a 
number of factors, including complex power dynamics and questions of trust 
within the group and pressures brought to bear upon it by both cross-
community and intra-community politics. Renegotiation of the collaboration 
led to a new project on loyalism in the 1970s. These stories were presented 
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for discussion at community events in each location, a number of the 
interviews were deposited at the Dúchas Archive, and in March 2011 the East 
Belfast Oral History Archive was launched by the First Minister, Peter 
Robinson. Moloney (2013) argues that, despite its difficulties and limitations, 
by bringing together members of politically opposed communities in the 
negotiation of a new, practical cooperative relationship, the project developed 
participants’ confidence in their own agency and power to effect change 
within their marginalized communities; created opportunities for breaking 
conflict-created divisions and silences; and enabled critical reflection and 
dialogue, leading to new understandings of the past, present and future that 
recognize and include the historical experience of the ‘other’.  
 
I have suggested in this chapter that the task of historical reconciliation after 
conflict has a spatial dimension, and argued for a complex and nuanced 
understanding of post-conflict spaces as these intersect with histories and 
memories of the violent past. The concept of memoryscape becomes a more 
precise analytical tool to the extent that it is deployed in relation to other 
categories, enabling the reproduction and transformation of the physical 
existence of places to be distinguished from continuities and changes, firstly, 
in the cultural and affective significance of those places, and secondly, in the 
internalized landscapes of subjectivity. Such distinctions allow identification 
of the different speeds and temporalities of change, as well as different 
relations between past and present, at work in each of these dimensions of 
post-conflict geography. ‘Trauma’, a term signifying the affective 
consequences and repercussions of past violence reproduced in the present, 
together with the psychic defences that are mobilized to contain and manage 
its effects, is a property of the interior world of subjectivity. It is also a 
shaping factor in the making of cultural landscapes, narratives and memories, 
that construct knowledges and interpretations of places, their significance and 
history. In order not to be trapped in the conflicted past, social groups and 
individuals within post-conflict societies need to evolve shared understand-
ings of its hold upon them, in spatial as well as temporal terms, and of the 
resulting ambivalences and contradictions that complicate a sense of the 
future. 
Subjectivities in ‘post-conflict’ Belfast are decisively influenced by the 
reproduction and internalization of local spatial knowledges as these intersect 
in various ways with the affective residues of past violence and with templates 
of memory warning of the return of conflict from the past. These psychic 
legacies of the past, both conscious and unconscious, are negotiated in a 
complex and ambivalent relationship with desires for a future society freed of 
violence and fear. Strategies designed to promote the transition to a ‘shared 
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city’ have not sufficiently engaged with historically-formed subjectivities and 
identities, or attended to the complexities of their ‘attachments to the past’ 
(Dawson 2007, p. 5), and to the spaces where such attachments are embodied. 
The production of new spaces and cultural landscapes in the city centre and 
Queen’s Island, based on rectification and obliteration of the sites of conflict 
and the suppression of all traces of conflict within memoryscapes designed to 
figure a common heritage, remakes the present and transforms the relation 
between present and past on the template of a particular version of the 
desirable, shared future. This hinders the necessary creative engagement with 
these legacies.  
An alternative is figured in the dialogical encounters across the spaces of 
fear as negotiated in grassroots history-making within the Bridging Project, and 
in the ‘animated exchanges’―about the removal of the peace walls, and about 
their own ‘core role [...] in facilitating future cooperation [...] across the 
divide’―stimulated amongst her young participants by Leonard and 
McKnight’s (2011) research. Both cases involve, simultaneously, ‘dual 
processes of accepting and challenging’ the historical and geographical 
divisions, and their subjective correlates, which ‘characterise [...] daily spatial 
lives in interface localities’ (Leonard & McKnight, 2011, p. 580). Through the 
exercise of agency that originates from below, starts from where people find 
themselves placed now, and is willing to allow difference and conflicting 
histories to exist, ‘new shared space’ may be created in the city; in which 
‘boundaries [become ...] more permeable [...] leaving space for identities to 
change and evolve’ (Komarova, 2008).  
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Introduction 
Growing up in a ‘typical’ Afrikaner home in the 1960s and 1970s, the Great 
Trek of the 1830s and the Anglo-Boer War of 1899 to 1902 formed―from an 
early age―part of one’s historical frame of reference; something which was 
strengthened by the stories told by a paternal grandmother (who passed away 
in 1980 at the age of 98). She lived through the latter conflict between Boer 
and Briton as one of the (relatively few) Boer civilians who were able to 
evade capture by the British forces and consequently did not suffer in the 
camps, but rather in the veld, where survival was sometimes dependent on 
food provided by local black inhabitants. This ‘typical’ Afrikaner home was 
not a house in the platteland (rural) in an Afrikaner-dominated town, but a 
flat (apartment) in Durban, in Natal (now KwaZulu-Natal), a province then 
often referred to as “the last outpost of the British Empire”. There were books 
in the flat: Afrikaans, and English, Dutch and German; many books, as well 
as many more books in the Durban Municipal Library in the imposing 
(British) Durban city hall complex.  
To the inquiring and critical mind it soon became clear that the Anglo-
Boer War (like the rest of the history of South Africa, and all history) is not 
simplistic. There are seldom clear-cut good people and bad people. To 
understand many political, social and even economic developments, one 
often has to study the wars and other forms of conflict that have shaped our 
societies. What starts as a hobby, can develop into a vocation. What starts as 
a fascination with military campaigns and battles, strategy and tactics, can 
lead one to asking questions about the consequences of the decisions taken by 
ambitious politicians, and vain military commanders. When elephants fight, it 
is the grass that suffers. Thus, one can end up doing research on the traumatic 
and other consequences of a war between staunch imperialists and proud 
nationalists; a war of which the after-effects still resonate with us today.  
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Fast-track to some twenty years after South Africa became a true 
democracy in 1994. When one looks around South Africa today (2014), one 
unfortunately sees many people who are angry, or disillusioned, or bitter; or 
all these things, and more. There are people who suffer from historical 
amnesia: they do not know who they are, where they come from, where 
exactly they are (historically speaking) today, or where they are heading. 
There are also many traumatised people around us―people either 
traumatised by events of the past (for example, the humiliation and hardships 
they suffered under apartheid), or by recent events, such as crime, or the 
Marikana massacre near Rustenburg (16 August 2012) when miners were 
killed in police action. One meets people who yearn for the so-called ‘good 
old days’ of the past and others who want to refight the battles of the 
past―including those between the British and the Afrikaners/Boers of long 
ago. 
Notwithstanding a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, reconciliation 
is still a problem in South Africa. Why? Why all the bitterness, the hostility, 
the unresolved trauma? In an effort to understand these challenges, it is 
imperative that one should understand the history of twentieth-century South 
Africa. Of course the root causes go back much further in history, but in this 
chapter there is space to go back only as far as the Anglo-Boer War of 1899 
to 1902―a war that set in motion a train of events which, in due course, had 
profound implications for inter-group relations in South Africa. It goes 
without saying, that the above-mentioned questions, as well as an 
understanding of the historical context of the challenges South Africans are 
facing today, are of paramount importance if we are to find truth, 
reconciliation, and healing. 
From 11 October 1899 to 31 May 1902, the Anglo-Boer War raged in 
what is today South Africa. This bitter conflict may be regarded as the first 
liberation struggle of the twentieth century, with the Afrikaners being the first 
African freedom fighters. Thus far, it is the most extensive and destructive 
war that has been fought in southern Africa. In this chapter, it will be shown 
how the military conflict between the world’s only superpower on the cusp of 
the twentieth century (i.e. the British Empire) and two small Afrikaner/Boer 
republics (i.e. the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek/Transvaal and the Oranje-
Vrijstaat/Orange Free State) wreaked havoc on the civilian population in the 
war zone, and what trans-generational trauma it caused. What started as a 
white man’s war and a so-called ‘gentleman’s war’, soon degenerated into a 
conflict that―at least to some extent―displayed the characteristics of both a 
civil war and a total war, affecting the lives of all the inhabitants (i.e. white, 
black, brown and Asian) in the region. 
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Thus, proceeding from the assumption that a basic prerequisite for 
breaking intergenerational cycles of repetition is knowledge of history (one’s 
‘own’ history, but also the history of ‘the other’), it is the purpose of this 
chapter to focus on what can be regarded as the most important conflict in the 
history of what is today, South Africa, namely the Anglo-Boer War of 1899 
to 1902; and more specifically, to indicate what the profound “collateral 
damage” and concomitant consequences of this war were. The issues that will 
be addressed in this chapter link up with the work that has thus far been done 
by scholars such as Spies (1977), Nasson (2010), Pretorius (2001), Kessler 
(2012), and van Heyningen (2013). 
In this chapter the connections between the past and present regarding the 
trauma caused by the Anglo-Boer War (and in particular the camp system) 
will be highlighted―something that is not often addressed in the scholarship 
on the war of 1899 to 1902, albeit that the author has done some work in this 
regard in the past. But, in an effort to understand the terrible collateral 
damage done by a particular conflict, the basic military events should always 
be understood, and consequently a brief overview of the events in the South 
African war zone in 1899 to 1902 will be provided. In the following section, 
the traumatic consequences and legacy of the Anglo-Boer War will be 
analysed. 
The Course of the War: A Brief Overview  
The causes of the Anglo-Boer War can be summarised as the culmination of 
a very long struggle between British imperialism and Afrikaner nationalism. 
The finer details of the course of the war are not relevant to the purposes of 
this study. Suffice it to say that there were false expectations on both sides 
regarding the duration of the conflict; many British and Boers indeed 
believed that the war would be over by Christmas 1899 (Wessels, 2000, pp. 
83-84). If a closer look is taken at the Boer and British strategies and how 
these strategies were implemented during the first three (semi-) conventional 
phases of the struggle, it becomes clear that both sides made serious 
mistakes. The British and the Boers underestimated each other: the British 
were not well-prepared for the war; the Boers did not exploit either their 
initial advantages or their initial tactical successes, and the first British 
commander-in-chief in South Africa, General Sir Redvers Buller, made 
serious errors. He was then removed from his command and replaced by Lord 
Roberts of Kandahar, who succeeded in defeating a large Boer force at 
Paardeberg (27 February 1900) and who captured the Boer capital cities: 
 Anglo-Boer War and Its Traumatic Consequences 163 
Bloemfontein on 13 March 1900, and Pretoria on 5 June 1900 (Amery (Ed.), 
1902-1906; Breytenbach, 1969-1983). 
By then, however, the character of the war had changed; as a matter of 
fact, already from March 1900 onwards (i.e. when the Boers changed their 
(semi-) conventional strategy to that of guerrilla warfare). The British Army 
in South Africa took several drastic measures in a desperate effort to counter 
the new Boer onslaught. This included: the scorched-earth policy and 
concomitant camp system; the building of some 8 000 blockhouses across the 
length and breadth of the war zone; mobile drives against the Boer 
commandos; and the employment of as many as 140 000 black and brown (as 
well as a few Asian) local inhabitants (either in a combatant or non-
combatant capacity), as well as more than 5 500 Afrikaners who had 
surrendered and then joined the British forces (Grundlingh, 2006). 
The consequences of the British counter-guerrilla strategy included the 
‘collateral damage’ it inflicted on the country and its inhabitants. The British 
scorched-earth policy, for example, led to the destruction of approximately 
30 000 Boer farmsteads, and the houses of tens of thousands of black 
labourers, as well as approximately 40 towns and villages were partially or 
totally destroyed. The fact that more than half of the total (only 219 000 
strong) Afrikaner population of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, and 
more than a 100 000 black civilians, were left destitute, and that in due 
course the British authorities established internment camps (a term preferred 
to the emotionally-charged term ‘concentration camps’) where these civilians 
were housed―most of the time in unsanitary conditions, and without 
sufficient food or medical facilities―speaks for itself. The result was a 
humanitarian disaster, which led to the death of at least 28 000 white civilians 
(80% of them children, aged sixteen years and younger), and at least 23 000 
(but probably many more) black civilians (once again, most of them young 
people and children). The trauma was incalculable (Pretorius (Ed.), 2001; 
Kessler, 1999). However, it has to be clearly understood that there was no 
intention on the side of the British authorities to let either white or black 
civilians die in the camps. Thus, to make a clear distinction between the Nazi 
concentration/extermination camps of the Second World War and the camp 
system established by the British in South Africa, this author prefers the term 
‘internment camp(s)’ when referring to the camps in South Africa, 1900-
1902. 
The Anglo-Boer War was the 226th of 230 wars, campaigns and punitive 
expeditions in which the British Army took part in the 64 years of Queen 
Victoria’s reign from 1837 to 1901 (Farwell, 1973, pp. 364-371). Although 
both sides initially saw the Anglo-Boer War as a ‘gentleman’s war’, as well 
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as a white man’s war, the conflict was from the start neither the one nor the 
other. Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, who succeeded Lord Roberts as the 
British commander-in-chief in South Africa at midnight on 28-29 November 
1900, had to bring the war to a conclusion as soon as possible, but the Boers 
frustrated his efforts, and consequently his measures became very harsh―al-
beit, that from a military point of view, he had no other option. Eventually he 
was ruthlessly successful (from a military point of view), but his actions 
caused much trauma (Wessels (Ed.), 2006). However, it should be kept in 
mind that had the Boers realised by mid-1900 that they could no longer win 
the war, had accepted the fact, and had surrendered to the British forces, their 
women and children would have been spared much suffering. 
During the Anglo-Boer War, the distinction between soldiers and 
civilians, combatants and non-combatants, in due course became blurred. 
Civilian casualties (collateral damage), including deaths in internment camps, 
henceforth had military significance. For example, news about the plight of 
loved ones in camps caused burghers serving in commando units to think 
seriously about their role in the continuation of the struggle. On another level, 
the idea that military conflict could be coupled with respect for the enemy, 
gradually faded away. In this sense, the Anglo-Boer War was―albeit on a 
small scale―a precursor to the destructive total wars of the twentieth 
century.  
Boer civilians were not sent to internment camps primarily for what 
they did, but for what they were (Giliomee, 2003, p. 354). Although the 
British justifiably regarded the Boer farmsteads and Boer civilians as 
legitimate military targets, and although the Afrikaner was correct in 
arguing that the British waged war against civilians, it has to be understood 
that there were no intentional attempts on the part of the British to 
exterminate Boer civilians in the camps―as happened during the Second 
World War to the Jews in the Nazi extermination camps. However, it is true 
that when the camps were first erected, as well as in the course of 1901, 
administration was sometimes very poor and that this, and negligence, with 
regard to the provision of food and medical services, for example, led to the 
deaths of many women and children. Thus, it is understandable that during 
the war the camps were already known among Afrikaners as ‘murder 
camps’ and ‘hell camps’. If conditions in the white internment camps were 
bad, they were, generally speaking, worse in the black internment camps. In 
fact, one could regard the lack of planning and the limited supplies these 
camps received as criminal neglect on the part of the British authorities 
(Kessler, 1999; Kessler, 2012). 
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Through the ages, it has always been innocent civilians who have suffered 
most during wars―and innocent civilians continue to bear the brunt of 
present-day conflicts. In the South African context, however, the Anglo-Boer 
War is prominent as a conflict in which civilians had intentionally been 
targeted by a military strategy. Since then, numerous examples can be found 
in history, and for this reason, this war in South Africa, more than any other 
local conflict, had an incredibly negative effect on the white and black 
civilian population in the war zone. 
However, it was not only the internment camps that impacted negatively 
on inter-group relations in South Africa and led to trauma. Relations were 
also strained by other traumatic events during the war, such as the baKgatla 
attack at Derdepoort on 25 November 1899; the murder of Abraham Esau 
(the coloured man who was tortured at Calvinia by the invading Boer 
commando and who was killed on 5 February 1901); the Boer attack at 
Leliefontein on 27 January 1902; and the Zulu attack on the commando of 
Field-Cornet Jan Potgieter at Holkrans (Mthashana) on 6 May 1902 (Nasson, 
1991; Laband, 2000, pp. 123-124; Botha, 1969). 
By the end of 1901, the British forces’ counter-guerrilla strategy of 
directed severity began to yield results; however, in the western Transvaal 
and in the northern and north-eastern Orange Free State, the Boer 
commandos (under the command of General Koos de la Rey and General 
Christiaan de Wet respectively) pursued the guerrilla war relentlessly and 
with relative success. No wonder, therefore, that the British forces’ counter-
guerrilla operations in the western Transvaal and in the northern and north-
eastern Free State were more comprehensive (and more forceful) than in 
other parts of the war zone. But by May 1902, the Boers’ situation was 
hopeless. Lord Kitchener had forced the Boers on commando into a position 
where most of them had given up hope. Consequently, on the conclusion of 
negotiations between Boer delegates at Vereeniging, the British conditions 
for surrender were accepted (by 54 votes to six) on 31 May 1902 (Kestell, & 
Van Velden, 1912). 
The fact that the war had ended with the loss of Boer republican 
independence, left most of the bittereinders (bitter-enders, die-hards) and 
their families filled with dismay. As time passed, most Afrikaners accepted 
the outcome of the peace negotiations. However, some bittereinders’ 
unhappiness with the conditions of surrender led to their believing that some 
of the negotiators had sold out the Boers at Vereeniging and Pretoria 
(Wessels, 1988, pp. 103-105, 109-112). 
Like many Germans after the Great (First World) War of 1914 to 1918, 
some Afrikaners believed, albeit erroneously, that they were not actually 
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defeated militarily in the war, and could therefore have continued their 
struggle. Like the Germans who after 1918 believed that they had been 
stabbed in the back by the Weimar politicians who negotiated for peace and 
had surrendered (see the Dolchstoss-im-Rücken lie that was propagated by 
Adolf Hitler and his Nazi followers), some Afrikaners believed (erroneously), 
on conclusion of the Anglo-Boer War, that they could have continued to 
pursue the guerrilla war against the British with success, but had been 
betrayed by people, such as General Louis Botha and General Jan 
Smuts―both of them prominent Transvaal commanding officers (Wessels, 
1988, p. 103). 
However, there is no evidence that Boer leaders, such as General Louis 
Botha and General Jan Smuts, had sold out or betrayed the Boers; indeed, in 
many respects, their carefully considered and diplomatic initiatives during the 
peace negotiations at Vereeniging and Pretoria, saved the Afrikaner nation 
from complete destruction. Together with other Boer leaders, Botha and 
Smuts negotiated exceptionally generous conditions of surrender; for 
example, those who decided to become British subjects would retain their 
personal freedom and property; Dutch could still be used as a medium of 
instruction in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony schools; and the 
granting of voting rights to black people would be discussed only after 
responsible government (i.e. self-government) had been instituted (Kestell, & 
Van Velden, 1912, pp. 133-135). The last-mentioned clause meant in effect, 
that Afrikaners would decide the political future of black and coloured South 
Africans, and in practice, once the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony 
(as the Orange Free State was called under British rule) received self-
government, they did not give blacks and coloureds the right to vote. Thus, at 
the peace negotiations in Pretoria, the political and other interests of black 
and coloured people were sacrificed to facilitate reconciliation between Boer 
and Briton. Those traumatised by the Anglo-Boer War, soon became the new 
traumatisers. This then brings us to the point where the legacy of the war of 
1899 to 1902 has to be analysed in more detail. 
The Traumatic Consequences and Legacy of War 
To most Afrikaners north of the Orange River, the only way that the injustice 
of the ‘peace’ of Vereeniging could be reversed, was by regaining the 
independence of the Boer republics (and much later, the establishment of a 
Republic of South Africa). The Afrikaners who suffered most during the war 
were indeed those who lived in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and 
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more specifically, the inhabitants of farms and towns whose houses had been 
partially or entirely destroyed by the British forces. 
However, the Anglo-Boer War left almost all the race groups discontent-
ed in the country that from 1910 onwards was known as South Africa. 
Afrikanerdom was left divided (the bittereinders versus the hands-uppers and, 
especially, the joiners), while the bittereinders in particular, were embittered 
and humiliated. Coloureds, and especially black people, were frustrated 
because the end of the war did not yield the expected political and other 
privileges. 
Although the British authorities had created the impression during the war 
that they would give equal political and social rights to black people in 
exchange for their support against the Boers, some of them did not really 
intend to do so (Walshe, 1969) while others―as has already been pointed 
out―were prepared, in the interest of reconciliation with the Afrikaners, to 
sacrifice the blacks’ right to vote. Thus, black people were more suspicious 
of whites than ever and would soon seek their political salvation in an 
organisation such as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), 
which was established on 8 January 1912 (with Sol T. Plaatje, who had been 
besieged by the British at Mafeking, as one of the founder members) and 
which was known from 1923 as the African National Congress (ANC) 
(Odendaal, 1984, pp. 270-277). As time passed, the black resistance 
movement (primarily working against white domination) would come into 
conflict with the conservative white resistance movement (initially fighting 
against British domination), and an important Leitmotiv in the political 
history of twentieth-century South Africa would thus emerge, namely that of 
black nationalism versus Afrikaner nationalism; sometimes also manifesting 
itself in the binary opposition of black expectations versus white fears. 
Many Afrikaner leaders intended consolidating Afrikaner power and 
therefore desired to heal the rift in Afrikaner ranks. Not everyone was 
prepared to co-operate with English-speaking South Africans, while co-
operation with other race groups was not even on the cards. There were 
indeed attempts to uplift the Afrikaner in a material sense (Van Rensburg, 
1967), but otherwise there were no co-ordinated initiatives to come to terms 
with the trauma caused by the war of 1899 to 1902. In due course, this 
contributed towards the development of an aggressive Afrikaner nationalism, 
with separate development (apartheid) as one of its most important 
manifestations. 
During the Anglo-Boer War, the British humanitarian Emily Hobhouse 
launched the world’s first (informal) ‘truth and reconciliation commission’ 
when she compiled the book The Brunt of the War and Where it Fell 
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(published in the second half of 1902), consisting of, inter alia, letters (and 
excerpts from letters) in which Boer women related their experiences during 
the war. Hobhouse also tried to offer traumatised camp and other victims of 
British collateral damage the opportunity to provide an account of their 
narratives of loss, suffering and despair, so that they could rid themselves in 
this way of the trauma of the then recent past. The Women’s Memorial in 
Bloemfontein, adjacent to the world’s largest Anglo-Boer War museum, was 
unveiled on 16 December 1913 in honour of the white Boer civilians who 
suffered during the Anglo-Boer War. Hopefully this Memorial will in due 
course be embraced by all South Africa’s cultural groups as a symbol of 
mutual suffering and trauma. 
Since Hobhouse’s work was, in a large measure, a one-person action, she 
could reach only a very limited number of (white) persons, and the 
therapeutic value of her work, viewed as a whole, was therefore also limited. 
There were also never any formal attempts at reconciliation between Boer 
and Briton. And, of course, black and coloured people were totally left in the 
cold to deal with their own trauma. For this reason, most of the war trauma 
was transferred to the next white and black generation. The Afrikaners who 
suffered in the internment camps, stored the negative experiences in their 
memories. The trauma was internalised, and for many years, some Afrikaners 
harboured great resentment, bitterness, frustrations and fear. In some cases 
only many years later, even in a succeeding generation, these traumatic 
experiences once again gained prominence, and sometimes manifested 
themselves in one or other political view, for example in the apartheid policy. 
As time passed, the Afrikaner developed a terrible fear of foreign (non-
Afrikaner) domination. 
The South African government’s decision to declare war against Germany 
in 1914, i.e. at the start of the First World War, and invade German South-
West Africa (today Namibia), was an important reason why some Afrikaners 
rebelled and took up arms, in the hope that they would be able to regain their 
republican independence. On the whole, the rebellion was not well organised, 
and the government forces were able to suppress it fairly quickly. 
Nevertheless, it left many Afrikaners bitter and traumatised.  
In May 1924, Emily Hobhouse put the finishing touches to a second book 
that offered white civilian victims of the Anglo-Boer War the opportunity to 
‘be heard’. In War Without Glamour or Women’s War Experiences, Written 
By Themselves 1899-1902 (London, 1927), Hobhouse included 
approximately 30 statements that were written during or just after the war by 
Boer women. She held the view that the voices of the generals and the 
politicians had indeed been heard, but that the voices of the wronged civilians 
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had not yet received a hearing. This book strikingly illustrates the terrible 
effects (collateral damage) of war on civilians. Unfortunately, nothing 
was―once again―done to alleviate the plight of black, coloured and Asian 
South Africans. As a matter of fact, in the years following unification in 
1910, the plight of black South Africans worsened, as the policy of 
segregation (a precursor to post-1948 apartheid) was implemented.  
In May 1948, the ‘right-wing’ National Party of Dr D.F. Malan defeated 
General Jan Smuts’s United Party at the ballot box and introduced a new era 
in the history of South Africa. In contrast to the rest of the world, where the 
emphasis was increasingly placed on equal treatment and justice for all races 
(owing to the Second World War, and especially Nazi racism), the National 
Party implemented a policy that accentuated racial differences and 
segregation.  
From 1948 to 1954, under the leadership of Malan, and after that under 
the leadership of Adv. J.G. Strijdom and Dr H.F. Verwoerd, the National 
Party government passed various apartheid laws and implemented measures 
to transform South Africa into a country where racism was institutionalised. 
Thus, in due course, apartheid systematically dehumanised and traumatised 
many millions of people.  
In the years from South Africa’s becoming a Union (1910) up to the 
founding of the Republic (1961), the Anglo-Boer War, and in particular the 
suffering associated with the white internment camps, formed an important 
part of many Afrikaners’ historical (and political) frame of reference. Since 
most inhabitants of the internment camps never resolved their trauma 
successfully, this psychological collateral damage was transferred to their 
children. In the minds of many Afrikaners, there was the idea that what the 
Afrikaner had to go through during the Anglo-Boer War, should never again 
happen to ‘us’.  
The excessive emphasis on the protection of their own interests meant 
that the next logical step, namely, to prevent universal oppression and 
suffering, was never taken by the Afrikaner. The Afrikaners had not learnt 
from their history and they, who had been humiliated and oppressed earlier, 
and who had suffered an immense amount of collateral damage and 
concomitant trauma during the war of 1899 to 1902, became the new 
oppressors (of black, coloured and Asian people) from 1948 onwards under 
the banner of separate development (apartheid). In this way, the traumatised 
from the era of the Anglo-Boer War (and their descendants) became the new 
traumatisers, thus causing a new wave of collateral damage, to the detriment 
of mutual relationships in South Africa, and to the disadvantage of the ‘non-
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white’ inhabitants of the country. This is probably the greatest tragedy in the 
history of the Afrikaner people―and in the history of South Africa.  
The traumatisation of the largest part of South African society continued 
after South Africa became a republic on 31 May 1961 (i.e. exactly 59 years 
after the end of the Anglo-Boer War), and at the same time, there was an 
ever-increasing sense of alienation among the races. South Africa’s relations 
with the outside world were also gradually affected, an aspect that led to 
increasing isolation in sport, the imposition of a mandatory United Nations 
arms embargo in November 1977, and economic pressure. This, in turn, led 
to the emergence of a siege and laager mentality in a large sector of the 
Afrikaner community (Giliomee, 2003, pp. 578-589). 
On the home front, the violence that erupted in the black ‘township’ of 
Soweto, and elsewhere, in 1976, had a negative effect on South Africa’s 
position internationally. The 1980s were characterised, inter alia, by black-
on-black violence (which left about 30 000 people dead), police brutality, and 
an increase in operations by the ANC’s military wing, uMkhonto weSizwe 
(MK)―all of which were contributing factors in the traumatisation of South 
African society. By the late 1980s, South Africa seemed on the verge of total 
anarchy; then came the year 1990, which brought various dramatic political 
changes, for example: the unbanning of several organisations (including the 
ANC), the release of political prisoners (in particular Dr Nelson Mandela), 
and the start of negotiations between the National Party government and 
other political organisations. These events led to the first truly democratic 
election in 1994, with the accompanying dramatic political transformation. In 
addition, the establishment of a formal Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC), which, like Emily Hobhouse’s informal discussions with Boer 
women almost a century earlier, offered the marginalised victims of conflict 
the opportunity to voice their suffering, so that their trauma would hopefully 
be resolved and perhaps healed (Jeffery, 1999). 
Concluding Perspectives 
In the light of the terrible slaughter that took place during the First World 
War of 1914 to 1918, the nature, scope and meaning of the Anglo-Boer War 
of 1899 to 1902 were relegated to the background in Britain. However, for 
the Afrikaner nation it was the most extensive conflict in which they had 
been involved in their entire history, and this war guided Afrikaner thinking 
for a large part of the twentieth century. Moreover, the history of the 
Afrikaner nation cannot be fully understood if we do not consider the 
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significance of the Anglo-Boer War. Together with the Great Trek of the 
1830s, the Anglo-Boer War was indeed the most epoch-making event in the 
history of the Afrikaner. 
The consequences of the internment camps probably tower above all the 
other after-effects of the war. Unlike the razed farmhouses that could be 
rebuilt, those who died in the camps could not then be restored to life. The 
trauma caused by the British internment camp system would continue to 
haunt both the Afrikaner and the other inhabitants of South Africa for many 
years to come. The internment camps of the Anglo-Boer War led to 
disruption, trauma and alienation. A large section of the Afrikaner people was 
impoverished, and various Afrikaners who lost everything on their farms 
sought a new life in towns and cities. In the course of time, some of them 
became part of the so-called ‘poor-white’ problem. In the urban areas, fear of 
the British was soon replaced by fear of domination by black people, inter 
alia, because the Afrikaners had to compete with black people for 
employment opportunities. Many of these whites in due course became 
supporters of the National Party’s policy of apartheid (Dubow, 1989). 
More than a hundred-and-ten-years after the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer 
War, we are able to reflect on the immense political and social fallout from this 
traumatic conflict. These negative consequences include the scorched-earth 
policy and the internment camps of the Anglo-Boer War; the rebellion of 1914-
1915; the years of political Sturm und Drang in the 1920s and 1930s; the 
political changes of 1939 and (in particular) 1948; the implementation of the 
policy of apartheid since 1948; the events at Sharpeville and elsewhere in the 
1960s; the uprisings in Soweto and elsewhere in 1976; and the violence of the 
1980s―violence which spilt over into the 1990s. Not all of these conflicts and 
their ensuing collateral damage can be directly linked to the Anglo-Boer War, 
but the war of 1899 to 1902 did cause immense damage, disruption and trauma, 
and set in motion a train of events which to a large extent determined the 
course that twentieth-century South African history would take. 
Taking everything into consideration, one cannot understand the history 
of twentieth-century South Africa (including the country’s political 
development) without knowledge of or insight into the traumatic history of 
the Anglo-Boer War and the consequences it had for the country’s white, 
black, coloured and Asian inhabitants. The war’s trauma was internalised by 
both the white and black victims of the war, and was ‘transferred’ to next 
generations. This, in turn, had profound implications for the political, social 
and economic developments in the country. Indeed, the war left deep spiritual 
and psychological scars, the powerful effects of which continue to be felt in 
the third millennium.  
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The transgenerational traumas of the twentieth century have haunted 
South Africans for far too long. Traumatic memories with regard to the 
Anglo-Boer War (and other events) should be used to bind people together 
across cultures, races, political and other beliefs. It should be kept in mind 
that all South Africans share a common past, including the history of 
traumatic events such as the Anglo-Boer War. This war is indeed an integral 
part of all South Africans’ colonial past. If the intergenerational cycles of 
repetition have thus far not been broken, the time has now come to do exactly 
this, in the interest of all the people of South Africa. It is up to present-day 
South Africans to prove that it is possible for the negative consequences of 
the memory of trauma experienced collectively, to end. For this to happen, 
South Africans indeed need empathy as an important element in overcoming 
inter-group prejudice, but also economic empowerment, and education; i.e. 
knowledge and insight into South Africa’s chequered past, including the 
history of the Anglo-Boer War of 1899 to 1902 and its traumatic 
consequences. After all: History enables one to forgive, without the need to 
forget.  
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Introduction 
After a long day’s work interviewing former Khmer Rouge (KR) cadres, our 
last interviewee, a former female cadre from Cambodia’s north, recounted 
her compelling story. Her life too, she told us, was turned upside down. She 
had joined the KR at the age of 14 when the US Air force destroyed her 
village. “We are going to liberate Cambodia,” the local cadre told her. She 
followed her superiors to Phnom Penh on a truck. She had to eat gruel too, 
she said. She starved and did not finish school. And, never, “ever” did she see 
anyone being actually killed, she insisted. She was interviewed as a swarm of 
barely dressed toddlers just surrounded her, while she simultaneously worked 
on a piece of fabric. Her home, a square wooden structure on four poles, had 
no electricity or running water. One could describe her as poor even by 
Cambodian standards. Our translator, fluent in English in his early 20s, was 
the picture of coming success. He was following world affairs on a daily 
basis and every morning gave the team the daily briefing. One of many 
siblings, he used his language skills to fund his education. He offered very 
little information about his roots and how the Genocide that ravaged his 
country between 1975 and 1979, or the violent years before, had affected his 
family. That evening, on our way back to the base he shared: “See, she said 
she saw no killings…all these stories are made up by the Vietnamese.” His 
reaction puzzled us and lead us later to ask this question: What does it mean 
for the young to be born into a society where so much socio-political trauma 
such as in Cambodia during the KR, has occurred? Specifically, what does it 
mean for the potential well-being of the offspring of former KR to be born to 
parents with a strong association to a regime responsible for roughly 
2.000.000 (Chandler, 1999) deaths of fellow Khmer and Cham Muslim 
Cambodians? 
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In Cambodia, despite the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT), the Genocide 
has either been talked about very little or vehemently denied. Such a trend of 
unaccountability raises the question: What is the likelihood of a re-emergence 
of extreme violence in this post-Genocide setting? We will argue that in order 
to break the cycle of repetition as this volume aims, we have to start by 
assessing how the past is framed by the different variously affected groups. 
We want to know if the thinking that led to such destruction and disruption of 
life, namely blind obedience to authority, evasion of responsibility and 
limited reflection still exist among cadres and the extent to which these 
attitudes have been passed on to the younger generation. While “repetition” 
often implies strictly resurgence of violent patterns, we believe that it should 
also imply the regeneration of attitudes that embolden the glorification of the 
past. These attitudes perpetuate intergroup divisions and allow the passing of 
denial from generation to generation through transferring the blame and the 
acting out of individual and group trauma.  
In this examination, we present findings from survey analysis we 
conducted in 2011-12 among 157 former KR cadres and 44 second 
generation individuals from the same community in Anlong Veng, the last 
KR stronghold. Because of the relative isolation of this community the two 
groups offer real life (as opposed to laboratory) conditions to study the 
transmission of patterns of obedience and psychosocial trauma from first to 
second generation and the long term effects of thought reform as they pertain 
to associates of a genocidal regime. Other KR communities in more mixed 
parts of Cambodia may have had more opportunities to interact with different 
segments of the population and more exposure to the historical record of the 
KR. In such areas, we suspect the second generation may have grown more 
critical of their parents as opposed to this relatively homogenous group.  
Studying the extent of transmission of political and psychological 
attributes in this community is important in two critical ways. It will offer 
points of reference for a more comprehensive study of Cambodia’s post-
Genocide society and will allow a comparison of first and second generation 
KR with parallel groups from survivor communities. We hypothesize that the 
first generation has passed on its attitudes about the past, present and future 
of the country, as well as patterns of unquestioning obedience to authority 
and socio-psychological traumatisation to the younger generation. Given the 
problematic state/society relationship within Cambodia, these patterns can 
only nurture violent trends. While more research is required to study 
offspring of genocidaires and survivors across Cambodia and their relative 
similarity to their parents’ outlook, this chapter is a first step towards a better 
understanding of how the youth of Cambodia relate to the past and the future 
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in a context of denial and very limited dialogue. After a brief overview of the 
Genocide and its ripple effects, the chapter presents a political psychological 
profile of the former KR cadres’ community in Anlong Veng and discusses 
the research findings. Ongoing assessment of views about the past will give a 
picture of how KR cadres and their offspring relate to not only the past and 
present but to the future as well.  
The Cambodian Genocide: Social Experimentation Amidst the 
Cold War 
The Cambodian Genocide is unique in the sense that nearly a quarter of the 
population of the country perished either through hardship (killing fields) or 
torture and execution (Hinton, 2005). The breeding ground for the genocidal 
regime that the KR established was provided by conditions in Cambodia, as 
well as throughout East Asia, that had been simmering since the early 1950s 
and throughout the 1970s. The Lon Nol dictatorship (1970-75) polarized the 
population. The US carpet bombing of Cambodia (1969-73) to disrupt the 
supply line of the Northern Vietnamese led to 500,000 victims, mostly in the 
country side (Kiernan). The ensuing climate for chaos was exacerbated by the 
Cold War rhetoric, the nearby Vietnam War (1959-75), and China’s Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976). Additionally, the local political and cultural context 
resulted in rigid hierarchical structures and disproportional revenge norms for 
ill-doing (Hinton). In these conditions, the cult-like system that Saloth Sar 
(Pol Pot, 1925-1998) and his immediate entourage nourished took over the 
whole country.  
By all accounts, during the KR Cambodia became a laboratory of 
pervasive fear. Pol Pot and his “executive” board were facilitated by the 
political context in which they functioned. The KR leadership drew 
inspiration from existing norms in Cambodian society such as respect and 
obedience to hierarchy as well as thought reform practices that were first 
developed by the Soviets (during the show trials of 1936-38) and then the 
Chinese (re-education campaigns) (Chandler, 1999; Lifton, 1999: 122-127). 
The method of imprisonment that dictated thought reform procedures was 
first introduced to the KR leadership during the 1950s. At the time, Pol Pot 
and his associates were studying in France. In the early post-war years, the 
French communist party was closely associated with the Soviet communist 
party (Chandler, 2008). 
The KR demanded blind obedience to the Communist Party of Kampu-
chea (Angkar) and disregard for each other’s humanity. The KR applied 
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social experimentation and sought to create an agrarian utopia (Chandler 
2007; Boyden & Gibbs, 1995). This extent of social experimentation, despite 
similarities with the Chinese Cultural Revolution, was unique in that 
Cambodia was sealed from the outside and the majority of the population left 
the cities. The aim was to forge among the population a new collective and 
agrarian identity where the individual mattered as long as it served the 
Angkar (the KR party). The systematic tools of the KR depended upon 
hundreds of thousands of workers/prisoners in the killing fields as well as the 
prison system. This system included forced confessions, self-confrontation in 
the presence of superiors, performance of repetitive tasks, and dehumaniza-
tion of those outside the Angkar. Constant surveillance and celebration of the 
spirit of the KR revolution were also vital components. Indoctrination of 
young cadres was the first step to turning them into in most cases obedient 
executioners. It continued throughout the regime and in areas where the hard 
core KR withdrew after their fall in 1979. This indoctrination aimed at what 
Lifton (1979) called “thought reform.” Accordingly, thought reform is the 
process of “death and rebirth” of the self through focused emotional power 
with the purpose to achieve total control of the human mind (4). Upon taking 
power in 1949, the Chinese Communists developed thought reform 
systematically. They implemented among dissenters and their own ranks a 
practice of confession about past and present and re-education in hopes of 
reducing former habits and recasting the person into the mould of an obedient 
soldier of the revolution.  
In the context of thought reform, “enemies” were sought out within one’s 
own “undeveloped consciousness” as well as in those who were not members 
of the Angkar (the KR party). The crimes varied; they ranged from exhibiting 
bourgeois attitudes, working slowly, and having doubts for, or hating the 
revolution, and therefore serving its enemies such as the Vietnamese, the 
KGB and the CIA. Similar to China and the Soviet Union, the cult of 
confession that was applied in Cambodia included purging of the inner self 
(outmost inner thoughts); self-surrender of the individual to his or her 
environment, and making public one’s own individual thoughts to maintain 
the revolutionary ethos through self and other observation. Eventually, the 
culmination of the process involved statements that signalled a “born again” 
self. The cadres in Anlong Veng and elsewhere experienced persisting 
examinations of their “revolutionary selves” in a continuous basis.  
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The Anlong Veng District 
Following the Vietnamese invasion in 1978, lower KR cadres dispersed 
themselves throughout the country. Most returned to their villages and 
eventually were absorbed by the other inhabitants. Those who followed the 
higher echelons, and often had reason to hide, were more reluctant to 
reintegrate. Such groups withdrew towards the mountainous regions close to 
the border with Thailand, such as Pailin and Oddar Meanchey. They 
subsequently did not integrate with the rest of the country until 1998. Odar 
Meanchey became home to Pol Pot and his trusted military commander (who 
eventually turned against him), Chhit Choeun (alias Ta Mok), also known as 
“the butcher” for his ruthlessness. Reportedly, some 3,500 troops followed 
Ta Mok towards Anlong Veng. Ta Mok exercised authority over his cadres’ 
lives until he was arrested and died in captivity in 2006 while awaiting trial 
with genocide charges. Ta Mok would distribute land and even arrange the 
marriages of several cadres. The District, until recently, was considered as 
outer periphery and dangerous for travel. More recently, Anlong Veng 
became a trade hub due to its proximity with Thailand. Ta Mok is still 
regarded with reverence by many KR cadres, and his home is a destination 
for unrepentant former KR mourners and tourists alike. The KR cadres who 
have been living here in relative autonomy since their withdrawal in 1979, 
are immune from prosecution under a 1994 amnesty law by the Cambodian 
government. In the 1990s, there were 5,122 KR households with 22,466 
former KR and their family members. In 1998 Prime Minister Hun Sen’s 
“win-win” policy of national reconciliation allowed the last Khmer Rouge 
stronghold in Anlong Veng to enjoy a semi-autonomous control over this 
region.  
Collective Trauma and Memory Transmission in the Cambodian 
Context 
Destruction of the existing infrastructure by the KR impacted the quality of 
life for generations. The extreme poverty that ensued ensured their ascent to 
power that until today has allowed retraumatizing conditions to affect the 
majority of the population. Seeking to define this impact, Chhim (2013) 
points to the Khmer term baksbat (broken courage) and other terms of 
distress such as phey-khlach (double fear); bor –veas-cheas-chgnay (wishing 
that the trauma would go away) as distinct ways in which Cambodians in 
Cambodia, and those who live as refugees in the United States, describe 
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distress. By definition, trauma implies a psychological breakdown caused by 
external events. When in trauma, individuals’ capacity to respond to these 
externalities diminishes (Becker, 2004). These externalities within societies 
that have experienced trauma are eventually morphed into new challenges 
and continue to trigger negative responses in individuals and groups. For 
example, socioeconomic challenges of parents such as those experienced in 
post-Genocide Cambodia, are known to affect the cognitive development and 
emotional health of children (Najman et al., 2004). Also, studies on the 
Holocaust and Northern Uganda further illustrate that traumatic events affect 
individuals in different ways depending on the age they experienced it 
(Schauer and Elbert, 2010; van IJzendoorn et al. 2003; Keilson, 1979). The 
age of parental traumatization (the first generation in this study) as well 
affects how the second generation will manifest trauma symptoms such as 
PTSD and anxiety (Yehuda, 2005; Solomon, 1998)  
Traumatic experiences are unavoidably part of the memory content from 
generation to generation. Memory transmission between family members 
discloses that family memories consist of controversial, inconsistent, and 
incoherent stories. As Weltzer (2010) argues, the purpose of memory 
transmission is to affirm the very existence of the family. Specifics of a story 
such as what, where, or how a family member underwent certain experiences 
are secondary to the function of communicating about the past that confirms 
the very existence of the family. Individuals in what Weltzer calls memory 
communities like the community of former KR cadres in Anlong Veng as we 
discuss later, have “chosen” which aspects to remember. This choice is 
determined based on what makes sense to them. These stories are not always 
historically factual. Rather, they contain a strong emotional message but may, 
nevertheless, refer to historical facts. Also, they offer “emotional frames” that 
help the listener interpret the past. Pertinent to intergenerational memory 
transmission is the notion that different generations of people remember what 
is specific to them (Bartlett, 1932; 1997). Interestingly, members of the same 
generation will remember the same facts from a story even if it is not actual 
families remembering, but rather random groups of people.   
The young are particularly vulnerable to absorb the “aftershocks” from 
the environment and their own inventory of experience. This accumulation of 
experience starts at the beginning of life through emotional learning from 
parents and continues through socialization at home, school, and the broader 
society (Bandura, 1989). However, autobiographical development occurs 
later between the ages of 10-25 and takes the form of what is regarded by 
each generation as “the normal way of things” (Bartlett 1932; Shore 2008: 
20). Young adults tend to have informal social involvement through their 
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active, yet less organized social lives. Thus their reflections on the causes, the 
effects of the Genocide, and its reverberations that exist today are expected to 
have been filtered through their parents’ Genocide memories, especially 
considering memory outside the family circle in Cambodia is highly 
controlled and politicized (Chandler, 2007).  
Intergenerational dynamics in post Genocide Cambodia were more 
recently studied by Field et al (2011, 2013). This study explored the 
mediating function of role reversing and overprotective parenting between 
parental trauma symptoms on the child’s anxiety and depression. The 
findings are corroborated in similar situations outside Cambodia. An 
exploration of Holocaust survivors asserted that even in cases where first 
generation Holocaust survivors did not manifest symptoms of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Syndrome (PTSD), second generation survivors were more susceptible 
to PTSD than second generation non Holocaust survivors from the same 
community (Baider et al., 2005). This transmission of emotions and 
experience becomes integrated as part of the second generation expression 
and functioning in society. It also underlines the role “restorative” education 
can play to reverse victimization and address traumatization.  
The Politics of Post-genocide Memory in Cambodia: Denial and 
Human Rights Violations 
Cambodia’s young adults have inherited a sharply divided society, one that 
consists of survivors and another of perpetrators. Both groups coexist in a 
political context where human rights violations are an ever present fact of 
life. Given the politically oriented production of public memory and the 
limited focus on justice by Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), public 
discourse and historical accounts of events and the genocidal process have 
been tinged by the CPP rhetoric or what Chandler called “the hegemonic 
historiography” of the ruling party (Chandler, 2007, 358). A most serious 
symptom of the genocidal process in Cambodia in particular, was caused by 
the vast implementation of thought reform practices that the Khmer Rouge 
(KR) used on the population. Cadres and the silenced population had to deny 
that events they were experiencing, such as mass murders, were unnecessary 
and were living in denial. The “Killing Fields” emerged as the ultimate 
solution for people deemed incapable of becoming appropriately re-educated. 
Survival was achieved by successfully convincing authorities that capitalistic 
values had been replaced by community communist doctrine. The culture of 
unquestioning obedience to authority took on new meaning during the KR.  
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As a consequence of the widespread denial about the atrocities, many 
perpetrators and observers seem impassive about testimonies of survivors, 
observers, and even perpetrators before the Court during the trials of five 
protagonists of the Genocide. Despite the stark and incriminating evidence 
the KR left behind, “induced amnesia” had been the official policy of 
Cambodia’s government until June 17, 2013. In a move to undermine his 
opponent, Cambodia’s Prime Minister (since 1985) Hun Sen introduced a 
law that made it illegal to deny that atrocities were committed by the KR.  
In a context of denial, human rights violations can be a predominant 
challenge for rebuilding the social fabric. These violations range from 
trafficking to forced evictions. Both the State Department Bureau on 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labour and Amnesty International, reported 
that forced evictions among the very poor constitute common practice. 
Amnesty International included in its report that forced evictions since 2003 
have affected 420,000 individuals. In Phnom Penh reportedly ten percent of 
the population has either been evicted or planned resettlement 
(http://www.amnesty.org/en/ region/cambodia/report-2012). Forced evictions 
today strike a chord since during the Genocide forced population transfers 
were part of the KR social engineering program. Another notable human 
rights issue concerns freedom of expression. There has been a heavy 
repression of protesters and challengers of the Hun Sen government. Police 
have opened fire at relatively quiet protesters regardless of sex or age. 
Violence against protesters has been perpetrated by either police forces or the 
so called “Pagoda Boys,” a group who promotes an agenda of the current 
government among the young (Kurtenbach, 2012; Hensengerth, 2008). The 
“Pagoda Boys” have participated in violence against their protesting peers 
from the garment industry and have claimed that they will not stop at 
anything if the rule of the current government is disrupted. Besides human 
rights violations, other crimes such as domestic violence or street crime 
numbers are also high. NGOs working on domestic abuse in Cambodia report 
that 20-25% of women in Cambodia have experienced physical abuse by 
their partner. From 2000to 2004, Cambodia had an increase in prison 
population to 112% compared to 50% in San Salvador. The fact that violence 
continues and takes other forms (domestic and gang violence, petty crimes 
and crimes against life and corruption) in post-genocide societies constitutes 
a major challenge for the rebuilding of civil society (Berdal, M & Suhrke, A, 
2012).  
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Population and Method 
The research team led by Kosal Path, came to Anlong Veng in 2011 and 12. 
The team obtained the approval from the district governor of Anlong Veng, 
Yim Phanna, who himself led the mass defection to the Hun Sen government 
in 1998. Village chiefs were also contacted to facilitate communicated with 
local cadres. The first generation respondents, who were willing to respond, 
joined to take the survey. The second generation was accessed in the only 
high school of the district and a group of 44 students above 18 was surveyed. 
A valid starting point to the investigation is the extent of similarity that might 
exist between the perceptions of a self-identified group of 157 first generation 
KR cadres and a self-identified group of 44 second generation KR offspring 
from this community. We were interested to know how the second generation 
found out about the Genocide, their views of the first generation’s 
involvement, and their predominant emotions when they initially discovered 
their parents’ involvement. Also, we wanted to find out whether any 
similarity existed in attitudes regarding obedience towards authorities 
between the first and the second generation group as well as whether the 
second generation might have adopted the first generation’s views about what 
led to the Genocide. Any such similarities might be indicative of the younger 
group inheriting elements of the thought reform process that the older 
generation was subjected to after they willingly or unwillingly joined the KR. 
The extent to which the second generation group may have adopted this 
feature might explain the difficulty in observing the emergence of coherent 
narratives across the perpetrator/survivor divide in post Genocide Cambodia. 
As we will discuss, in Anlong Veng the narrative of the second generation 
manifested a rather truncated truth in the sense that their parents’ 
involvement in the Genocide was glossed over by heroism and sacrifice to 
fight the Vietnamese invaders during the 1980s.  
 
Two versions of the same survey were distributed among 157 former cadres 
(first generation) and 44 young adults ranging in age. In 1975, the year the 
KR took power, the first generation had a mean age of 21, with ages ranging 
from 7 to 44 years old. In their majority they were unmarried. They described 
their quality of life as “poor” or “average,” with 67.5% stating their parents’ 
occupation as farmers and 14.6% as peasants. The second generation were 
upper high-schoolers between 18-22 years of age (second generation) from 
the only high school of Anlong Veng. Incidentally, in rural areas such as this, 
it takes longer for children to finish high-school as they often interrupt to 
help their farming families. These young adults self-identified as KR 
offspring.  
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Data 
Memory Transmission in Anlong Veng: Evading the Past 
One of the most pertinent question to initiate reflection on the past was 
phrased as: Is it necessary to think about the past? The inclusion of this 
survey measure was critical in establishing the foundation upon which the 
second generation’s responses would be analysed. 43.3% of first generation 
respondents replied “not at all” with another 43.9% responding, to various 
degrees, that the past should be remembered. These results reveal a split 
position on the importance of memory among former perpetrators. Perhaps 
this also revolves around the idea of how things are remembered. Almost 
70% of first generation respondents strongly agreed that Cambodians today 
should not think about the KR period and instead think that “things are 
different now,” and thus desire to focus on something else. This idea among 
the majority of former KR we sampled, that “things are different now,” may 
refer to the fact that the current government does not outwardly resemble that 
of the “three year regime” also known as Democratic Kampuchea (DK) the 
official title of the KR genocidal government.  
The initial question for second generation respondents was about the 
source of their knowledge regarding the KR three year regime. 70% of those 
surveyed responded that they heard about the KR rule by their parents as 
opposed to newspapers, seeing a segment of TV, finding out from friends and 
(or) reading about it at school. This number calls into question the role of the 
education system to inform the younger generations about what has 
transpired. Then the question became: How often do you discuss with your 
family about the KR regime? 76.67% of the second generation respondents 
replied “sometimes” as opposed to 3.3% for never and often.  
Predominant Emotions for a Difficult Past 
The majority of respondents reported that they had avoided activities, 
thoughts and feelings associated with the KR in the past week. Specifically, 
66.9% of respondents report that, to varying extents, they avoided thoughts or 
feelings associated with the KR regime; with 59.2% avoiding, to varying 
extents, activities that remind them of traumatic or hurtful events. 
Consciously avoiding thoughts, feelings or activities associated with the KR 
necessitates a controlled, critical awareness of the stimuli and its influence on 
their inward state. In recognizing an unresolved past and choosing to avoid it, 
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the majority of former perpetrators also acknowledged a low level of 
reflection about the atrocities they committed, witnessed or suffered from, as 
well as a general lack of moral confrontation. Whether attempts at evading 
the past are a result of a personal shame or due to a negative societal 
depiction of former perpetrators, the mere need to resort to avoidance 
techniques hints that remembering is both traumatic and stressful, or would 
involve an emotional trade-off toward self-condemnation that may be too 
costly.  
Consistent with their perception about the extent of their responsibility in 
the Genocide, the first generation do not feel ashamed of their participation. 
While it may be theorized that the cadres also wish to forget the past out of 
some sense of guilt, shame, or regret, we found that 54.1% of those sampled 
do not feel ashamed of their involvement in the KR regime, with only 37.5% 
feeling various degrees of shame ranging from a little to quite a bit. Yet we 
also discovered that 67.5% of respondents reported that they feel some sense 
of shame, regret, or resentment about what happened to them and their fellow 
Cambodians during the KR period. 45.6% of these respondents also reported 
experiencing a great deal of shame, regret, or resentment. These findings 
highlight the degree to which KR cadres continue to deny a sense of personal 
agency or responsibility in the atrocities committed. Furthermore, 50.32% of 
respondents reported that they joined the KR because they had no choice, 
55% joined because to some degree they wanted to overthrow the corrupt 
Lon Nol regime backed by the US or restore Sangkum Reas niyum (the 
political organization created by Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1955 which 
lasted until 1970). The carpet bombing by the US during this period 
exacerbated misery in the country side. Additionally, 47. 8% said they 
believed the KR would bring justice and equality. Any outside observer at the 
time would have also attested to the need for both in Cambodian society. This 
agenda, however, was obscured by the means the KR eventually employed.   
We then inquired how the second generation felt when they first heard 
about the parents’ association with the KR. They appeared to be split on the 
question of whether they felt love (for the parents) with 36.6% answering 
“absolutely do not” and 30% “absolutely do.” An additional emotional 
response gauged was pity. 63.33% of this generation reported pity, ranging 
from “somewhat do” to “absolutely do,” when they found about their parents’ 
association with the KR. These results accentuate the previously asserted first 
generation perpetrators’ denial of personal agency. Moreover, the responses 
elicited by the second generation elucidate various justifications of why their 
parents joined the KR. 51.72% of respondents answered that their parents 
joined the KR because they had no choice. These responses indicate that the 
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young see the older generation as victims and by 40% reasoned their parents 
wanted to overthrow the Lon Nol regime. 
Assigning Blame for the Genocide 
We then asked the first generation respondents: Who is to blame when 
wrong-doing happens? 82.1% of respondents agreed, 48.4% of which 
strongly agreed, that those in positions of leadership are responsible for the 
effects of actions exhibited by those under their command, even in cases 
where they are not aware of a cadre’s actions. This extreme degree of 
responsibility placed on Khmer Rouge leaders may be directly related to the 
collective predisposition toward unquestioning obedience. By engaging in 
duties with absolute compliance, former members may have disassociated the 
consequences of their actions from their own sense of personal agency, again 
perceiving themselves merely as the means through which their superiors are 
the primary actors. Yet, 26.1%, over a quarter of those sampled, do blame 
themselves for what happened, with 37.5% feeling some sense of shame 
regarding their involvement in the regime. The additional 10% of 
respondents reporting shame in relation to their involvement with the Khmer 
Rouge indicates that disgrace was not necessarily predicated on feeling 
culpable for their offenses.  
Further survey research was aimed at discovering when these cadre saw 
their decision to obey orders to kill or torture as justified and considered right 
or reasonable. This sense of justification was qualified through different 
statements as morally, reasonably, or legally justified. Respondents were given 
a series of potential consequences if they were to refuse their orders, and then 
rate whether the decision to kill/torture was justified under the given condition.  
Consistent with such value prioritization, the cadres’ preferred self-
descriptive during the years they spent with the KR was that of the soldier. 
During interviews, soldiering was projected as an alternative to either a 
revolutionary or a victim. “I saw myself as a soldier who defended our country 
and our people,” one cadre argued. By calling himself a soldier he could avoid 
associating himself with the revolution. Clearly, his allegiance was then 
transferred to the government using words such as happiness to describe how 
he felt for the governmental action to open pagodas in Anlong Veng and 
openness regarding his attitude towards what the government wanted to do.  
The extent of intergenerational memory transmission furthermore raises 
questions about similarities that may exist between first and second 
generations as to how the former regard themselves in the context of the 
Genocide and how the latter see them. 73.9% of the first generation 
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responded that they do not feel responsible for events that happened during 
the KR regime. This compares to 70% of the second generation that they do 
not think the first generation is to be blamed. In fact, the second generation 
perceive the first generation as victims. Similarly, 50.3% of the first 
generation argued that they had no choice in joining the KR. On their part, 
43.3% the second generation responded very much/a lot that their parents had 
no choice but to join. Consistent with their self-view as victims, 83.4% of the 
first generation responded that the regime was regretful but now it is time to 
focus on the future. The second generation offspring agreed by 66.7%.  
A Good Citizen is an Obedient Citizen 
We then sought the respondents’ perceptions as to what constitutes a good 
citizen. 90.4% of the first generation of the adults very much/a lot agreed that 
a good citizen complies with the government of Cambodia. And 87.3% very 
much/a lot agreed that good citizens respect laws and authority. Also, 61.1% 
of the first generation respondents reported obligation to support the 
government despite contrary views. For their part, 56.7% of the second 
generation reported very much/a lot agreeing that good citizens complied 
with government policies. 66.7% of the second generation poll reported very 
much/a lot agreeing that good citizens respect the laws. From the survey of 
adults, 88.5% “very much” agreed that a good citizen will sacrifice their life 
to defend the national sovereignty. Among the second generation, 63.4% 
very much/a lot agreed. With regard to national pride, 87.27% of the first 
generation agreed very much/ a lot of good citizens work to restore national 
pride. 76.6% of the second generation gave the same response.  
With the only channel for dissent ending in execution for a KR cadre or 
his/her family, many cadres found themselves in a state of pervasive fear. 
Obedience, therefore, became an internal survival tactic. This concept was 
supported in our findings, with 81.5% agreeing, 62.4% strongly agreeing, 
that if they followed their superiors’ orders, they and their family would stay 
out of trouble. When asked if soldiers should commit crimes their superiors 
order, over half of those sampled, 52.3% of respondents, agreed that they 
should, with 34.3% of respondents responding that they did not know or did 
not want to answer. Additionally, 74.5% said that one should have supported 
the Angkar, and 56.1% that one should not have taken an active part in 
evaluating and questioning Angkar’s policies. Former perpetrators continue 
to uphold that during the period of DK, whether out of indoctrination, fear, or 
an inclination to obedience, one should have upheld the Angkar as valid and 
right. In their responses, former perpetrators seem to suggest the necessity for 
 Cambodian Genocide across Generations in Along Veng 187 
a separate frame of judgment for perpetrators of the Khmer Rouge, one in 
which perhaps guilt can only exist in such cases when one is not threatened.  
These results reveal not only a disavowal of responsibility when 
following superior orders, but a general inclination towards complicity in the 
face of apparent injustice. When respondents were asked if they feel 
responsible for their actions under the regime only 1.3% of the sample, two 
respondents, reported “yes” with 76.9% reporting no sense of personal 
responsibility, and 24.8% choosing not to answer the question. These results 
reveal that over 30 years after the Khmer Rouge regime’s end, the majority of 
the former KR cadre sampled continue to deny their liability as the primary 
agent behind their own actions under the regime. This finding supports a 
general pattern of former KR cadres’ denial of their wrong-doing across the 
country. 
For many, personal responsibility and even guilt was nullified once they 
were given orders from those in positions of authority. Mid and lower-level 
cadre’s knew that they had a choice, but that choice to disobey meant 
possible execution for themselves or for their family. The result of this end-
game decision, whether individuals joined of their own volition or as child 
recruits, meant that many felt there was no choice to be made, or rather that 
the choices they made were not their own, but those of their superiors. In 
their perspective, they were merely the means through which the superiors 
executed their orders, no more than powerless puppets controlled by 
omnipotent puppeteers.  
This reasoning or justification has only been reinforced since the fall of 
Democratic Kampuchea as successive governments have focused on bringing 
only senior leaders to justice. With blame for the atrocities committed during 
DK placed solely on the regime’s leadership, and lower level KR members 
effectively pardoned, issues of individual or collective responsibility were 
never raised. Instead nearly all responsibility on behalf of former perpetrators 
has been deferred to the regime’s leadership.  
The cadres by 84.1% agreed or strongly agreed, that the best a citizen can 
do is actively support the government. When in doubt about the government, 
76.5% of respondents reported that it is “a lot” or “very much” true that the 
best thing to do is to stay out of trouble. Support for the government, 
therefore, may continue to be seen as an alternative to oppression. Yet, 
despite a high volume of respondents who report feeling a great degree of 
obligation to respect, support, and compliance the government, 65.6% of 
respondents reported that it is “a lot” or “very much” true that they would 
protest, or engage in some form of demonstration of disapproval, if the 
government violated their basic rights. This notion reveals that while 
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conceptions of right and wrong may be clearly outlined by the regime or state 
power in office, it has also become part of the collective social conscious-
ness, perhaps as a result of the country’s progression toward democracy, and 
empowerment of the people as conscious actors in the public realm.  
Discussion 
“‘Do I have remorse? No,” said Ieng Sary, Pol Pot’s brother in law who 
helped engineer the KR regime. “I have no regrets because this was not my 
responsibility,” Sary added (New York Times, September 18, 1996). Denial 
is not atypical of genocidaires especially when the historical record is 
undermined by the official government. Despite a 1979 conviction in 
absentia of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary himself, it took decades of negotiations 
between the UN and the Cambodian government for KRT to materialize. 
Those who carried the agenda of the KR regime were free and often rewarded 
with land and positions in the army as the cadres we surveyed in Anlong 
Veng. The implications of this amnesty and denial are just becoming obvious 
for the collective mind of the young adult generation through their emotional 
responses and re-interpretations of the past.  
Here, we presented findings of a 2011-12 survey researching 157 first 
generation self-identified former KR cadres and 44 second generation young 
adults who also self-identified as KR cadres’ offspring. Both groups came 
from the relatively homogeneous, and until 1998 semi-autonomous, Anlong 
Veng District. In this environment of cadre support systems, the cadres 
maintained openly their identification through self and other reinforcement. 
Their narrative involved heroism for having defended Cambodia against real 
or imagined (through thought reform) enemies, self-victimization and a 
strong obedience to authority orientation that they (inadvertently or 
otherwise) passed down to the younger generation. These narratives provide a 
starting point for us to further examine how the KR mind has evolved in 
other areas of Cambodia where the cadres have co-existed with survivors. It 
remains to be seen if, in such areas of increased societal integration, cadres 
and their offspring manifest guilt for the atrocities of the KR regime. 
However, given the limited extent of discussions about the Genocide across 
the country, we suspect that our population may be considered representative 
of the majority of cadres who live elsewhere in Cambodia as well.  
Overall, the cadres of Anlong Veng and the second generation reflect the 
challenges of preserving the historical record in post-genocide societies. Such 
guilt can only be inferred indirectly from the population we surveyed here. 
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During an interview, one cadre argued: “I followed their [KR recruiters’] 
orders to protect my own family from danger.” At the time he joined the KR 
in 1973, he and the rest of villagers did not know the big picture, he 
explained. “So, (he remarked), the best way was to follow everyone else,” he 
commented. During the KR hold on power, he claimed that he had lost his 
capacity to think about the direction of the Angkar and went with the flow. 
Then again after the defeat of the KR he followed his group of fleeing cadres 
to the jungle “because [he] had heard that the Vietnamese would cut [his] 
throat.”  
There is merit to the idea that to an extent our population was victimized 
by the pre-KR violence during Lon Nol’s rule and the carpet bombing of 
Cambodia by the US air force. However, there is marked difference with how 
survivors and their offspring were victimized. Here, we offer a first look into 
how these affiliates of a genocidal regime and their offspring have processed 
the past and relate to the present and the future. There has been worldwide far 
more attention on survivors. Field et al and Bar-On et al (1998) that studied 
parenting patterns of survivors of the Cambodian Genocide and the 
Holocaust respectively, pointed out towards over protection and parent/child 
role-reversing. From a political psychological perspective, our study shows 
that the second generation in Anlong Veng mirrored the first generation’s 
self-view as victims and has adopted the way in which they relate to the state. 
The predominant feelings of the younger when they first found out about the 
involvement of the first generation were pity towards their parents and anger 
for their difficult experiences. Furthermore, the second generation manifested 
a similar orientation to the first generation’s perceptions of the original 
reasons that they had joined. Leadership is important for the second 
generation. However, while respect for leadership is not all surprising in a 
hierarchical society like Cambodia, its high numerical value among the 
young also implies the absorption of their parents’ attitudes on how to relate 
to authority.  
Also, we found that intergenerational memory of the KR regime within 
the KR community in Anlong Veng is filtered through the local collective 
narrative of “KR heroization.” Although the children of former KR cadres in 
Anlong Veng have been exposed to news about the KRT, these news sources 
are filtered through their family narratives and war traumas. Members of the 
first generation were either willing or unwilling (through child soldiering) 
participants in a group of hard core genocidaires and thus exposed to violence 
for the majority of their lives. Self-heroization and victimization due to 
poverty and prolonged fighting, has curtailed the cadres’ opportunity for self-
confrontation and acceptance of any share of blame. Children of former KR 
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cadres born in the 1990s were significantly impacted by their parents’ war 
against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s. In their view, 
their parents were “heroes” fighting against the Vietnamese invaders. Despite 
the fact that this second generation grew in the relative safety of their closely 
knit community, they have been re-victimized similarly to their peers, KR or 
survivors’ offspring, elsewhere due to deprivation and limited infrastructure 
throughout Cambodia.  
Our insight into the Anlong Veng KR cadres’ frame of mind, challenges 
the idea that there is one public discourse of the Cambodian Genocide and 
highlights the need for deeper exposure of the ex-KR community in Anlong 
Veng (and across Cambodia where former KR reside) to the truth of what 
happened during the KR regime. As these results reveal, over 30 years after 
the end of the Genocide, the majority of the former KR cadres sampled 
continue to deny their liability as the primary agents of the KR lethal record. 
For many, personal responsibility and even guilt was nullified once they were 
given orders from those in positions of authority. Mid and lower-level cadres 
knew that they had the choice to disobey, but such choice meant possible 
execution for themselves or for their family. The result of this end-game 
decision indicated that most KR cadres and successive generations, feel that 
there was/is no choice to be made, or rather that the choices they made were 
not their own, but those of their superiors.  
Traumatic memories for perpetrators as well as survivors and obedient 
observers constitute a distinct entity in the individual/collective psyche of 
Cambodians. These memories have intergenerational effects and lead to 
collective anxieties and alienation. The extent of denial among perpetrators of 
the Cambodian genocide is pervasive and comes at an enormous social cost. 
Even outside the realm of genocide studies, studies that offer focused 
observations on groups of executioners indicate the very extent that families 
of perpetrators and the whole society(ies) live with painful and shameful 
memories (Bandura, 1989; Osofsky, Bandura, Zimbardo, 2005). 
An expanded curriculum from hourly sessions to entire subjects about the 
Genocide would serve well the young people in Cambodia and would 
contribute to the elimination of the consequences that come along with 
denial. However, teaching about the history of the Genocide started only after 
2009 and is confined to a class session during the terminal year of high 
school. It is mostly attributed to the efforts of organizations like those of the 
Documentation Center for the Cambodian Genocide (DC CAM) that teachers 
have underwent the necessary training on how to teach about the Genocide. 
In Germany, despite occasional denial glitches, Holocaust education has been 
successful. Yet, in this instance too, once the Holocaust narrative becomes 
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personal and the youth seek to place their ancestors into the picture of events, 
the following theme emerges; “one’s grand-pa is never a Nazi” (Welzer, 
2002) or in the Cambodian context, one’s ancestor was never a genocidaire.  
The results of the Genocide are felt across Cambodia today. The 
extensive collective trauma of the population is exacerbated by socio-
economic injustice (Sonis et al., 2009). Coupled with corruption, such large-
scale trauma is only intensified with the post-Genocide realization that civil 
society is unable to operate. Avoidance on the part of the government to 
address the past has contributed to the sense that justice is rarely served in 
Cambodia. What happens in this post genocide society is what sociologist 
and psychoanalyst Jeffrey Prager calls “ a historical cycle of destructiveness” 
(2008, 2003). Such cycles are exacerbated by silence. Prager and South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) psychologist Pumla 
Gobodo-Madikizela (2012, 2007) raise concerns about silencing as a public 
attitude. As we see in the case of Anlong Veng, the silencing over the 
Genocide and self-heroization indicate a rift in Cambodian society not only 
between KR cadres and survivors but the groups of their offspring as well. 
While in other societies such as post-Holocaust Germany, South Africa, and 
Rwanda efforts are made to reverse the cycles of destructiveness, Cambodia’s 
inability to address the past leaves a negative legacy for future generations. 
The reparation of trust and cultivation of empathy that hold any society 
together will have to start from within and between communities, as well as 
within individuals and their microcosms through accurate portrayals of the 
past.  
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Introduction 
In the Australia of the 1990s, the idea of reconciliation, backed by 
government initiatives, enjoyed popular support. Reconciliation was 
concerned with acknowledging and redressing the wrongs of the past in 
relation to Australia’s treatment of its Indigenous people. In 1991 the Federal 
government launched the Council for Reconciliation, with the expectation 
that reconciliation would be achieved by 2001. Perhaps the most iconic event 
of the reconciliation era was the national inquiry into the Stolen Generations, 
conducted in the mid-1990s by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission (HREOC). This inquiry investigated the policies, practices and 
effects of separating children of mixed Indigenous descent from their families 
and communities during much of the twentieth century. Its landmark report, 
Bringing Them Home, recommended that the Federal Parliament, State 
parliaments, and churches offer an apology to the Stolen Generations 
(HREOC, 1997). Fearing litigation and compensation, John Howard, then 
Prime Minister, refused to offer a parliamentary apology, and the Stolen 
Generations and the Australian public had to wait until 2008, when Kevin 
Rudd, newly elected Prime Minister, made the long-awaited apology.  
Although the apology was apparently well-received by Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous Australians (Moses, 2010), even before it was offered the 
discourse of reconciliation was being superseded by a discourse of ‘crisis’ in 
Aboriginal Australia. In this era of crisis, the Stolen Generations paradigm, 
characterized by a compassionate politics of testimony and witnessing, has 
lost much of its moral and political purchase. The reasons for the shift from a 
discourse of reconciliation to crisis are complex, and here I can only sketch 
what have been divisive and contested issues (see Altman & Hinkson, 2007; 
Altman & Hinkson, 2010). This shift, however, provides the context for my 
consideration of a parallel shift, from an aesthetics of reparation that 
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flourished during the reconciliation era, to an aesthetics of survival which 
mediates an era of ‘crisis ordinariness’ (Berlant, 2011).  
The waning of the era of reconciliation was hastened by the publication of 
Little Children are Sacred, the Report of the Northern Territory Board of 
Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse (Wild 
& Anderson, 2007). The report, which detailed cases of child sexual abuse in 
remote Indigenous communities, prompted sensationalizing media accounts 
on high levels of crime, sexual assault, violence, substance abuse and sub-
standard living conditions in central and northern Australia. In response to 
the report the federal government, at the time led by John Howard, declared a 
state of national emergency and devised a controversial plan known as the 
Northern Territory Intervention. Taking a ‘muscular humanitarian’ approach 
(Orford, 1999), the government spent millions, bringing in the army, police, 
bureaucrats and teams of medical personnel to conduct child health checks 
and to police communities.  
Shortly after the intervention, anthropologist Peter Sutton published The 
Politics of Suffering (2009), which intensified public and scholarly debate on 
issues facing remote Aboriginal communities. He controversially proposed 
that the negative outcomes Indigenous people were experiencing today could 
not all be traced back to colonialism; some outcomes stemmed from the 
internal dynamics of Aboriginal culture (7). Improving health, education and 
life expectancy would require a change in Indigenous behavior, and 
particularly in child socialization. He singled out the politics of Bringing 
Them Home as problematic, arguing that while it “vitally raise[d] awareness 
of a relatively unknown negativity in Australia’s past,” it also “enhanced 
victimhood as a basis of positive regard for Indigenous people, and polarizes 
opinion about the state or other collective historical guilt” (p. 210). He 
contends that the national project of reconciliation, with its grand symbolic 
gestures such as apology, divisively entrenches the notion of two separate 
peoples, Indigenous and non-Indigenous, in one nation (203). Sutton’s effort 
to articulate a “contemporary moment from within that moment” is an 
example of the present as a “mediated affect”, which Lauren Berlant 
describes as “a temporal genre whose conventions emerge from the personal 
and public filtering of the situations and events that are happening in an 
extended now whose very parameters….are also always there for debate” 
(2011, p. 4). Discussions about the shared historical present are “always 
profoundly political” and “under constant revision” because they are about 
“what forces should be considered responsible and what crises [require] 
urgent attention” (Berlant 2011, p. 4). While Sutton is only one of many 
contributors to the debate about how the government, anthropologists and the 
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public should respond to Aboriginal disadvantage in the present and prepare 
for the future, his book has ignited significant debate (see Altman & Hinkson, 
2010; Lattas & Morris, 2010). 
Like Sutton, Indigenous commentator and anthropologist Marcia Langton 
(2010) agreed that the conditions in Aboriginal Australia constitute a crisis 
and require urgent attention. Lamenting “how much worse [Aboriginal] 
suffering has become in the last forty years,” she argues that “an older, 
gerontocratic view of Aboriginal culture” has occluded “the new reality” that 
has taken hold in Aboriginal Australia (Langton 2010, pp. 95-96). Radical 
changes include the growing number of children, many of whom are at risk: 
children under 14, she reports, constitute 38% of the indigenous population, 
and are eight times more likely to be subject to care and protection orders 
than non-Aboriginal children. She contends that there has not been enough 
attention to alcohol-fuelled violence, nor public debate about Aboriginal 
customs and their role in contributing to the crisis in the Aboriginal world. 
She describes what she calls the “the shock of the new” in Aboriginal 
Australia: 
The overwhelmingly young Aboriginal population, along with the poor outcomes 
in Aboriginal health, education and employment, demonstrate that the Indigenous 
Australian population has altered fundamentally from one typical of the former 
hunter-gather way of life to one that is very poor, marginalized, powerless and 
sedentarised, much like the billion or so people living in poverty in the developing 
world. The future for those young Indigenous people…will be one of accelerating 
poverty and exclusion (112).  
The Northern Territory Intervention and the commentary and media reporting 
brought the ‘shock of the new’ to the Australian public. While non-indi-
genous Australians could identify with children who had been wrongfully 
removed and the suffering of their mothers, articulated by Bringing Them 
Home, and mediated in films such as Rabbit Proof Fence (2002), many 
Australians were shamed by the media reports and images of poverty and 
extreme violence in remote indigenous communities. The government’s 
heavy-handed intervention created uncertainty and fragmented the public, 
most of whom thought something needed to be done, but did not agree with 
the government’s militaristic or racially-targeted tactics.  
New social and material conditions call for new genres. The shift I have 
been tracing, from a discourse of reconciliation to one of crisis, has been 
accompanied in the cultural domain by a shift from a poetics of reparation to 
a poetics of survival. In this chapter, I identify features of what I call the 
Stolen Generations paradigm, which conceives of child removal as a 
traumatic event, and imagines reconciliation as a process of national and 
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personal healing, facilitated by a dialogic model of testimony and witnessing. 
I explore this paradigm as it is articulated in the genre of the human rights 
report, in this case, Bringing Them Home, and in fiction. Specifically, I read 
Gail Jones’ novel Sorry (2007) as an example of a poetics of reparation for 
the Stolen Generations, which is grounded in a model of trauma, recovery 
and compassionate witnessing. In contrast to a poetics of reparation, 
Warwick Thornton’s compelling film, Samson and Delilah (2009), produced 
during the Northern Territory Intervention, exemplifies a poetics of survival, 
and demands a different kind of response from non-Indigenous audiences. 
Samson and Delilah is a rare film which uses cinematic language to convey 
the unfolding present, on terms neither of melodrama nor sentimentality. It 
conveys something of “the new reality” of Aboriginal Australia that Langton 
has described, but nonetheless retains a degree of optimism.  
The Stolen Generations Paradigm: Trauma, Testimony and 
Witnessing 
The 1990s was a decade in which the concept of trauma moved out of the 
clinical domain of psychiatry and into culture more broadly (Farrell 1998, 2). In 
The Empire of Trauma, anthropologists Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman 
argue that it has only been within the last twenty-five years that trauma, and 
with it the figure of the victim, has been legitimated; previously “the victim 
was tarred as illegitimate” and “trauma was a suspect condition” (2009, 5). 
Indeed, trauma has become the dominant moral discourse for understanding 
and interpreting violence in our time. They propose that “trauma…has created 
a new language of the event” (Fassin & Rechtman 2009, 6), and a new way of 
understanding the effects of war, colonialism and violent conflict, which has 
replaced an older language of oppression and liberation struggles. Adopting a 
Foucauldian approach, they seek “to understand how the contemporary moral 
economy has been reshaped” by the now “global idea of trauma…which 
designat[es] an irrefutable reality linked to a feeling of empathy” (6). Their 
analysis is grounded in ethnographic observations of humanitarian psychiatry, 
which produces new knowledges, new subjectivities and a “new condition of 
victimhood” (5). In conflict zones, humanitarian psychiatrists do not simply 
diagnose and treat, they make moral judgments, and testify and advocate on 
behalf of victims, thereby engaging in a “politics of trauma” (9). In the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict, for instance, “recourse to the concept of 
trauma…expands the range of victims considerably,” (Fassin 2008, 550) and 
enables people on both sides of the conflict, and potentially the entire 
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population of Israel, to identify as victims of posttraumatic stress, and to appeal 
to the public for support and empathic understanding. Although based on 
fieldwork in conflict zones, Fassin and Rechtman’s (2009) analysis of trauma 
discourse helps to explain how Indigenous suffering has been legitimated and 
become a moral touchstone in the Australian public sphere since the 1990s.  
In Post-Traumatic Culture, Kirby Farrell (1998) also adopted a 
Foucauldian approach, but with particular attention to the implications of 
trauma discourse for literature and film. He argued that people not only suffer 
trauma; the concept of trauma is used for all kinds of ends (Farrell 1998, 21). 
Trauma is not only a diagnostic category. Rather, when trauma moves from 
the clinic into the domain of culture, its explanatory powers come to the fore: 
“whatever the physical distress…trauma is also psychocultural, because the 
injury entails interpretation of the injury” (7). He adds that “Cultures not only 
report but classify traumatic events: a train wreck may be a ‘catastrophe’ or a 
‘tragedy’ or merely an ‘accident’” (16). At stake in this cultural shift is how 
authoritative institutions and discourses interpret an event or injury. When an 
event is described as ‘traumatic’, rather than simply as an ‘accident’, claims 
are being made about the deep and ongoing psychological impact on the 
affected population, including future generations, which raise issues of 
responsibility and reparation. In the Australian public sphere, the language of 
trauma has produced new understandings of the long-term psychological and 
social effects of settler colonialism, with its practices of violence, 
dispossession, assimilation and child removal, on Indigenous people and 
communities. This language has changed understandings of the political 
struggle in which Indigenous people are engaged. Today, in government 
discourse, the political language of Aboriginal self-determination has been 
replaced by a bureaucratic language of ‘closing the gap’ in health and 
education outcomes between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, the struggle for Aboriginal rights was framed in 
terms of a national discourse of land rights, sovereignty and self-determina-
tion, as well as a transnational discourse of liberation, equality and black 
power. With the emergence of the reconciliation movement in the 1990s, and 
especially, the publication of Bringing Them Home, the discourse of trauma, 
suffering and compassion provided a new idiom through which Australians 
could understand the harmful legacy of settler colonialism. This moral idiom, 
which can be traced through several key statements of the reconciliation 
movement in the 1990s, required non-Indigenous Australians to recognize 
and acknowledge the pain and suffering caused to Indigenous Australians by 
colonization, dispossession and child removal. For instance, in a widely- 
quoted speech delivered in Redfern, an Aboriginal neighborhood in Sydney, 
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the Prime Minister at the time, Paul Keating, exhorted white Australians to 
recognize our role in contributing to Indigenous suffering:  
We took the children from their mothers. We practised discrimination and 
exclusion. It was our ignorance and our prejudice. And our failure to imagine 
these things being done to us. With some noble exceptions, we failed to make the 
most basic human response and enter into their hearts and mind. We failed to ask 
how would I feel if this were done to me (as quoted in HREOC 1997, 286). 
Keating urged his fellow Australians to respond compassionately―to 
imagine “how would I feel if this were done to me”. Compassion―“to feel 
the pain of another”―became a moral foundation of reconciliation. This 
understanding of reconciliation as requiring acknowledgement of past 
wrongs, and recognition of the ongoing effects on Indigenous people and 
communities in the present, was expressed by Chief Justice Brennan in his 
opinion in the 1992 Mabo case. It also underpinned HREOC’s approach to 
the national inquiry into the Stolen Generations.  
Bringing Them Home used both legal and moral discourses to assess the 
policies, practices and effects of Indigenous child removal. Applying the 1948 
UN genocide convention to the circumstances of Indigenous child removal in 
Australia, Bringing Them Home controversially interpreted forcible child 
removal as constituting ‘genocide’ and as a breach of human rights (HREOC 
1997, 266-275). Less widely recognized, it interpreted forcible child removal as 
constituting individual and collective trauma, which had impacts both on 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians (HREOC 1997, 196). The 
commissioners recognized that children, their mothers, and their communities 
were often traumatized by the circumstances and the aftermath of child removal, 
family separation and cultural dispossession. The report explicitly drew on a 
psychocultural and, at times, a clinical discourse of trauma to interpret child 
removal as traumatic: “Separation and institutionalisation can amount to 
traumas. Almost invariably they were traumatically carried out with force, lies, 
regimentation and an absence of comfort and affection. All too often they also 
involved brutality and abuses. Trauma compounded trauma” (HREOC, 1997, 
196). Citing evidence from numerous psychiatrists and psychologists, the report 
linked the intergenerational legacy of trauma to a range of conditions that 
continued to afflict individuals who had experienced child removal, including 
high levels of violence, alcohol and drug dependency, family breakdown, self-
harm and suicide. In interpreting child removal as a traumatic event, the national 
inquiry legitimated the physical, emotional and psychological suffering 
experienced by individuals who had been removed and their mothers and 
communities. In identifying the legacy of suffering and harm caused by policies 
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and practices of removal, it implicated white Australians, who inherited the task 
of acknowledging and atoning for the harms of colonialism.  
Unlike a truth commission or legal trial, the national inquiry did not aim 
to identify specific crimes or individual perpetrators. Rather, Sir Ronald 
Wilson, who chaired the national inquiry, conceptualized it in therapeutic 
terms, as participating in “healing the nation” and in “prepar[ing] the way for 
reconciliation.” “What this inquiry provides,” he stated, “is an option to bring 
to light the anguish and suffering associated with being a victim of the 
actions of past governments, and to engage present governments in 
addressing the issues and suffering which affects peoples today” (as quoted 
in Devitt 2009, 54). Listening to the stories of survivors of removal was 
considered to be essential for promoting healing and for the reconciliation 
process. Rather than using forensic methods of proof that would hold up in 
court, the national inquiry adopted testimonial methods aimed at promoting 
healing and reconciliation. Commissioners travelled around the nation to 
listen to members of the Stolen Generations tell their stories, thereby 
facilitating the production and reception of testimony. Unlike a truth 
commission, the testimonial process was not open to the public, and 
fragments of the testimonies were published anonymously in Bringing Them 
Home to protect the identities of survivors.  
In the 1990s, the Australian Stolen Generations inquiry was one of many 
such efforts that nations were making to respond to histories of violence, 
colonialism, genocide and dispossession. The testimonial approach had its 
roots in the 1961 Holocaust trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. Historian 
Annette Wieviorka (2006) contends that whenever testimony is collected and 
archived today, including in trials and truth and reconciliation commissions, 
it bears the trace of a paradigm that gained legitimacy in the Eichmann trial 
(89). The Eichmann trial, and the testimonial methods it initiated, had 
profound implications for collective memory. Rather than the past being 
regarded as distant and inaccessible, “… [w]ith the Eichmann trial, the 
witness became an embodiment of memory, attesting to the past and to the 
continuing presence of the past” (Wieviorka 2006, 88). As a public record, 
the historic significance of the Australian inquiry resides, in large part, in the 
credibility and publicity it granted to Stolen Generations testimony. The 
testimonies made public those feelings and emotions that were previously 
experienced as private and individual. Bringing Them Home opens by 
acknowledging that it contains material that ‘is so personal and intimate that 
ordinarily it would not be discussed’ in the public sphere (HREOC 1997, 3). 
This archive of Indigenous testimony brought the Stolen Generations into a 
‘global archive of suffering’ (Sarkar and Walker 2010), and constituted a 
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collective emotional and moral truth that supported a demand for national 
recognition and justice. 
Constituting Australians as a Witnessing Public 
Testimony is widely understood not simply as a statement about past events 
or ‘what happened’. It is understood, rhetorically, as an address to an 
audience, an actual or implied listener, which optimistically hopes for a 
response. Anthropologist Meg McLagan argues that testimony functions as 
an “intercultural technology, connecting individuals together from different 
worlds through the medium of pain, creating solidarity out of difference” 
(2003, 607). She proposes that “[a]s narratives and images of suffering travel, 
they have the potential to construct audiences as virtual witnesses, a subject 
position that implies responsibility for the suffering of others” (608-609). The 
publication of anonymous testimonies from members of the Stolen 
Generations served not only to inform the Australian public about the harm 
done by government policies aimed at eradicating Aboriginal culture; it also 
made “ethical claims on viewers and cultivate[d] potential actors”, and 
thereby engaged the public in the process (608-609). As Geoffrey Hartman 
(1995) observes in the context of Holocaust testimonies, however, we have to 
“enable reception, it isn’t simply there” (220). Reception, he explains, “has to 
do with a specific concept of the communal” (220). During the reconciliation 
era, the Australian community was taught to become compassionate 
witnesses to Indigenous suffering (Kennedy 2011a). For instance, Governor 
General William Deane, who mediated the reception of Bringing Them 
Home, played a key role in enabling reception by hailing Australians as a 
witnessing public. He cautioned that the legacy of child removal ‘cannot be 
addressed unless the whole community listens with an open heart and mind to 
the stories of what happened in the past and, having listened and understood, 
commits itself to reconciliation’ (HREOC 1997, 3). Deane’s appeal to the 
public to respond from ‘the heart’ was crucial for soliciting a compassionate 
response, and positioning Australians as an ‘affective community’ for the 
Stolen Generations (Kennedy 2011a).  
Many Australians responded to Deane’s solicitation. For instance, the 
Sorry Books campaign provided Australians with the opportunity to respond 
compassionately to the Stolen Generations and commit to reconciliation 
(Kennedy, 2011a). The Sorry Books campaign, organized by Australians for 
Native Title and Reconciliation, was a grass roots movement which 
developed in the wake of Howard’s refusal to offer an official apology. Sorry 
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Books, which opened with a pledge in which the signatory committed to 
reconciliation, circulated in communities around the nation and enabled 
ordinary Australians to say ‘sorry’ to the Stolen Generations. Community 
events were organized in schools, workplaces, churches and community 
centres at which members of the Stolen Generations told their stories, and the 
public listened. Novelists have also pursued the work of reconciliation by 
revisioning the past and mourning Indigenous losses in fictions that revisit 
frontier violence, dispossession and child removal. Such work has been 
particularly important in the Australian context, in which federal 
governments have, since 1996, progressively backed away from what has 
been called ‘symbolic reconciliation’ in favour of a ‘practical’ focus on 
health, education and housing.  
A Poetics of Reparation: Trauma and Compassion in Gail 
Jones’s Sorry  
Gail Jones’s novel, Sorry, published in 2007, provides an opportunity to 
examine the cultural reach of the trauma paradigm as a model for national 
healing and reconciliation.1 Bringing Them Home positioned white 
Australians as belated witnesses to the ongoing effects of traumatic practices 
such as child removal and forced assimilation. By contrast, Sorry is told from 
the perspective of the child of a perpetrator who is both complicit in the 
injustice and a beneficiary of it. Offered as an act of literary reparation, the 
novel tells the story of a lonely white Australian child, Perdita, the daughter 
of eccentric, alienated British migrants. Perdita struggles to remember and 
atone for her unwitting complicity in a crime that results in the wrongful 
incarceration of an Indigenous girl, Mary, who has befriended her. Sixteen-
year old Mary has come from a convent to help Perdita’s family after her 
chronically depressed mother, Stella, has become incapacitated. Ten-year-old 
Perdita impulsively stabs her father, Nicholas, when she witnesses him raping 
Mary. As her father’s blood spurts on the girls, Perdita represses the 
horrifying knowledge of what she has done; Mary confesses and is 
incarcerated. Perdita spontaneously develops a debilitating stutter, and the 
events that took Mary and her father from her become literally unspeakable. 
The novel narrates the story of Perdita’s recovery of her memory and her 
speech under the guidance of a gifted Russian doctor, Dr. Oblov. The novel 
may be read as an allegory of the inability of white Australians to confront 
                                                          
1  The following five paragraphs draw on material from Kennedy (2011b). 
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their own complicity in acts of violence against Indigenous people. Perdita 
benefits from Mary’s sacrifice, but she also inherits—like Australians 
today—the responsibility of atoning for her father’s crime, and her own 
unwitting crime against Mary.  
In Sorry complicity is explored in relation to the larger ethical issue of 
compassion―of recognizing and responding with “appropriate distress” to 
the suffering of others, both proximate and distant (Jones 2007, 185). The 
novel is set in and around Broome, a small town populated by Japanese and 
Malay pearl divers and Aborigines, with a minority of whites, in the remote 
northwest of Western Australia in the early 1940s. In February, 1942, 
thousands of Dutch refugees from Indonesia were passing through Broome to 
Perth, seeking shelter from the Japanese. On March 3, 1942, Japanese pilots 
based in East Timor attacked Broome, killing scores of Dutch refugees 
crammed into flying boats on the harbour. This scene, which Perdita 
witnesses from the safe distance of the beach, forms an important historic 
context for the novel’s exploration of trauma and witnessing. Observing that 
“war may destroy scale altogether,” Sorry juxtaposes the intimate gendered 
and racialized trauma of sexual assault and child removal with the historic, 
public trauma of WWII, and of the Spanish influenza which kills Dr. Oblov’s 
two sisters when he is a boy.  
The point of departure for Sorry, never directly stated, is the issue of 
justice for the Stolen Generations, and John Howard’s refusal to apologize.2 
Readers are told that Mary, of mixed descent, is taken from her Aboriginal 
mother when she is six years old and raised in a convent. Mary later learns 
that her mother, tortured by grief for the loss of her stolen child, rolls into a 
campfire and allows herself to be consumed by flames. Mary’s removal and 
her mother’s tragic death are only mentioned in passing. The novel 
approaches the Stolen Generations indirectly, through the broader theme of 
“damaged childhoods” (see Felman 2002, 43). In Sorry, damaged childhoods, 
racial violence, and trauma are condensed onto the figure of the vulnerable 
and traumatized child. Perdita, Mary, and Billy, a deaf-mute, all suffer from 
damaged childhoods. What are the effects of representing white Australian 
complicity in colonial violence and racist injustice on the model of trauma 
and recovery?  
Trauma discourse has become a favored idiom for exploring experiences 
of and responses to individual and collective violence and injustice. As a 
psychocultural trope, trauma conveys the collective cultural and 
psychological obstacles that prevent British settlers from witnessing 
                                                          
2  Jones discusses the issue of apology in an afterward to the novel. 
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indigenous suffering. In Sorry, a clinical understanding of trauma and its 
aftermath provides the narrative frame for Perdita’s personal journey of 
recovery. For instance, Dr Oblov tells Perdita that the aim of the therapy is 
“that she should one day tell her own story with simplicity and lucidity” 
(Jones 2007, 174). Perdita does recover her memory, but her mother’s refusal 
to corroborate her story to the police prevents her from securing justice for 
Mary. The narrative describes Perdita’s anguish when she realizes that Mary, 
who is paying for her crime, is suffering an injustice: “She sobbed 
uncontrollably for what she believed was her heartless forgetting. She sobbed 
for her mother’s deception and her own self-delusion and . . . for Mary’s 
extraordinary sacrifice” (Jones 2007, 195). Read as an allegory of national 
contrition for the harms perpetrated against the Stolen Generations, this scene 
exemplifies a politics of “true feeling”, grounded in “a popular belief…that a 
nation can be built across fields of social difference through channels of 
affective identification and empathy” (Berlant 2000, 128). “Sentimentality,” 
Berlant argues, “is the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced in 
the dominant public sphere, as the true core of national collectivity. It 
operates when the pain of intimate others burs into the consciousness of 
classically privileged national subjects, in such a fashion that they feel the 
pain of flawed or denied citizenship as their pain” (Berlant 2000, 129). 
Perdita’s psychological suffering is her means of atoning for the injustice that 
Mary experiences. As a narrative of national atonement, the novel values 
compassion and recognition of the other’s pain as a basis for reconciliation.  
As in Bringing Them Home, in Sorry redress for historical injustice is 
conceived on a model of reconciliation grounded in compassionate 
recognition and empathic feeling. When Perdita confronts Mary about her 
sacrifice, Mary responds by insisting on her agency to act: “Deeta, I chose. I 
chose to help you eh?” (Jones 2007, 203). Perdita later realizes “this was the 
point at which she should have said ‘sorry.’” Perdita deeply regrets her 
failure to apologize to Mary. Perdita imagines her failure to apologize as a 
failure of “affective identification and empathy” (Berlant 2000, 128). 
Reflecting on Mary’s incarceration, Perdita thinks she “should have imagined 
what kind of imprisonment this was, to be closed against the rustle of leaves 
and the feel of wind and of rain, to be taken from her place, her own place 
where her mother had died, to be sealed in the forgetfulness of someone 
else’s crime” (Jones 2007, 204). It’s not only Mary’s lack of freedom that 
Perdita tasks herself with imagining; it is also Mary’s removal from “her 
place” and, ultimately, from her mother. This scene of regret for an apology 
not offered can be described as a “fantasy reparation,” which involves a 
“therapeutic conversion of the scene of pain and its eradication to the scene 
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of the political itself” (Berlant 2000, 132). In the context of a public debate 
about the prime minister’s refusal to apologize to the Stolen Generations, the 
title of the novel, Sorry, completes the logic of “fantasy reparation”: it 
connects the scene of suffering conveyed in the narrative to the external 
scene of the political—and offers itself as an act of reparation for all of those 
people who had been removed from their families and their place. Fantasy 
reparation is achieved here through what memory critic Alison Landsberg 
(2004) calls “prosthetic memory”, the ability to imagine oneself, through the 
vehicle of a film or a cultural text, in the place of the other, without confusing 
the other’s experience as one’s own.  
A Poetics of Survival: Samson and Delilah 
Cultural memory scholar Andreas Huyssen (2003) has argued that the 
paradigm of traumatic memory is focused too exclusively on the past, at the 
expense of the future. The national inquiry into the Stolen Generations 
investigated practices of removal from the 1930s to the 1970s. The cultural 
texts that have brought Stolen Generations into cultural memory, such as 
Rabbit Proof Fence (2002), Baz Lurhmann’s melodrama, Australia (2008), 
and Sorry (2007), are set in the past, often during the era of World War II. By 
contrast, the significance of Warwick Thornton’s 2009 film, Samson and 
Delilah, is its mode of conveying an unfolding situation in the present. 
Berlant argues that it is important to theorize the present event as it unfolds; 
she is concerned with fantasies of “the good life” that have become 
unsustainable as a result of deteriorating economic, environmental and social 
conditions (2011, 2). She is interested in how people maintain an attachment 
to each other, to ideals, to habits, and to the political in such circumstances. 
Of course, fantasies of “the good life” vary and her archive consists of 
American and European texts. Nonetheless, there is much in her thinking 
about attachment that is usefully applied to an Australian film about the 
precarious conditions of life for young people in an impoverished Indigenous 
community. 
Samson and Delilah, which tells a love story focused on two marginalized 
teenagers living in a remote community in Central Australia, was released in 
the wake of the Northern Territory Intervention. While the film brings what 
Bringing Them Home refers to as the “appalling living conditions” of a 
remote indigenous community onto the big screen, it also tells a personal 
story, which conveys something of the everyday texture of life, and the 
challenges that the young characters face simply to survive. Samson, around 
206 Rosanne Kennedy  
fourteen years old, loves music and dancing, and would play in his older 
brother’s band if allowed. Excluded, he takes comfort in petrol sniffing, the 
drug of choice for Indigenous youngsters seeking escape from the pain and 
monotony of their lives. Delilah, about the same age, is the responsible 
granddaughter of an elderly artist, who teaches her to paint, but things turn 
sour for her when her grandmother dies. In a customary ritual following the 
death of her grandmother, Delilah is severely beaten by a group of Aboriginal 
women who blame her for the death. She chops off her hair with a carving 
knife as a sign of her grief. She, like Samson, is left to fend for herself. In one 
scene, Samson, who lives with his brother, opens the door of the refrigerator, 
only to find it empty, flies buzzing around. He retreats to a bedroom with a 
mattress on the floor, soiled clothes piled around, and inhales petrol fumes. 
Abandoned wheelchairs take the place of a skateboard, as kids take turns 
racing them. A caravan serves as the clinic, on those days when a visiting 
nurse comes to the community. The pair head to Alice Springs, the only 
sizeable town in the region, to try their luck at making a life, but end up 
living on the fringe. Delilah tries to sell her grandmother’s paintings, but 
without a white intermediary she is unsuccessful. There is little dialogue; in 
contrast to the testimonial paradigm that characterized Bringing Them Home, 
the story of Samson and Delilah is conveyed almost entirely through visual 
language and the soundtrack. The cinematography, and particularly 
Thornton’s hand-held camera work, images a visually stark and stunning 
landscape that appears endless.  
The narrative merges love story and road trip, but to call it a love story is 
to defy the usual sexually and verbally explicit expectations of the genre. 
Love is conveyed only through sly glances, subtle gestures, and primarily 
through Delilah’s actions. In Alice Springs, the pair is subjected to racist 
slurs, and Delilah is abducted and presumably raped by a group of white 
youths, who later throw her out of the car. She joins Samson, living under a 
bridge, and takes up petrol sniffing. Stoned, she is hit by a car, and ends up in 
hospital. After recovering in hospital, Delilah returns to the bridge under 
which Sansom lives, to find him sitting cross-legged under a tent-like 
blanket, sniffing petrol and slowly killing himself. With the help of Samson’s 
brother, the pair return to their community, load up the car, and Delilah takes 
Samson to her grandmother’s country to live remotely in what is known as an 
“outstation”. There she sets up a home in a tin shed to care for him while he 
withdraws from petrol sniffing.  
Susan Ryan-Fazileau views Samson and Delilah through the lens of 
trauma theory. She argues that the film, through its representation of the lives 
of two teens, invites viewers to “reflect on the legacy of trauma in an 
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Indigenous community in today’s Australia” (2011, 1). To facilitate this 
reading, she draws on Indigenous researcher Judy Atkinson’s understanding 
of the intergenerational transmission of trauma in Indigenous communities as 
“chronic, cumulative and ongoing” (Ryan-Fazileau 2011, 1). Trauma was 
originally produced by colonial dispossession and structural violence, and 
compounded in later generations through ongoing racism, exclusion, alcohol 
and drug dependency and violence (Ryan-Fazileau 2011, 2). Atkinson 
contends that narrating stories of trauma in a community context is an 
important step in the recovery process, as it enables Indigenous people to 
gain an understanding of the structural conditions that produce trauma (as 
cited in Ryan Fazileau). Ryan-Fazileau reads the film as “a trauma story 
narrated to a caring group-the spectators, who identify with the protagonists 
thanks to the way the filmmaker presents their plight” (Ryan-Fazileau 2011, 
2). While this analysis is compelling, it reads the film through the familiar 
interpretive frame of trauma and recovery. When and if the protagonists 
recover, however, the conditions of ‘ordinary crisis’ - the violence, drug 
addiction, welfare dependency and the like - will still be present. Recovering 
from trauma does not extinguish the intensifying conditions of precarity 
produced by racism, neoliberalism and globalisation, and for Samson and 
Delilah, exacerbating their already marginal position. In fact, the film’s 
aesthetics, and the almost complete lack of dialogue, suggest an emergent 
genre of the historical present (Berlant 2011). Taking this into consideration, 
I suggest that the film can be productively read as initiating a shift from the 
exceptional logic of trauma, organized often around a spectacular ‘event’, to 
what Berlant calls “crisis ordinariness” (2011, 10). This shift is accompanied 
by another, from a poetics of recovery to a poetics of survival or living on.  
Berlant advocates a shift from the language of trauma, which tends to 
focus on a singular extraordinary or catastrophic event. She proposes, 
instead, the concept of “crisis ordinariness” as a means of registering the 
entrenched conditions of precariousness and vulnerability that are present in 
ordinary life (2011, 10). Crisis ordinariness, which seeks to capture the 
“intensities of a situation that spreads into modes, habits and genres of being” 
is a particularly apt term for identifying the precarious conditions of ordinary 
life for Samson and Delilah in a remote community (Berlant 2011, 82). 
Whereas Rabbit-Proof Fence focused on the theft of the children as a 
traumatic event in their lives and the lives of their mothers and community, 
Samson and Delilah depicts the perilous conditions of ordinary life in a 
remote community shaped by decades of structural economic and social 
inequality and isolation. Even when violent or extreme events occur―when 
Delilah is abducted, raped and hit by a car―these events are not singled out 
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as ‘exceptional’, but rather, as ‘normal’ in her everyday life. Samson’s 
addiction to petrol sniffing is a response to the conditions in which he lives, 
conditions of disenfranchisement from the social and economic world. In 
contrast to the genre of melodrama, “whose depictions for the good life now 
appear to mark archaic expectations about having and building a life” 
(Berlant 2011, 6), Samson and Delilah, unlike Rabbit Proof Fence and The 
Sapphires (2012), is relentlessly based in the present. It can be described as a 
“situation tragedy”―the narrative of an unfolding “situation” the contours of 
which are not yet clear. In a situation tragedy “the subject’s world is fragile 
beyond repair, one gesture away from losing all access to sustain its 
fantasies: the situation threatens utter, abject unraveling” (Berlant 2011, 6). It 
takes the form of a “menacing new realism” (Berlant 2011, 6), which is 
precisely the aesthetic mode of Samson and Delilah.  
The film, billed with the slogan “love never judges,” was well-received 
both in Australia and at Cannes Film Festival, where it was selected for Un 
Certain Regard. Margaret Pomerantz and David Stratton, host of the weekly 
Australian television show, “At the Movies,” give the film a coveted 5 star 
rating―the only film they both rated “5” in 2009 (Pomerantz & Stratton). 
Many non-Indigenous audiences experience the film, which depicts extreme 
poverty, social isolation, repeated violence, racism and the lack of the 
material goods that many Australians identify with “the good life,” as 
confronting. Audiences have described their reaction in visceral terms, saying 
the film left them feeling as if they had been punched. Indeed, in describing 
the affective experience of watching the film, Pomerantz uses precisely that 
term: “The emotional punch that Samson and Delilah delivers is one of those 
rare things in cinema which doesn’t come along very often. And when it does 
you feel like falling down on your knees in gratitude. And it’s not because 
Thornton has gone for sentimentality. It’s the reverse.” What impresses 
Stratton, however, is the film’s optimism and hope, in bleak circumstances. 
He comments that “it’s a film that, while you’re watching it, you feel that it’s 
a tragedy…. It’s a very sad story. But the way it concludes with such 
optimism, I think it really soars and I think every Australian should see this 
film.” Like William Deane’s appeal to Australians in the wake of Bringing 
Them Home, Stratton’s review of the film exhorts “all Australians” to see it; 
through this address, he appeals to viewers as a witnessing public to the lives 
of Aboriginal teens living in circumstances of extreme poverty, deprivation 
and social isolation. I want to pursue Stratton’s observation about the film’s 
optimism. What kind of future does the film permit us to envision for these 
two characters? Berlant’s concepts of “crisis ordinariness” and “cruel 
optimism” provide a useful analytic lens for considering the affects and 
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relationships depicted in the film, and for considering how the scene it 
describes and the affects it produces differ from Stolen Generations 
melodramas such as Rabbit Proof Fence (2002) and Australia (2008).  
Delilah’s attachment to Samson, her love for him and desire to be with 
him, despite the fact that he thwarts her efforts by stealing petrol from their 
truck and leaving them stranded, could be described as having the affective 
structure of “cruel optimism”. Berlant introduces the concept of “cruel 
optimism” to describe the nature of our attachments, and particularly, 
perverse attachments. “A relation of cruel optimism exists,” she proposes, 
“when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing” 
(2011, 1). It is not the “experience of optimism,“ but rather its “affective 
structure“ that is especially important for explicating the nature of our 
attachments to fantasies of the “good life”. Optimism becomes cruel when 
“the very pleasures of being inside a relation have become sustaining 
regardless of the content of the relation” (Berlant 2011, 2). Delilah hopes that 
Samson will quit petrol sniffing, and she aims to support him. The film 
brilliantly succeeds in transmitting what Langton (2010) has called “the 
shock of the new”―the violence, poverty, isolation and monotony in some 
remote communities―and its effects on children and young people. Delilah 
attempts to give Samson the care and space to recover by taking him to a 
remote outstation on her grandmother’s land―a move which also enables her 
to reconnect to her “country” and to her grandmother, and recover a sense of 
purpose. They will live in a shed, hunt for food, and be self-sustaining. This 
fresh start is possibly what Stratton has in mind when he refers to the film’s 
optimism. The film leaves open their future, and the question of whether 
moving to remote country will facilitate their flourishing. It is a risk Delilah 
is willing to take.  
Made shortly after the Northern Territory Intervention was initiated, 
Samson and Delilah introduces a new aesthetic, which conveys the 
conditions of the unfolding present as experienced by young people growing 
up in remote Aboriginal Australia. What most Australians know about life in 
remote Indigenous communities they learn through sensationalist media 
reports, which inevitably position children and teens as victims of neglect and 
alcohol-related violence. The Intervention enraged Warwick Thornton, who 
felt that as an Aboriginal male, he and others like him were under suspicion 
of being paedophiles. He originally considered referencing it but instead 
decided not to, as it would date the film. While Samson and Delilah does 
show the teens as subjected to violence both from white and Aboriginal 
communities, and surviving without adult help, Thornton conveys this reality 
without sensationalising or sentimentalising it.  
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The film refuses to render life in this Indigenous community totally 
intelligible to outsiders; rather, it engages viewers by making us work to 
make sense of what we see. Nor does it provide the comfort for viewers that 
comes from compassionate recognition and fantasies of rescue; rather, we 
have to find another way of engaging and relating to it. On this issue, 
anthropologist Stewart’s (2007) work on “ordinary affects” provides a lead. 
Referring to herself in the third person, Stewart distances the authorial voice 
in order to foreground the provisional status of narrative and identity. In her 
role as an anthropologist of “the ordinary,” sensitive to the affects of 
everyday life, she writes of herself: “She is not so much a subject position or 
an agent in hot pursuit of something definitive as a point of contact; instead 
she gazes, imagines, senses, takes on, performs, and asserts not a flat and 
finished truth but some possibilities (and threats) that have come into view in 
the effort to become attuned to what a particular scene might offer” (p. 5). 
Thus, Stewart is able to create the distance that critical thinking requires. I 
suggest that Samson and Delilah offers one such space of affective encounter 
where we may engage the other not through familiar notions of victimhood 
and rescue, but through potentialities that are not yet entirely obvious. 
Samson and Delilah, through its menacing realism, denies the possibility of a 
sentimental response; it doesn’t allow us to sustain the fantasy of a nation 
forged out of pain, across boundaries of difference. Instead, it brings us face 
to face with entrenched precarity in Australia, and challenges Australian 
fantasies of a “fair go” for all, and of ourselves as “good” people.  
Conclusion 
The Stolen Generations paradigm was based on a therapeutic model of 
testimony and witnessing, reconciliation and recovery, which is conveyed 
through the narrative structure of cultural texts. For instance, Rabbit Proof 
Fence and Australia are film melodramas that brought the Stolen Generations 
into national and international visibility, travelling on a global vernacular of 
trauma, suffering and disrupted family bonds. Rabbit Proof Fence has a double 
ending―the diegetic ending tells of two of the girls’ triumphant return home, 
and the non-diegetic ending grimly reports that the practice of child removal 
continued into the next generation, bringing more grief and loss to the girls who 
returned. Australia, by contrast, optimistically imagines reconciliation as a path 
to national redemption. Gail Jones’ novel, Sorry, does not take the form of 
melodrama, but the novel’s narrative trajectory is modeled on a paradigm of 
trauma as an exceptional event. Compassionate feeling and imaginative 
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identification with the pain of the other is vital to its conception of atoning for 
past wrongs. These Stolen Generations texts all, to some degree, focus on 
relations between black and white, and in that sense they can be considered to 
be within the discursive framework of reconciliation.  
Samson and Delilah initiates a shift from a sentimental poetics of reparation 
grounded in “true feeling” to a poetics of survival. An Aboriginal film which 
depicts ordinary life in an Aboriginal community, Samson and Delilah focuses 
the viewer’s attention on the teens’ struggle for survival both within the 
impoverished community in which they live, and in town, where they 
experience white racism and violence. The white viewer is peripheral, a 
positioning that provides the possibility to move away from the presumption of 
white authority. Samson and Delilah, through its visual language and 
soundtrack, manages to convey what Marcia Langton has identified as the 
“shock of the new.” In contrast to the optimism associated with “going home” 
and reconciliation, it transmits something of the cruel optimism that stems both 
from the struggle for survival in conditions of entrenched poverty and 
disadvantage, and from the deep attachment to ideals of self-determination and 
sovereignty under ongoing conditions of settler colonial neo-liberalism.  
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There was no way to escape this dread anymore, this pendulum between 
regret and forgiveness (The Dew Breaker, p. 242). 
Introduction  
A 2010 painting by the Haitian painter Frantz Zéphirin, entitled “il était une 
fois le 12 janvier” (once upon a time on the 12th of January), foregrounds, 
before a deep dark blue-black background, two light azure rimmed single 
lapis eyes that are surrounded by roughly strung pairs of smaller, seemingly 
blinking eyes that cover the canvas like beads and whose pupils’ shades run 
from blue to purple. The haunting piece captures the fear, the eyes, the 
looking for dear ones, of the after moments to 4:53 pm when the 2010 
January earthquake struck in and around the Haitian capital city as the 
darkness that envelops Port-au-Prince on any given evening transfixed the 
peering of the citizenry into staring human twinkling lights. But the 
speechless painting also represents for me a darkened other “once upon a 
time” which continues to haunt Haitians still living both at home and 
dispersed abroad and which after the earthquake, took on a sharpened vérité 
with the return of the deposed dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier, alias Baby Doc 
as the son of Papa Doc, François Duvalier, both of whom instigated the 
tonton macoutes’ deeds. As the regime’s death squads, the tonton macoutes 
petrified the Haitian public into silencing the disappearances, torture, and 
mass murders that they perpetrated and that constitute the charges of crimes 
against humanity that lie in waiting for the Duvaliers and their henchmen. 
The forced silence that haunted and still contains the era of the Duvalier 
dictatorship let fall a few whisperings, and it is these barely audible snatches 
that the women authors, who dialogue here through their novelistic fiction, 
try to tender and fill in through their writing. 
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In her February 2012 article in the Montreal Gazette, journalist Sue 
Montgomery reports on the Haitian ruling that Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby 
Doc) would not be tried for grave human rights abuses committed under his 
watch and underlines the disturbing silence that ensued in France, the United 
States, and the Caribbean, as well as the mildness of Canada’s response. The 
case had been formerly brought against Jean-Claude Duvalier when he 
travelled back to Port-au-Prince, with his current partner Véronique Roy on 
January 16th, 2011, almost twenty-five years to the day since his departure 
on February 7th 1986.1 Questions abounded as to Duvalier’s motivations2 
especially since he immediately took up his old habits with impunity and was 
seen eating in town, and attending weddings and parties all over Port-au-
Prince; and this, even though two days after his return, his passport was 
confiscated so that he could not leave Haiti and he was placed under house 
arrest following his arraignment before a Haitian court for his crimes against 
the people of Haiti which include human rights violations, torture, arbitrary 
imprisonment, killing of civilians, and embezzlement from state coffers.3 His 
return a little more than a year after the 2010 earthquake had appeared timely 
to some, even if others thought it would re-awaken fears, and reopen scars 
that run deep as Martine Theodore of Haitian Women of Miami indicated: 
Now that Haiti is in such a terrible situation, some people might see him as some 
sort of liberator―he embodies an era of relative peace and quiet, though things 
were not perfect, [....] However, Duvalier’s regime brings a lot of fear and 
emotional aspects to the equation that we may not need right now. (quoted by 
Daniel, 2011, Jan. 17, The Miami Herald, n.p.) 
Indeed over the past decade, in the selective memory of some, the Duvalier 
years have taken on a confounding softer undertone as the infrastructure of 
Haiti and its cities have lacked upkeep, and the implementation of safety 
standards and generalised planning in the areas of public works―notably 
with regards to the enforcement of building codes both before and since the 
2010 earthquake―remain marred in bureaucratic stagnation.4 Theodore adds 
that “In the past ten years, a sense of nostalgia for the Duvalier-era of cleaner 
streets and better government services has emerged, even though the bulk of 
the population is too young to remember Duvalier’s bloody rule” (Miami 
Herald 2011, Jan. 17). It is this very deadening silence that allows and 
enables Haiti’s newly elected president, Michel Martelly, to place 
Duvalieristes in key governmental positions who in turn construct and revise 
the history of the Duvalier era in nostalgic hues. As Jan J. Dominique, the 
novelist and daughter of the assassinated radio station director and 
agronomist Jean Dominique, points out “In Haiti, young people are never 
taught about what it was like under Duvalier, and those old enough to 
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remember fear speaking out.”5 And with the current political conjuncture, it 
is once again risky to speak out.6  
On the eve of Baby Doc’s return, Haiti’s capital and its other cities, 
situated along the fault line whose movement brought down the state’s 
figure-head―the presidential palace―and smothered so many in the rubble 
that the earth’s quaking left in its wake, learned the effects of this 
(geological) mis-alignment, just as several women authors of Haiti were re-
membering and working dangerously at enunciating other (socio-political) 
mis-alignments: those unsaids of their childhood.7 Three of these authors, 
Marie-Célie Agnant, Kettly Mars8 and Evelyne Trouillot spoke out at book 
fairs in France in 2010 and 2011, alongside other contemporary writers of the 
diaspora and living in Haiti, and returned to the injunction of their diasporic 
US-based sister Edwige Danticat, to her anxious cry to “create dangerously.” 
They pushed up against the virtual yet forbidding barriers, insisting on the 
role of authors and artists in telling, recounting, giving news, gifting 
responsible stories as Marcel Mauss (1923-24) might have expressed their 
politics of engagement. Kettly Mars described at the 2011 Paris Book Fair 
how the adults whispered among themselves and fell silent when children 
happened on their conversations and, acknowledged that with Saisons 
sauvages, she wants to render visible and public the murmurings of the Papa 
and Baby Doc eras.9 Agnant, for her part, is concerned on the one hand about 
the generalised impunity accorded such persons as Rosalie Bosquet 
(otherwise known as Madame Max Adolphe) which can be witnessed for 
example with the library being built and named after her in Mirebalais, Haiti, 
even though she led the tonton macoutes under Papa Doc after having shot 
nineteen men whom she pretended were plotting to overthrow the “father of 
the nation.” On the other hand she attests to aching to know what such 
women, whose names keep coming up, were doing in and amongst the tonton 
macoutes. At the Paris Salon du livre, talking about the French edition in 
2011 of her 2007 novel, Un alligator nommé Rosa, Agnant expressed how 
creating a space with the other in which to take back the silenced is a process, 
one with which she hopes readers will help her.10  
Ending the Haunting, Halting Whisperings of the Unspoken 
Despite the frequent presence of the Duvaliers, their henchmen and the 
tonton-macoutes in the stories situated or written during the hereditary 
dictatorship, it has been rare to find them incorporated as key protagonists 
except for François Duvalier himself, and even he is rarely portrayed 
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realistically. Generally, they have been characterised by the black clothes 
they wear, the reprehensibly cruel acts they perform, and their uncanny 
hovering presence that triggers the silence that allows the fictitious 
characters―as well as the families of the authors writing out these 
stories―to remain out of harm’s way. However on the pages of Danticat’s, 
Trouillot’s and Agnant’s novels that give no easy answers, fear of reprisals 
gives way to a face to face between violators and victims. In Agnant’s Un 
alligator nommé Rosa, Antoine Guibert doggedly pursues the murderer of his 
parents to the south of France where she is bed-ridden and (uneasily) cared 
for by her adopted daughter, another orphan of the invalid’s murderous acts; 
in Trouillot’s (2010) La mémoire aux abois, Marie-Ange, the nurse’s aide, 
pieces together her family’s tragedy as she is ordered to care for the widow of 
the dictator who wrought such horrors upon the people of her native land; 
and in Danticat’s (2004) The Dew Breaker, the daughter Ka learns from her 
father after he returns from drowning her carving of him that he had not been 
a prisoner in the Casernes in Port-au-Prince but the barracks’ chief 
officer―working under his superior Rosalie, the head of the female force 
known as Fillette Lalo (Fyèt Lalo)―and the assassin of her mother’s brother. 
Writing from the painful place of addressing the victimizer, each of these 
women authors restage head on and have their characters relive―some in 
diegetic memory, others in fictionalised “real time”―the violence 
perpetuated by the political actants of the 1960s, 70s and 80s without the 
transpositional ploys, and the more individualised characters that Marie 
Chauvet felt compelled to use especially in Amour, Colère, Folie which she 
elaborated in Haïti under the dictatorship in 1968. The characters, deeply 
scarred by the legacy of the muted, unexplained violence of their childhood, 
live with its remnants, liminally and madly obsessed by their attempts to 
reconnect with their own subjectivity. In attempting to understand, the 
characters go beyond the violence of the interdicts and emerge from the 
trajectory of their encounters with the demons of their nightmares out in the 
open, in an allegorical no-man’s land, at the edge of life. Where Danticat 
(and Mars) present stories that place their female protagonists literally in the 
camp of the perpetrators―as their children, and as their lovers respective-
ly―Trouillot and Agnant evoke and stage the necessary fascination of 
coming eye to eye with the elder woman whether she be the widow of Papa 
Doc or Rosa Bosquet11 (the reine-choche―she devil) the head of the VSN 
and of the parallel female force, the Fillette Lalo, both of whom are at death’s 
door and living in exile in France. 
I am struck by the ways in which Agnant and Trouillot have moved 
forwards in time, away from their earlier foci on the trauma of historical 
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displacements across the Atlantic when they sought to give voices to the 
echoes of slave-ships and slavery, to speak out and resist the undertow of 
silencing the past and closing out the future. After Danticat, these women 
novelists have elected to write in the hushed, whispered forbidden and the 
frightfully fascinating fear that accompanied their childhood during the 1960s 
and 1970s, a fear still with them, haunting their living memory. Moving 
beyond regrets and forgiveness, these works seek a conciliatory opening with 
which to unlock the past. Resisting the amnesia that this certain nostalgia for 
the Duvalier years encourages, Un alligator nommé Rosa and La mémoire 
aux abois follow in the tracks of Edwige Danticat’s 2004 The Dew Breaker 
for they place centre page the very characters of Haiti’s history―alarmingly 
powerful men and women of the Duvalier regimes―and, bring them face to 
face, in their demise, with their nemesis, in situ of distributive justice. 
Danticat’s title―The Dew Breaker―alludes to the ‘shoukét laroze’, the 
Haitian Kreyol syntagm for torturers who act before the morning dew as 
Beatrice, the protagonist of the sixth story “The Bridal Seamstress” explains: 
“We called them shoukèt laroze, [....] They’d break into your house. Mostly it 
was at night. But often they’d also come before dawn, as the dew was settling 
on the leaves, and they’d take you away” (p. 131). The title of this collection of 
nine stories also recalls that of Jacques Roumain’s (1944) classic novel: 
Gouverneurs de la rosée, an intergenerational story that seeks to redress long 
held wrongs, by seeking out the source, a source of water to re-distribute its 
life-giving sustenance to the divided Fonds-Rouge community of peasants. 
Ka’s father, the dew breaker in Danticat’s work, takes once he is in exile in 
New York the name of Roumain’s hero’s father, Mr. Bienaimé. Gouverneurs 
de la rosée’s linear pattern counters the puzzle-like structure of the 
contemporary women’s novels that gradually fills in past ellipses―silences, 
non sequiturs, missing pieces―tremulously at times and with flash floods of 
recalled instances. These narratives situate the historical personalities, alone in 
lowly ex-isled positions,12 or in sickness at death’s threshold, and where they 
can no longer hold anyone in their power, where they are bound back within 
the limits they crossed with such hubris. The characters finding or sounding 
them out are counter-positioned to reach towards an afterwards. The fictions 
portray a conciliation, a coming to terms, a poetics of survival that intimates a 
release from the stranglehold of feared power holding them and the perpetrators 
back. Such movement forwards out of ill-living and living-sickness (mal-
vivre/le mal de vivre) augurs a promissory habitus for an ethics of survival, one 
that patterns learning to live as an evidential form of disobedience.  
Such release takes on different contours as triggers from the historical 
past lived in fictional time, as well as in creative engagements, generate 
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actual and imagined responses. One such release occurred in a set of knee-
jerk reprisals to Jean-Claude Duvalier’s flight from Haiti in 1986 that 
Danticat scripts into her chapter “Monkey Tails” in The Dew Breaker. At this 
sudden switch in February 1986, the populace suddenly, fervently, searched 
out the Volunteers for National Security, the tonton macoutes: 
Overnight our country had completely changed. We had fallen asleep under a 
dictatorship headed by a pudgy thirty-four-year-old man and his glamorous wife. 
During the night they’d sneaked away―I had to see the television images before I 
could believe it―the wife ornately made up, her long brown hair hidden under a 
white turban, her carefully manicured fingers holding a long cigarette, the 
husband at the wheel of the family’s BMW, driving his wife and himself to the 
tarmac of an airport named after his dead father, from whom he’d inherited the 
country at nineteen, to an American airplane that would carry them to permanent 
exile in France. The presidential couple’s reign had ended, his having lasted 
fifteen years and hers the span of their six-year marriage. Their departure, 
however, orphaned a large number of loyal militia-men, who had guarded the 
couple’s command with all types of vicious acts. Now the population was going 
after those militiamen, those macoutes, with the determination of an army in the 
middle of its biggest battle to date. (Dew Breaker, p. 140)  
Danticat in particular examines the amorphous liminality between fiction and 
reality to interrogate through the creative process the validity of clichés and 
presumptions present in phlegmatic statements like: “atonement, reparation, 
[is] possible and available for everyone” (Dew Breaker, p. 242). In The Dew 
Breaker, Anne, the sister of the preacher who was killed at point blank range 
in the Casernes prison by Bienaimé, the man who would become her husband 
and would father Kâ, dithers, probing her maternal trustworthiness when he 
finally crosses over and exposes his past modus vivendi to their daughter, to a 
member of the next generation. She wishes that the verbatim of his former 
modi operandi would permit her to account for the fear and self-hatred that 
embody her instinct of survival. Hoping for Kâ’s forgiveness, Anne searches 
for the empathic words to wrap the corporeal rebellion that their daughter 
represents in an affectionate embrace of regret.13  
Another such trigger from the historical past is a recurrent scene from the 
Papa Doc era which appears like a palimpsest in the works of authors and 
artists alike―men and women like Jan J. Dominique (1984) in Mémoire 
d’une amnésique (p. 66); Danticat (2010) in Create Dangerously (pp. 1-5, 
150, et passim); Emile Ollivier (1999) in Mille eaux (p. 134); Blondel 
Débrossé (1985) in his play Conscience criblée (p. 2) and in La mémoire aux 
abois (pp. 65, 155) as well as Un alligator nommé Rosa (p. 75). The writers 
mark, in these works, one particular execution on November 12th, 1964 at 
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the Port-au-Prince cemetery by a firing squad made up of seven helmeted 
men in khaki military uniforms, of two young men, Marcel Numa and Louis 
Drouin, ordered by François Duvalier. It occurred seven years into his 
fifteen-year term as president, and has remained etched upon human memory 
maybe because a public holiday was declared; all government offices and 
schools closed so that everyone―school children alongside army 
officers―would attend together with the hundreds of people, often peasants, 
who were bussed in from outside the capital of Port-au-Prince; and probably 
because the masses assembled were filmed watching as the two men were 
shot and the recording rebroadcast daily for a week in an eerily sinister 
emplotment of secondary witnessing.  
Exiled in New York, Drouin had belonged to an organisation called Jeune 
Haïti, and in 1964 he had returned with thirteen others including Numa, his 
childhood friend, to “engage in a guerrilla war [...] to topple the Duvalier 
dictatorship” (Create Dangerously, p. 2) and “[a]fter months of attempting to 
capture the men of Jeune Haïti and after imprisoning and murdering hundreds 
of their relatives, Papa Doc Duvalier wanted to make a spectacle of Numa’s 
and Drouin’s deaths” (p. 2). Antoine Guibert, the male nurse and writer who 
has tracked down Rosa Bosquet, in Agnant’s novel, points out the photo 
amongst the many he has posted around her room, demanding that she 
explain it:   
Regarde bien, Rosa, une autre photo: deux hommes, [...] la vingtaine. Ils sont 
beaux, vigoureux, instruits. Ils ont pour nom Numa et Drouin. On les disait 
généreux. Ils étaient l’avenir de leur pays; aujourd’hui ils n’ont même plus de 
place dans sa mémoire. Ils sont ligotés à des poteaux dressés face au mur d’un 
cimetière. Leurs yeux sont clairs, ouverts, ils affrontent la barbarie, et tomberont 
sous les rafales meurtrières de ta bande de chacals. Ils recevront le coup fatal de 
ton complice, Franco Néro, spécialiste, paraît-il, des coups de grâce. Allez, Rosa 
Bosquet, explique afin que je comprenne: au nom de quelle cause ces jeunes ont-
ils été assassinés ? Vous aviez, tes accolytes et toi, exigé des écoliers qu’ils 
assistent à cette exécution. Pour ce crime supplémentaire, tu vas aussi payer, 
Rosa. Pour le regard franc de ces deux jeunes hommes que vous avez éteint ce 
jour-là, tu vas devoir payer, Rosa Bosquet! (alligator, p. 75-6)  
Look Rosa, another photo: two men [….] about twenty years old. They are 
handsome, strong, educated. They are called Numa and Drouin. They are said to 
have been generous. They were their country’s future, today they don’t even hold 
a place in its memory. They are tied to posts set up against a cemetery wall. Their 
eyes are unclouded, open, they confront the barbarity, and will fall under the 
murderous bursts of gunfire from your band of jackals. They will receive the fatal 
blow from your accomplice, Franco Nero, a specialist, apparently, of the coup de 
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grâce. Come on, Rosa, explain so that I can understand: in the name of what cause 
were these young men murdered? You and your acolytes insisted that school 
children be present at this execution. For this additional crime, you will pay too, 
Rosa. For the frank gaze of these two young men that you extinguished that day, 
you will have to pay, Rosa Bosquet!  
The visual iterations of this event effectively bound and tied tongue and body 
into a silence that nevertheless ends up returning in the words of this 
multitude of works and in particular this generation of women writers who 
were barely ten to fourteen-year old girls and among those who could have 
been forced to watch the public execution, or in Danticat’s case not yet born. 
For many then, whether present―or not even―at the execution, this story 
haunts and obsesses them. To Danticat, it feels like a creation myth for “aside 
from its heartrending clash of life and death, homeland and exile, the 
execution of Marcel Numa and Louis Drouin involves a disobeyed directive 
from a higher authority and a brutal punishment as a result” (Create 
Dangerously, p. 5) one which she places alongside Adam and Eve’s 
disobedience when they defied “God’s order not to eat what must have been 
the world’s most desirable apple” (p. 5).  
In this nexus of novels, it is disobedience that is at stake, a tactic in 
Michel de Certeau’s sense rather than a strategy that effectively responds to 
militarised violence from the perspective of women working at living. Where 
Numa and Drouin used strategy to undermine the Duvalier regime, Danticat, 
Agnant and Trouillot tactically seek to uncover the halting whisperings of the 
Haitian torturous dictatorship and render a gift of nemesis to themselves and 
to all who live with the haunting silence of the past. Nemesis, the name of the 
Greek goddess of proportion and retribution, who was instructed by Zeus to 
take care of the world’s harmony by chastising those who would compromise 
it, is derived from the Greek neimein―the gift of what is due. She brings 
down all immoderate good fortune, checks the presumption that attends it, 
and is the punisher of extraordinary crimes.14 Nemesis of antiquity 
personifies the law establishing equilibrium in the world. Representing 
distributive justice through the rhythm of destiny, Nemesis recommends 
discretion as modus operandi, and retracts happiness and pride from those 
who live in excess, and with hubris.  
Agnant and Trouillot each incorporate an eminently recognisable 
historical female personality as the central protagonist of their narratives to 
stage in their texts the encounter of victim and victimizer. They each also 
position their victimised characters as disobedient nurses intriguing with 
messages of death, moving back and forth between angrily wishing for 
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vengeance and seeking proportional justice, until a point is at-
tained―seemingly so improbable at the start―when they tip the scales and 
reach the victimizer, as if on a par with her. As adults who when they were 
children either lived with or witnessed the violence perpetrated on their 
parents, they reset the muted button. Through discourses about (gendered) 
violence―literal, physical and psychological―they navigate the precarity of 
public and private spheres of human life. They speak for themselves (and for 
others who have testified privately) to or alongside the two elderly women 
who elect to wall themselves in behind an anxious mutism. Of a single 
mindedness, as grown-ups having lived bound up in the unexplained, the 
unsayable, and the undecidable, they play out private TRCs, truth and 
reconciliation commissions of self and other in their tropological encounter 
with Nemesis. 
Each of the two novels reconstructs a female historical figure, contempo-
raries of each other, as the central protagonist of their respective narratives. 
Encountering a return of Nemesis’ justice, both women are now bed-bound 
and close to death, living in exile in France, holed up with their own form of 
self-imposed resentful silence. The yesteryear Commandant Rosalie Bosquet 
is the main character referred to in Agnant’s eponymous title: Un alligator 
nommé Rosa. Described similarly as that “short, stout, bespectacled” superior 
to the preacher’s killer in Danticat’s Dew Breaker (p. 216) and as the “femme 
sanglée dans un uniforme sévère, des lunettes noires barrant son visage, un 
fusil à baïonnette dans les mains” (alligator, p. 77; “woman tightly buttoned 
up in a strict uniform, with dark glasses cutting across her face, a bayonet in 
her hand”), she has since fled Haiti and settled in Gourdaix, a remote village 
in the Alpes Maritimes region of the South of France. There Antoine, who 
witnessed as a ten year old child his parents’ brutal murder upon Rosa’s 
orders, and who has tracked her down some forty years later, has just 
arranged to be hired as her nurse and ghost writer-biographer. In La mémoire 
aux abois, Trouillot’s prominent figure is a barely disguised Simone 
Duvalier, the wife of Papa Doc who fled Haiti in 1986 to settle in Paris. The 
novel opens some ten years later, with her hospitalisation. She is tended to by 
Marie-Ange, a young twenty-three year old Haitian woman, who fled Haiti 
with her mother to Martinique when the latter’s husband was shot by the 
tonton macoutes in 1980, a second traumatic loss for her since her brother 
Jean-Édouard had been killed for participating in an opposition organisation 
after the public execution at the cemetery of Port-du-Roi of two anti-
government men―Lionnel Dubois and Marc Noisin―in whose initials Louis 
Drouin and Manuel Numa are readily recognisable as the two who participate 
in Danticat’s creation myth.  
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Where Rosalie loses the final syllable from her first name in Agnant’s 
text, Simone becomes the widow of Doctor Fabien Doréval, of the dictator 
Fab Doc―whom she refers to as le Défunt (the Deceased). In keeping with 
the parodic distancing shifts within semantic fields that characterise the 
translations from historical reality to historicised diegesis in Trouillot’s novel 
and that seem to help bring the unspeakable to the written page, the 
protagonist is known as Odile Doréval (golden vale), a name that borrows the 
‘val’ from Duvalier and precedes it with a suffix-like ‘doré’ (golden) in 
reference to the dictatorship’s ostentation and the family’s embezzlement of 
Haitian state funds.15 Mme Odile Doréval keeps the titles of first lady, and 
“gardienne de la revolution”, one that her real-life model received after her 
son, Baby Doc displaced her when he married Michèle Benett. 
Odile Doréval has consciously decided to keep silent and to take refuge in 
her memory in order to keep her thoughts organised, and to ensure that she 
does not let slip anything in front of the hospital staff so as to prevent them 
from talking about her and pointing her out with such mutterings as “veuve” 
(widow) or “dictateur” (dictator). Rendered almost an object by the gaze of 
the nursing staff, as well as by the binary structure of the four chapters’ titles 
that divide up her life into her various positions and roles, the monologue that 
constitutes her self-ordering and remembering logically extends her life-long 
quest for control―of her corporeality as well as of the nation’s insatisfac-
tion―and emphasizes from the outset this very retreat into her memories 
with its third person voice formulation:  
Le moyen de contrôle le plus garanti demeurait finalement le silence. [....] Sa 
seule issue résidait dans sa capacité de maîtriser toute communication vers 
l’extérieur. [....] Ils arrêteraient d’essayer de lui tirer les vers du nez ou de la 
considérer comme la bête curieuse de la maison. Celle que l’on montre du doigt 
aux parents des autres pensionnaires. [....] Celle autour de laquelle les murmures 
s’attardent assez longtemps pour que les mots “veuve” et “dictateur” lui arrivent. 
A partir de maintenant, elle se laisserait faire sans prononcer une parole. Elle se 
réfugierait dans sa mémoire, mais il lui fallait de l’ordre, une méthode pour que 
ses pensées ne s’effilochent pas comme ces draps ternes qui lui recouvraient le 
corps. (mémoire, p. 9)  
In the end silence remained the surest means of control [….] Her only way out lay 
in her capacity to control all outward communication [….]. They would stop 
trying to worm her secrets out of her or considering her the strange beast of the 
house. The one who is pointed out to the relatives of the other residents [….] The 
one around whom the whispers last long enough for the words “widow” and 
“dictator” to reach her. From now on she would let them care for her without 
pronouncing a word. She would take refuge in her memory, but she needed order, 
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a method so that her thoughts did not fray like the drab sheets which covered her 
body. 
The silence that has controlled all discourse within and about Haiti, which 
Simone Duvalier enforced, returns this time usurped to serve the ends of her 
simulacrum, Odile who fights the effects of her exilic unrootedness and its 
concurrent “démémoire” (de- or un-memory).16  
Answering Chauvet’s denunciation of hypocritical silence, and the 
resultant sinking of Haiti’s official history into oblivion, Trouillot’s novel 
calls to mind the switching between the story and the interior monologue 
which constructs the former’s powerful Amour. Marie-Ange’s first person 
monologue runs alongside her ward’s, for neither of them speak to each 
other. The young Haitian working in the Parisian hospice speaks in an 
internal dialogue to her mother who has just died leaving so much unsaid. 
Yet their personal logs run through their minds day in and day out. As the 
two women’s internally spoken words criss-cross and almost answer each 
other in the tense alternation and altercations of their memories, these streams 
of thoughts speak louder than words, and more contentiously than if they had 
been in dialogue.  
Watching the hospice’s new resident’s face, Marie-Ange never has any 
doubts about her identity. After all the Dorévalist period’s horrors that her 
mother had lived with and shared with her, how could she forget “[c]e visage 
qui symbolise pour moi aujourd’hui la somme de toutes les horreurs d’un 
régime qui a laissé sa marque sur mon pays d’origine?” (mémoire, p. 76; 
“this face which symbolizes for me today the sum of all the horrors of a 
regime which has left its mark on my country of origin?”). Giving free rein to 
her thoughts and dreams, and unable to contain her nightmares, she recalls 
her mother’s stories and their years together in Martinique in an imaginary 
dialogue with her that mirrors the subject roles that Odile goes over in her 
mind. Their respective internal discourses intersect and work out their 
disappointments, fears, regrets, reproaches, failings as well as their inherited 
anxieties as they revisit and weave in the events of the 1960s, 70s and 80s. At 
times defiant, and at others beaten down, replete with non sequiturs, they 
contradict each other as they revisit Haiti’s recent past from their opposite 
positions and different generational perspectives. Justifying Doc Fab’s and 
her decisions, as well as their behaviour and actions, Odile’s journey back 
through her life traverses her repeated battles for recognition from being an 
orphan to ending up as a lonely widow. Where she remembers the creation of 
“cité Odile” as her consecration, Marie-Ange recalls what she dismisses as 
insignificant details:  
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Elle donnait son nom à ce quartier où la misère inhumaine s’installait jambes 
ouvertes et fesses au vent. Donnait son nom comme une gifle à la désespérance de 
ces gens qui vivotaient, sans eau potable, sans latrines, dans des taudis poussant 
comme de la mauvaise herbe sur une terre boueuse. Sans direction ni dignité. Elle 
osait se montrer fière dans sa robe de soie aux manches longues et son chapeau 
d’imposture. Première Dame, pseudonyme de l’avilissement endimanché. 
(mémoire, p. 78) 
She gave her name to this neighbourhood where inhuman misery established itself 
with legs spread open and buttocks to the wind. Gave her name like a slap in the 
face to the desperation of these people who subsisted, without drinking water, 
without latrines, in hovels sprouting like weeds on muddy ground. Without 
direction or dignity. She dared to appear in her long-sleeved silk gown and her hat 
of deception. First Lady, pseudonym for Sunday-best degradation. 
Repeatedly, Marie-Ange recalls her mother’s stories of loneliness and the 
self-imposed silence of fear that determined family relationships in response 
to new governmental decrees determining that meetings of all sorts―public 
and private―were forbidden.  
Gradually she returns to her notes about the Dorévals and assigns them to 
her computer confessing to finding herself both drawn to the invalid and 
disgusted by this urge in her:  
Avec un mélange de fascination et de ressentiment. De dégoût aussi envers moi-
même, car je refrène difficilement les élans qui me poussent mon travail terminé 
vers le lit, dans cette chambre [....] Ma mémoire s’affole, emmêlée entre souvenirs 
et réalités, assiégée par tes cauchemars et mes rêves à moi. (mémoire, p. 129) 
With a mixture of fascination and resentment, Of disgust too towards myself, for I 
curb with difficulty the momentum which thrusts me, my work finished, towards 
the bed, in this room [….] My memory panics, muddled between souvenirs and 
realities, besieged by your nightmares and my own dreams. 
In a dialogue de sourds―or like sleeptalkers (night-talkers as Danticat 
designates them in The Dew Breaker) who can only talk away their troubles 
in their sleep―they rewrite history as their own story, with the tactics of their 
criss-crossed, over-lapping yet silent logs.  
Similarly in Un alligator nommé Rosa, Antoine is assailed by his 
memories and his years of research into Rosa Bosquet. He however does not 
leave her to her silence. He confronts her and determines the course of her 
writing project for it is his intent to extort a signed affidavit from her after he 
has constituted her case with her in order to understand how she could be, 
like the alligator, so pitiless and remorseless in the execution of her victims. 
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He arranges about the enclosed space of her bedroom the incriminating 
evidence of his collective archive and testimonials that he has gathered 
alongside his own embodied knowledge.17 As he sets up his “end game” he 
plays testimonial recordings and adds in her notebooks and all that she 
herself has brought with her from Haïti, before instigating a tête-à-tête trial to 
push her to confess by using the same evidentiary-seeking methods as she 
utilised: 
Demain, je viendrais avec le nécessaire pour te photographier, te filmer pendant le 
repas. Il est des moments qu’il faut immortaliser! On dit que, dans le temps, tu 
aimais bien photographier tes proies, les voir souffrir ne te suffisait pas, tu 
collectionnais leurs souffrances également. (alligator, p. 72) 
Tomorrow I will come with what I need to photograph you, to film you during the 
meal. There are moments which must be immortalized! They say that, at the time, 
you liked to photograph your prey. To see them suffer wasn’t enough for you, you 
also collected their sufferings. 
Wishing desperately that she might have been madly inspired to become a 
celluloid heroine, that she might lie, or that she might try to make him believe 
that she was not responsible, that it was the men with whom she drank, ate 
and fornicated that had transformed her into a bloody jackal and forced her 
into performing such acts, he waits for the moment to confront her with her 
crime against his father and mother: 
Tu n’aurais jamais cru te retrouver un jour prisonnière de ton passé? Malheur à 
toi, Rosa! La preuve nous est donnée tous les jours que les victimes peuvent 
dépasser en cruauté et de milliers de coudées leurs bourreaux d’hier. La 
malveillance des uns finit-elle par s’imprimer, encre indélébile... parvient-elle à 
s’inscrire dans les cellules des autres? Malheur à toi, Rosa Bosquet, car ce fameux 
livre que tu prétends vouloir écrire, ce fameux livre s’écrira, mais il ne sera rien 
d’autre que les minutes de ton procès! (alligator, p. 73) 
You would never have thought that you’d find yourself one day a prisoner of your 
past? Woe betide you, Rosa! We are given proof every day that the victims can 
exceed in cruelty and by thousands of cubits their former tormentors. Does the 
malevolence of some end up by imprinting itself, indelible ink …does it succeed 
in inscribing itself in the cells of others? Woe betide you, Rosa Bosquet, for this 
infamous book that you claim to want to write, this infamous book will be written, 
but it will be nothing more than the record of your trial. 
He has been hired to help her write her memoirs by Laura Bosquet, a fellow 
orphan, who is caring for Rosa after the latter adopted her and tried to 
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transform her into one of the young girls that as the Commandant, she trained 
to become the Fiyèt Lalo.  
Agnant who lived her own childhood in the shadow of the dictatorship’s 
hubris creates two characters caught up in trauma’s web, exacting answers as 
nemesis’ request for what is due from each other and from Rosa, answers to 
explain the crimes perpetrated against them and others like Numa and Drouin 
too: 
– C’est vrai, crie-t-il, il n’existe aucun châtiment à la mesure des crimes de Rosa 
Bosquet! Il n’est de loi que l’on puisse inscrire dans sa chair ! Un seul choix 
s’impose malgré tout, à moi, à nous, Laura: faire régner notre propre justice, celle 
de deux être bafoués, deux êtres dont elle a détruit l’existence. La justice ne doit 
pas être un vain mot ! La justice ne doit pas être un vain mot ! (alligator, p. 101) 
– It’s true, he cried, there is no punishment that fits the crimes of Rosa Bosquet! 
There is no law that one can inscribe on her flesh! One single choice imposes 
itself after all, on me, on us, Laura: making our own justice prevail, that of two 
jilted beings, two beings whose existence she destroyed. Justice must not be a 
vain word! Justice must not be a vain word! 
With the third person narrator as nemesis repeatedly giving the floor to 
Antoine’s and Laura’s interior monologues and dialogues, their enunciations 
express a form of “refusal”, of “protest”, or what Certeau (1994) sees as a 
violent gesture of denial that pushes back against their inexistence (Prise de 
parole, p. 41),18 and as a form of emancipation from their suffering in silence. 
Laura asks herself: “Comment guérir de la parole bannie?” (alligator, p. 99; 
“How can one recover from the banished word?”) remembering Rosa’s 
threats: “Ne rien dire, tu entends! Apprends à te taire ! Faudra-t-il te couper la 
langue ?” (p. 99; “Say nothing, do you understand? Learn to be silent! Must 
your tongue be cut out?”). Antoine’s intrusion into her space unlocks the 
mutism that Rosa Bosquet has imposed upon her, and brings her gradually, in 
the novel’s second part, to face her own contradictory feelings of detestation 
and recognition, the years she has spent in France unable to leave Rosa, and 
all that she has kept to herself:  
...en tant qu’êtres humains, n’avons-nous pas la possibilité de diriger à notre gré 
notre mémoire, de sélectionner ce qui doit l’encombrer ou non? N’est-ce pas, en 
réalité, ce qu’elle-même avait toujours fait, s’accommoder, malgré elle ? Trahison 
infâme de l’âme. [....] “C’était là le prix de la survie, Laura. D’où te serait venue 
la force de te rebâtir une vie nouvelle?” [....] Cette même voix sans cesse... depuis 
ce jour où elle avait compris que sa vie et celle de Rosa étaient liées et qu’aucune 
 Confronting the Haitian Past 227 
terre ne serait assez vaste pour toute la haine qu’elle ressent pour Rosa. (alligator, 
p. 122)  
… as human beings, do we not have the possibility of directing our memory as we 
please, of selecting what should or should not clutter it up? Is it not, in reality, 
what she herself has always done, compromise despite herself? Infamous betrayal 
of the soul […] “It was the price of survival, Laura. Where would you have got 
the strength to rebuild a new life for yourself?” […] This same unceasing voice … 
from the day when she had understood that her life and Rosa’s were bound 
together and that no land would be vast enough for all the hatred that she felt for 
Rosa. 
Together Antoine and Laura, two orphans of everything, except of their 
memory (alligator, p. 126), wait on each other’s time, exchange listening and 
speaking. Opening up to each other, they share stories long locked away. 
As they give cognition to their fears, cowardice, resentment and death 
wishes, they confront Rosa’s self-enforced muteness with her heinous crimes 
wanting her to ask for forgiveness, to sign her own accusation. Gradually, 
they reach the point when they come to the decision to institutionalise her in 
a hospice where she can await her death wheelchair-bound, watching, on the 
news, similar horrors to those she perpetrated and had broadcast, in places 
resembling Haiti. In the novel’s last chapter, the two orphans turn their back 
on their alligator and break out of the dead-lock that has paralysed their life. 
No longer caught in her grip, they depart, leaving her to eat in front of her 
nemesis: a TV screen distributing haunting testimonial images of the hubris 
of human militarised violence, like that of a young soldier whose gaze locks 
on an old woman hanging on to an olive tree next to her burnt-out home.  
In La mémoire aux abois, Marie-Ange too considers calling a vaudou 
priest in, using toxic substances, resorting to asphyxia; she wishes her ward 
would identify herself, face justice and look to her memory until, with 
Christmas drawing near, the immobile form of her charge seems to 
interpellate her. She places her hand on her arm calling out to her as she 
quickly withdraws to the doorway, even expresses a grateful thank you when 
Marie-Ange still in dialogue with her absent mother wipes the widow’s tears 
brought on by the latter’s on-going third person monologic historicising 
project. Wondering about her gesture of kindness, Marie-Ange’s memory 
gradually escapes the barbed scars imprisoning it in secret wounds 
(“Sommes-nous prisonniers de notre mémoire ou serait-elle plutôt tributaire 
de nos blessures secrètes et de nos défaillances? Incapable de s’épandre 
lorsque nos cicatrices s’accumulent et l’encerclent de barbelés ensanglantés”, 
mémoire, p. 177; “Are we prisoners of our memory or would it rather be 
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dependent upon our secret wounds and our failures? Incapable of spreading 
when our scars accumulate and encircle it with bloodstained barbs”) and 
while she readies herself to bid farewell to her ghosts, she instinctively saves 
the widow by sounding the alarm: “J’aurais pu la laisser mourir. Simplement. 
En ne faisant rien. En ne disant rien. Mais tu sais bien, maman, tu avais 
toujours su que je n’aurais jamais pu la laisser mourir. Il y a déjà tant de 
morts autour de moi” (mémoire, p. 186; “I could have let her die. Quite 
simply. By doing nothing. By saying nothing. But you know very well, 
mummy, you always knew, that I could never have let her die. There are 
already so many dead around me”). Instead of killing her retributively with 
her own hands, Marie-Ange surveys in her mind’s eye as though she were on 
a reconnaissance flight, many of those killed―anonymous, forgotten who 
happened to sell some rice to the Thirteen; to be the mother of a militant; or 
be run over by one of the president’s cars―for being alive at the wrong time 
in the wrong place, as if she were following Nemesis’ charge. As the room 
closes in on both of them, isolating them, pushing out the past, its ghosts, the 
regrets and the reproaches, she elects to sit and wait by the body that she has 
just pulled from death’s door, giving Odile her due.  
None of these works circumscribe a neat conclusion. Rather this nexus of 
novels dissolves tactically the silence that allowed Papa and Baby Doc, 
Simone Duvalier and Rosalie Bosquet to perpetrate the crimes that they 
committed. Between the lines that historical actions and annals stress in bold, 
channels for long muffled, unheard and muted voices are written in. The 
novels probe the darkness that contained the hushed fear-filled conversations 
of the authors’ parents’ generation in advance of and in ways that account for 
the possibility of Jean-Claude Duvalier’s return to Haïti. Their characters’ 
internal monologues, soliloquies and dialogues de sourds―spoken, shouted, 
held back, inscribed into diaries and files―serve a charge to the reader as 
tropological figure of Nemesis. With the former instigators and perpetrators 
of the executions, the rapes, and the torture, who enjoyed their fear-inspiring 
unjust advantage for so long, now diegetically ex-isled, de-mobilised and im-
mobilised, the children of their victims engage in voicing the trauma of the 
unexplained and of the unspoken that haunts them. By retelling even 
imperfect composites of traumatic encounters with the Duvalier/Doréval 
reign of terror, whether to herself as Marie-Ange does, or to Rosa and with 
Laura in Antoine’s case, the private and public versions interconnect to fill in 
gaps in understanding horrific witnessed scenes left unexplained, under-
silence. Coming between disappeared parent(s) and the instigators of the 
crimes (against humanity), these characters come to a―con/naissance19―a 
knowledge and co-birth with the gift that is due. Seeking to find balance,20 
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they do not nurse to heal, but to accept a restorative e/motion of 
reconnaissance―a reconnoitering move of redress, feeling its way towards 
self-knowing and recognition.  
A fellow Caribbean writer from the Dominican Republic, Junot Díaz 
characterises Danticat’s work as being about “how one deals with historical 
silence and amnesia―national, personal, inter-generational” (cited by Jaggi 
in The Guardian, 2004); “her fiction gives voice to unspeakable grief and 
trauma, genocide and torture” and as the author ascertains herself, The Dew 
Breaker enables one to “look at the human face of the dictatorship. We knew 
the Tontons Macoutes, went to school with their children. I wanted to explore 
the aftermath on another generation” (Jaggi, 2004). Robert Antoni adds that 
“[i]nverting the story [as Danticat does] allows us to enter it as a puzzle with 
pieces missing, so we have to reconstruct it” (Jaggi, 2004). Each of these 
dangerous creative works reconstruct the past and etch out a space where the 
unspoken of the past becomes a conciliation for the self―the protagonists of 
the respective novels and those hurt by the regime―and structures text as a 
means to distributive redress, as an evidential form of disobedience that 
unclenches the powerful’s hold over those egregiously treated. Nemeses all, 
Edwige Danticat, Marie-Célie Agnant and Évelyne Trouillot, women writers 
each in her own manner, disobey by writing in side by side soliloquies that 
arch up against one another, that cut across each other, that cull a shared 
event to sound out a polyphony of counteracting engagements devoid of 
simplification. Interacting with one another, the constructed multidirectional 
memories weigh in on the silences of the past to trigger their open 
circulation. Mnemonic performances on the page, the novels counter the 
nostalgic Sweet Mickey strains playing on the airwaves and, facing the dread, 
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Notes 
I thank the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee for its travel grant in support of the presentation of this work. I am indebted to 
Myriam Chancy and Renée Larrier for their generosity in sharing their insights into these works 
as well as their knowledge of Haitian society; and to Brenda Davies for translating the quotations 
from the original texts. 
1. To further this aleatory situation, Aristide also returned, after what appears as much dithering, 
on the eve of the second round of the presidential elections (March 21, 2011) which placed 
Michel Martelly, alias Sweet Micky the popular Kompa pop star, ahead of Mirlande Manigat and 
therefore as president-elect of the Republic of Haiti. The uncertainty still surrounding Aristide’s 
own departure from the Haitian presidency in 2004–often referred to as a coup-napping–and the 
banning of his Lavalas party from the 2010-2011 elections raised predictions of violence and 
reprisals just like those that occurred immediately following the departure of Jean-Claude 
Duvalier in 1986, as Danticat writes in her chapter “Monkey Tails” in The Dew Breaker. 
2. As William Booth (2012, Jan. 17) reported in “In Haiti, Former Dictator Baby Doc Duvalier is 
thriving,” The Washington Post, Duvalier was giving commencement speeches; and attending 
memorial services to the victims of the 2010 earthquake alongside President Martelly, former 
president Prosper Avril and former US president Bill Clinton right up to his fateful heart attack 
on October 4, 2014. 
3. See Bob Corbett’s former haiti@lists.webster.edu and current moderator@corbethaiti.org for 
regularly posts about Haiti. A 7 January 2011 post entitled “Victims of Duvalier Regime” 
included the following links to lists of victims: 
http://haitiforever.com/bbs/mensajes/66.html; and to those of Fort Dimanche: http://www.fordi9. 
com/page/Victlist/ListA.htm. The extensive legal documentation of Mr. Duvalier’s crimes 
includes: A July 3, 2009 order from the First Court of Public Law of the Federal Court of 
Switzerland, which notes that the Haitian government had informed it of current criminal 
proceedings against Mr. Duvalier as late as June 2008; the Decision of the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida, Jean-Juste v. Duvalier, No. 86-0459, dated January 8, 1988, 
finding Mr. Duvalier liable for over US$500,000,000 for his misappropriation of public monies 
for his personal use; and an extensive accounting of Mr. Duvalier’s misappropriation of public 
funds conducted for the Haitian government by a U.S. accounting firm between 1986 and 1990, 
establishing the theft of over US$300,000,000 of public funds. This legal documentation is 
supplemented by an extensive public record of Mr. Duvalier’s human rights violations, including 
the torture and the disappearance of political dissidents at the Fort Dimanche prison. 
4. The September 2013 reports regarding the cosmetic prettification of the Jalousie quarter of 
Port-au-Prince address the Martelly government’s lack of enforcement or compliance with 
structural building requirements since the 2010 earthquake: “it is in the process of spending over 
US$6 million on the slum, but not to deal with the double danger–the neighbourhood sits on a 
secondary faultline and rain run off causes precipitous mudslides–nor to provide the basic 
services like water and electricity distribution. Instead, the administration is doing what some 
have called a "make-up job"–painting the houses in a project called "Jalousie en couleurs" 
(Jalousie in Colour), as a homage–one he would surely have found horrendously ironic–to the 
Haitian painter Préfète Duffaut (1923-2012) who often filled his paintings with brightly colored 
hillside houses (see Haiti Grassroots Watch’s “The Jalousie Project: Make-up for Misery” in 
“This week in Haiti, ” Haiti Liberté 7: 11 (Sept. 25 - Oct. 1, 2013) http://www.haitiliberte.com. 
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5. Sue Montgomery. “Frustration follows Duvalier ruling” in The Montreal Gazette (Feb 3, 
2012) http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Frustration+follows+Duvalier+ruling/6095084/stor 
y.html (retrieved Feb. 6, 2012). As a young girl, Jan J. Dominique fled the Duvalier dictatorship 
with her father Jean Dominique. Since his gunning on April 3, 2000 in front of Radio Inter, the 
radio station that he directed, she has been fighting with her step mother to bring the assassins to 
justice. See Jonathan Demme’s film The Agronomist for details about Jean Léopold Dominique’s 
engagement in Haiti’s socio-politics. J. J. Dominique’s re-edition in Montréal of Mémoire d’une 
amnésique in 2004, twenty years after the original edition published during Baby Doc’s 
dictatorship in Port-au-Prince, fills in many of the allusive references of the first version. 
6. This renewed feeling of the necessity of self muzzling was anxiously expressed during the 
question period of a session on the Haitian women’s recent works, discussed in this article at the 
23rd Annual Haitian Studies Association (HSA) conference which was held at the University of 
the West Indies, Mona campus, Kingston, Jamaica in November 2011.  
7. Two novels by women writers were published a few months apart: Trouillot’s on January 13, 
2010, a day after the earthquake, and Agnant’s later in May 2010, in time for the St Malo 
meeting of Étonnants Voyageurs which transferred to its Britanny setting its Haitian edition of 
the book fair that had been planned to open in Port-au-Prince on January 13, 2010.  
 
8. Kettly Mars published Saisons sauvages also in early 2010. Clearly situating her diegesis 
during the Duvalier dictatorship, one peopled with characters that might easily be identified with 
historically recognisable individuals, this author does not, as do Agnant and Trouillot and to a 
lesser degree Danticat, use well known and recognisable (named) figures such as Papa Doc’s 
wife and Rosalie Bosquet as a protagonist of her story. Instead as Yves Chemla indicates, Mars 
unlocks the secrecy of intimacy in a story of an atrocious gendered master-slave relationship 
which holds the two protagonists in an impossible deadlock (Culture Sud). Their complicit 
liaison reconstructs the past through dangerous (re)readings: diegetic of the two male 
protagonists’ past – the diary of her husband, Daniel Leroy, and the revolutionary past of her 
lover, the secretary of state for public safety, Raoul Vincent – and intertextual with canonical 
Haitian literary texts (as John Walsh explained during his presentation at the 2011 HSA meeting 
in Jamaica) (John Walsh, see previous note) as well as with Danticat’s The Dew Breaker. 
 
9. Where the feminist movement of the women in Haiti and in the diaspora had experienced a 
second or double stifling and curtailing as a result of American imperialism and of the Duvalier 
regimes as Myriam Chancy elaborates in ““No Giraffes in Haiti”: Haitian Women and State 
Terror”, the current w/ri(gh)ting out of women’s perspectives on such silencing and absence in 
the literature seems to organise a different discourse around their participatory resistance to the 
patriarchal and the state’s violence perpetuated against those without a voice or a power base, 
one which is beginning to remedy the “textual ellipsis”–the lacunae–that Marie Chauvet perhaps 
most evidently bridged with her trilogy and with Les rapaces [written between 1971 and 1973] 
in Écrire en pays assiégé Haïti Writing under Siege, eds. Marie-Agnès Sourieau & Kathleen M. 
Balutansky (p. 308). 
 
10. Marie Célie Agnant’s father who was in hiding in the countryside when she was a young girl, 
was abducted by the tonton-macoutes who followed him to his home when he attempted to visit 
his family. He was never seen again. She was then adopted and her second father did all he could 
to help her forget this cruel disappearance. Continually harassed by the coming and going of the 
dictatorship’s henchmen, he decided despite his advanced age to go into exile with her and his 
family to Quebec, in Canada (alligator [2010], pp. 189-90). 
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11. Rosalie Bosquet Adolphe alias Mme Max Adolphe, as head of the VSN (Volontaires de la 
Sécurité Nationale otherwise known as tonton macoutes) and of the Fyèt Lalo, a women’s militia 
that she created, led in particular the section known as Mie Jeanne under Papa Doc before 
leaving her position and Haiti in 1986. During this time, she was responsible, among other 
murderous actions, for the fire set to rase the Saline quarter (that burnt numerous babies to death) 
in order to create the Cité Simone, so named after Papa Doc’s wife. 
 
12. The formulation of “ex-îlé” (transl. ex-isled) is Joël Des Rosiers (1996), from Théories 
caraïbes: Poétique du déracinement. 
 
13. Simon Baron-Cohen (2011), in Zero Degrees of Empathy: A New Theory of Human Cruelty, 
explains a lack of empathy as a mechanism which has been triggered in childhood by some 
awful experiences which then subdues or disengages activity in certain parts of the brain. Having 
empathy for those who lack it becomes a question which these novels address as have those who 
have been part of the Rwandese gacaca courts and the South African Truth and Reonciliation 
Commission, and other such instances. 
 
14. These definitions are drawn from the (1989) Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press and the Trésor de la langue française, the dictionary of the Académie 
française. The common noun ‘nemesis’ was removed from the latter in 2011. In Roman 
mythology: Nemesis is also Invidia representing indignation before an unjust advantage. 
 
15. Other such transformations include a geo-political nomenclature whereby Haiti becomes 
‘Quisqueya’ one of the names historically associated with the island while the capital shifts 
differentially from Port-au-Prince to Port-du-Roi, from prince’s port to king’s port. Other 
recognizable switches play with figures of speech, moving from metonymic to synecdochal 
references as when the political group Jeune Haïti becomes les Treize (the Thirteen), or use 
similar metaphors to denote their role as end places in referencing key sites that are indelibly 
marked with the imprimatur of the Duvalier era, as is the case with Fort Dimanche turning into 
Fort Décembre. 
 
16. Antoine calls their island the “pays de la démémoire” (alligator, p. 170). 
 
17. Antoine Guibert’s memory rests upon having witnessed, forty years, before his parents’ 
assassination at the age of ten and upon the trauma of his ensuing adoption with its concomitant 
loss of identity as he was renamed which gives him that (generational) remove. As such for the 
reader, it is not and yet is what Marianne Hirsch calls ‘post-memory’ for Antoine practices 
“citation”; looks back as a result of traumatic recall; and bases his memories on others’ accounts 
as he regains his own self and identity (“The generation of Postmemory” Poetics 29:1 (Spring 
2008), pp. 103-128). 
 
18. Michel de Certeau (1994) in La prise de parole et autres écrits politiques, indicates that by 
taking the floor, the person is stating that s/he is not nothing, s/he exists (p. 41). 
 
19. I borrow this homonymic wordplay of connaissance as knowledge and shared or co-birth 
from Catherine A. F. MacGillivray’s preface to her (1998) translation of Hélène Cixous’ 
Firstdays of the Year, p. xxi, in which she indicates that she is reiterating Paul Claudel’s idea.  
 
20. In understanding mourning, Elizabeth Kubler-Ross’ fifth step–acceptance--comes after four 
stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depression; each of which play a part in the 
development and process that Agnant’s and Trouillot’s characters undergo as they face Rosa and 
Odile respectively. 
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Jewish Trauma in the Contemporary South African Novel 
Ewald Mengel 
University of Vienna, Austria 
Introduction 
Jewish people have been living in South Africa from the beginning of white 
settlement, but only in the second half of the 19th century, there is a notable 
rise in numbers (Shain & Mendelsohn, 2008). The Jewish population had its 
peak in the seventies of the 20th century with roughly 120 000, but, due to 
emigration, this number has dropped to about 80 000 in the present, most of 
them living in the areas of Johannesburg (around 60%) and Cape Town 
(around 20%). Even if the Jewish community in South Africa forms only a 
relatively small minority of the total population, it can boast quite a few well-
known figures, for example, Helen Suzman, Jo Slovo, Ruth First, and Albie 
Sachs.  
A number of Jewish authors have chosen to write about the life of Jewish 
people within the South African context. Family sagas such as Maya Kriel 
(2004), Rings in a Tree, Joanne Fedler (2005), The Dreamcloth, or Patricia 
Schonstein (2007), A Quilt of Dreams, relate the fate of different generations 
of Jewish immigrants to South Africa. They form part of the great number of 
trauma novels written after the fall of apartheid. In the South African context, 
they give the authors the opportunity to thematise collective, transgeneration-
al, and multiple traumatisation: Collective, because not only families but a 
whole community (the Jews) are concerned; intergenerational, because the 
traumas of the grandparents and parents are handed down to the children 
(Volkan, 2009); and multiple, because the protagonists suffer from more than 
just one trauma: from the holocaust, the collective trauma of their 
community, which is kept alive in the memories of the survivors, and from 
the individual traumas they suffer for various reasons in the course of their 
lifetime in a South Africa that, especially in the time before WW II but also 
after the war under the apartheid government of the National Party, seems to 
be sharing a fascist ideology, if not clearly anti-semitic sentiments (Gilbert, 
2010). 
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In the following, I should like to concentrate on Patricia Schonstein’s A 
Quilt of Dreams and Joanne Fedler’s The Dreamcloth, two novels in which 
“cloth” figures prominently in the novels’ titles. From a literary point of 
view, the “dreamcloth” and the “quilt” are the novels’ central symbols. 
Psychologically speaking, they play the role of transitional objects. 
According to Winnicott, little children use dolls, teddy bears or ‘safety 
blankets’ as substitutes of the mother/child bond. However, the concept 
signifies more than just a mother Ersatz. As Robert M. Young explains, 
Winnicott believes that the transitional object is “the fundamental element of 
culture, the way into the world of play, creativity, including the arts, religion 
and science” (Young, 1994, pp. 145-146). 
In the trauma novel, the transitional objects help the traumatised persons 
to find their way back into normality. The objects are ‘transitional’ in a 
double sense of the word: 1) They are handed on from one generation to the 
other, and 2) they become important ‘markers’ that signify the transition from 
a traumatised state back into normal life. As “linking objects” (Volkan, 2009) 
they help to mourn the loss of a beloved person. More generally speaking, 
they play an important role in the coping process which allows the 
traumatised persons ‘to get on’ with their lives―if not to thrive in the 
aftermath of trauma. At the end of these novels, the giving away of the 
transitional object to somebody else who needs it more than the original 
owner is a symbol for the beginning of a healing process that seems to be 
promising a better future. Both novels I have chosen for closer analysis show 
the survivors’ ‘taking on’ of their traumas, their struggles, and their final 
success. If trauma cannot be overcome completely, it can at least be 
“shackled,” “handcuffed” in such a way that surviving―sometimes even 
thriving―in the aftermath becomes possible. 
Winnicott’s theory of transitional objects is widely known. In the 
following quotation, he explains this phenomenon with regard to infants: 
It is well known that infants as soon as they are born tend to use fist, fingers, 
thumbs in stimulation of the oral erotogenic zone, in satisfaction of the instincts at 
that zone, and also in quiet union. It is also well known that after a few months 
infants of either sex become fond of playing with dolls, and that most mothers 
allow their infants some special object and expect them to become, as it were, 
addicted to such objects. There is a relationship between these two sets of 
phenomena that are separated by a time interval, and a study of the development 
from the earlier into the later can be profitable, and can make use of important 
clinical material that has been somewhat neglected. (p. 1) 
Less well-known is the fact that not only dolls, teddy bears or blankets can 
fulfil this role but any kind of object which has a relevance to the person 
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concerned. In this context, Winnicott’s case study of a young boy suffering 
from separation anxiety becomes interesting. As Winnicott reports, fearing 
the separation from his mother the boy develops a predilection for strings: 
String can be looked upon as an extension of all other techniques of communica-
tion. String joins, just as it also helps in the wrapping up of objects and in the 
holding of unintegrated material. In this respect string has a symbolic meaning for 
everyone; an exaggeration of the use of string can easily belong to the beginnings 
of a sense of insecurity or the idea of a lack of communication. In this particular 
case it is possible to detect abnormality creeping into the boy’s use of string, and 
it is important to find a way of stating the change which might lead to its use 
becoming perverted. It would seem possible to arrive at such a statement if one 
takes into consideration the fact that the function of the string is changing from 
communication into a denial of separation. As a denial of separation string 
becomes a thing in itself, something that has dangerous properties and must needs 
be mastered. In this case the mother seems to have been able to deal with the 
boy’s use of string just before it was too late, when the use of it still contained 
hope. When hope is absent and string represents a denial of separation, then a 
much more complex state of affairs has arisen, one that becomes difficult to cure, 
because of the secondary gains that arise out of the skill that develops whenever 
an object has to be handled in order to be mastered. (p. 13) 
As Winnicott emphasises here, the fixation on a transitional object can easily 
become perverted, namely when it becomes a “thing in itself” that “must 
needs be mastered,” a kind of fetish that has taken possession of the person’s 
mind. This happens when the borderlines between play and reality collapse, 
when the transitional object does no longer ‘represent’ but becomes identical 
with reality. 
In Winnicott’s theory, the transition from childhood to adulthood implies 
playing, symbolising, ‘re-lating’ and ‘re-cognition’. It is interesting to note 
here that successful attempts of coping with trauma point into the same 
direction. In the novels to be analysed, the giving away of the transitional 
object to someone else who seems to be in greater need of it, signals an 
important step in the healing process of the traumatised character. 
Both novels that I want to analyse make use of cloth as their central 
symbols. Cloth consists of individual threads or ‘strings’ woven together with 
the purpose of forming a texture that ‘holds’, does not come apart again. It 
goes without saying that sewing as an activity―which is symbolically very 
prominent in both novels―has the same purpose. Apart from the 
mythological intertexts that sewing and weaving create, it is also important in 
this context that especially women are related to it. Finally, sewing and 
weaving may be understood as metaphors for narrative construction and 
novel writing, which adds a metafictional level of self-reflection that 
 Jewish Trauma in the Contemporary South African Novel 237 
contributes to the complexity of these novels. The novelists, ‘weavers of 
words’, thus make their contributions to the overcoming of trauma by way of 
their art. 
Joanne Fedler (2005), The Dreamcloth 
This novel’s title is inspired by W.B. Yeats’ poem “He Wishes For the Cloths 
of Heaven”, which thematises in Romantic fashion the power of the 
imagination. Joanne Fedler’s The Dream Cloth deals with various traumas of 
a Jewish family, handed on from generation to generation. In the first 
generation, Maya, a Jewish woman, emigrates from the little village of 
Kovno in Lithuania to South Africa, following her husband Yankel, although, 
by doing so, she has to leave her lesbian lover Rochel behind (who later 
commits suicide). Her marriage is not a happy one: Since she can no longer 
endure Yankel’s insensitive sexual approaches, she sews herself up after 
having given birth to Issey. In this context, sewing takes on a bitterly ironic 
meaning. Otherwise meant to hold things together, it here is used to shield off 
the male approach and to separate the male from the female. 
In the second generation, the talented painter Issey suffers from the early 
death of his mother Maya―who leaves him the dreamcloth (a present of 
Maya’s lover Rochel, the seamstress). He loses his emotionally frigid wife 
Fran to Rochel’s son Asher, who lives in Israel but also turns up in South 
Africa and who has sworn to take revenge on Maya’s family. He takes his life 
when he feels that he has lost both his wife and his daughter to this stranger. 
In the present (1994), Issey’s daughter Mia, a gifted poet and journalist, is 
traumatised by her Jewish heritage, by her job as journalist (which brings her 
into contact with rape victims of the fights in Bosnia-Herzegowina), by the 
emotional coldness of her mother Fran and the suicide of her father Issey. 
Joanne Fedler’s The Dreamcloth is framed by a paratext implying that the 
whole novel itself is a long, extended diary. The headings of the individual 
parts of the novel and the chapter headings are printed in a font that suggests 
handwriting, thus underlining the subjectivity and privacy of the narration 
and the importance of the diary form. For Mia, writing is a form of self-
realisation: she writes down her dreams, her inner life, her hidden feelings 
and thoughts. For her, writing also has to do with the holocaust: Writing 
keeps the memory alive, puts the Jewish fate on the map and safeguards it 
against being forgotten: 
There she sat, pen poised at the page’s surface, until wick was consumed by 
candle wax or the sound of footsteps crushed the voice. She watched her hand 
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move across the page, its letters sometime neatly touching the lines, at other times 
crossing them, a swelling growing in her breast that never failed to cause her to 
weep. As long as she put ink to the page, her hidden life was not forgotten, not 
wiped out in a pogrom, not buried in an unmarked grave, despite the days and 
hours she had to live outside of the writing. (p. 76) 
Mia’s writing is aimed at the ghosts of the past: the holocaust and the 
nightmares of her people which she inherits from her grandparents, her own 
personal nightmares, caused, for example, by the coldness of her mother and 
the suicide of her father, and the traumatising sights and testimonies she has 
to witness as a journalist reporting about the pogroms in Bosnia-Herzegowina 
in 1994, especially about women who were raped, tortured, or killed. 
Most of the novel’s story is set in the Johannesburg of 1994, but there are 
many flashbacks into the past, focussing in the first generation on Maya and 
her husband Yankel, Maya’s lesbian relationship with Rochel, and her 
unhappy marriage. In the second generation, the story concerns Maya’s son 
Issey, Mia’s father and a talented painter, and his wife Fran, Mia’s mother. In 
the third generation, the present, we witness the restless wanderings of Mia, 
who has inherited Maya’s poetic talent but also her father’s artistic ability 
and vulnerability. The structure of this novel, its shuttling between past and 
present, emphasises the idea that trauma is omnipresent, that it is handed 
down from the past, and that it is very difficult to get rid of it in the present. 
The dreamcloth is the novel’s transitional object and its central symbol. 
The dreamcloth is sewn by Rochel, the seamstress, who gives it as a present 
to Maya: 
From the dark seam between her bosom, she drew out a piece of cloth, no bigger 
than a small handkerchief, and held it flat in the palm of her hand. Maya did not 
know where to look first or longest―into her palm or her eyes, for in both she 
saw tricks of light and sleights of wonder, a glimmer of blue silk, a copper sequin, 
a moon of filigree lace, a rosebud of buttons, woven cobblestones of amber and 
jade. Maya was made to think of meadows in starlight and rainbows after thunder, 
things unseen by her eyes, but suggested by her heart. That cloth whispered 
stories, its promises made her weak with longing. 
“Why, it’s a poem!” Maya whispered, 
And then as quick as she had shown it, she folded it back into her breast, and put a 
finger to her mouth, and Maya nodded. Perhaps it was the secret threaded from 
her palm to Maya’s eyes and back to her that changed the world that day when she 
first beheld such beauty wrought from nothing. For the first time, she wanted to 
share her poems. (pp. 104f.) 
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Maya receives the dreamcloth as a parting present from Rochel who has to 
stay behind when Maya follows her husband Yankel to South Africa. The 
cloth symbolises Rochel’s and Maya’s secret love affair, and their wishes and 
unfulfilled dreams. It appeals directly to the imagination and seems to have 
the mythical power of transforming reality. On a metafictional level, it stands 
for the transforming powers of art, for art’s power to heal and make whole 
what is broken under the pressures of everyday life. 
When Maya dies from a broken heart after Rochel’s suicide, the 
dreamcloth goes to her son Issey, the talented painter who believes that “art 
comes from suffering” (p. 183) and is “exhaled pain” (p. 182). Issey often 
lends it to his daughter Mia who believes that the dreamcloth makes her 
nightmares go away. When Rochel’s son Asher arrives in Johannesburg and 
gets to know about the dreamcloth, he is very keen on it and finally steals it 
and takes it with him to Israel. Mia nurses him there in the last days of his life 
upon his request, and is rewarded by his returning the dreamcloth to her. At 
the end of the novel, Mia passes it on to her former friend Grace, from whom 
she had become temporarily estranged but with whom she makes up and 
becomes friends again at the end of the novel. Obviously, Grace needs the 
dreamcloth more than she does. 
Mia has inherited the artistic sensibility of her grandmother and her 
father. As a baby she cries a lot, and only when her father recites Tennyson’s 
“Mariana” for her, can she be calmed down. It comes as no surprise that the 
first word she speaks is “dead”, referring to the refrain “I would that I were 
dead” of Tennyson’s famous poem (and not ‘Dad’, as Issey first wants to 
believe). Tennyson’s poem is about a woman who lives a lonely life in a 
‘moated grange’ waiting in vain for her lover to come and see her. All in all, 
it is a study of a deranged (traumatised?) female mind for which the baby 
Mia instinctively feels something like sympathy. 
Mia herself is struggling to come to terms with her multiple traumas. 
When Fran gives birth to her, she not only tears Fran’s vulva but brings the 
whole uterus along with her, thus sealing Fran’s infertility. Fran takes a long 
time to be able to face her baby, falling into post-natal depression. Mia is not 
her firstborn, but she is the first to survive. A few years before, Fran gave 
birth to a baby boy who came into the world with a crushed skull and could 
not live. 
There is something special about Mia: A white curl in her otherwise black 
mane calls up the crushed skull of her baby brother and seems to show where 
fate has touched her, too, this time however without taking a life. Her name is 
reminiscent of the name of her grandmother Maya. At the age of seven she 
already writes stories, and also begins to compose her own poetry. 
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Rabbi Goldenbaum who has been called in to find out what is wrong with 
Mia has a theory based on the idea of Jung’s collective unconscious: 
“I have a theory about South African Jews. I call it ‘Destabilized and Detribal-
ized’.―it’s my own name for what in layman’s terms could be called confused 
identity. Or multiple identities. Don’t forget that our ancestors left Eastern 
Europe, escaping pogroms and anti-Semitism, scattered into the diaspora, and 
settled wherever they were allowed to stay. Africa allowed them in. Not all 
countries were so generous. And here, we hoped to find acceptance. But what 
happened when we got here? We found that we had little in common with the 
schwartzes who hate us because we’re white and have a work ethic and contribute 
to the economy. And on the other hand we had little in common culturally with 
the Afrikaners who hate us because they think we are all communists. Joe Slovo is 
a Jew, did you know that?” 
Fran and Issey both nodded their heads.  
“Scapegoats in the diaspora, lost from the fold, unable to find our way back again. 
That’s the fate of the Jews in South Africa.” (pp. 132f.) 
As far as Mia is concerned, she is no longer entirely stuck to South Africa. 
She travels around the world, and her home is where her friends are. She 
shares this lot with a number of other South African expatriates who love to 
come visiting from time to time but who prefer to live in countries such as 
England, Australia or the USA. 
Although Mia can never completely rid herself of her various traumas 
from which she is suffering, she is capable to get on with her life. This 
becomes clear at the end of novel when she gives the cloth to her friend 
Grace who seems to need it more desperately than she does. 
“There’s something I want you to have,” putting her hand inside her shirt and 
removing a folded rag. 
She opened it up in the sunlight. It winked, even in old age. 
“It’s beautiful,” Grace said. “What is it?” 
“A bit of history … that needs a good home.” 
Grace took the cloth in her fingers and ran them lightly over the beaded stubble. 
“I inherited it from my dad, he got it from his mother, and she got it from 
someone who loved her greatly.” (p. 348) 
Giving away the dreamcloth signals Mia’s readiness to tackle her life again, 
to ‘get on with it’ in spite of her multiple traumas. She does not become 
‘fixated’ on the transitional object but is able to free herself from it and from 
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all that it symbolically implies, especially the various traumas to which it is 
related. The novel therefore ends with a strong symbolic gesture that 
underpins the idea that thriving in the aftermath is possible after all. 
Patricia Schonstein (2007), A Quilt of Dreams 
In Patricia Schonstein’s A Quilt of Dreams, the arts of quilting and sculpting 
play a decisive role. In the novel, quilting is conceived of as an art, not only 
on the realistic level of the story, but also on the discourse level as a 
metaphor for novel writing as such.  
In the present, the story concerns the life of Baby (Reuben) Cohen, of 
Jewish origin, living in the South African Diaspora. Reuben’s life is in a 
mess―everybody looks down on him, he is a heavy drinker, his marriage is 
in shambles, and he is suffering from PTSD due to the fact that, as a member 
of the SADF reserve, he took part in the killing of four youths.  
But Reuben has also decided to make some changes in his life. He insists 
on being called Reuben instead of Baby from now on, he is determined to 
give up drinking, and he is undergoing psychological treatment. At the end of 
the novel, he rescues the black girl Vita (who has been shot at) out of the 
turmoil of violent protestations in the late eighties. He gives her a little toy, a 
carved wooden bull that was sent on to him and was made by his 
father―whom he never got to know. This is the event which knits together 
more tightly the two strands of the plot which are based on two different 
lifelines: Reuben’s, whose family is of Jewish origin and who feel like 
foreigners in this country although they are whites, and Vita’s, whose father 
and brothers are working for the black resistance movement and who have 
been suffering from the persecutions of the apartheid regime. Vita herself is 
on a mission: Since her grandmother has explained to her that all the bad luck 
of her family (no money and no decent food, father imprisoned, brother 
disappeared) stems from the fact that her great-great-grandfather failed to pay 
the demanded lobola for his bride (a magnificent bull owned by a white 
farmer), she has decided to buy the bull herself―which brings her into 
trouble, that is, she is swept away by the crowd of protesters which is shot at 
by the apartheid police. 
The novel stretches across three generations. In the first generation, 
Gershon Cohen witnesses the death of his father, who is killed 1938 in 
Dresden by the Nazis in the course of the Kristallnacht pogroms. Gershon, 
severely traumatised, escapes to South Africa, where he meets the hare-
lipped Rosa, whom he marries after some time. Rosa bears him a daughter, 
the beautiful Lilianna, who later becomes pregnant with twins without being 
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married. A botched-up abortion results in the survival of one 
twin―Reuben―and Lilianna decides to take her life: she drowns herself in a 
river. 
Gershon can never forget what he saw during the Kristallnacht in 
Dresden, witnessing the death of his father. 
He realized that the only way he could carry on living and conversing with others 
would be to close up his past for ever. From that first morning in Auntie Pearl’s 
guestroom, Gershon kept his horror tightly sealed in his heart, where it would 
remain, surfacing only in nightmares that would plague him periodically, in the 
dark hours before dawn, for the rest of his life. (p. 68) 
He is unable to talk about his feelings, but his silence becomes the ‘elephant 
in the room’ that traumatises everybody else. Although Gershon tries to leave 
his old life behind, the past keeps catching up with him: 
Gershon left Europe by ship, but he never really left it behind. He crossed the sea, 
but his nightmares were always of Dresden fragmented into glittering glass. He 
reached Africa, but he never arrived; not in any true sense. He tried to forget and 
begin again, but the past haunted him and would not let him subdue the soldiers 
and the glass and the terror. (p. 134) 
His grandson Reuben is traumatized in more than one way: he shares the 
intergenerational trauma of the Jewish people, and as a Jew in South Africa, 
whites and blacks treat him with contempt; his twin brother is killed in his 
mother’s womb; he never gets to know his mother and father but grows up a 
Jewish orphan in a Roman-Catholic boarding school; the killing of four black 
youths by the SADF in which he takes part traumatises him even further. 
The beautiful quilt, which Rosa made for his mother Lilianna, becomes 
the central symbol of the novel and gives it its title: A Quilt of Dreams. 
He would lie on her double bed, on the beautiful patchwork quilt Rosa had made 
for her, and try to invent her, try to make a mother out of the adoring snippets his 
grandparents had given him. 
Her name was Lilianna. She had long black curls. Her cheeks were like petals. 
Her voice was a bird’s song. She was lovely beyond words. The sun once rose 
each morning only on her account. 
‘Hold me,’ the boy would whisper into his mother’s pillow. ‘Come back to me so 
that I can sleep here and not at the orphanage. Come to me, Mamma. I am waiting 
for you,’ and he would attend with bated breath, his eyes closed as he anticipated 
a heaviness on the bed to signal that she was lying there next to him, ready to take 
him in her arms. (p. 45) 
 Jewish Trauma in the Contemporary South African Novel 243 
Lying on his mother’s quilt is a means of relating to her. The death of his 
mother and the absence of his father create a trauma from which he has to 
suffer for the rest of his life. For Reuben, the quilt functions as transitional 
object, a surrogate or mother ‘Ersatz’ by which he is able to connect with her 
in his fantasy. Like the quilt is constructed from bits and pieces of different 
cloths, he tries to put together the image of his mother by the bits and pieces 
of information given by his grandparents. 
On the story level, then, the quilt plays an important role: it illustrates 
Reuben’s isolation and loneliness, provides consolation, and is an important 
requisite in the mourning process by which he tries to cope with his 
bereavement. With regard to Rosa who produces this work of art in the first 
generation, it illustrates her unfulfilled dreams, her unconsummated love for 
the itinerant salesman Emmanuel Levy who visits the family now and then 
and whom she secretly loves. He brings her fabrics that “come from all 
corners of the earth, some ancient and some just old; all of them exquisite” 
(p. 55). He takes quilting really seriously and instructs her so that she 
becomes an expert in it. For Rosa, the art of quilting is a sublimation of her 
unfulfilled erotic desires. On the political level, the quilt is also a central 
symbol: it consists of precious materials in various colours and make-ups that 
come from different parts of the world and have unique histories. Rosa sews 
them together, joins them so that they finally form an organic whole. “This is 
going to be an organic work, Mrs Cohen, a slow-growing work. We are going 
to make something of a stained-glass window out of the finest of woven 
fabrics” (pp. 105f.). The quilt thus stands for everything that is opposed to 
apartheid and becomes a symbol of humanity. 
Over the years, while the country’s apartheid regime strengthened and its policies 
became more cruel and divisive, the quilt had slowly grown towards a harmony of 
types and unison of different colours. It was now complete, fully backed and lined 
except for one last square to be placed in the right-hand corner. (p. 112) 
The “last square to be placed in the right-hand corner” needs a lot of 
consideration. It reminds one of Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, where 
Lily Briscoe towards the end of the novel finishes her painting with one 
stroke of her brush. On the level of discourse, the quilt (quilting, sewing, 
joining) symbolizes the art of narration. Each cloth that Emmanuel Levy 
brings to Rosa has its own history: “The stories he told Rosa were really 
those of humankind, the beautiful ones” (p. 106). In so far as the narrator of 
this novel is also stitching together, joining the life stories of people of 
different colour and ethnicity, trying to give them coherence, forming them 
into a whole, quilting is a metaphor for novel writing. Even the herringbone 
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stitch, which Emmanuel Levy favours and recommends to Rosa, has 
narratological implications: Schonstein is reflecting about emplotment, about 
how to draw the different parts of the story together. The herringbone is 
simple but effective, and the neat crossing of threads creates a decorative 
pattern that has an aesthetic quality of its own. In A Quilt of Dreams, the 
different life stories are neatly woven together, their crossing seems to 
happen accidentally but is actually the result of the author’s planning, her 
intentionality, her ‘stitching’. 
This is also illustrated by the episode of the carved wooden bull, which 
Reuben gives to the injured Vita as a present. The artist who produced it is 
Reuben’s father, whose own life story remains peripheral to the novel’s plot but 
is of course important with regard to Reuben’s trauma. Reuben’s father carved 
it in hospital where he had to undergo psychiatric treatment after Lilianna’s 
suicide. When Reuben receives the bull from Nicodemus, a black man who had 
been working in the shop of his grandparents and whose son was in hospital 
together with Reuben’s father, he is at first unwilling to accept it and does not 
want to hear its story. But when he hears that his father van Tonder carved it 
and gave it as a present to Nicodemus’ boy Pious (who later dies in prison) he 
suddenly gets interested (cf. pp. 302-307). Nicodemus returns the bull to “his 
family” because “a white man … had befriended my youngest son, my last-
born” (p. 303). 
As Reuben confesses to his psychiatrist, the bull he received from 
Nicodemus had an unexpected effect on him: 
‘It was night when I went back in. I locked myself inside and went to lie on my 
mother’s bed. On her quilt. And then I started to cry. I cried and cried like a damn 
baby. Holding on to that bull. Fucking kissing the bull…’ (p. 306) 
Again we are dealing with a transitional object, the bull carved by Reuben’s 
father. In the same way as the quilt represents the absent mother, the bull 
stands for the absent father. Lying on the quilt and holding on to the bull, 
Reuben cries like a baby, letting out his sorrow, mourning his loss. The two 
transitional objects help him in this mourning ritual, and his tears signify a 
slackening of tension and beginning relief. 
The story of the bull is there from the beginning of the novel, and like the 
quilt dominates the first strand of plot, the bull dominates the second, that of 
Vita’s family. The novel begins with the mythic tale of the rescue of the 
Xhosa chief Maqoma by his favourite bull, Jingqi, from Robben Island in 
1873. The second plot strand continues with the grandmother’s tale about the 
failed quest for lobola, the bull of a white farmer. This is followed up by 
Vita’s attempt to ‘heal’ this family misfortune by buying the bull in the 
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present, getting injured in the course of the events. It finds its solution in the 
novel when Reuben gives the bull carved by his father to Vita as a present. 
The two plot strands are interwoven in a careful way, first loosely, at the 
end tightly: Vita’s mother works as ‘maid’ for the Cohen family; Reuben 
takes part in the killing of Vita’s brother Boniface (whom he doesn’t identify 
as Vita’s brother). When Reuben at the end saves Vita’s life by taking her to 
a white hospital ward, and gives her the bull as a comforter, the two plot 
strands become one: apartheid is defeated, not only in reality (it is 1989), but 
also on the level of plot. 
For Reuben, the wooden bull is a precious keepsake, something through 
which he can relate to his father whom he never got to know. Nevertheless, he 
gives it to the injured Vita whom he has rescued and taken to hospital, thus 
overcoming his egotistic sorrows and problems and turning to the other in a 
generous gesture of self-conquest. The concept of ‘transitional object’ hereby 
takes on a different shade of meaning. When Vita wakes up from her coma 
with the carved bull in her arms, and her father who has been released from 
prison by her bedside, a dream seems to have come true: the black family has 
finally succeeded in acquiring the white man’s bull after all―at least 
symbolically. Subsequently, the curse is lifted from Vita’s family, and the end 
of apartheid is dawning. The artificiality of this tale, the fairy-tale-like quality 
of its ending, is also an implicit comment on what art can do. The ending may 
be compared to the last patch of cloth in the quilt, which has to be placed 
carefully in the right-hand corner, so that the whole becomes an aesthetic work 
of art. Lily Briscoe would have appreciated it, and aestheticism is triumphant. 
Conclusion 
Sewing, quilting, or knitting are traditionally female occupations. Making 
whole what is torn, separated, ripped apart seems to be the female lot―at 
least according to the novels I have analysed. 
On the story level, traumatised characters who cannot speak about the 
‘unspeakable’ use cloth art―sometimes unconsciously―as a means of 
relating to themselves and to others, of communicating their feelings, in a 
non-discursive manner. Their art comes from suffering, and by the help of 
their art, they relate to their traumas. Sculpting, quilting, sewing, poetry in 
this way contribute to the process of ‘working through’ one’s trauma, of 
recovering one’s self, of redefining one’s identity. 
On the level of discourse, the different art forms are employed to reflect 
about the role of art as such in the coping process, which includes the art of 
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novel writing. Novel writing, too, is a way of relating to the past, and of 
coming to terms with the present. The authors I have been dealing with 
answer the question of what art can do with regard to trauma in a positive 
way. In the third generation, the intergenerational cycle of trauma is broken, 
the protagonists lift their heads and begin to see their own future with new 
eyes. They start to tackle life again, and they are not to be defeated by the 
traumas that have accompanied them for the greater part of their lives. Even 
if they have not got rid of their traumas entirely, they have learned to live 
with them, ‘entangled’ but coping. 
References 
Primary Sources 
Fedler, Joanne (2005). The Dreamcloth. Johannesburg: Jacana. 
Schonstein, Patricia (2007). A Quilt of Dreams. London: Black Swan. 
Secondary Sources 
Benedetti, G. (2003). Trauma und Kunst aus dem Leiden. In R. Hampe, P. Martius, A. 
Reiter, G. Schottenloher & F. von Spreti (Eds.), Trauma und Kreativität. Therapie mit 
künstlerischen Medien (pp. 39-49). Bremen: Universität Bremen.  
Bryant-Davis, T. (2005). Thriving in the Wake of Trauma: A Multicultural Guide. 
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. 
Cape Town Jewish Board of Deputees (2012). About the Jewish Community. Retrieved 
March 9, 2015, from http://www.capebod.org.za/about-the-board/about-the-jewish-
community 
Gilbert, S. (2010, Spring/Summer [New Series]). Jews and the Racial State: Legacies of the 
Holocaust in Apartheid South Africa, 1945-60. Jewish Social Studies, 32-64. 
Mengel, E. (2012). Trauma and Genre in the Contemporary South African Novel. In E. 
Mengel & M. Borzaga (Eds.), Trauma, Memory, and Narrative in the Contemporary 
South African Novel (pp. 143-175). Amsterdam: Rodopi.  
Shain, M., & Mendelsohn, R. (2008). The Jews in South Africa: An Illustrated History. 
Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball Publishers. 
Tischer, A. (2008). Die weibliche Stimme im englischen Frauenroman des 18. 
Jahrhunderts. Frankfurt: Lang. 
Volkan, V. D. (2009). The Next Chapter: Consequences of Societal Trauma. In P. Gobodo-
Madikizela & C. van der Merwe (Eds.), Memory, Narrative and Forgiveness: 
Perspectives on the Unfinished Journeys of the Past (pp. 1-26). Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars. 
Winnicott, D. W. (1971). Playing and Reality. Routledge, London. 
Young, R. M. (1994). Mental Space. London: Process Press. 
   
Chapter 13 
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Beata Hammerich, Johannes Pfäfflin, Peter Pogany-Wnendt, Erda 
Siebert, Bernd Sonntag 
Beata Hammerich et al. 
Members of the Study Group on Intergenerational Consequences of the Holocaust 
Introduction 
Our intention in this chapter is to make a personal contribution to a better 
understanding of the psychological mechanisms involved in the transmission 
of Holocaust experiences, both on the part of victims and of perpetrators. A 
core element in this understanding is the dialogue among descendants of both 
sides. 
After the end of the apartheid regime, the TRC in South Africa made 
possible a direct confrontation between victims and perpetrators in the 
generation of those affected—a confrontation that never occurred in 
Germany. Therefore, we are particularly interested in comparing the timely 
South African process of addressing and exposing a dictatorial system to the 
delayed process in Germany involving transgenerational carry-over into the 
second and third generation. 
In Germany, even as recently as the 1990s, with very few exceptions, 
neither the psychological conflicts emerging from transgenerational 
transmission of the Holocaust nor the prerequisites for a constructive 
dialogue among descendants of victims and perpetrators were studied 
systematically. The situation was dominated by silence and speechlessness 
(Opher-Cohn et al. 2000). 
This prompted a group of Jewish and non-Jewish psychotherapists and 
members of other professions to found, in 1995, an organisation devoting its 
attention to these problems. More than ten years of work in the Study Group 
on Intergenerational Consequences of the Holocaust have been characterised 
by the systematic pursuit of personal dialogue, topical work groups and 
public discussion forums that have, in part, been evaluated for research. In 
the course of these analyses and the confrontations they encompassed, it 
became increasing apparent that victims and perpetrators in the generation 
that was directly affected unconsciously handed down their unresolved 
experiences to their children and grandchildren, charging them as surrogates 
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with the task of resolution. These commissions involved “undigested” 
feelings of mourning, anger, guilt and shame. Some aspects of this process 
within our group have also been described elsewhere (cf. Opher-Cohn et al. 
2000; Volkan 2000; Volkan, Ast and Greer 2002).  
The ongoing dialogue among PAKH members has provided insight into 
the unconscious tradition of the victim–perpetrator dynamic, which is an 
essential determinant of dialogue in the second generation after the 
Holocaust.  
The following text employs examples of such vital experiences to 
describe and reflect upon the work of PAKH. The process of dialogue in the 
second generation is depicted from the perspective of a victim’s and a 
perpetrator’s child and related to their respective life histories. From this 
contrast, conclusions are drawn and discussed. 
To understand the process of the group, it is important to know that we 
are a group of five psychotherapists in our late forties to early sixties, and we 
belong to the second generation after the holocaust. Two of us are children of 
perpetrators, two are offspring of Jewish families that survived in 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. One of us is the son of a father who joined the 
army at seventeen but was not actively involved in Nazi misdoings. 
Transgenerational Consequences of the Holocaust from the 
Point of View of a Child of Survivors 
(Perspective of Beata Hammerich) 
My participation in PAKH meant for me, first and foremost, making my 
Jewish origins public. This was nothing short of breaking a taboo since, in 
my family, we had never let anyone know the truth about our history. This 
way, no one was overly cautious towards us, and we were able to recognise 
prejudices more easily. Even now, the very idea of speaking openly about my 
origins makes me feel as if the ground were sinking beneath my feet. 
Given the background of my mother’s life history, I fully understand why 
she urged me “not to tell”. She survived the major part of the war as a 
baptised Jewish child in a convent in Slovakia. It was drummed into her, 
“Don’t you ever tell anyone anything, or you will get us all killed”, and 
indeed, at the time, this threat was real. 
This left an indelible impression on my mother, and its influence carried 
over into later life—still capable, after decades, of triggering something like a 
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breakdown. Once I was telling her about a supervisory session with my 
teaching analyst, who was Jewish. The topic had been the significance of my 
Jewish origins for my therapeutic work with a particular patient, a woman 
whose father had been in the SS. Suddenly my mother glared at me, a 
shocked expression in her eyes; she turned pale, sat down and asked me full 
of dismay, “And you told him who we are?” 
As an adult and trained analyst, I realised immediately what had 
happened. I called her attention to the difference between the past and 
present, and my mother said with relief, “That gave me such a terrible fright.” 
What had happened? And how often had something similar gone unnoticed 
in the course of my childhood? I would like to expand this point with 
reference to a psychoanalytic concept. 
Fonagy (Fonagy et al. 2004, chap. 4 passim) describes the importance of 
appropriate affective reflection on the part of the mother for the development 
of affective regulation in the child. If emotions are mirrored insufficiently or 
inappropriately—for example, if they are intermingled with the mother’s own 
anxieties—this seriously inhibits the process of the child’s development of a 
sense of self. Fonagy corroborates what Khan (1974, quoted in Grubrich-
Simitis 1979, 1006) tried to characterise in children of survivors in the 
concept of “cumulative trauma”. With this term, Khan denotes a disturbance 
in the non-verbal relationship of mother and child in which low-profile 
empathetic deficits, hardly noticeable when they occur, are cumulated over a 
long period of time and lead to traumatic effects. 
Insufficient empathy on the part of the parents emerges from a capacity 
that, for many, was a key to survival but later could not be cast off: they built 
up protective “armour” around the ego, learning to disavow or to invert 
feelings. When a mother cannot reflect emotions adequately, the child—who 
naturally tries to empathise with the mother—develops a “false sense of self”. 
This inhibition of empathy, a result of an emotional numbness necessary 
for survival, is the key factor in transgenerational transmission of trauma and 
in the ensuing identity disturbances in children of survivors. Overcoming this 
numbness involves becoming aware of the losses suffered, allowing all the 
associated feelings of pain, grief, anger, shame and so on to surface, and 
enduring these feelings without being broken by them. The less successful 
this “re-vitalisation” through mourning, the more burdensome will be the task 
passed on as a legacy to the next generation. 
Taking differences of historical circumstance into account, these 
observations can be generalised to apply to any dictatorship. I experienced 
that same notion of “you’re not allowed to tell” as a child, growing up in 
Prague under the communist regime. My mother had retained the Christian 
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faith from her convent, and she raised my sister and me as Christians, despite 
the dangers this implied within the communist system. She did not tell us that 
we were Jews. I can recall once meeting a schoolmate in a place where we 
were not supposed to be—in a church. Each of us looked the other way; we 
were embarrassed rather than feeling like allies. Anxiety is the instrument of 
power in all dictatorships, and the force of this mechanism is made clear by 
this seemingly banal situation. It would have been very risky not to follow 
the rule of silence—“keep quiet and keep covered”—for example, it could 
have endangered our parents’ jobs. 
After the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, my family immigrated to 
Germany. There I first learned of my Jewish origins, quite by chance, from 
my cousin. She was astounded: “Don’t you know that we’re Jewish?” I 
pretended that I had known it all along, and felt mortified. It was not until 
years later that I was able to articulate to my mother how she, by her very 
effort to protect me, had put me into a very difficult situation. 
It still shocks me to think of how long I lived in Germany without being 
aware that I was on friendly terms with former perpetrators and their 
children. The extent of this denial is difficult for me to grasp, even today. It 
can only be comprehended through careful consideration. Thanks to my 
identification with my mother—reinforced by my own experiences under the 
communist regime—I had internalised to the point of denial all the anxieties 
and the protective mechanisms of “keeping covered”. Compulsively, I 
devoured books about the Holocaust, but this encounter took place in 
absolute isolation. Meanwhile, I visited my girlfriends at their homes 
frequently—never noticing anything, never looking for anything, definitely 
not asking any questions or talking about my background. Long after there 
was any necessity for it, we still believed we had to hide. 
All the same, I felt a strong need to belong. In Czechoslovakia I had not 
belonged because I was a Christian, with no inkling of my Jewish origins. In 
Germany I was an immigrant. Finally, in 1980, I made an important 
discovery. I came across the book by Helen Epstein (1980), Children of the 
Holocaust. I realised that there were others like myself. I was not alone with 
my life story and my feelings, even if I did not know any of the others 
personally! Or so I thought. 
First Phase: Establishing Contact with the Jewish Members 
Struggle for Acceptance 
I first learned about the PAKH group while attending the PAKH symposium 
in 1998. Initially, the Jewish participants had the greatest significance for me. 
 Handing Down the Holocaust in Germany 251 
I chose Peter as a contact person. His story touched me most deeply. He 
talked about his unconscious sadness, which had been pointed out to him by 
his daughter—a sadness that he himself, as a child, had perceived in his 
father. 
At the root of my wish to take up contact with other Jewish children of 
survivors was my need to find out whether they would accept me or reject me 
when I disclosed my identity as a baptised Jew. For me, this was a question 
of life and death. As opposed to my mother, I had consciously seen myself as 
a betrayer. Now, I no longer wanted to hide out in a lonely place. 
I felt guilty for denying my real identity, and was alone with my guilt 
until I heard Peter’s story. When his family immigrated to Germany, his 
parents had resolved not to let it be known that they were Jewish. Before 
getting married, Peter decided to reveal the secret once and for all. He did not 
want to start a family of his own and then have to hide his own life story 
from his children. He was expecting vehement reproaches from his parents. 
In a one-on-one talk, he told his father about this decision and to his 
amazement, his father nodded, with tears in his eyes—visibly relieved and 
proud. 
On my entry into the group, the non-Jewish participants played a 
secondary role, although I appreciated their heartfelt welcome. During the 
same period, together with my Jewish analyst, I was working through my 
complicated identity. This was a decisive factor enabling me to reveal myself 
and to accept the recognition of the Jewish members of the group. I felt as if I 
had finally found a home. 
Second Phase: Approaching the Non-Jewish Members 
Overcoming Anxiety and Inner Resistance 
When Erda Siebert came into the group, I was frightened and immediately 
had a strong impulse to leave. My sentiment was, “If she stays, then I have to 
go”. I already knew Erda, but at that point knew nothing about her history. I 
did not understand myself, and I forced myself to stay. 
The more I learned, the more distinct were my feelings—at first 
predominantly a feeling of inhibition, followed by empathy and then by the 
anxiety that I might be perceived as an accuser, merely because I was the 
child of a survivor. A personal conversation with Erda was a milestone for 
me; here, we told one another about our life stories. This was the first time 
that such an exchange did not leave me with the unpleasant feeling that I had 
“dropped my cover”. It became clear to me that this surprising fact was due 
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to Erda’s genuine interest and empathy. Encouraged by her questions, I had 
the courage to ask her a few questions, too. 
This initial phase of feeling liberated and relieved was followed by a 
difficult period. In the group, we now directed our full attention towards the 
perpetrators. I was flooded by inward resistance, I felt overtaxed and 
criticised myself for that. I also felt guilty for refusing to empathise. When I 
managed to articulate the difficulty I had in getting so deeply involved in the 
personalities of prominent perpetrators, it was Erda who backed me up with 
her understanding. 
Viewing the television documentary film My Father, the Murderer (Tatari 
2003) at a public event held by PAKH in 2003, together with the daughter of 
a Gestapo boss, I was overwhelmed by my empathy with her burdensome 
fate and my admiration for her bravery in confronting her own situation as 
the daughter of a culprit. I kept quiet, because I felt that I had no right to 
speak out, since I myself did not have such a terrible load to carry. This 
feeling of having no right to speak resulted from a number of encounters with 
survivors who said one should not express opinions on things one had not 
experienced oneself. How many times had survivors told me, “You haven’t 
got a clue, you haven’t been through anything!” 
Within me, gradually a feeling which I did not understand at the time took 
the upper hand—a feeling of, “I’ll have nothing to do with it all”. My refusal 
to become involved emerged whenever the children of perpetrators brought 
forth positive aspects of their parents and their mutual attachment. I insisted 
that the perpetrators be regarded as perpetrators, while their children 
struggled to accept their own parents. Erda made it clear to me why it was so 
important that the children of the perpetrators be able to acknowledge 
positive qualities in their parents. 
Hearing Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela and Eva Mozes Kor speak publicly at 
the Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities in Essen in 2005 brought 
to the fore the themes of forgiveness and reconciliation. Pumla’s impressive 
depiction of her meeting with Eugene de Kock deeply affected us all. Eva 
Mozes Kor’s account of her “reconciliation” with her tormentor in 
Auschwitz, Hans Münch, left us with many unanswered questions. Very 
helpful for me was the encounter with Hillel Klein’s (1992 [1983]) thoughts 
on responsibility. He emphasises that if a survivor forgives his would-be 
murderer, it is tantamount to accepting the Holocaust and avoiding the 
necessary task of grieving. This leads to disastrous consequences for the 
following generation, because without mourning, there can be no empathy. 
Trauma is thus handed down to children through their experience of their 
own relationships with their survivor parents. Alongside everyday reality, the 
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children inhabit a “second world” in the traumatic past, and in their 
imagination carry out a futile struggle to overcome it on behalf of their 
parents. Above all, they take on the parents’ affective burden of feeling 
constantly exposed to the threat of death. 
Laub (Laub, Peskin and Auerhahn 1995) coined the term “second 
holocaust” to describe this phenomenon of repetition across the generations. 
In the struggle to overcome the trauma of the “second holocaust”, coming to 
terms with one’s own inner representation of parents is a prerequisite to 
developing an integral sense of self. The children of survivors face the 
conciliatory task of accepting their destiny: that they have parents who have 
been damaged, and that they as children must deal with the ramifications. 
Only after releasing themselves from a duty to fulfil the impossible task 
passed on to them by their parents can the children assume responsibility of 
their own. 
Third Phase: The Confrontation Takes on Contours, Intimacy and 
Distance 
At present, I see myself in a third phase of my interaction within PAKH. It 
fluctuates between an experience of similarity and closeness with the children 
of perpetrators on the one hand, and on the other an experience of differences 
and inability to comprehend. Sometimes the differences appear to be 
insurmountable, but to a certain extent they are realities that cannot be 
altered. 
Grünberg (2000, 1019) describes how inappropriate and dangerous it is to 
equate victims and culprits. Neither their suffering nor their silence can be 
compared. The same applies to the second generation: like the children of 
survivors, children of perpetrators are marked and burdened by the 
Holocaust, but in completely different ways. Problems that may appear to be 
similar are, in fact, not identical and cannot be reduced to a common 
denominator. 
I find that Klein (2003, 289) has expressed this most adequately: 
The children of the tormentors, who are not guilty of the actions of their murderer 
fathers but who nevertheless, in their own lives, cannot deny the lasting burden of 
responsibility, correlate tragically in this respect to the children of survivors, who 
in their own continuity take on the burden of their parents’ fate.  
We, the children of survivors and perpetrators, have done no harm to one 
another. Therefore, we do not need to be reconciled: there is nothing we need 
to forgive. However, our personal contact is burdened by the trauma that 
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occurred and that survivors and perpetrators have handed down to us. The 
fact that our parents either suffered grievances or inflicted them and thus 
became laden with guilt can have a destructive effect on our relationships 
with one another. However, we can, if we assume our individual 
responsibility as children of either survivors or perpetrators, enter into a 
genuine dialogue. Such a dialogue would require us to confront one another, 
to admit that irresolvable differences exist and to live with them. 
One step in that direction—to quote Dan Bar-On (Braunschweiger Zeitung, 
August 23, 2006)—would be “if the children could get to know and respect the 
other side’s narrative of history, without abandoning their own narrative”. 
This dialogue is encumbered by an inner conflict: standing up to my own 
life history would imply identifying the perpetrators for what they are. In 
doing so, I would be accusing the fathers of my friends and colleagues, who 
would thus be damaged. Moreover, I would see myself in the role of the 
accuser, the perpetrator, the culprit. The reason why I have avoided this 
became clear to me in retrospect: I recognise my own behaviour as an attempt 
to placate the children of the perpetrators, to gain their recognition. It is a 
gesture of submission. I was not aware of my dependence on them, and it is 
certainly not yet entirely overcome. 
I have repeatedly experienced this dialogue as being endangered. Only 
through a permanent process of introspection and clarification can the 
obstacles be surmounted. When I am able to open myself, encouraged by the 
openness of others, then we can carry on with our dialogue. 
My conclusion is that we, the children of survivors, are called on to come 
to terms with our inner representation of our parents and to grant ourselves 
remittance from the impossible tasks they have handed down to us. That is 
the prerequisite if we are to assume individual responsibility. Only in this 
way can we avoid passing on the same inheritance—capable of destroying 
identity—unfiltered, to our own children. Only in this way can we enter into 
a genuine dialogue with the children of perpetrators, a dialogue which can 
further promote our inner process of development. A genuine dialogue, in my 
eyes, implies that we allow ourselves to be truly moved by one another, while 
accepting that some distinctions between us cannot be overcome. 
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Transgenerational Consequences of the Holocaust from the 
Point of View of a Perpetrator’s Child 
(Perspective of Erda Siebert) 
Before I focus on my process in the PAKH group, I would like to look briefly 
at how I see my own development in the context of German society after the 
Second World War. 
The Beginnings 
My father was born in 1906 and joined the National Socialist Party at the age 
of twenty-five. Two years later he joined the SS and, by 1942, had advanced 
to the rank of “SS-Obersturmbannführer”. From 1938 onwards, he must have 
been responsible for serious crimes, particularly after 1941 when his unit was 
active in Eastern Europe. I do not have any precise information and so can 
only speculate. I do, however, have some positive memories of him from the 
first six years of my life; my parents were divorced after the War and I did 
not see him again before he died in 1974. 
I myself was born in Dresden in the East of Germany, but my mother fled 
the bombed city in the winter of 1945 with me, aged eleven months, and my 
two brothers. We came close to death several times during three air raids. In 
Northern Germany we found a new home with my grandparents as a refugee 
family. 
Many children had no idea of the crimes their fathers had been involved 
in. Fathers—including my father—went into hiding after the war. Families 
were afraid and fled to avoid discovery, and so the children’s loyalty to their 
crisis-ridden and apparently persecuted families was inevitable. As a result, 
the development of our individual identities was undermined. 
After the war, the occupying Allies enforced a process of informing 
people about the Nazis and democratising society, but in many families this 
went hand-in-hand with a continuation of the national socialist ideology. My 
brother remembers a situation as late as the 1950s, when he was ten: he was 
apparently threatening to show some “unmanly” feelings when my mother 
snatched him up, saying, “Hands at your sides, and be a hero!” That was how 
the second generation learned to deal with feelings of guilt, shame and grief. 
Worse still was a fundamental diffusion of identity, in which we learned to 
regard as alien what was in fact our own and belonged to us (for example, in 
the recurrent dream of a patient that as soon as she became pregnant, she was 
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compelled to abort her child). Instead, parental introjections were perceived 
as the way life was to be lived (Shengold [1979] speaks of “soul murder”, 
Hardtmann [1995] of “being a stranger in one’s own house”). Moreover, 
there always lurked an existential angst that the “destructive tumour”, the 
cruel perpetrator within ourselves, might develop against our own will and 
erupt like a volcano (Hardtmann 1995). 
These introductory remarks are intended to make clear what a complicat-
ed blend of culprit/victim roles was imbibed by the second generation as it 
grew up and how this contributed to making it impossible, for many years, to 
process one’s personal family history. 
The ’68 Movement 
From 1968 onwards and into the 1970s (the so-called ’68 revolt), information 
began to seep out about the involvement of fathers in the atrocities of the 
national socialist era, and that a significant number of them had smoothly re-
assumed positions of power and authority. The Jewish author Ralph 
Giordano calls this “the second guilt”: 
Any second guilt presumes a first—in this case, the guilt of the Germans under 
Hitler. The second guilt: the suppression and denial of the first, after 1945. It has 
significantly influenced the political culture of the Federal Republic of Germany 
until today—a mortgage that will take a long time to repay. (Giordano 1987, 11) 
With this development, the parents’ “silent generation” suddenly gave way to 
the “raging generation” of their children. Battle was now openly declared 
against this “second guilt”, against the duplicity and hypocrisy to be found at 
almost all levels of public life. 
With hindsight, the fierce and committed struggle for a better society and 
the protest against the silent, paralysed parents were, in the final analysis, 
once again a struggle to maintain an “intact ego ideal” that united both 
generations and produced a solidarity of silence about the evil and murderous 
past. As a result, inwardly the perpetrators’ children remained indivisibly 
united with their parents and developed, on the one hand, the narcissistic ego 
ideal which the parents had lost, and, on the other hand, a cruel and punishing 
super-ego if they were unable to realise these ideals (Schneider 1993; 
Franzen 1999). 
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The Period Following Reunification (1989) and Its Consequences 
Upon the reunification of Germany and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
American government permitted public access to the Berlin Document Centre 
and gave us the first opportunity to obtain documents about our fathers that 
had previously been kept secret. The upshot of this for me—and no doubt for 
many others like me—was a sudden confrontation with the facts of a reality 
that, until then, I had been able to play down in my imagination. So, forty-
five years after the end of the war, I gradually began to get some idea of the 
extent of my father’s criminality and guilt. 
During the 1990s, along with many other offspring of perpetrators, I felt 
an urgent need to engage in dialogue with persons in a situation similar to 
mine. The inner loneliness I had felt due to not being able to speak openly 
often seemed quite overpowering. The general public for the most part was 
still imprisoned in their mindset of hypocrisy and denial of their involvement 
in national socialism, be it as bystanders or perpetrators. Groups came into 
being to foster dialogue among the descendants of victims and perpetrators, 
as well as to make contacts with people in Israel. At that time, in 1998 after 
the PAKH symposium (see Opher-Cohn et al. 2000), I joined the PAKH 
group. 
I would like to turn now to the process that other descendants of 
perpetrators and I went through within PAKH, differentiated into three 
phases. 
First Phase: Anxiety and Resistance 
In the beginning of the PAKH dialogue work, before I entered the group, the 
emphasis lay on the suffering of the victims and their families and on 
literature by Jewish authors. That meant that the non-Jewish Germans, 
children of perpetrators or bystanders, had not yet confronted the aspect of 
the culprit in themselves. 
At that time Johannes, also a perpetrator’s child, described his situation as 
follows: 
I looked for and found the problem in the others. I regarded myself as the good 
person who was a victim of circumstances. My past and present became 
increasingly intermingled in me, as I allowed the past to surface. Suddenly I felt 
as if I myself were a Nazi criminal and had to defend myself in relation to the 
other Germans in PAKH, for instance Erda, who presented herself from the start 
as the daughter of a perpetrator. 
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For me personally during this phase of angst and resistance, two events were 
essential.  
Firstly, in the literature circle of PAKH consisting of victim’s and 
perpetrator’s children we were discussing a book by Anna Maria Jokl (1997), a 
Jewish psychoanalyst who was then practising in Berlin. She had had a young 
male Jew and a young male German in therapy at the same time. The Jew had 
fled from the ghetto with his mother and the German was the son of a SS officer. 
Anna Maria Jokl describes how their life histories converged at a central point in 
the psychoanalysis: namely in their nightmares about vermin, destruction and 
death. Each of them revealed both victim and perpetrator aspects. Both had been 
damaged at the root of their personalities by the national socialist ideology.  
In our group the courageous but also daring comparison of these two 25-
year-olds led to a heated discussion about whether and how a (moral, human, 
ethical) boundary had been crossed by bringing together victim and 
perpetrator in this way.  
This brings to mind Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela’s book A human being 
died that night (2003), in which the central issue was likewise the breaching 
of both an external and an inner psychological boundary between victim and 
perpetrator, good and evil. 
To return to Anna Maria Jokl: her book had already strengthened in me the 
hope that the children of perpetrators, too, can and will be allowed to 
experience not only profound feelings of guilt but equally profound sorrow. 
The discussion of the book pushed the group towards a crucial decision: 
namely, whether it was willing to accept this concept and, with it, me as a 
perpetrator’s child with such feelings and as a fully acknowledged member of 
the group. The discussion was very difficult for everyone and in the end I was 
so tense that I was in tears, leaving me with an intense feeling of shame. I was 
concerned that a sacrosanct barrier had been breached that evening—and that I 
had thereby turned the literature circle into a self-experience group and was 
imposing myself on the others. This can only be understood by explaining the 
problem that our literature circle, consisting of both victim’s and perpetrator’s 
children, ran the risk of becoming too emotional and of losing its rational basis. 
The second key occurrence was the documentary film (Tatari 2003) about 
the daughter of the head of the Gestapo in Belgrade/former Yugoslavia 
(Bruno Sattler), which we viewed and discussed in her presence. This event 
confronted the German non-Jewish participants with perpetrator elements 
within themselves—about which they were in denial—and led to massive 
resistance. There was a critical lack of openness and empathy during the 
discussion, as if there was a wall between her and the group. 
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Later it emerged that the group had split in two: the Jewish members fell 
more and more silent and left the discussion to the offspring of the 
perpetrators. The latter were increasingly caught up in their own anxiety 
defence structures: denying their anxiety, they tried to defend their critical 
opinions. This was perhaps also because, in my opinion, the film depicted a 
heroic daughter who, without sparing herself, had embarked on uncovering 
the trail of her father’s cruel and awful crimes, and was doing so without any 
visible angst or ambivalence. 
Initially, the film induced in us resistance and a sort of dissociation. Later, 
a letter from our guest revealed her disappointment about the course of the 
discussion. Then, suddenly, it became clear to me why I had been unable to 
face the film and the discussion more openly: I had experienced it as a 
challenge to me to follow up my father’s trail in a similar manner. I did not 
have the confidence that, were I to undertake a similar search, I would be 
able to separate my life from my father’s; in this way, the threat inherent in 
the message of the film became clear to me. 
Second Phase: Cautious Approach and Coming to Terms with the 
Victim Position 
This second phase was triggered by a so-called “Saturday conversation”. It 
was only open to members of the group and was an annual event. In small 
groups we would narrate and re-experience our own personal life stories. In 
our group there were three women (including Beata Hammerich and myself) 
who took part in intensive, if cautious, exchanges. The questions put to Beata 
did not probe deeply and I, too, felt I was being treated with great 
consideration. However, for the first time, I experienced a very close 
confrontation with the victims’ side. I saw that the group was in a position to 
cope equably with our different life histories and to listen to them 
respectfully and empathetically one after the other, and that each of us had a 
moving story to tell. This fed into the literature circles and intervision groups 
that took place afterwards. There was an increasing trend to differentiate less 
between Jewish and non-Jewish participants, and closeness and trust spread 
throughout the group. 
In this context, a noteworthy process developed between David, a Jewish 
survivor—one of the few from the first generation—and Johannes, a second-
generation perpetrator’s child, as a result of their experience of each other. At 
the outset, Johannes perceived David as perplexing, but then tried to establish 
contact with him. Johannes was afraid of confrontation and an intensely 
demanding attitude from which he could not distance himself. He feared it 
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might provoke in him a massive counter-reaction in which he would devalue 
David. The human support that Johannes experienced from Jews of his own 
generation in the group helped him, as he said, to correct “the prejudiced 
image of Jews I had inherited”. It enabled him to acknowledge David’s 
autonomy and dignity. David, for his part, reminded us that he was a Jew but 
first and foremost a human being and that he wished to be accepted on the 
basis of his humanity and his own personality. 
To me David is the bearer of the real experiences of the Holocaust and a 
living example of reconciliation to us all. One outcome of these shared 
experiences is his recent project in which he told ten-year-old schoolchildren 
about the Holocaust and his life under the Nazis. “How can I do that without 
scaring the children?” he asked Johannes beforehand. The moving answer 
can be found in a booklet created by the schoolchildren themselves, 
containing pictures and texts about this project (Kloecker and Reusmann 
2005). 
During the period from 1990 until today, German society has become 
more open in this respect. People have been publishing documents, novels, 
biographies and films (often about their own families) as an attempt to 
recreate the continuity of family histories, accepting the perpetrators as “our 
fathers”. There may be hope now of closing the gap in social and family 
history. 
Third Phase: Confidence, Beginning Acceptance of One’s Own 
Unconscious Involvement in the Crimes, Shared Grieving 
Johannes Pfäfflin reported the following about me: 
When Erda entered the literature circle, she wished to talk about a book that she 
wanted us all to read, one about the children of perpetrators and how they dealt 
with the heavy burden they have inherited. That Erda was the daughter of a 
perpetrator immediately put a gulf between us. Her openness and at the same time 
her inner crisis, which for me was very noticeable, brought me once again into 
contact with the perpetrator side of me; which I had indeed always blocked out as 
part of my identification with my father. Embarrassing and dangerous images 
arose in me, but ones that from now on should be permitted to have a place. 
The climax of this more trusting and open phase was brought about by 
another film we viewed in our literature circle, The lost children of Cologne 
by Jürgen Naumann (2006) who showed it to us in person; it led to a 
profound discussion. During the film there was a moving scene during which, 
as far as I could see, almost all those present were weeping. I experienced a 
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strong feeling of thankfulness in sharing this grief with my Jewish and 
German colleagues. 
Personally, the gradual experience of allowing myself to feel trust in the 
group, and the encounter with Pumla and her book two years previously in 
South Africa, was something new for me. Reading A human being died that 
night opened a door inside me, which a deep paralysis had kept firmly closed 
until then. To me, now, the title of the book could well be A human being 
was born that night because it opened up the opportunity for me to perceive 
my “monster father” differently, and to give him a human face. Interestingly, 
through the book and our dialogue in PAKH it became possible for me to 
differentiate between the “good” and the “bad” father and to give up the inner 
splitting within myself. A mourning process had taken place that allowed me 
not only to perceive emotionally my father’s “human” life to see him as a 
human being who himself had gone through childhood, had parents and 
experienced a development but also to realise my feelings of shame and grief 
that this father had been capable of committing such atrocities.  
In summary, it seems to be vital that we, the offspring of perpetrators, 
should come to terms with the atrocities committed by our fathers and, 
moreover, should confront the parental introjections in ourselves. In so doing 
we can differentiate between our fathers’ guilt and our own shame and 
responsibility in order to rebuild our own autonomy. Furthermore, it helps to 
restore the missing human links between the generations that all family 
traditions need.  
Conclusion 
In the course of our dialogue over many years in PAKH, we were confronted 
with the unconscious dynamic of victim and perpetrator. We, the children of 
the victims and the children of the perpetrators of the Holocaust, are charged 
with addressing the unmourned suffering of our victimised parents or the 
guilt for which our victimiser parents did not want to assume the 
responsibility. 
If this dynamic remains unrecognised, then it will unfold its destructive 
energy. Reflecting on the process of dialogue has led to an important insight: 
by taking on the unsolved tasks of our parents we are bound into unconscious 
roles, either as victims or perpetrators, through which we define ourselves. 
At the beginning of PAKH, the dialogue was significantly influenced by 
these roles. To illustrate: shortly after the founding of PAKH, the core 
group—consisting of three German, non-Jewish members and two Jewish 
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non-German members, one born in Rumania and one born in Hungary—
organised a symposium. During the preparations, tensions became apparent 
in the group. In some situations, the Jewish members reacted extremely 
aggressively to their German colleagues, whereas on other occasions they 
behaved in a submissive manner. Similar fluctuations could be observed in 
the behaviour of the non-Jewish Germans. Unconsciously, the Jews 
perceived the Germans as “Nazis”, while the Germans regarded the Jews as 
“victims”. 
Vamik Volkan, our supervisor at that time, described the process as 
follows: 
The members of the PAKH core group were psychoanalytically trained 
colleagues, people with similar interests and not enemies. However, their German 
and Jewish parents, grandparents and relatives had lived in completely different 
circumstances. They had been enemies, victims and perpetrators—and the next 
generation had carried forward this ill-starred heritage on both conscious and 
unconscious levels. Although in the meantime, half a century had passed, they 
carried within themselves the inexpressible trauma of the war and of annihilation. 
(Opher-Cohn et al. 2000, 32)  
Nowadays, PAKH-Members are more successful in making visible the 
unconscious roles of victims and victimisers so that they can be handled 
better. The question is, what led to this change? Our thesis is as follows: 
through long-term work in the encounter with one another, we increasingly 
succeeded in disavowing the roles of victim and perpetrator. With that, the 
dialogue became less determined by these roles. 
We will now try to sketch this process briefly in four phases. 
Phase 1: Search for Protection, Recognition and Sense of Security 
from One's “Own Side” 
In the above-mentioned core group, the members oriented themselves 
emotionally in their early days at PAKH in a way similar to that described by 
Beata and Erda: they tended to bond with their “own side”, from which they 
hoped for protection, recognition and a sense of security. At the same time, 
relations with the “other side” were shaped by anxiety, mistrust and bias. As 
the dialogue in the group was very much determined by these roles, some 
crises nearly broke the group up. 
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Phase 2: Cautious Approach to the “Other Side” 
This was able to occur in the course of further development of PAKH after 
each person had been accepted into their “own group” and felt supported by 
them. This step was always accompanied by very ambivalent feelings.  
The wish for “reconciliation” which arose during this period was 
accompanied by the serious danger of falling into a destructive dependency 
on victim–perpetrator roles and being unable to surmount this. The child of a 
victim assumes its parents’ feelings of having lost their dignity and self-
respect. Subsequently, the child unconsciously believes that only the 
offspring of a perpetrator, as a representative of the Nazi-victimiser, can 
restore his dignity. By contrast, the perpetrators’ child wants the victims’ 
child to forgive him the legacy of guilt. Since neither “restoring dignity” nor 
“release from guilt” is possible between the offspring of culprit and victim, 
the two are caught in an emotional trap: each of them expects “release” from 
the other. The feelings of hate and revenge that are thereby repressed, as well 
as the disappointment about the non-fulfilment of the desired “release” lead 
to the development of an interaction which, in the long term, is destructive in 
nature. 
Phase 3: Moving Beyond the “False” Feeling of Reconciliation 
This step is necessary to enable the unfolding of a dialogue that is not 
handicapped (or even entirely undermined) by the dependency trap. The 
protagonists must differentiate and separate themselves from the “other side” 
and again focus on themselves. This is necessary because the offspring can 
only overcome the respective victim and perpetrator roles on their own, as an 
autonomous action. Toward this end, they have to give back the 
“unfulfillable tasks” to their parents. This can only be attained by dealing 
with their internal representations, and it presupposes painful mourning. It is 
a very difficult process, since feelings of betrayal towards the parents and 
strong feelings of guilt are bound to arise. 
This step is not one of reconciliation as such, but rather of coming to 
terms with one’s internal images of the parents and refusing to fulfil 
unrealisable tasks, which can then lead to giving up unconscious burdening 
roles. 
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Phase 4: Independent Dialogue 
Depending on the extent to which victim and victimiser roles can be 
relinquished, the dialogue can become more “normal” and less dependent, 
that is, less determined by the delegated dynamic of victim and perpetrator. 
If this occurs, the Holocaust increasingly loses its character as a “chosen 
trauma”, the term Volkan gives to humiliating trauma that, unmourned, goes 
through transgenerational transmission with appalling consequences. Thus, it 
need no longer be transmitted as a “virulent”, emotionally uncontrollable 
phenomenon, but can instead be passed on to the coming generations as 
narrative and remembrance. 
Over the years in PAKH, there have been very moving encounters 
between individual members. On some occasions we were able to feel the 
pain of the other; at other times it was aggression, unconscious hatred or 
desire for revenge that determined our dialogue. In spite of all this, though, 
we were to some extent able to reflect such feelings and to continue the 
dialogue. We became aware of the destructive dynamic which lies in the 
deepest layer of the dialogue between the two poles of the second generation 
of the Holocaust: at this level we are confronted with murder and survival, 
gas chambers and the hills of corpses, also with hatred and revenge, bare 
destruction and naked inhumanity.  
We have attempted to describe our experiences in PAKH concerning the 
dialogue between the offspring of the perpetrators and the offspring of the 
victims of the Holocaust as a flowing and lively process that has been going 
on for years. Personal narratives that are shared shape the group’s process. A 
constructive dialogue is only possible to the extent to which the protagonists 
are able to give up their delegated roles as victims or perpetrators. If they 
succeed in that, they will allow themselves to be affected by the narratives of 
the others. 
This process requires an attempt to come to terms with the past of our 
parents and includes painful mourning. In this way, the impossible tasks that 
were handed down to us can be abandoned and given back. Reconciliation is 
not necessary because neither have the offspring of the victims themselves 
experienced persecution, nor do the offspring of the perpetrators have blood 
on their hands. In a work published in 1946, the French existentialist Jean 
Paul Sartre commented: “To blame the grandchildren for the mistakes of the 
ancestors, one must have a very primitive concept of responsibility” (Anti-
Semite and Jew, 1946). Our responsibility consists in maintaining the 
memory of what took place, without transmitting the fateful and destructive 
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dynamic of hostility to our children. Insomuch as we do not fulfil our “tasks”, 
we fulfil them. 
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Confronting the Past, Engaging the Other in the 
Present: The Intergenerational Healing Journey of a 
Holocaust Survivor and his Children 
Healing Journey of a Holocaust Survivor and his Children 
Jeff Kelly Lowenstein, Dunreith Kelly Lowenstein, Edward Lowenstein 
Jeff Kelly Lowenstein et al. 
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Introduction 
In May 2012, Edward Lowenstein returned to his hometown of Essen, 
Germany for the first time since 1939 when at the age of 4 he was put on a 
train to England as part of the Kindertransport. Dr. Lowenstein was invited 
to Essen as part of German teacher Gabriele Thimm’s attempt to teach her 
students about their country’s troubled past. Thimm played a critical role in 
shaping the experience into an opportunity for understanding and healing for 
both sides. Lowenstein was accompanied on the trip by two of his sons and 
one of his grandsons. The trip illustrates many key elements involved in 
breaking intergenerational cycles of trauma transmission for family members 
and the Essen community. A subsequent trip in June 2013 to present an 
award created in the family’s name for children who act with tolerance and 
justice helped advance this process and to begin to forge a new and different 
story for the town that moved away from shame, guilt and denial and into an 
honest reckoning with its genocidal past. This paper will explore the trauma 
experienced by the Lowenstein family, its generational transmission, and the 
impact the return to Germany held for both the Lowenstein family and the 
community of Essen, and will place the trip and ensuing activities in the 
context of other scholarly, autobiographical and artistic works that address 
similar themes.  
 
The Holocaust is one of humanity’s greatest atrocities. The state-sanctioned 
murder of 6 million Jews, including more than 1 million children, and more 
than 5 million other victims inflicted physical and psychic wounds with 
which Jews and non-Jews alike continue to grapple. 
As with nearly all, if not every, Jewish family of German descent, the 
genocide directly affected the Lowensteins of Essen-Steele, an upper-middle 
class, religiously observant and culturally integrated family who had lived in 
the community for at least 140 years by the time Adolf Hitler and the Nazi 
regime came to power in early 1933. 
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Many members of the family were murdered by the Nazis, including 
patriarch Joseph Lowenstein, who had been a much-respected and loved 
physician in Steele, his son Rudolf, also a physician; his daughter-in-law 
Margarethe and his grandchildren Klaus-Martin and Clara. 
The Nazi regime also affected Lowensteins who were able to escape its 
murderous clutches. Edward Lowenstein, who was born in 1934, and his 
older brother Ralph, born in 1932, were two of them. Both boys were sent on 
trains called Kindertransport, or child transport, to England. The 
Kindertransport was established by the British government in the aftermath 
of the Kristallnacht pogrom in November 9 and 10, 1938 that injured and 
killed many Jews, destroyed thousands of Jewish synagogues, homes and 
businesses across Germany. The goal of the program was to give sanctuary to 
10,000 Jewish children from Germany, Austria, Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
The Lowenstein boys were able to flee the country due to the advocacy of 
an English relative in England and the courage of their parents, Max and 
Hilde Lowenstein, in sending the young children away. 
Ralph, who was 7 years old at the time, went first. In his Shoah interview 
close to 60 years later, he recalled how agonizing it had been for his father to 
let him go. 
Edward, who had not turned 5 years old, followed a few weeks later. His 
departure was delayed by appendicitis. Max, an injured World War I veteran, 
had taken his son around the town in an effort to find someone who would 
perform an appendectomy, but no one would operate on a Jewish boy. 
Eventually, Max’s father Joseph found a non-Jewish doctor who was willing 
to perform the procedure and carried it out on the kitchen table on the first 
floor of Joseph’s three-story house. Just weeks after having a life-threatening 
condition that required emergency surgery, Edward was sent away from his 
parents for a period of unknown duration. 
Edward remembers little of his time in Germany-a lack of memory that 
perhaps was due to the combination of his tender years and the traumatic 
nature of the experience. 
The boys stayed in the country near Southampton, England for about 18 
months, under the watchful and loving care of Ruth Stern, headmistress of a 
country school who never married or had children. In later life, both Edward 
and Ralph spoke about their attachment to Stern, while she described the 
transformative experience for her of caring for them. 
In the spring of 1940, Max and Hilde were able to leave Germany via 
Genoa, Italy, a port city in a country whose government was a Nazi ally, and 
to depart from there for the United States. The boys left from England shortly 
thereafter, arriving in New York City October 4, 1940. Thus, just 18 months 
 Healing Journey of a Holocaust Survivor and his Children 269 
after having lost contact with their parents, Ralph and Edward experienced 
the second loss of Ruth Stern, the primary parental figure who had cared for 
them after they left Germany. 
After a few months, the refugees moved from New York city, where they 
had been staying with Hilde’s brother Eric Goldberg and his wife Ilse both of 
whom had immigrated to the United States in 1937, to Cincinnati, Ohio. 
Once there, the parents set about the task of learning the language and 
adapting to life in the country that had given them safe haven. 
It was no easy task. 
As opposed to Germany, where the family was known and respected in 
the community and lived in material comfort, the family was unknown, poor 
and depended upon the kindness of others. In Germany, Max and another 
brother were lawyers, while his two other brothers were doctors. The loss of 
his professional status was particularly painful for him. 
The Trauma 
Trauma was a defining element of the Lowenstein family´s experience during 
these years. There was Max’s physical trauma of having been arrested and 
beaten as well as having loved ones murdered by the Nazi regime. There was 
the material trauma of having lost home, money and careers. There was the 
emotional trauma of having lost the respected place they held in the 
community, the security of living in a country where one spoke the language, 
had roots and understood the culture, and, perhaps, some guilt at having 
survived where so many others did not. 
As many German Jewish families did, and, indeed, as many trauma 
survivors do, the family adopted a number strategies to deal with their trauma. 
The most important of these was focusing on moving forward in their new 
home, not looking back at where they used to live. Hilde and Max concentrated 
on caring for their children, earning a living and establishing a community in an 
unfamiliar nation where they did not have history, language or cultural bearing.  
Although Max and Hilde socialized with other German Jewish émigrés, 
they did not talk much about what had happened in Germany with their 
children. One can speculate about their motivation, and it is possible that 
several factors were at play. The first was that sharing of this nature was not 
within their pre-existing cultural framework. The second was that they may 
have been trying to shield the children from the pain they had experienced. 
And a third may have been that the challenges as new arrivals left little time 
for reflection and sharing of this type. 
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Regardless of the reasons for their silence, Hilde and Max indeed did not 
share much about their lives in Germany with their boys. As a result, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, they passed on the practice of not speaking 
openly about traumatic events. 
In short, then, Germany changed from a much-loved home and site of 
family connection and tradition, albeit interspersed with episodic 
antisemitism, to a place from which one was totally cut off, about which 
there was little information, and from which one had to flee to save one´s life.  
Edward and Ralph grew up, married and had children of their own. 
Edward adopted the same approach with his three sons toward his and the 
family’s past that his parents had done with him.  
He did so in the face of evidence that the subject clearly troubled him. 
Jeff had a memory of watching the first episode of the mini-series 
Holocaust. The show had barely aired for 20 minutes when Edward, 
distraught, silently shut off the television. Yet when Jeff and his brothers 
asked what was upsetting him, Edward insisted that nothing was wrong. 
This disjunction between the stated words, the lack of information and the 
emotional distress impacted each of the boys in different ways. 
Jeff in particular thirsted to know more about his father and that period. 
After graduating from college, he initiated a series of actions to fill the void 
he felt within himself. These included visiting and interviewing family 
members from the previous generation like Ilse Goldberg and Ernie 
Lowenstein, a paternal uncle of Edward’s who played a major role in his 
decision to become a doctor. Jeff read many books about the Holocaust, 
identified with oppressed people of different backgrounds, and, in 2004, took 
a trip sponsored by the German government to see new Jewish life in the 
country.  
At the end of the trip, he tacked on several extra days to visit sites of 
family significance, visiting the two apartments his father, uncle and 
grandparents had lived in and meeting a non-Jewish family who had held the 
Lowenstein family bible at great personal risk for a quarter century. A 
member of the non-Jewish family also gave Jeff a copy of a notebook she had 
assembled that contained more than 100 pages of correspondence between 
the two families collected over 65 years. 
The supplying of information, the visiting of sites where his family had 
lived and the meeting people who had known key family members all were 
sources of comfort and healing for Jeff, who returned with the notebook, 
shared its contents with the family and spoke about his hope that the entire 
family might return with Edward and/or Ralph to see the hometown they had 
left so many decades ago. 
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Jeff also wrote about the experience in a three-part series for a Jewish 
publication. In 2008, at a national journalism conference, he met a 
representative from the German government who, after hearing the story, 
expressed interest in publishing the piece on the federal website. (This 
happened later in 2008.) 
Gabriele Thimm read the article on the site while searching for Low-
enstein family members as part of her planning a memorial event for the 
Jewish community in Essen. She then contacted Jeff. 
It is impossible to overstate the importance of the role Gabriele Thimm 
played in the project. As a teacher deeply committed to teaching her students 
the true nature of her nation’s history, she has worked tirelessly to provide in-
school learning as well as outside of school, “real-life” situations that have 
taken the educational activities out of the classroom and into the community. 
She has thereby provided a vehicle for the students to take concrete and 
constructive action based on what they have learned about the Nazi genocide 
and the possible involvement of their forebears. 
In 2006 Thimm worked with the students to have Stolpersteine, or 
stumble stones, placed outside the home on Alte Zeilen, which had been 
owned by Lowenstein family patriarch Joseph Lowenstein. Bronze stumble 
stones are placed just below the standard level of stone, thus causing the 
person who walks not to fall, but to have their normal gait interrupted by the 
fact of history. Individual stones record the name, year of birth, and year and 
location and manner of death for the people who lived at the address. 
Gabriele and her students participated in the laying of the stones for 
Joseph, Rudi, Margarete and Clara, who among them represented three 
generations of Lowenstein family members who were murdered during the 
Holocaust. (The students’ parents sponsored Klaus-Martin’s stone.)  
Rudi Lowenstein, no longer able to make a living as a physician due to 
Nazi regulations, had moved back to his father’s home. He chose not to 
pursue sending his children on the Kindertransport, believing they would be 
better off staying together in Germany. Sadly, all five family members 
ultimately perished in Auschwitz. 
In Thimm, then, the students have the example of a ceaseless advocate not 
only for providing them with an unblinking look at Germany’s murderous 
history, but of someone who is equally committed to providing them with 
opportunities to engage in constructive activities based on their newly acquired 
knowledge. 
Thimm applied both of these qualities during the Lowenstein family trip 
with the family itself, with the students with whom she worked, with her 
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colleagues at the Realschule Uberruhr and with other members of the Essen 
community. 
The initial contact with the family came through virtual communication. 
In her email Thimm explained that she was organizing a memorial ceremony 
for the Jewish community and that one of the planned stops was going to be 
at home of Joseph Lowenstein, the family patriarch for whom Jeff was 
named and a highly respected doctor in the community who was murdered in 
Auschwitz. 
She invited family members to attend the event, which was to be held on 
the 73rd anniversary of Kristallnacht. 
“I think, it’s our responsibility to teach the children/pupils about the German 
history in the time of National Socialism (Hitler) and the history of the Jews in 
Germany,” she wrote. 
Lowenstein family members were unable to attend the event in person, but 
did send pictures that were projected onto Alte Zeilen, a three-story yellow 
stucco building. 
The family also sent the following statement to be read during the 
ceremony: 
Dear Ms. Thimm, parents, teachers, and members of the Essen-Steele community, 
It is with gratitude and respect that we write this note to register our appreciation 
of the commitment you have shown to confront the dark chapter in Germany’s 
past and to commemorate the lives of residents in the community who were killed 
during the Nazi era. 
Ms. Thimm, we honor the courage, character and persistence you have shown in 
undertaking this project, and we also want to acknowledge the support you have 
received from your supervisors and the other members of the community in 
making a public and permanent acknowledgment through these memorials of 
what happened here during the period when Adolf Hitler ruled the country. 
This memorial and the ongoing teaching of the children about what occurred 
represents an important act of acknowledgment that has, in its process and 
substance, contributed to a healing process. It is also a critical, but not sufficient, 
element in allowing young people to emerge into adulthood with a full 
understanding of what has been part of their nation’s past, but what need not be 
again should they act with the same decency and humanity demonstrated by so 
many of the people who are gathered here today. 
We regret that we are not able to join you on this momentous occasion, but want 
to be emphatically clear that our inability to attend in person does not in any way 
signal a lack of awareness, appreciation and respect for what you have done and 
what you will continue to do this in this area. 
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We look forward to the day, hopefully this spring, when we will be able to meet 
and express our gratitude to you in person. In the meantime, we hope the 
ceremony goes well today. Please know that it is deeply appreciated by us. 
Sincerely, 
The Lowenstein Family 
Jeff Kelly Lowenstein wrote about the buildup to the ceremony and the event 
itself for (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeff-kelly-lowenstein/kristallnacht-
anniversary_b_1082302.html) the Huffington Post, a blog network to which 
he contributes, as well as on his own blog.  
Thimm sent a description of the event, which included stops at three 
houses where Jewish people used to live, a description of the Jewish 
community in Essen, an explanation of what happened during the Nazi era, 
the reading of the statement, and a display of old and new family pictures. 
The final part of the presentation was music and the message, “Life goes on.” 
In December 2011 Jeff Kelly Lowenstein spoke to the family about taking 
the trip to Germany, and, for the first time, Edward Lowenstein agreed. The 
topic had been one that the family had discussed at various points over the 
years, even to the point of talking about dates for tickets. In fact, he had been 
reluctant to return to his birthplace even to the point of declining to get off a 
train stopped there during a trip to Europe in the mid-1960s. He felt it had 
“nothing to do with his life.” 
Jeff and Gabriele were the point people in the planning process, which 
was an important element in establishing trust and building a connection 
between people on both sides. Both took care to be inclusive of the people 
with whom they were communicating, to provide new information whenever 
it surfaced and to ensure that people on both sides were comfortable with the 
schedule and events. The communication took place largely through email 
with occasional Skype calls. 
During these conversations Gabriele spoke English and Jeff spoke 
German. Although this possibly made the communication less efficient and 
involved both people speaking in a language in which each had less 
proficiency, it also was a sign of respect and an effort to engage the other. 
They also began to build a personal relationship that extended beyond the 
logistics of the trip to learning about each other´s children and even cats. 
Jeff´s wife Dunreith participated in the conversations, too.  
The planning process itself stimulated significant conversations on both 
sides. A concern surfaced on the Lowenstein side about whether Gabriele 
was to be trusted since she kept asking for additional information about the 
family. This perspective was understandable, given the family’s previous 
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experience. But part of breaking the intergenerational cycle of repetition was 
developing confidence that the person on each side was indeed to be trusted. 
At the same time, the period before the 2012 trip also sparked discussion 
and sharing of Ralph’s trip to Essen in 1977 with his family-a trip during 
which he visited his father’s former law office and met the non-Jewish family 
who had kept the Lowenstein family bible. Thus, Ralph was happy to share 
his experience with family members but more guarded about sharing it with 
an as yet unknown German teacher. 
One key effort of the planning by each side was an effort to be as 
inclusive and open as possible.  
This meant sending a myriad of emails to all members of the family, 
including those who were not going on the trip, answering questions and 
informing everyone of the latest developments. It also meant being as clear as 
possible with Gabriele about what was happening on the family’s side. 
Gabriele did the same for the community. 
In designing the week Gabriele and Jeff tried to strike a balance between 
having activities that would be meaningful, but the pace of which would not 
be overwhelming. 
The family members who eventually went on the trip were Edward, Jeff, 
Dunreith, Aidan and Jon. Edward’s partner Lee accompanied them. 
The goals of the trip were to provide a series of experiences for the family 
that would help them learn about their roots, that would be comfortable for 
Edward during his return and that would also create a forum for learning and 
healing for the community and family. The emphasis of the ceremony was to 
be on life, not on the destruction that had occurred. They were therefore 
entitled, “A Celebration of Life.” 
The Trip 
The trip had five distinct types of experiences for the family: return for 
Edward; those that extended the family´s knowledge; those that involved a 
family connection with a non-Jewish German family; celebrations; and a pair 
of public events that emphasized community and youth education.  
Return 
Three events were related to return for Edward. The first two consisted of 
going to the two apartments where he had lived before he left Germany in 
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early 1939, while the third involved going to Alte Zeilen, the former home of 
his grandfather Joseph and the site of his appendix operation on the kitchen 
table. 
Gabriele had organized for a local historian, Dr. Ludger Heid, a historian at 
the University of Duisburg-Essen, to attend the apartment visits with the 
family. While the visits were planned, no contact had been made with the 
people who lived there. Fortunately, residents were present in both apartments. 
The first apartment was on Roonstrasse in Duisburg. A resident of the 
floor below where Edward had lived was home and, after hearing the 
explanation of the family´s reason for visiting, welcomed them into his home.  
Edward had very few remaining memories of being in Germany. 
However, standing in the window and looking across the street produced a 
visceral feeling that he had been there. Dr. Heid informed him that there had 
been a Hitler Youth camp across the street. This for the first time gave 
Edward the realization that the nightmares of green men marching ominously 
that he had experienced for many years while young in England and 
Germany might well be related to the marching of Hitler youth. 
The man who lived in the apartment, Michael Frohling, was professional-
ly involved in arts education and even contacted the family later to see about 
having a Stolperstein put in outside the home to commemorate the family´s 
living there. (After some discussion, the family decided against it because 
they felt the intent of the Stolpersteine was to note the presence of people 
who had lived there and later been killed by the regime.) Frohling spent time 
with them, showed the backyard and pledged to keep in contact. 
The second visit was an entirely different experience. This was on 
Lotharstrasse, and also a place Jeff had visited in 2004. The name 
Winkelmann was still there. After ringing the bell, the family discovered that 
Mr. Winkelmann was no longer alive, but his widow was. 
Mrs. Winkelmann’s manner was almost the complete opposite of Mr. 
Frohling. She asked for identification before allowing the family to enter the 
apartment, did not show them around and went to great lengths to share a 
story that presented her family´s actions in a favorable light, but that proved 
impossible to have taken place. According to her, her father had stretched 
himself to give Max Lowenstein, Edward’s father, a good deal when he 
bought the apartment from Max in the late 1930s. Max had returned after the 
war to ask for money. Like her late husband, Mrs. Winkelmann clearly 
considered Max Lowenstein’s price distasteful. Again, as her husband had 
done with Jeff eight years earlier, she searched for documents that ultimately 
she could not locate that she asserted would have proved the veracity of what 
she was saying. 
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There were at least three factual errors in Mrs. Winkelmann’s story. The 
first was that the Lowensteins were renters and never owned the apartment. 
The second was that there were no documents. The third was that Max never 
returned to Germany after the war. 
After a visit of about 30 minutes, Mrs. Winkelmann showed the family 
around the Square and pointed out a wall plaque that noted the destruction of 
the synagogue in November, 1938 caused by Kristallnacht and shared her 
memories of having walked, as a scared little girl, hand in hand with her 
mother watching the fire. 
While less emotionally gratifying, the visit to the Winkelmann house 
contributed to a deeper understanding of the generational transmission of 
trauma in several ways. To begin, it showed the abiding unease and suspicion 
with which many people live many decades after the war’s end. Through her 
anecdote about Kristallnacht, Mrs. Winkelmann demonstrated how, even as her 
family had benefited from Jewish suffering, she carried with her a self-concept 
as a victim of that era based in part on her disturbing childhood memories. 
The interaction provided the family an understanding of how the issues of 
trauma transmission exist on both sides of the historical divide and also 
helped place the generosity and extraordinary level of welcome by Gabriele 
and many others in the community in a larger cultural context. It also 
illustrated the need that many people who have benefited unfairly have to 
explain their actions in a way that casts them in a positive light, even if it 
requires telling a story that is untrue and easily disproved. 
The first two visits occurred without advance notice for the people living 
there. The third was the most planned and had the warmest sense of welcome.  
The family visited the residents of the first floor of 22 Alte Zeilen, a 
stately yellow three-floor building where Joseph Lowenstein had lived and 
where Edward had been operated on shortly before leaving on the 
Kindertransport. 
The Fuchs family could not have created a more inviting environment. 
The table was beautifully set, and Mrs. Fuchs had baked cakes from her 
favorite recipes, including one of her mother’s. 
The Fuchs family also presented the Lowensteins with a series of gifts, 
each of which conveyed the Fuchs’ desire to help them understand and feel 
connected to their past. These included a floor plan Mr. Fuchs had obtained 
in his capacity as a civil servant, a copy of the bill of sale from Joseph 
Lowenstein to an unknown butcher and an actual piece of the house that had 
become dislodged during a repair project. Each was offered with generosity 
and without hesitation. Dirk Fuchs later communicated in writing to Jeff his 
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pleasure in the house and his desire that the Lowensteins also have 
information about his family.  
Angelika, a woman who owned the second-floor unit, also joined the 
gathering. She started crying when she shared her feelings of guilt and shame 
after she had learned about how the house had previously been owned by 
Jewish people and what had happened to them. 
Lowenstein family members explained to Angelika that they did not hold 
ill will toward her, and she appeared comforted by that. She invited the 
family upstairs, and, before they left, said, “It´s the family´s house. We are 
just visiting.” 
On one level, it was the ultimate statement of welcome. But on the other 
hand, her statement raised important questions of reparations and the state of 
what would happen should the family have actually wanted to live there.  
While the three visits did not result in sparking new memories for 
Edward, they did allow the family to have a shared experience of a range of 
welcome, a greater understanding of where they had come from and a 
connection to the people who live there now. 
Extend Family Knowledge 
The family had two experiences that extended their knowledge of their roots 
beyond what they known before. The first was a visit to the local Jewish 
cemetery in which four generations of Lowensteins were buried, while the 
second was a surprise visit to a farm family members used to own. 
Gabriele arranged both for the family to have access to the Jewish 
cemetery, which remained intact during and after World War II even though 
half of the Jewish community had been murdered, and for the experience to 
be a guided one. 
Dr. Uri Kaufmann, a Swiss scholar who headed the former old synagogue 
and current cultural center, was the guide. He showed the family five points 
in the cemetery where Lowensteins had been buried, including a blank stone 
where the last relative had been buried in 1940.  
The graves were of varying size and prominence, showing both the 
family’s deep roots and position in the community. The decreasing size and 
elaborateness of the graves over time demonstrated the family, like the rest of 
the Jewish community, had seen their status decline during the Nazi regime. 
Dr. Kaufmann also gave the family information that extended beyond the 
Holocaust and the experience of profound rupture and disruption. 
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The second event occurred during a surprise birthday party for Edward, 
when Norbert Mering, who hosted the event with his wife Hanni, informed 
the family that they used to own a nearby farm called Hemmerhof, and 
invited them to go see it. 
The family did, and, after a short drive, arrived at the main house. 
Mering knocked on the front door, and presented the family to a woman 
in her late 30s or early 40s. She nearly went into shock, ran over to another 
house on the property and joyfully summoned her in-laws. Her father-in-law 
had been born in the house, and was the direct descendant of the Roemling 
family who had purchased the farm and the house from the Lowenstein 
family in the early part of the 20th century, decades before the Nazi era. The 
two families visited and chatted before the Lowenstein family returned to the 
party. Members of the Roemling family later joined them. 
Both of these incidents showed the family that they indeed had deep roots 
in the community. Through documents, people, property and graves, they 
gain a broader sense of the family´s history in the community and were able 
to place the Holocaust era in greater historical perspective. 
Family Connection: Meeting the Non-Jewish Family 
During the week the Lowenstein family also met the non-Jewish family. The 
husband’s father Karl had owned a print shop and been a patient and friend of 
Joseph Lowenstein. Joseph had visited Karl shortly before being deported to 
Theresienstadt, and later to the Auschwitz death camp. During that visit 
Joseph entrusted for safe keeping until he returned a copy of the Lowenstein 
family bible that had a hand written family tree that went back to 1791, along 
with books of classical literature. Karl had held the bible for a quarter century 
before Ernest Lowenstein, one of Joseph´s sons, returned in 1968 to retrieve 
it. 
Jeff had visited Karl’s son and his wife in 2004 and had learned that the wife, 
a former secretary, had kept a faded blue notebook in which she had compiled 
correspondence between the two families. The documents began in 1931, when 
Karl printed the death notice for Joseph´s wife Clara, and continued until the 
present. 
The couple welcomed the family to their home and showed the family the 
notebook over more sweets and tea. The husband told the family that Karl 
had urged Joseph many times to leave the country, but Joseph had not wanted 
to do so until it was too late. The husband also shared memories of receiving 
care packages the Lowenstein family had sent after the Second World War, 
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while Edward shared memories of making the packages and considered that 
experience responsible for learning to wrap presents. 
The visit to the family allowed Edward to meet a member of the family 
who was responsible for saving the family bible and for the rest of the family 
to know someone whose ancestors had not blindly complied, but instead 
actively resisted, the dictates of the Nazi government. 
Celebration  
The week contained official and unofficial celebrations. 
They began at Gabriele’s home, where this indefatigable host had 
prepared bountiful food and provided copious amounts of wine that she and 
her college-age children, Gawain and Gloria, shared with the Lowenstein 
family. She did this several nights, enabling all to begin to truly know each 
other. The dates included the evening of May 28, which at midnight marked 
the beginning of May 29 and Edward’s birthday. 
Other meals and sweets were also sites of unofficial gatherings during 
which participants chatted and built their relationship in a setting that was 
less formal and more conducive to relaxed conversation. 
The community also gave Edward a surprise 78th birthday party at Hanni 
and Norbert Mering’s home the evening of the first ceremony. It was an 
idyllic setting with plenty of green space Norbert had cleared by hand, honey 
he had gathered from his hives, tasty food, a champagne toast, gifts and, later, 
a roaring bonfire. The evening was an official tribute to Edward to thank him 
for returning 73 years after he had last left. 
These celebrations provided the settings in which relationships and 
friendships could develop and conveyed the diametrically opposite message 
from that which he and his family had received during the Nazi era. 
Ceremonies Centered on Youth and Education 
The most public and communal element of the week was a pair of ceremonies 
held at the Old Synagogue and, the next day, at Realschule Uberruhr, the 
school where Gabriele taught. 
Gabriele had worked with her students for months on both events. 
The first was attended by hundreds of people and included statements by 
dignitaries welcoming the family and thanking them for their participation in 
the event. The program consisted of students reading, singing, showing 
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pictures and taking the audience through the history of the Jewish people, the 
history of the Jewish community in Essen, the history of the Lowenstein 
family and the destruction that occurred after the Nazis’ rise to power.  
A young woman named Melina explained the perspective that the 
students brought to the presentation: 
“This is neither because we feel like offenders nor because we feel like victims, 
but because it is our concern to remember those people who lived in Essen as 
respected citizens, as friends, as acquaintances, as sport comrades, as parents, as 
employers and employees, in fact as citizens of the city of Essen,” she read. 
Edward Lowenstein answered questions in both ceremonies; some in German 
though mostly in English. When asked what he thought of Germany, he said 
that it was the country where some of the worst events in human history had 
taken place, but it was also the country that had done more to face its past 
than any other. 
Edward also made a statement in which he explained that, rather than 
accept the honorarium he had been offered, he and the family had spoken and 
had decided to offer to create an award in the family´s name that would be 
awarded annually to students to promote tolerance and justice. 
Jeff spoke in German about how being there was a dream coming true for 
the family. He talked about the gifts the community gave the family through 
their presence and complimented the young people who had done so well 
during the ceremony. 
He also said that the adults understood that it is not easy to be a young 
person, but that they were there for the youth, they believed in the youth and 
they know young people can learn not just from history’s bad parts, but from 
people like the non-Jewish family who had helped the Lowensteins. 
Each ceremony had key elements of symbolism. The first was held in the 
Old Synagogue, a building that Kaufmann explained had been desecrated 
during the same Kristallnacht pogrom that sparked the establishment of the 
Kindertransport program on which Edward and Ralph had escaped the 
country. 
People the family had met throughout the week, like the Merings and the 
Fuchs, all attended the ceremony. 
The second had a Stammbaum, a green cardboard family tree that was 
empty at the beginning of the celebration. Students who had been given signs 
with names of family members were called forward to place them on the tree. 
Thus, in a short time, seven generations of Lowenstein family members’ 
names were added, literally building the tree as the ceremony progressed.  
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Each event also contained an injunction from Gabriele for the students 
and all attendees to recognize that the work of building a better world had 
only been begun, not completed: 
Dear Dr. Löwenstein, may I ask you to join me once more. I want to reveal to 
everybody here that Dr. Löwenstein celebrated his birthday yesterday, on 29th 
May. He was 5 years old when he had to leave Essen to survive, and now, after 73 
years, he is back for the first time. Almost everything has changed―and 
fortunately, many things have improved. 
But even today, we don’t live in a land of milk and honey. 
We still have to create our own paradise. 
Knowing history and remembering is the only way to make sure people can work 
on future freedom, security and peace. While antisemitism increases and there are 
frequent menaces to extinguish Israel, we still won´t give up hope that young 
people will learn to think on their own and withstand indoctrination and 
manipulation to live a life in freedom. 
The events were not identical.  
Geared to a younger audience, the ceremony at the school was more 
interactive and included frequent stops by the older students conducting the 
ceremony to ask the younger students in the room for the answers to 
questions they posed to the group. The second event also included 
information about Edward’s professional accomplishments. This allowed the 
students to understand that his life was not solely defined by being a 
Holocaust refugee who returned 73 years later with some family members. 
Rather he was a highly accomplished Harvard professor and medical doctor 
who not only had not allowed the turbulence in his childhood to deter him, 
but instead who had displayed values of compassion and a commitment to 
helping others who had been less fortunate than him. The inclusion again 
highlighted the trust, dialogue and openness to feedback that characterized 
Gabriele´s interactions with the family the entire time. 
These events and the family´s response provided the most public and 
communal forum for healing helped to forge a new and different chapter to a 
story that had been shrouded for decades in guilt, shame, and death. It is 
important to note that the future-oriented approach did not for one second 
imply that what took place did not happen or did not matter. Instead 
memories of the past should be an active stimulus to learning and preventing 
such atrocities from happening again. 
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Post-trip Presentation and Return for the Award 
In August 2012, family members applied and gained acceptance to present 
about the trip at the third Engaging the Other conference in Bloemfontein, 
South Africa. The presentation summarized the background to and events 
during the trip, and included in-person presentations by Dunreith and Jeff 
Kelly Lowenstein, Dunreith reading a statement that Gabriele had prepared, 
Edward Lowenstein participating via audio conference and Jon Lowenstein 
participating by sharing a sample of the photographs he had taken during the 
trip.  
A member of PAKH, or Arbeitskreis für intergenerationelle Folgen des 
Holocaust, a German dialogue group of psychiatrists who are either the 
children of Nazi perpetrators or of Holocaust survivors, facilitated the 
session. 
The presenters, shared their thoughts and perspectives, then opened the 
audience to questions. 
In response to one of these, Edward replied that while the trip had had 
many benefits for him, it had not led him to a place of forgiveness. This 
statement sparked a vigorous discussion around the topic of forgiveness, 
including specifically about who has the right to confer it and to what degree, 
if at all, people should be held accountable for the actions of their parents or 
ancestors. (The unanimous consensus among the family was that they should 
not.) 
After the session ended, audience members from South Africa, Germany, 
Rwanda and Israel all shared their gratitude for the substance and method of 
the presentation. 
The conference was important for family members because it allowed 
them to see, listen to, learn from and talk with people engaged in similar 
efforts throughout the world. The experience expanded the perspective, 
which had initially been limited to a private family journey of return, to 
joining a global community dedicated to reconciliation work. Furthermore, 
they learned that the family´s project resonated powerfully with people from 
countries that had no direct connection to either the Holocaust, Judaism or 
Europe.  
Following the conference presentation, Dunreith and Jeff Kelly 
Lowenstein, and Jon Lowenstein met with Dr. Mary Harvey, a psychologist 
who has done important work around communities healing from violence. 
Harvey introduced family members to Lesley University faculty. Family 
members and Gabriele participated in an event on the Lesley campus in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts in February 2014 that began a yearlong series of 
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events titled, “Violence Transformed.” (The event included showcasing the 
work of Manuel Schroder, an artist affiliated with Michael Frohling, the 
gentleman who lived in the same building as one of Edward Lowenstein’s 
apartments. Frohling connected Schroder to the family, who then in turn put 
him in touch with Harvey.) 
In June 2013 Edward Lowenstein and Jeff Kelly Lowenstein returned to 
Essen to present the Lowenstein Family Award for Tolerance and Justice to 
the first winners. 
The presentation of the first annual Lowenstein Award took place during 
the tenth birthday celebration of Realschule Uberruhr, and again saw 
dignitaries express their gratitude to the family for having made the journey 
to return and show the community the importance of the work they were 
doing. 
Edward Lowenstein made a statement in German, reading from a 
translation by a teacher who had been unable to attend the previous year’s 
event: “We hope that students make Justice and Tolerance a part of your lives 
every year, and in turn teach your children, family and friends,” he said. “The 
future is the hands of the youth, in your hands.”  
He also presented the awards to students who had participated in the 2012 
as well as to the winners selected by a jury of three community members-
Andreas Bensch, a student teacher, retired middle school teacher Ute 
Kuntzsch, and Gabriele Thimm-who chose from the 19 essays submitted by 
students on a broad range of topics. The winning essay was by student Eva 
Sander, who wrote about the poverty in the world with her own ideas for 
poverty reduction. Lowenstein’s statement and the student’s recognition both 
elicited hearty applause.  
Student acts also included a rap about the family created by 14 young 
people that told the story of the family´s history, and a video. The video 
started by showing black and white pictures of children holding suitcases, 
wearing numbers around their necks and waiting to board a Kindertransport 
that would take them to safety. Ensuing text explained that Edward and 
Ralph Lowenstein were two of the 10,000 children who were part of the 
program. The video then showed pictures from the previous year´s ceremony 
at the Great Synagogue, explaining that Edward Lowenstein had returned 
with his family after 73 years and the family had created the award that 
would be given out for the first time that evening. 
The family’s presence was noted at other points in the school. Pictures 
from the previous year´s ceremony were displayed in a case on the school´s 
second floor, and at least one student had made the family the focus of a 
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major school project that was displayed among other examples of meritorious 
work. 
Importantly, much of the focus had to do more with the principles of 
tolerance and justice than with the family’s specific history. The school’s art 
teacher had, with his students, built a mural that stretched around three 
interior walls of a building that bordered a concrete section of the students’ 
playground. The teacher and his class had designed, then painted the mural, 
which had many bright colors and which spelled the words “Tolerance” and 
“Justice” letter by letter. The letters were made of puzzle pieces put in place 
by human-like characters, each of whom at most could create a single piece 
and many of whom were doing other activities like swinging on a swing or 
playing. The mural’s message signified the importance of the components of 
tolerance and justice and suggested that everyone has a part to play in its 
becoming a lived reality for all. Principal Frau Elvira Bluemel expressed the 
thought that words were not enough; rather, the students had created a visual 
reminder of the standards to which she and other community members need 
to hold themselves and the children. 
In addition to the acts and mural, the family also learned of the impact of 
the project by meeting and talking with the people whom they had met in 
2012.  
People like Mr. and Mrs. Roemling and Norbert Mering. 
They related that Mering was building two plaques with the family´s 
name on it. One will be on a wall at the school and will have the name of the 
prize winner engraved each year. The second plaque is a historical one that 
the Roemling family has given permission to display permanently near the 
front of the house after it had been completed.  
Mering’s action was one of several that suggested that the experience had 
been a positive, and even healing, one for second-generation members of the 
Essen community. Dirk Fuchs, the owner of the first-floor unit at Alte Zeilen, 
wrote to Jeff Kelly Lowenstein. In his letter he said that he had appreciated 
the family’s visit to their home, that he wanted to spend some time 
introducing his family to Kelly Lowenstein and that the home had been a 
place of joy for his family.  
Members of the third generation seemed positively affected by their 
participation in the project, too. Gabriele Thimm’s children Gawain and 
Gloria said they felt enriched by participating in the project in a supportive 
role, a number of her students told her in 2012 that the Lowenstein family’s 
visit had been one of the highlights of the year for them, and several of the 
young men who had written the rap went with Thimm to greet Edward 
Lowenstein and Lee Kass at the train station when they arrived in June 2013.  
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The second visit and award presentation cemented many ties that had 
been established. It also allowed the family and the community to engage 
with each other in a way similar to the one that the student at the first 
ceremony had described; aware of and sobered by the past, but living in the 
present with an eye toward the future. 
“Children need repetitions,” Gabriele Thimm wrote about the family’s 
second visit. “They need tradition. So you can install the awareness of their 
own responsibility for a better world. In retrospect, I realize what has 
happened with the students. Before our project nobody talked about his own 
family-history. But today more and more children know about their own 
family and they tell about it. So they get an empathically feeling for each 
other. This is a beginning for understanding and also for working together―I 
hope.” 
Further Expansion and Development of the Project  
The project has continued to expand and grow. 
In November 2013, students from Realschule Uberruhr spoke about the 
Lowenstein Family Award and performed the rap in front of 250 people, 
including Essen mayor Reinhard Pass, delegates from many political parties 
and Bishop Matthias Ring, at the 75th anniversary commemoration of 
Kristallnacht in Essen.  
The number of students at Realschule Uberruhr participating in the 
second award competition was about double from the first year; the year’s 
theme was “Life in a multi-cultural community: the people of Essen.”  
In late December 2013 Gabriele Thimm suggested that the family 
consider establishing a non-profit association in order to be able to present 
the award at more schools and to ensure its continuation after she retired from 
the Realschule Uberruhr. The family agreed, and both Edward and Ralph 
Lowenstein enthusiastically pledged financial support for this endeavor. 
Also in December Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, a former member of South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and convener of the 2012 
conference Dunreith and Jeff Kelly Lowenstein attended, visited Essen to better 
understand the project. She went to the Lowensteins’ former apartment, met 
Gabriele Thimm and Frau Bluemel, spoke with students at the school and heard 
the rap performed. Subsequent to her visit, Gobodo-Madikizela began 
discussions with the family about winners of the award and a teacher being 
sponsored to attend a youth conference in South Africa in 2016.  
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Thus, the project has rapidly expanded beyond the original parameters to 
one involving people of good will from three continents.  
Key Themes, Unique Elements 
Many others have grappled with and written about the themes of memory, 
intergenerational transmission of trauma, the hunger to know one’s family’s 
past, and the desire for dialogue and mutual understanding among members 
of post-atrocity generations that were among the most central of the 
Lowenstein family’s trip and ensuing project.  
Indeed, there is an emerging, increasingly rich body of works that tackle 
the themes of the intergenerational transmission of trauma to the children of 
survivors and perpetrators.  
In Haunting Legacies: Violent Histories and Transgenerational Trauma, 
literary scholar Gabriele Schwab connects her personal experience growing 
up in postwar Germany with those of her countrymen on both sides of the 
genocide. Schwab also delves into the “disappearances” that happened in 
South American countries like Chile and Argentina and explores these issues 
in South Africa during the apartheid era.  
The late psychologist Dan Bar-On’s interviews with the children of 
former Nazis, several of whom were high-ranking officials, formed the basis 
for his significant work A Legacy of Silence. Both books address the themes 
of shame and the desire on both sides to puncture the silence that is one of the 
chief vehicles of transmission and enforcement of trauma.  
Others have written about the experience of returning to one’s former 
home or site of detention. In “We Would Not Have Come Without You”: 
Generations of Nostalgia, professors and spouses Marianne Hirsch and Leo 
Spitzer chronicle their return with her parents to Czernowitz, Romania. In 
1995, Elie Wiesel returned to the Auschwitz death camp, the place where he 
had lived and his father has died, and memorably implored a merciful God to 
“not have mercy on those who had no mercy on Jewish children.” In a related 
but different vein, Helen Epstein describes her efforts to go beyond the single 
photograph she possessed and learn about her mother’s experience in Where 
She Came From: A Daughter’s Search for Her Mother’s History.  
There have also been numerous projects and works about dialogue 
between the children of Nazis and the children of survivors. Psychology 
Professor Florence Kaslow writes in the Journal of Family Psychotherapy 
about one such effort in the article, A Holocaust Dialogue Continues: Voices 
of Descendants of Victims and Perpetrators.  
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The members of PAKH have been in regular dialogue for more than 15 
years. The topic has inspired works of art like The Lost Childhood, an opera 
based in part on survivor Yehuda Nir’s memoir by the same name. The work 
depicts conversation and confrontation between a Holocaust survivor and 
post-war German, each of whom struggles with the past’s emotional 
burdens.  
The Lowenstein family trip bears similarities to the central concerns of 
these works, yet also has a number of distinctive elements. The first is the 
unique presence of Gabriele Thimm and her role in helping to transform what 
was initially a personal journey of family return into a public forum for 
healing. Hirsch and Spitzer conclude their article about her parents’ standing 
in their former community and thanking their daughter and son-in-law for 
giving them the strength to return to their former home. No one from present-
day Czernowitz is interacting with them. By contrast, Thimm’s actions, from 
initiating contact with the family, inviting them to the November 2011 
ceremony, planning the week with Jeff Kelly Lowenstein, working with the 
students to carry out the pair of ceremonies in 2012, administering the first 
award contest, suggesting the formation of an association, and hosting Pumla 
Gobodo-Madikizela all played a vital role in helping the family feel welcome 
and creating a space for intergenerational learning on both sides. 
The presence of three generations of Lowenstein family members is 
another element that distinguishes the trip from other similar journeys, which 
at most involve two generations. Aidan Kelly Lowenstein’s being able to 
witness the return of his grandfather is both rare and a powerful story of 
survival and resilience. 
Edward Lowenstein and the family’s decision not just to return and 
engage in dialogue with the community, but to confer an award designed to 
honor those students whose written work reflects a commitment to tolerance 
and justice is a third unique aspect of the Lowenstein family trip. Lowenstein 
spoke openly with the community about the atrocities that had occurred in the 
country and that for many decades had made him unwilling to return to his 
former home. Yet he also took the honorarium that had been offered to him 
and gave it back to the community. “The purpose of this is to try to do a little 
to ensure that such acts as occurred in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s are 
never again performed,” he said at the ceremony at the Great Synagogue in 
May 2012. He added that the family would work with school and community 
leaders to determine a mutually acceptable content and form of the award. 
Thimm and family members decided that the goal of the award would not be 
so much to focus on the past, but rather to use the lessons of the past to 
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consider the present moment and give students tools to help construct a better 
future.  
The visit by Gobodo-Madikizela and the possible participation of Israeli 
educators and students constitute a fourth unique element of the project. 
Previous dialogue projects have primarily remained with the framework of 
the original country where the trauma or atrocity occurred. Gobodo-Madiki-
zela’s speaking to students about South Africa and subsequent offer of at 
least one spot in a 2016 youth conference for a Lowenstein Family Award 
winner provided the opportunity for students and educators to place their 
experience in a larger, more global context, and to consider the simultaneous 
emotional similarities and cultural and historical differences between their 
situation and that of post-apartheid South Africa. This process is likely to 
continue and extend for all sides.  
Finally, it is worth noting the incremental, organic and unofficial manner 
in which the project began and has grown. No one involved on either side 
envisioned an award with an association, students from two countries and 
participation from people in three continents, yet that is precisely what has 
evolved thus far. The substance and process of the project sends a powerful 
message both about the role that each individual can play in bringing 
something unknown into existence and the powerful energy that is unleashed 
and to which people respond when one establishes a space for young people 
inheriting a painful past to move in a different direction.  
Potential Challenges, Limitations and Developments 
At the same time, it is important not to paint an overly rosy picture of the 
experience, as extraordinary as it was.  
Indeed, there were a series of challenges associated with it.  
To begin, it took Edward Lowenstein months to reckon and come to terms 
with the completely opposite treatment he received from the German people 
in the community when he returned to Essen with the lifelong negative 
associations he had held in his head and heart. He arrived at a sufficiently 
peaceful place by the following June to make a return trip, though it was not 
an easy process for him. 
Gabriele Thimm expressed the concern that many Germans observe 
Holocaust commemorations, but are doing so from political correctness 
rather than because the sentiment is coming from their hearts. She also talked 
about the importance of not separating the past from the present. “Only both 
together can build a better future,” she wrote. 
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Building that future will be a stiff challenge, according to Thimm, citing 
rising antisemitism in Germany, the indoctrination of many Muslim children 
against Jews through Koranic schools, parents and Arabic television shows. 
“The few Jewish children we have at school keep secret about it,” she 
wrote. 
The potential participation of the Israelis sparked discussion among 
family members about whether the award was specifically designed to focus 
on German children and the Holocaust or whether there are more universal 
messages. With the growth of the project come questions of funding, 
organizational structure and criteria by which other schools and nations can 
meaningfully participate. Finally, while the goal of young people not being 
burdened by the past is arguably a laudable one, approaching that state can 
also raise the specter of complacency, indifference and even forgetting.  
As significant as they are, these problems occur within the context of a 
real and viable entity that as of May 2012 simply did not exist. (As Edward 
Lowenstein noted in the opening words during the 2013 award ceremony, “A 
year ago we didn’t know each other. You didn’t know us and we didn’t know 
you.”)  
At the same time, the difficulties within the community that Thimm 
described provide additional motivation for Lowenstein family members and 
Thimm to expand and grow the project. 
Although not undertaken with the intention of serving as a model for 
other groups or communities to emulate, the project’s development raises the 
possibility a number of elements might well be worthy of consideration for 
others interested in doing similar work. 
These include the building of respect and trust through regular communi-
cation, continuous sharing of new information, and checking to see how a 
person on the “other side” is feeling, the importance of planning while 
retaining flexibility, and the recognition that each person in this situation has 
something valuable to give the other, even as the meaning that each person 
derives is different. The importance of structuring time that includes a range 
of activities, including time for socializing and celebrating, is important, too. 
The goals were also enhanced by having a tangible, youth-oriented 
project that used the creation of a public and detailed description of the 
history of both sides that combined elements of acknowledging the past, 
living in the present and working to create a better world in the future. 
“I think ... that the story of the Lowenstein family makes history alive,” 
wrote Gloria, Gabriele’s daughter in an email message, “I think many of the 
learners were very touched when they met you first. I think such personal 
stories are a good sign for young people ... that you didn’t talk about guilt but 
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that you were in a dialogue with them. People have to understand that it’s not 
possible to turn back time, but that we have to look to the future and try our 
best to have good and deep relations” (G. Thimm, personal communication, 
February 17, 21014). 
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Psychosocial Approaches to Healing in Burundi 
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University of Sydney, Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Services, Burundi 
Introduction 
As one of the poorest countries in the world, Burundi is struggling to recover 
from 40 years of political and genocidal violence, including a civil war 
during which approximately 300,000 people died and many more were 
wounded, internally displaced or became refugees. This paper argues that 
addressing the cycles of trauma produced by these cycles of violence is 
critical to peacebuilding and prevention of further violence. By examining the 
work of the Burundian non-government organisation THARS (Trauma 
Healing and Reconciliation Services) and other local Quaker organisations, 
we explore how combining locally-developed trauma healing and 
reconciliation methods with principles of capacity-building and self-help, can 
assist in building social trust and community resilience. 
The chapter also considers how Burundians are preparing for the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that was agreed as part of the Arusha 
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000, and the likely psychosocial 
impact of the TRC, based on research conducted by THARS in 2012. Our 
overall aim is to further understanding of how approaches to transitional 
justice and peacebuilding can be more localised, holistic and transformative 
through addressing psychosocial needs and priorities with a particular 
emphasis on trauma healing and reconciliation. But first, an account of the 
causes and consequences of the politically motivated ethnic violence 
illuminates the challenges and opportunities facing the Burundian people as 
they seek to rebuild their country through dealing with the legacies of the 
past. 
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Ethnic Tensions, Genocide and Civil War  
Burundi, together with its more well-known neighbour, Rwanda, was 
colonised by Germany as part of German East Africa in 1890, and following 
World War I it became a League of Nations mandate, and later following 
World War II a trust territory, of Belgium. The kingship structure and 
geographical boundaries of Burundi remained relatively unchanged since the 
mid-19th century, with a very high population density in a country less than 
the size of Belgium (Watt, 2008, pp. 23-4). In pre-colonial Burundi, rank and 
privilege were determined largely from social status rather than ethnic 
identity as such, although these tended to coincide (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 
10), and there were no wars or conflicts between the majority Hutu and 
minority Tutsi groups (Uvin, 2009, p. 7). The political system was relatively 
stable, and the Hutu/Tutsi divide remained more fluid in Burundi even under 
Belgian colonial rule, compared with neighbouring Rwanda, with the result 
that post-independence in 1962 a mixed government emerged in Burundi 
(Lemarchand, 1996, p. 1). However, political stability quickly eroded over 
the next four years, with an increase in Hutu/Tutsi differences and a number 
of coup d’état, resulting in Tutsi military rule from 1966 until the beginning 
of the civil war in 1993 (Uvin, 2009, p. 9).  
Like Rwanda, Burundi has experienced genocide, but the history of 
power dynamics, political coups and violence since independence has been 
more volatile and complex. In 1972, approximately 200,000 Hutu were 
massacred by the Tutsi army in response to a violent Hutu uprising against 
Tutsi rule, and up to an estimated 300,000 Hutu refugees fled to neighbouring 
countries. It was after the genocide of 1972 that the Hutu/Tutsi divide became 
more widely and deeply entrenched. Hutu were thereafter almost totally 
excluded from political and military leadership, education and business 
(Uvin, 2009, p. 10), and the memories continued to haunt the Hutu masses 
creating a collective trauma driven by fear of another ‘holocaust’ 
(Lemarchand, 1996). In 1988, a small violent uprising incited by extremists 
afraid of impending liberal reforms, was followed by a localised but still 
vicious revenge massacre by the Tutsi army, which added further fuel to Hutu 
fears (Watt, 2008, p. 41).  
Efforts towards democratisation resulted in a brief period of Hutu-led 
government which was abruptly ended when the President was killed in a 
coup d’état in 1993 (Uvin, 2009, p. 11-14). An estimated 50,000 Tutsi lost 
their lives in revenge killings, and a further 700,000 Hutu refugees fled in 
fear of reprisal massacres (Watt, 2008, p. 48). The civil war had begun.  
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Peace, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice 
Violence had become a political strategy in Burundi, with coups a regular 
occurrence when any hint of political stability seemed on the horizon. 
Factional splits in the Hutu rebel movement resulted in a number of rebel 
groups emerging to fight the Tutsi-dominated security forces and the local 
Tutsi militia, whilst divisions amongst the Tutsi elite also fuelled the violent 
approach to political power (Lemarchand, 1996; Taylor, 2013). The 
internationally mediated Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was 
signed on 28 August 2000, and the United Nations provided a peacekeeping 
mission which supervised the election of a power-sharing government in 
2005 (Penklis, 2011). The fighting continued, however, until December 2008 
when the last of the rebel groups, Palipehutu-FNL, finally agreed to disarm, 
but only after reassurances that they would not be arrested and prosecuted 
(Vandeginste, 2012, p. 4). Other transitional justice issues which were 
discussed during the final peace negotiations included the release of 
combatants and prisoners of war, integration of former combatants into the 
security forces, and the rebels’ preference for a ‘Truth, Forgiveness and 
Reconciliation Commission’ (Vandeginste, 2012, p. 3). 
The 2000 Arusha Agreement had already provided a framework for 
transitional justice in Burundi, including the establishment of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in order to investigate the crimes committed in 
Burundi, promote reconciliation, and clarify and rewrite the country’s history 
(Taylor, 2013, p. 4). It called for an educational program on peace, 
democracy and ethnic tolerance and the promotion of reconciliation and unity 
amongst Burundians. It also stipulated that the transitional government would 
request the UN Security Council to set up an international judicial 
commission of inquiry which would be followed by a request for an 
international criminal tribunal for Burundi should evidence be found that acts 
of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes had been committed 
(Vandeginste, 2012, p. 2). Legislation for the establishment of the TRC was 
adopted in December 2004, but it was not implemented, and negotiations 
between the UN and the Burundian government to establish a judicial 
mechanism also foundered based on disagreements about the relationship 
between the two proposed bodies (Vandeginste, 2012, p. 2). Instead, 
agreement was reached for national consultations on transitional justice 
which were conducted in 2007, and the findings released in 2010.  
The national consultations revealed majority support for the establishment 
of a TRC with a mixed national and international composition and a mandate 
to investigate the full range of crimes from independence in 1962 until the 
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end of the civil war in 2008, as well as provision for reparations (Impunity 
Watch, 2013, p. 2). Following repeated commitments by the President, the 
creation of a technical committee, release of the Kavakure report and several 
versions of a draft law with guiding principles for the proposed TRC, the law 
to establish the TRC was finally promulgated in May 2014. At the same time, 
the UN has continued to include a mandate to support transitional justice in 
its political missions, most recently the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) which 
includes a Transitional Justice Unit (TJU) tasked with supporting civil 
society engagement in transitional justice through the creation of 
FONAREC/JT (Forum National des Relais Communautaire en Justice de 
Transition, or Forum of Community Facilitators in Transitional Justice) and 
support for the protection of witnesses once the TRC is created.  
International and local non-government organisations in Burundi have 
established a Reflection Group on Transitional Justice (Groupe de Réflexion 
sur la Justice Transitionnelle or GRJT) which, along with the UN and other 
local civil society groups, has commented on the Kavakure report and 
subsequent versions of the draft law for the establishment of the TRC. These 
comments have included criticisms that the draft law fails to comply with 
international standards and does not reflect the findings of the national 
consultations. The third draft of the law which was presented to Parliament in 
December 2012 included amendments which provide for pardon in exchange 
for confessions (conditional amnesty), and give the Burundian government 
the sole authority to nominate and select the commissioners instead of 
opening the process to public participation (Impunity Watch, 2013). This is 
disturbing but not surprising given that the government comprises a number 
of former rebel leaders who could be accused of genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity through the TRC, and who thus have a vested 
interest in maximising their control of the Commission. It is therefore a 
challenge for civil society in Burundi to have a meaningful say in the 
proposed TRC, despite the national consultations and UN presence. 
Essentially, the design and implementation of the TRC and any other national 
transitional justice process is in the hands of the Burundian government 
which is unlikely to support a robust investigation through a truth 
commission, far less prosecutions through the establishment of a special 
tribunal. 
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Trauma and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
In the absence of any formal transitional justice institutions or processes of 
reconciliation, local civil society organisations, led by THARS, have focused 
on addressing the legacy of psychological trauma in the Burundian 
population, and on preparing the population from a psychosocial perspective 
for the planned TRC. It was evident that, while a peace agreement had been 
reached and armed conflict had ended, Burundians faced many peacebuilding 
challenges in the context of extreme poverty and political indifference at the 
national level, as well as the psychological scars and social breakdown 
resulting from 15 years of civil war and mass population displacements. 
Despite intensive involvement of the UN in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, 
the focus on political and economic development at the macro level has failed 
to address the psychosocial impacts of genocide and cycles of trauma on 
individual and community well-being and ability to engage constructively 
across the ethnic divide. As argued by Gutlove and Thompson (2006), “social 
reconstruction is a strand of humanitarian activity that complements physical 
reconstruction and political reconstruction” that by focusing on community 
reconciliation aims to restore social trust and hope within a community and to 
support cooperative behaviour and the development of shared values and 
expectations (p. 187). 
THARS’ emphasis on understanding the role of trauma in the Burundian 
population and the means to promote healing has been driven by a Quaker 
belief that for peace to be lasting, you have to start on the healing process 
because healing lays the ground for creating peace in the country. It also 
draws on Western psychological theories about trauma and therapeutic 
approaches to healing, which will be elaborated in the following section. We 
argue that unhealed trauma is a driving force in perpetuating cycles of 
violence, which in turn produce more trauma, and that this affects the 
decision-making of political elites as well as relationships and therefore 
peace and development in local communities. The work of THARS is aiming 
to redress past experiences of transitional justice processes in other countries 
(such as the South African TRC), where there has been minimal recognition 
of trauma, its impact on participation in transitional justice, and the impact of 
transitional justice on trauma. 
Trauma has been defined in the Western context as the sense of being 
completely overwhelmed by a very stressful event in which the ordinary 
systems of care that give people a sense of control, connection and meaning 
are destroyed; attachments of family, friendship, love and community are 
shattered, and the belief systems that give meaning to human experience are 
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undermined (Herman, 1997). In response to real or perceived threat to the 
survival of an individual, a support system, or a larger community or culture, 
trauma leads to changes in the brain and nervous system that are essential to 
survival but potentially detrimental to ongoing sense of self, engagement in 
relationships and productive involvement in learning and work (Kantovitz & 
Riak, 2008). Collective trauma has been identified as a form of trauma which 
permeates a group living in an environment of fear and institutional failure, 
direct and/or structural violence.  
In Burundi, a new word was created in the Kirundi local language to 
express the meaning of trauma resulting from the cycles of genocidal 
violence and civil war: ihahamuka, which conveys the sense of running, 
being afraid and out of breath. The term means ‘being overwhelmed by what 
is inside me’. It attempts to capture the state of being completely 
overwhelmed and unable to cope or integrate the ideas and emotions involved 
with the traumatic experience.  
THARS started by investigating the level of trauma in the Burundian 
population, to provide a baseline for developing a project of sensitisation and 
psychosocial accompaniment during the process of transitional justice and in 
preparation for the TRC in particular. It is important to recognise here that we 
are not only talking about the trauma experienced by victims, but also the 
trauma produced by perpetrating mass violence. Surveys were conducted in 
2012 to ascertain the level of trauma in the Burundian population, as well as 
to gauge the level of knowledge about transitional justice, and to understand 
the fears and needs of Burundians in relation to transitional justice. The study 
found that 25% of the population were traumatised according to clinical 
definitions of trauma or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but this does 
not mean that the rest of the population who experienced the cycles of 
violence in Burundi do not also suffer from some symptoms of traumatic 
stress which could impact on their psychological well-being and social 
effectiveness. 
There are those who are living in the streets or sometimes with their families, 
who exhibit extreme symptoms of trauma, unable to cope at all with a normal 
life. In addition to psychological symptoms, such severe trauma or PTSD causes 
physical symptoms including confusion, nightmares, exhaustion, lack of appetite 
and sleeplessness which may be experienced immediately after the traumatic 
event and can continue to recur over many years (Hayner, 2011, p. 152). Others 
may appear to be coping, but the underlying trauma can be triggered when they 
see the person who harmed them or their families in the past, or they may not be 
able to interact on a daily level with those from the other ethnic group or 
political party. If the memories, pain and trauma remain repressed and 
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unexpressed, it is likely that family and social relationships will continue to be 
affected and economic productivity may also be impeded (Hayner, 2011, p. 
146). It is the latter impact of trauma which is mostly what trauma healing 
workshops and other community-based psychosocial interventions aim to 
address by providing a safe space for people to talk about their suffering, while 
the more serious cases of PTSD are referred to individual psychological 
counselling or psychiatric interventions when such services are available. 
The trauma experienced by Burundians during the historical cycles of 
genocidal violence has had a particularly devastating impact because of the 
targeted nature of the violence based on ethnicity and the identification of an 
enemy group which has ‘deliberately inflicted pain, suffering and 
helplessness on its victims’ (Volkan, 2009, p. 1). According to Volkan 
(2009), the transgenerational transmission of trauma can result in the 
evolution of a ‘chosen trauma’ which refers to the ‘shared representation of 
an event in a large group’s history in which the group suffered a catastrophic 
loss, humiliation and sense of helplessness at the hands of enemies’ (p. 15). 
In the case of the Hutu majority in Burundi, their chosen trauma is the 1972 
genocide, while for the Tutsi minority it is the massacres of 1993 combined 
with the impact of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis in neighbouring 
Rwanda. The repeated or ongoing experience of trauma for an individual and 
their ethnic group over long time periods, meanwhile, is likely to affect 
individual health and resilience, as well as social or community resilience, the 
success of development projects and the ability to continue life with hope for 
the future (Yoder, 2005, p. 27). The impact of trauma induced by such 
extreme political violence as occurred in Burundi can also be reinforced by 
the chronic traumatic experience of living in poverty and facing severe 
economic and social challenges which can impede the healing process 
(Hayner, 2011, p. 152).  
A truth and reconciliation commission has the potential to enable group 
mourning and begin to heal the chosen traumas of each group if it allows the 
stories of both victims and perpetrators to be heard and acknowledged, 
recognising that both groups have suffered loss and trauma (Volkan, 2009; 
Minow, 1998). This was the approach taken by the South African TRC, 
where both black and white victims and perpetrators of violence during the 
apartheid era were able to tell their stories, to forgive and reconcile at an 
interpersonal level in order to support the national reconciliation process. The 
transformative potential of acknowledgement via a TRC could thus be critical 
for Burundians to begin to heal their historical wounds and collective trauma 
(Green, 2009). Following safety and freedom from fear of recurrence, 
acknowledgment is the second stage identified as part of the process of 
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trauma recovery or healing (Herman, 1997). This potential benefit of the 
TRC will depend on all political parties and ethnic groups involved in the 
conflict participating and being willing to contribute to determining the 
factual/forensic truth as well as sharing their personal/narrative truths, in 
order to create a social/dialogical truth and as a result the opportunity for 
promoting a healing/restorative truth at the individual, community and 
national levels (Boraine, 2006). 
If the TRC is able to provide a safe and respectful space for victims and 
witnesses to tell their stories and express their feelings, and previously denied 
events and responsibility are acknowledged, the process of recovery and 
healing may thus be supported. However, the TRC could serve to 
retraumatise individuals through the retelling of stories of pain, humiliation 
and suffering, and reinforce collective trauma if the political leaders of Hutu 
or Tutsi groups fail to acknowledge their role in perpetuating the cycles of 
violence (Brounéus, 2010). Burundians also fear that by revisiting the past it 
will reignite the hatreds and undermine the potential for reconciliation. 
Indeed, the evidence that truth commissions can promote reconciliation is far 
from clear (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2009, p. 150). By focusing on the 
importance of psychosocial accompaniment, THARS is seeking to reduce the 
chances of retraumatisation as a result of the TRC, and by combining this 
approach with sensitisation, trauma healing and reconciliation programs in 
local communities, the aim is to strengthen individual and community 
resilience and social trust in a culturally appropriate manner in order to 
maximise the potential of the TRC to promote healing and reconciliation. As 
pointed out by Hayner (2011), ‘a truth commission is not therapy’ (p. 151) 
and THARS recognises that positive and sustainable impact will only be 
achieved if TRC staff are trained in trauma awareness and psychological 
support is provided for those who testify, along with ongoing community-
level psychosocial programs. Healing is a process that requires time and 
support in order to build resilience and guard against relapses. 
A number of Burundians have expressed strong misgivings about the 
likelihood that the TRC will be successful in this aim as the political party in 
power is making unilateral decisions about its structure, composition and 
functioning. It seems unlikely at this stage that there will be a representative 
expression of the truth in a way that would acknowledge the pain and loss of 
all Burundians from different ethnic groups and political parties. The TRC 
has thus been described by some Burundians as a commission to protect the 
politicians rather than the people. The work of THARS and other 
organisations promoting psychosocial healing and community level 
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reconciliation and unity thus becomes more important to counter the 
potentially divisive and retraumatising impact of the TRC.  
THARS has produced a brochure and a training program on transitional 
justice which include an emphasis on healing, forgiveness and reconciliation 
and as part of the Quaker Peace Network in Burundi (QPN Burundi) has 
developed a Burundian model of transitional justice. This model translates 
the UN’s four pillars of transitional justice (prosecutions, truth recovery, 
reparations and institutional reform) into more culturally and contextually 
sensitive processes. The QPN Burundi model was launched in June 2014 at a 
public event attended by representatives from a number of local as well as 
international civil society organisations, the media, government and United 
Nations. The model includes reference to the need for healing and other 
psychosocial processes such as community dialogue and reconciliation which 
can improve social cohesion and thereby contribute to the prevention of the 
reoccurrence of socio-political atrocities. It also calls for removal of the 
cultural and other barriers to finding the truth as a means to healing the pain 
and hurt caused by the war and thus to support justice and forgiveness, good 
relations and a sustainable peace (QPN Burundi, 2014, p. 6). During the 
discussion and exchange of ideas after the QPN model was launched, a 
consensus emerged that the work of QPN was commendable as a tool to 
foster healing and reconciliation even though it did not fully address the 
justice component.  
Trauma Healing and Peacebuilding 
By contrast, at the macro-level of United Nations-led peacebuilding and 
national development, limited attention is paid to the role of trauma healing 
and psychosocial services (Lambourne & Gitau, 2014). There is a perceived 
disconnect between the individual, the community and the state which is not 
breached in traditional peace processes and theories of development which 
focus on political and socioeconomic change. Trauma diagnosis and healing 
are seen as belonging in the realm of psychology, psychotherapy and 
counselling, and in the Western context this means professional training in 
specific skills and techniques. Processes of healing, forgiveness and 
reconciliation are associated with personal, spiritual transformation which is 
not considered appropriate to include in the political, economic or 
development spheres at community, national or international levels. 
At the micro-level, however, faith-based civil society actors recognise the 
critical role of individual and collective healing for peacebuilding and 
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development. In the aftermath of mass violence, the psychological process of 
healing is intimately bound up with the social context, requiring ‘social 
transformation aimed at rebuilding the shattered political, economic and 
social relationships’ (Hamber, 2001, p. 131). Especially in African contexts 
such as Burundi, where religion and spirituality play a prominent role in 
individual beliefs and community life, healing and reconciliation are 
supported as priorities for community development. World Vision, for 
example, has developed a model of transformational development 
underpinned by an understanding of the links between trauma healing, 
peacebuilding and development (Kantowitz & Riak, 2008). According to this 
model, individual and collective trauma inhibits survivors’ ability to engage 
in post-conflict reconstruction and development, so there is a need to focus 
on agency and empowerment, and meeting basic needs. Inspired by his 
experience working with genocide survivors in Rwanda, Gasana (2008) 
proposed three stages of the trauma healing journey which are necessary for 
overcoming poverty and building peace: journey of energy recovery, journey 
of hope renewal, and journey towards togetherness and connectedness (pp. 
157-9).  
Our research has supported the observation that participation in 
development is adversely affected by a lack of hope, trust and resilience in 
communities after mass violence. And community healing has been found to 
directly address the restoration of the social fabric that has been destroyed as 
a result of mass violence and contribute to the relational health of the society 
as a whole (Gutlove & Thompson, 2006, p. 185). Reconnection with society 
is the final stage of trauma healing advocated by Herman (1997). Gutlove 
and Thompson (2006) advocate the embedding of trauma healing within a 
program of psychosocial support that is ‘synergistic with related 
humanitarian and reconstruction efforts’ (p. 193). THARS has therefore 
focused its work on healing linked with relationship and capacity-building in 
order to foster reconciliation, social trust and productive engagement in 
livelihoods. This approach directly addresses the root causes of direct and 
structural violence in order to counter ongoing trauma, and thus to interrupt 
the cycles of violence.  
This practice is underpinned by a process of healing and reconciliation 
through the creation of transformative relational spaces that enable a healing 
of the gap between self and other. This idea is linked to the concept of 
intercommunal reconciliation, described by Andrieu (2010) as unfettered 
dialogical processes building spaces in which participants would be able to 
discuss the causes of conflict and its societal consequences. It also builds on 
Gasana’s model of community life in which three primary spaces of 
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communication, solidarity-building and conciliation intersect in four new 
spaces of social interaction: transformed relationships, healing and 
wholeness, truth telling and unity-building processes (Gasana, 2008).  
Burundians tend to be reticent by nature, and this cultural tendency is 
exacerbated by the impact of traumatic wounds which people may be afraid 
to speak about. Many people do not understand why they are having intrusive 
thoughts or behaving strangely, perhaps thinking that their trauma symptoms 
are the result of ‘demonic attacks or the work of ancestral spirits’ (Watt, 
2008, p. 125). The methods used by THARS and others to promote healing 
and reconciliation share some common principles, including the provision of 
a safe space for people to share their stories and their trauma, so that they feel 
heard and the psychological barriers separating them from others begin to be 
eroded. Workshop participants come to realise that they are not alone, and 
start to reach out to others in friendship as their fear, anger and suspicion is 
relieved and transformed. 
THARS has a number of projects and programs which support its overall 
mission: ‘to contribute to the healing and peacemaking in the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa in general and Burundi in particular, using a holistic 
approach which brings people of all walks of life to psychosocial healing and 
resolution of differences’ (THARS, 2010-2011). These projects and programs 
include trauma healing training workshops; alternatives to violence 
workshops; building ‘listening rooms’; support groups for women who were 
once victims of war-related atrocities; self-help groups to empower the 
poorest women; healing of memories workshops; conflict mitigation and 
reconciliation; rescue and reintegrate children; transitional justice and Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission preparations; and development of the 
THARS centre in Gitega (the second largest town in Burundi). 
The THARS listening rooms apply a particular technique of group 
counselling or therapy with a trained facilitator (‘listener’) and with a specific 
focus on listening. Participants in THARS workshops are educated about the 
impact of trauma on brain functioning and the ability to express what has 
happened to them. Individual responses in these workshops include saying: 
‘Yes―that is what happened’ … ‘Me too’ and ‘me too’. The workshops and 
listening rooms help people to feel empowered and raise their self-esteem so 
they are able to make healthy choices and be responsible for the choices they 
make.  
The THARS intervention model provides a parallel with the three stages 
identified by Herman (1997) which trauma victims move through in the 
healing process: safety, acknowledgement and reconnection. Trauma healing 
aims to give victims (and perpetrators) a feeling that they have control over 
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their lives again. Healing programmes guided by these processes foster 
resilience in the survivors, defined as ‘the capacity to positively or 
successfully adapt to external problems or threats’ (Chandler, 2012, p. 217). 
This capacity is both at an individual level and at a community level; 
individual resilience contributes to building community resilience, and vice-
versa.  
One of the specific methods used by THARS in Burundi is the conduct of 
AVP (Alternatives to Violence Project) workshops in rural settings where 
there are political and ethnic tensions. AVP is a program developed by the 
Quakers to encourage and train people to use creative, non-violent strategies 
for handling conflicts which might otherwise lead to violence. The guiding 
principle of AVP is the potential of ‘transforming power’ which is explored 
through experiential, interactive exercises that focus on affirmation, 
cooperation, personal sharing, trust-building, community-building, role 
playing, humour and confronting and accommodating differences among 
members of the group (Garver & Reitan, 1995, p. 4). 
THARS has also run Healing of Memories workshops as developed by 
Father Michael Lapsley in South Africa (www.healing-memories.org). 
Comments from participants in these workshops in Burundi indicate how 
they contribute to promoting trauma recovery, reconciliation and trust:  
I hadn’t realized how serious the workshop was at the beginning. It enabled me to 
review my whole life and face issues from the past that I had been avoiding. 
I was able to discover some of the feelings I had been avoiding and have not been 
aware of different ethnic groups can share together how they have been affected. 
I liked the freedom of expression right through the workshop; it enabled us to trust 
and made us willing to share our feelings.  
THARS support groups involve women who have been victims of war-
related atrocities coming together to complete their healing processes through 
manual activities and a little commerce, including making quilts, baskets, 
soap, bags and jewellery. The emphasis is on practical activities, making 
things with their hands and working together, which helps in addressing the 
neurological impacts of trauma, as well as making an income from what they 
produce so they can become helpful and productive in the family. In these 
groups, and the self-help groups for the poorest women to realise their hidden 
potential, there is a focus on the mentality of self-reliance and ownership, as 
well as relationship-building, which helps to restore hope, dignity, well-being 
and social trust. The self-help groups are based on three principles of 
empowerment: economic, social and political empowerment, which aim to 
facilitate improved life conditions for the women and their children. The 
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approach taken by THARS is thus consistent with the claim by Gutlove and 
Thompson (2006) that ‘healing societal trauma involves the development of 
support groups that employ a facilitated process whereby individuals heal in 
the context of a group’ (p. 192). It also illustrates how ‘empowerment is an 
important by-product of reconnection’ that enables survivors to re-engage 
within a functional society (Gutlove & Thompson 2006, pp. 193 & 211).  
Another Quaker organisation which operates on a similar philosophy in 
Burundi is Healing and Rebuilding Our Communities (HROC), which was 
created in partnership with the African Great Lakes Initiative of the Friends 
Peace Teams in 2003. HROC workshops bring together participants from the 
different ethnic groups in order to build trust, deepen psychological healing 
and thereby contribute to rebuilding communities. Each workshop involves 
three steps: education about trauma, understanding and relating to others’ 
experiences of trauma, and working together to build more peaceful 
communities through developing joint projects if participants wish to do so. 
Such projects have included joint goat-raising and joint crop farming on 
shared land. HROC programs address the psychological trauma of individual 
participants at the same time as supporting community peacebuilding through 
joint income-generation projects. HROC workshops have also been run only 
for the Twa minority group to help them understand and heal from 
intergenerational trauma, and to assist them with training in kitchen 
gardening and nutritional health. These psychosocial interventions thus 
directly assist in building sustainable peace and development. 
Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation under the Cross (MiPAREC), another 
member of the Quaker Peace Network in Burundi, has focused on creating 
peace committees in rural communities throughout Burundi. MiPAREC was 
the first of the Quaker organisations to start peace work in Burundi, and it has 
recently become very involved in making sure that principles of peace and 
reconciliation are included in the transitional justice process in Burundi. The 
QPN Burundi model for transitional justice includes reference to the potential 
contribution of local peace committees to building good relations as a basis for 
peace, security and community development (QPN Burundi, 2014, p. 7). 
THARS workshops and programs enable Hutu and Tutsi to come 
together, shake hands, laugh together, realise that they are one people, and 
discover that the violence was based on political manipulation so that their 
fear can be dispelled. The Twa are also included in workshops, sometimes as 
facilitators, which contributes to reducing discrimination against this most 
marginalised group. THARS’ approach specifically aims to be inclusive and 
holistic, focusing on relationship-building and empowerment to help build 
both individual and community resilience. In this way, localised approaches 
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to reconciliation and community development through individual and 
collective healing can assist in providing the basis for the prevention of 
further violence and thus for a more sustainable peace. 
Conclusion: Planting the Seeds of Peace Through Healing 
The seeds of tomorrow’s wars grow in the soil of today’s unhealed traumas. The 
seeds of tomorrow’s peace grow in the soil of today’s healing and reconcilia-
tion.―THARS website (www.thars.org) 
In this chapter, we have begun to explore how psychosocial transformation 
through individual and collective trauma healing can contribute to building 
sustainable peace. As argued by Hart (2008), peacebuilding in traumatised 
societies requires attention to challenging the emotional as well as structural 
causes of mass violence. Trauma healing interventions such as those 
conducted by THARS in Burundi specifically focus on the individual 
psychological as well as relational aspects of micro-level peacebuilding. 
Combining this inner transformation and relational transformation with 
macro-level political, economic and legal structural transformation can 
provide the foundation for transformative peacebuilding, the restoration of 
social order and economic development from the ground up (Lambourne, 
2009). Daly and Sarkin (2007) similarly argue that conceptualising 
reconciliation as an inclusive process of social restructuring, rather than 
focusing on restoration of relationships between enemies as such, can 
promote new cultural values and a broad vision of a peaceful future. 
LeBaron (2003) emphasizes the importance of engaging people in post-
conflict societies in ways that address their psychological, spiritual, emotional, 
and physical needs―a holistic approach, combined with flexibility and 
creativity (pp. 168-9). This kind of approach helps to build resilience and 
coping strategies to enable traumatised survivors of mass violence to re-
imagine and re-engage productively in life and work (de Jong, 2011). As 
outlined by de Jong (2011), resilience enables individuals and groups ‘to 
restore a new balance and related worldview’ which enhances the ability to 
cope with the political, socioeconomic and physical conditions of the post-
conflict peacebuilding context. This observation is reinforced by the South 
African experience where the Khulamani self-help group has continued to grow 
and provide community support for survivors of trauma, and according to some 
‘provided a much greater sense of healing than the (TRC) itself’ (Hayner, 2011, 
p. 158). 
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As discussed, the TRC in Burundi is unlikely to be successful in 
promoting a full acknowledgement of the truth and a supportive environment 
for healing and reconciliation without significant political transformation. 
The QPN model of transitional justice for Burundi proposes a culturally 
contextualised and comprehensive approach to addressing these socio-
political deficits with its emphasis on developing leadership, positive 
relationships and community empowerment supported by psychosocial 
reintegration. In the absence of an effective TRC, local community programs 
are making an impact on psychological healing and reconciliation in Burundi. 
As argued by Gutlove and Thompson (2006), psychosocial healing ‘promotes 
the psychological and social health of individuals, families and community 
groups’ and thus contributes to the ‘relational health of the society as a 
whole’ ( p. 185). 
The work of THARS and other Quaker organisations in Burundi 
illustrates the potential significance of a psychosocial approach to ending 
cycles of violence through culturally appropriate trauma healing programs at 
individual and community levels, and reinforces the critical role of 
psychologists and faith-based actors in a transformative holistic approach to 
transitional justice and peacebuilding.  
References 
Andrieu, K. (2010). Civilizing peacebuilding: Transitional justice, civil society and the 
Liberal paradigm, Security Dialogue, 41(5), 537-558. 
Boraine, A. (2006). Defining transitional justice: Tolerance in the search for justice and 
peace in Boraine, A. & Valentine, S. (Eds) Transitional justice and human security. 
Cape Town: International Center for Transitional Justice, 22-37. 
Brounéus, K. (2010) The trauma of truth telling: Effects of witnessing in the Rwandan 
gacaca courts on psychological health, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(3), 408-437.  
Chandler, D. (2012) Resilience and human security: The post-interventionist paradigm’, 
Security Dialogue, 43(3), 213-229. 
Daly, E. & Sarkin, J. (2007) Reconciliation in divided societies: Finding common ground. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
de Jong, K. (2011) Psychosocial and Mental Health Interventions in Areas of Mass 
Violence: A Community-Based Approach. Guideline Document. 2nd edn, Amsterdam: 
Médecins Sans Frontières. 
Gasana, S. N. (2008) Confronting conflict and poverty through trauma healing: Integrating 
peace-building and development processes in Rwanda in Clark, P. & Kaufman, Z. D. 
(Eds), After genocide: Transitional justice, post-conflict reconstruction and 
reconciliation in Rwanda and beyond, London: Hurst & Company, 145-169. 
Gobodo-Madikizela, P. (2009) Working through the past in Gobodo-Madikizela, P. & Van Der 
Merwe, C. (Eds), Memory, narrative and forgiveness: Perspectives on the unfinished 
journeys of the past. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 148-169. 
306 Wendy Lambourne, David Niyonzima  
Green, P. (2009) The pivotal role of acknowledgement in social healing’ in Gobodo-
Madikizela, P. & Van Der Merwe, C. (Eds), Memory, narrative and forgiveness: 
Perspectives on the unfinished journeys of the past. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 74-97. 
Gutlove, P. & Thompson, P. (2006) Using psychosocial healing in postconflict recon-
struction’ in Fitzduff, M. & Stout, C.E. (Eds) The psychology of resolving global 
conflicts: From war to peace, Volume 3: Interventions, Westport, Con.: Praeger 
Security International, 185-213. 
Hamber, B. (2001) Does the truth heal? A psychological perspective on political strategies 
for dealing with the legacy of political violence in Biggar, N. (Ed.) Burying the past? 
Making peace and doing justice after civil conflict, Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 131-148. 
Hart, B. (2008) The way forward in Hart, B. (Ed.), Peacebuilding in traumatized societies, 
Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 319-325. 
Hayner, P.B. (2011) Unspeakable truths: Transitional justice and the challenge of truth 
commissions. New York: Routledge. 
Herman, J. H. (1997) Trauma and recovery. New York: Basic Books. 
Impunity Watch (2013, January). Policy brief: Burundi’s draft law on the proposed TRC, 
Bujumbura: Impunity Watch.  
Kantowitz, R. & Riak, A. (2008) Critical links between peacebuilding and trauma healing: 
A holistic framework for fostering community development’ in Hart, B. (Ed.), 
Peacebuilding in traumatized societies, Lanham, Maryland: University Press of 
America, 3-26. 
Lambourne, W. (2009) Transitional justice and peacebuilding after mass violence, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3(1), 28-48. 
Lambourne, W. (2012) Outreach, inreach and civil society participation in transitional 
justice’ in N. Palmer, P. Clark & D. Granville (Eds) Critical perspectives in 
transitional justice, Cambridge, UK: Intersentia, 235-261. 
Lambourne, W. & Gitau, L. W. (2014) Psychosocial interventions, peacebuilding and 
development in Rwanda’, Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 8(3), 23-36. 
LeBaron, M. (2003) Bridging cultural conflicts: A new approach for a changing world. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Lemarchand, R. (1996) Burundi: Ethnic conflict and genocide. Cambridge, UK: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press. 
Minow, M. (1998) Between vengeance and forgiveness: Facing history after genocide and 
mass violence. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Niyonzima, D. (2001) Unlocking Horns: Forgiveness and Reconciliation in Burundi. 
Newberg, Oregon: Barclay Press. 
Penklis, D. J. (2011) Implications of the 1993 to 2008 Burundi peace process for United 
Nations peacekeeping operations, unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Sydney. 
Quaker Peace Network Burundi (2014, June) QPN Burundi Modele de Justice 
Transitionelle’, Bujumbura: QPN. [translated from the French by the author] 
Richters, A. (2010) Community-based sociotherapy in Rwanda’ in Kapteigns, L. & 
Richters, A. (Eds) Mediations of violence in Africa: Fashioning new futures for 
contested pasts. Leiden: Brill, 74-90. 
Taylor, D. (2013) Truth under the avocado trees: Local needs and Burundi’s TRC: Whither 
the Truth?, Journal of East African Studies, 7(3), 450-470. 
 Psychosocial Approaches to Healing in Burundi 307 
THARS & GIZ ZFD (2012) Study of the needs in psychosocial accompaniment for victims 
during the process of transitional justice’, Bujumbura: THARS. 
Uvin, P. (2009) Life after violence: A people’s story of Burundi. London: Zed Books. 
Vandeginste, S. (2012) Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: How to shed 
light on the past while standing in the dark shadow of politics’, International Journal 
of Transitional Justice, 6(2),355-365. 
Volkan, V. (2009) The next chapter: Consequences of societal trauma in Gobodo-
Madikizela, P. & Van Der Merwe, C. (Eds), Memory, narrative and forgiveness: 
Perspectives on the unfinished journeys of the past. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 1-26. 
Watt, N. (2008) Burundi: Biography of a small African country. London: Hurst & 
Company. 
Yoder, C. (2005) The little book of trauma healing. Intercourse, PA: Good Books. 
 
   
Chapter 16 
Breaking Cycles of Trauma through Diversified 
Pathways to Healing: Western and Indigenous 
Approaches with Survivors of Torture and War 
Western and Indigenous Approaches with Survivors of War 
Shanee Stepakoff 
California Institute of Integral Studies 
Introduction 
For the past two decades, professionals working in settings affected by war 
and ethnopolitical violence have debated the usefulness of Western-oriented 
psychotherapy approaches, such as psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral 
therapies (Stepakoff et al., 2006). Some practitioners (e.g., Wessells, 1999; 
Wessells & Monteiro, 2004) have maintained that community dialogues and 
alternative healing rituals such as purification ceremonies may be preferable 
to psychological care. Others (e.g., LeRoy, 2002) have argued that traditional 
healers provide valuable services for war-affected populations. The 
importance of social-systems interventions such as livelihood support, 
conscientization, and collective action has also been emphasized (Wessells, 
2008). Often, these debates have been characterized by a failure to recognize 
the possibility of blending Western and indigenous approaches to healing, in 
order to more effectively address the psychological suffering that is often a 
part of daily life for survivors of large-scale trauma. 
The aim of this chapter is to challenge that polarization by discussing two 
psychosocial programs in which psychological counseling and indigenous 
healing methods were successfully combined. Both programs were developed 
by the same international nongovernmental organization (NGO)―the Center 
for Victims of Torture (CVT), but were implemented in very different settings: 
(1) refugee camps in a remote rural region of Guinea, West Africa, serving 
war-traumatized Liberians and Sierra Leoneans; and (2) an urban clinic in 
Amman, Jordan, serving Iraqis who had fled ethnopolitical violence in their 
homeland. I spent two years with CVT (one year in each of these programs), as 
a clinician/trainer on an international team of mental health professionals. We 
recruited, trained, and supervised teams of Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
paraprofessonal counselors in Guinea, and a team of professional Iraqi, 
Palestinian, and Jordanian counselors in Amman. We worked closely and 
collaboratively with the local counselors as they learned to facilitate group 
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sessions; we provided live, on-site supervision in a large percentage of the 
sessions; and we met with the local counselors regularly to plan and debrief the 
therapy sessions. Though there were a number of similarities in the programs, 
for the purposes of this chapter each of the programs is considered separately, 
below.  
Guinea 
In the refugee camps, in addition to suffering based on difficulties obtaining 
adequate food, physical health care, shelter, and so forth, a substantial 
proportion of the refugees reported psychological suffering, including grief, 
lethargy, feelings of hopelessness, difficulty sleeping, and painful intrusive 
memories of the war-related events (Hubbard & Pearson, 2004; Stepakoff, 
2007). Many questioned whether they could still make meaningful 
contributions to their families and communities. Most found it difficult to 
imagine rebuilding their lives. 
As discussed in a previous publication (Hubbard & Pearson, 2004), the 
program in Guinea had three main objectives: (a) the provision of 
psychological services to address mental health problems experienced by 
refugees, (b) the enhancement of community capacity to meet the mental 
health needs of the refugees through the training and supervision of local 
refugee counselors, and (c) the raising of awareness about torture, war 
trauma, mental health, and related issues throughout the camps through 
camp-wide sensitization campaigns, including outreach to community 
leaders.  
This chapter focuses mainly on the clinical services component. (For a 
more detailed examination of the clinical model, readers are referred to 
Stepakoff et al., 2006.) CVT established and administered four community 
mental health centers in the refugee camps of Guinea, each serving an 
average of 300 clients per year. Given the particular context, it was important 
to be able to reach large numbers of people without compromising on quality 
of care. Moreover, it was necessary to enhance clients’ capacity to form 
meaningful interpersonal relationships and establish new social support 
systems. CVT’s approach was designed to effectively address these realities.  
A variety of clinical services and modalities were offered, with supportive 
group psychotherapy as the primary approach. The theoretical foundations 
for the model included elements of psychodynamic, relational/interpersonal, 
cognitive-behavioral, narrative, and expressive/humanistic psychotherapies. 
The building and encouragement of interpersonal connections was the 
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primary aim. Another key idea was that there are psychological benefits to 
representing intense emotion-laden experiences in words or other symbolic 
forms (e.g., drawings, drama, songs).  
The local counselors regularly visited vulnerable clients in their homes to 
reduce isolation, monitor well-being, and encourage renewed participation in 
the community. A hallmark of the program was the combination of Western 
and African approaches. Circular mud-brick huts with thatched roofs, built 
with locally procured materials and in a traditional style, served as 
“counseling huts”, designed to provide a sense of safety, comfort, and 
familiarity for the clients. The fact that the paraprofessional group counselors 
were themselves Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees living in the camps 
helped to ensure that the treatment methods would be culturally sensitive. 
Elements of traditional West African culture that were incorporated into 
many of the groups included healing rituals, symbols (e.g., offering kola nuts 
to welcome newcomers), folktales, drumming, chants, rhythmical clapping 
(for example, a specific clap was used to mark transitions within a group 
session, and sometimes to begin or end a session), and song.  
Most groups met for 10 weekly sessions of about two hours each, 
although the exact number of sessions was tailored to the participants’ needs 
as well as exigencies of life in the camp. Groups typically comprised 9-10 
clients (with an average attendance of 7-8 members per session), and were 
led by two local counselors, one of whom also served as a language 
interpreter for the supervising clinician. Groups were formed according to 
age (e.g., children, teens, adults), gender, and commonality of traumatic 
experiences.  
From the orientation session on, we sought to support clients in 
developing safe, caring relationships with each other. In contrast to many 
traditional Western group psychotherapy approaches, which restrict contact 
among group members outside of sessions, in our groups contact among 
members between sessions was encouraged. This seemed important, given 
that most of the clients no longer had access to the social support networks 
they relied on in their home countries. For example, in many instances 
people who had lived in cohesive neighborhoods or villages dispersed as a 
result of a violent attack. Further, for many of the refugees, multiple 
members of their immediate and extended family had been killed or were 
unaccounted for.  
Cultural stories were incorporated into the group counseling sessions. 
Sometimes clients chose to share a folktale as a way of conveying important 
truths about their experiences and feelings, but more often stories were told 
by the counselors, as a way of inviting exploration of important topics 
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(Stepakoff, 2007). The most common themes of these stories were: the 
dangers of violating confidentiality; the importance of hope and faith; heroes 
or role models who embody positive attributes; the experience of renewal 
following loss; the benefits of making and keeping friends; the ability to 
overcome adversity; communal beliefs about moral versus immoral behavior; 
and the value of peacemaking, forgiveness, and reconciliation.  
Among Liberians and Sierra Leoneans, songs are among the most common 
and valued means of expressing emotions and coping with fear, sorrow, or 
stress (Stepakoff, 2007). A review of the wide variety of songs used in the 
counseling groups indicated that songs served a variety of psychological and 
social functions: to welcome newcomers; express grief and sorrow; convey 
messages about acceptable and unacceptable behavior; renew energy; help 
people get to know each other (e.g., learn names); transition from one part of a 
session into the next; bring about calmness and relaxation; foster an attitude of 
faith, hope, and persistence; encourage peace and reconciliation; inform about 
important historical events; and say goodbye (e.g., at the end of a group cycle). 
A typical example was a Liberian song consisting of the following two lines, 
designed to be repeated numerous times so that they have an effect similar to 
that of an incantation: Never never you give up in this world―life should go 
ahead. 
Group counseling sessions almost always began and ended with a song. 
Most of the time, the songs would be initiated by the clients. Typically, one 
client would begin singing the song, and the others would quickly catch on and 
join in. There is a strong tradition of call-and-response songs among Liberians, 
so the most common situation was one in which a client would initiate the call 
portion of a song, and the other clients would sing the response. At times, songs 
were initiated by the counselors, generally with a particular therapeutic 
objective in mind. Clients seemed to appreciate and enjoy the opportunity to 
learn a new song and sing it with fellow group members during the session.  
We combined these traditional West African healing approaches with 
methods derived from contemporary psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioral 
and humanistic/expressive psychotherapies. While cognizant of the need to 
avoid an arrogant or imperialistic attitude about the usefulness of Western 
mental health approaches in a refugee camp context, we nevertheless felt that 
it would be patronizing to assume that Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees 
could not benefit from the insights or tools of contemporary psychotherapeu-
tic methods.  
One simple yet meaningful set of exercises we engaged in focused on 
supporting clients in finding and using precise, accurate words to describe 
their own emotions and those of others. In many ethnic and linguistic 
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groups in Liberia, it is common to use general terms such as feeling “bad” 
to describe a very wide range of emotions. We found that supporting clients 
in developing a capacity to choose more specific verbal representations of 
their internal states would contribute to a sense of relief and a possibility of 
being more accurately understood by others. The medium of language 
could give form and containment to otherwise overwhelming sensations 
and emotions.  
Though over the past decade there has been much debate in the 
professional literature about whether it is useful to draw upon concepts such 
as “posttraumatic stress” when working with clients in non-Western settings, 
we consistently found that clients appreciated gaining new knowledge about 
common reactions to torture and war trauma. They were relieved to learn that 
their struggles with nightmares, startle reactions, hyperarousal, and intrusive 
recollections were normal given the events they had endured. Clients 
appreciated the opportunity to compare and contrast their reactions with those 
of their peers, and to learn practical means of managing these difficulties 
more effectively (for example, mindful breathing and other grounding 
techniques). Clients expressed appreciation for these coping tools, and 
reported continuing to utilize them even after the group cycle ended.  
We used a variety of methods for building connections among group 
members, and between the counselors and group members. The local 
counselors endeavored to serve as models of empathic interpersonal 
communication. When a group member would share, the facilitator might ask 
the other group members, “what touched your heart most in what s/he just 
told us?”, and the other participants would share their responses.  
In order to help clients more fully grasp the technique of replacing negative 
self-talk with positive self-talk, the co-facilitators sometimes performed a skit 
called “The Two Hearts” (in Liberian English, “heart” refers to one’s mood or 
state of mind), which depicted a person who felt torn between an encouraging 
attitude about his/her life and a discouraging, self-defeating attitude, and who 
ultimately is able to choose the former. A variation on this was an exercise 
called “Talking Back to Discouragement”, which drew on principles from 
psychodrama and from narrative, body-oriented, and dance/movement therapies. 
In this version, participants would first generate a list of negative thoughts which 
they acknowledged as exacerbating their despair, and a facilitator would then 
embody Discouragement, approaching each group-member one at a time while 
giving voice to the pessimistic thoughts that s/he had listed (e.g., “things will 
never get better”, “the situation is hopeless”). Group members were invited to 
rise and push against the facilitator’s hands while “talking back” to him or her in 
a strong tone (e.g., “You’re wrong! I have survived hard times before, and I will 
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survive this too”). The local facilitators reported that this exercise appeared to 
have a special cultural resonance, as many of the clients’ indigenous traditions 
featured supernatural entities (e.g., “bush devils”) that personified particular 
attributes.  
The middle part of the group cycle focused on emotional, cognitive, and 
verbal processing of traumatic memories, and included narrating the trauma 
story in the presence of compassionate witnesses, and allowing oneself to feel 
a range of emotions associated with it, in a contained environment (i.e., the 
group). There was considerable debate amongst clinicians about how much 
trauma narration should be done within the groups (versus in individual 
sessions) and how it should be managed. Ideally, this task was only attempted 
after a reasonable measure of safety had been established. The particular 
interventions and techniques at this stage varied according to the needs and 
composition of the group.  
In some groups, clients were invited to share about “a time they had felt 
afraid”, or about their “most difficult moment.” Sometimes we would 
propose that they depict this first in a drawing, and then use the drawing as a 
basis for sharing. The drawings helped to provide focus and containment in 
comparison to a purely oral approach. We could not use drawings in every 
group, however, because many clients (especially the women) had never been 
to school and thus were not familiar with using pencils. In these groups, the 
facilitators would ask open questions in order to help the clients explore their 
memories and emotions. As clients would answer, facilitators would listen, 
paraphrase the essence of what had been shared, validate and normalize their 
emotions, and express empathy, while also providing group members an 
opportunity to express empathy for one another.  
At the same time, the facilitators were implicitly conveying the idea that 
nothing is too scary to be talked about. We believed that the events would be 
less overwhelming if they could be talked about, and if the trauma narratives 
could be borne by the facilitators and other group members. In addition, in 
order to reduce feelings of stigmatization and shame, and to strengthen 
connections among the group members, it was helpful to highlight the 
commonalities among them. Although trauma is a very individual 
experience, there were usually important similarities in their stories. 
Loss and grief comprised another key area that we addressed midway through 
the cycle. Refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone suffered massive losses from 
the wars. Many lost several close relatives, and some lost their entire immediate 
families. Most also had relatives who remained missing. Although nothing can 
completely erase the pain of such losses, in the group counseling sessions we 
offered a safe, contained space within which clients could feel, and express, their 
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grief. Grief tends to be more overwhelming and terrifying when people feel 
isolated and unsupported. By contrast, when the bereaved are provided with 
empathy and support, the pain can become more bearable and they can usually 
regain a capacity for hope and a sense of meaning and purpose in their lives.  
In contexts of war, mourning is a precondition for psychological 
wholeness, thus we attempted to facilitate processes whereby clients could 
begin to mourn their losses. Clients appeared to benefit from having a safe 
space and at least one other person who was willing to listen to and “hold” 
their expression of fear, anger, shock, and despair. Once the grief was 
expressed, the intensity of the anguish tended to slowly lessen and the client 
could usually find interest in life once again. Also, we attempted to support 
clients in remembering as much as possible about the lost person’s life as a 
whole, and in particular, in revivifying a positive, life-affirming internal 
representation of their loved ones as they truly were in life, thereby 
counterbalancing the horrific, violence-laden images with multisensory 
images of being nurtured and loved.  
Usually, it was also important to allow time for clients to explore their 
feelings about not having been able to perform traditional ceremonies and 
rituals following their loved ones’ deaths. As a result of the constraints of the 
war situation, in which the survivors themselves were typically captured, 
injured, struggling to survive in the bush, or attempting to flee into refuge, it 
was often impossible to carry out the rites that would normally be expected in 
peacetime, such as a proper funeral and burial. Some clients expressed a 
desire to perform some type of bereavement ritual in the camp. We 
encouraged them to fulfil this desire to the extent that they were able in the 
refugee camp setting, in which traditional religious leaders and sacred objects 
were usually lacking.  
More often, however, drawing on the idea that words could serve as a 
substitute for action, we verbally explored the mourning practices and rituals 
that each group-member would have performed if s/he had not been robbed 
of the opportunity. Group members appeared to enjoy being able to share 
about their ethnocultural bereavement practices, and to learn about those of 
others. They gained some relief from representing these practices in words, 
even without being able to actually implement them.  
The interventions we chose to use in supporting clients to explore their 
losses and grief were informed by African cultural beliefs concerning the 
continuation of consciousness after physical death, and were also informed 
by a contemporary Western view of bereavement, developed over the past 
two decades, referred to as “continuing bonds” (Klass, Silverman, & 
Nickman, 1996). In this view, the bereaved do not typically “de-cathect” their 
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lost loved ones as was believed in previous psychological models of grief, 
but rather search for meaningful and culturally appropriate ways of 
remembering and honoring connections with them for the rest of their lives. 
Thus, we supported clients in developing a sense of a positive bond with a 
lost loved one.  
Although in many Western settings this might be experienced as an “as 
if” type of process, in which the positive representation is perceived as 
internal and subjective, the Sierra Leonean and Liberian clients tended to 
experience an authentic and potent sense of actual spiritual connection with 
the soul of the lost one. We used a variety of specific techniques to achieve 
these therapeutic aims. One was inviting each client to write a letter saying 
whatever s/he would like to say to the lost person, and then write a letter to 
himself/herself, in the persona of the lost one. The messages or letters may 
then be shared with the group. Yet many of our clients lacked basic literacy 
skills. Thus, a more widely applicable approach was a guided visualization in 
which group members close their eyes and imagine that they are speaking to 
their loved one, and that their loved one is speaking to them in reply. They 
would then share these messages with the group.  
A third approach, derived from a Gestalt therapy technique, was an 
exercise in which two chairs would be placed in the center of the hut, facing 
each other, and each client would take a turn sitting in one chair and facing 
the empty chair while imagining that his or her loved one was seated there; 
the client would say whatever s/he wished to say to the loved one, and then 
switch to the empty chair and imagine himself or herself as the lost one, 
looking across at himself or herself in the empty chair and responding in the 
persona of the loved one. Aspects of this exercise were consonant with the 
indigenous practices of many of the clients, in which during funerals and 
other ceremonies there is often a spokesperson who directly addresses the 
spirit of the deceased.  
In the latter part of the group cycle, clients would begin to redefine 
themselves in the light of their traumatic experiences, place these experiences 
in the broader perspective of their total life story, and reinvest in life and the 
future. This includes forming new relationships and reintegrating into the 
community. They would also begin to reclaim a sense of their own resilience 
and worth. 
One of the themes explored in this stage was referred to as “Stories of 
Survival.” We hoped to support clients in developing a more positive self-
image, namely, as survivors rather than victims and as persons who had 
shown courage and a capacity to endure; to enhance their awareness of 
coping strategies they had employed in the past and might therefore employ 
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in the future; to contribute to the restoration of a capacity to trust other 
human beings by remembering that other people had helped them survive; 
and to help group members learn to recognize and validate each other’s 
strengths.  
A variety of techniques were used to accomplish these goals. In some 
groups the facilitator would tell a traditional folktale about a protagonist who 
had endured terrible hardships by a combination of ingenuity and 
determination. Clients would comment on the lessons conveyed in the story, 
and then share their own stories. Facilitators would pose questions such as 
“What qualities in yourself did you draw upon when things became 
especially hard?”  
During the latter part of the group cycle, we also drew on the healing 
power of images. In the African context, as in many cultures, trees are a 
powerful and resonant symbol. Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, a technique 
that was consistently well-received was the utilization of a poster-size 
painting of a tree that had lost many of its branches and leaves but which was 
still standing, possessed strong roots, and showed signs of inchoate life (e.g., 
buds, or a few tiny flowers). This poster was used as a catalyst for exploring 
themes of loss and renewal, and their inherent dignity and value as human 
beings. In response to the poster and discussion, clients would usually arrive 
at the idea that even when a tree has lost most of its branches and leaves, if it 
still has roots and the inner core of a tree, and a capacity to grow and produce 
new blossoms, then it is still a tree. They would relate this idea to themselves, 
often culminating in a discussion about a person’s indestructible “core” or 
soul, sometimes leading to a guided visualization in which they would close 
their eyes and allow themselves to receive a message from their “inner core.”  
Survivors of torture and war trauma tend to be very preoccupied with the 
past. This trauma-related difficulty envisioning or planning for the future was 
exacerbated by the overwhelming challenges of daily survival in the camps. 
Thus, in the last part of the group cycle, another theme we sought to explore 
was “facing the future.” Through a combination of discussion and creative 
techniques, we attempted to help clients generate realistic goals, begin to 
prepare for future challenges, and think about ways to rebuild their lives.  
Very often, in preparation for the final session, clients would express a 
desire to perform some type of ritual signifying their completion of the cycle. 
We felt that in many instances, rituals could contribute to the process of 
reinvesting in life. The clients had many creative ideas for ways to 
acknowledge the ending of their group experience. These included sharing 
favorite proverbs or songs; planting a palm tree or a flower garden together 
near the counseling hut; bringing scraps of fabric, needle, and thread, and 
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using them to sew something special together (in one group, participants 
sewed a cat, to represent the Liberian view that cats have “seven lives” and 
therefore, symbolizing their own capacity to survive hardship and adversity); 
and building a miniature wooden boat in which group members placed 
messages expressing their wishes and dreams for the future and which they 
then released on the river in the direction of Sierra Leone.  
A ritual that was often used in the final session of a cycle, which was 
originally developed by an expressive arts therapist in the United States yet 
resonated easily and comfortably with the Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
clients and counselors, was to invite the group members to go outside and 
find an object that symbolized hope and healing. Clients would then return to 
the counseling hut, and take turns showing the object, and explaining how 
and why they had chosen it. For example, one client presented a stone, and 
said that it represented indestructibility; another presented a green leaf, and 
said that it represented the possibility of new life; another presented a pencil, 
and said that it represented her hope of obtaining an education; and so forth. 
Clients tended to be very moved and engaged during this process. 
The most common closing ritual was to share a simple meal together at the 
end of the final session. Among the clients, it was commonly believed that once 
people have partaken of food together they will never injure or betray one 
another in the future. In many groups, when they shared a meal in the final 
session, consistent with West African traditions they set aside a small portion 
of food in memory of their lost loved ones. Sharing a meal was also a way of 
expressing feelings of connection and mutual respect among group members.  
After a group cycle was over, clients usually continued to stay in touch 
with each other, often becoming significant sources of both emotional 
sustenance and practical assistance for one another. Many former clients 
showed an interest in building greater community awareness about torture 
and war trauma. This interest seemed consistent with the goal of regaining 
the capacity for meaningful participation in public life. Often, this also 
involves a desire to help other survivors, and to be part of collective efforts at 
prevention, awareness, justice, political transformation, and truth-telling. 
An example of the ways that public truth-telling was both an indicator of 
and a contributor to trauma recovery occurred each year on June 26th, the 
United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture. One year, 
as a creative means of bearing witness to ethnopolitical trauma, we used the 
“Story-Cloth and Liberian Time Line.” The method had conceptual roots in 
narrative approaches, which emphasize the psychological importance of 
being able to think of events in a coherent sequence. Participants were first 
invited to collaboratively recall key political events from the beginning of the 
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unrest to the present. These events were written on a “timeline” of modern 
Liberian history, beginning with the 1980 “rice riots” which preceded the 
first coup. Participants were then provided with square pieces of fabric of 
various colors and were asked to think of a loved one who was tortured or 
killed, and to write the person’s name, as well as the date, place, and manner 
in which s/he was victimized, on the cloth.  
Next, with the empathic support of the facilitators, each person was invited 
to share his or her story with the other participants. Finally, each person placed 
his or her loved one’s square on the timeline cloth, matching private tragedy to 
the corresponding political event, thereby “peopling” the history. For many 
participants, this was the first time that they had ever linked their personal 
stories to a larger historical and political context, thereby becoming better able 
to make sense of traumatic experiences that had previously seemed 
incomprehensible. The cloth functioned as a “container” that allowed the 
survivor to stand outside the story and bear witness to it, rather than being 
imprisoned by it, and also served as a physical space in which survivors could 
both memorialize loved ones who were killed and acknowledge those who 
survived.  
Moreover, there soon emerged, beyond the images of the tragic losses of 
specific beloved individuals, a powerful representation of massive collective 
losses that had resulted from repeated, large-scale civil wars. Thus, pain that 
had seemed purely personal was discovered to be part of the larger, collective 
phenomenon of ethnopolitical persecution. This realization can contribute to 
reconnection with the community, thereby deepening the work of the last 
stage of healing (Herman, 1992).  
Throughout the duration of the program, the paraprofessional counselors 
were trained and supervised in conducting psychosocial assessments, and in 
using assessment to inform treatment. Measures of psychological symptoms, 
social support, and daily functioning were re-administered at one month, 
three months, six months, and twelve months post-intake. Statistical analyses 
of the data consistently showed both significant and meaningful reductions in 
trauma symptoms, and increases in social support and daily functioning, 
during and after participation in the therapy groups. After the wars in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia ended, and the refugees were repatriated, the local 
counselors went on to establish similar services and programs in their home 
countries.  
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Jordan 
CVT’s Jordan program began in 2008, and continues to the present. The 
clients were initially Iraqi survivors of torture and war trauma who had fled 
their homeland to seek refuge in Jordan, though since 2011 the program has 
also served large numbers of Syrian refugees. As with the West Africa work, 
the program model was based on capacity building, with a focus on training 
and on-site clinical supervision of Iraqi, Palestinian, and Jordanian 
counselors.  
The group therapy model had many similarities with the model used in 
the above-described Guinea program, but with modifications for the 
differences in population and setting. In Jordan, hot tea is served in all 
groups, as in Iraqi culture offering tea traditionally signifies a welcoming, 
respectful attitude. Most of the Iraqi clients had good literacy skills, thus 
many of the counseling groups in Jordan successfully incorporated methods 
from poetry therapy. Poetry therapy―one branch of the larger field of 
creative arts approaches that comprise music, dance, art, photo, and drama 
therapies―relies on the utilization of poetic language to promote therapeutic 
aims such as insight, empowerment, interpersonal connection, and healing. 
Methods that rely on the creative utilization of language are particularly 
salient for survivors of ethnopolitical trauma. Most survivors do not readily 
find words to describe their experiences and emotions, particularly at the 
earlier stages of recovery. In addition, larger sociocultural and political forces 
discourage―and even actively suppress―the verbal narration of the 
violations they have endured. This silence often leads survivors to feel 
isolated, burdened, and overwhelmed (Stepakoff & Ashour, 2011). In the 
context of a safe, caring relationship, gradually moving from silence toward 
speech paves a pathway for reconnection with self and restoration of the 
capacity to connect with other human beings (Stepakoff et al., 2011).  
Critics might argue that the utilization of Western-style poetry therapy 
approaches with Iraqi clients in an Arab country (Jordan) is a form of cultural 
imperialism. However, the recognition and utilization of the transformative 
power of literature has ancient antecedents in Arab culture, especially in Iraq. 
Indeed, words were written for the first time in human history (around 3200 
BCE) in Mesopotamia―the early civilization located in the site of modern-
day Iraq. 
In all of the monotheistic faiths practiced in Iraq, the reading of verses 
from sacred texts, either silently or aloud (e.g., in the form of chanting), is 
used to foster comfort and inner strength. Among Muslims, strong value is 
placed on being able to read the Koran and commit Koranic verses to 
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memory. Moreover, the rhythmical and linguistic properties of the Koran are 
believed to enhance the positive psychological impact of reading it or hearing 
it read aloud.  
Though the counseling model in Jordan was based on a variety of 
approaches, in many of the individual and group sessions we were able to 
successfully incorporate methods derived from poetry therapy. This was not 
merely a Western approach imposed on Iraqi clients. Rather, stories, poems, 
and writing are an integral part of Arab culture in general and Iraqi culture in 
particular. Of course, there are important differences between the indigenous 
use of verbal-artistic expression and the formal practice of the expressive 
therapies. Nevertheless, most of the clients welcomed opportunities to work 
with traditional literary forms. 
In particular, Arabic proverbs from ancient sources were used as a basis 
for supporting clients in exploring important concerns. For example, in one 
session, as a springboard for discussing a client’s dignity and intrinsic worth, 
counselors used a poem by Ali Ibn Al-Jahm Al-Sami, an Arabian poet who 
was based in Baghdad (born around 804 A.D., died in 863): Be like the date 
tree in its generosity and its pride: people throw stones at it and it gives them 
the best dates. 
In another group, a group counseling session was designed around a 
rhyming couplet by Al-Mutanabbi, an Arab Iraqi poet who lived from 915-
965 A.D.:  
Not all that person desires does he or she obtain: 
The winds blow without regard for the wishes of the ships. 
We typed these lines (in Arabic) on a sheet of paper, and distributed it to each 
of the group members. The Iraqi facilitator read the poem aloud three times, 
in order to enhance its impact. Clients were then invited to respond by “free-
writing.” “Free-writing” is a technique in which clients are asked to write 
non-stop for a specified number of minutes, without thinking, without 
censoring themselves, and without lifting their pens from the page.  
Below are two examples of clients’ free-writing from the session (the 
excerpts below were originally published in Stepakoff et al., 2011). 
The future was mine and now I am set in oblivion. I do not know where my future 
lies nor that of my family, and I have a sense of fear, of being terrified and 
unstable and without safety….My thoughts have become hazy and I have no clue 
what to do. (“Jalen”) 
This proverb reminds me of the current situation we live in, where fate plays the 
larger role in our lives: fate is similar to the strong wind that wreaks havoc and 
pushes all boats off their course. Despite the ship’s plan to reach a shore that had 
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been intended by the captain, the winds lead it to deviate from its course to 
another shore, which may be a safe shore that one may stay on for a lengthy 
period, but it may also turn out to be a barren island without water or vegetation 
and you will be forced to stay there and wait for a glimpse of hope by the passing 
of other ships or a rescue boat. The proverb makes me think of the plans for the 
future that we used to imagine, plans for a happy and pleasant life for the whole 
family, but this is not what has occurred. (“Laith”) 
We were struck by the strong responses engendered by this couplet-poem.  
We continued to use this proverb and this method in several other groups, 
with consistently positive effects. In the above example, the therapists chose 
the literary material. Sometimes, however, clients brought in poems, 
proverbs, or songs that they wished to share, either spontaneously or in 
response to an invitation by the therapists. Material that clients brought to 
counseling sessions rarely mentioned torture or war directly, but instead 
tended to capture particular aspects of the experience of suffering, loss, and 
grief. For example, in a counseling group for men, “Burhan”, whose brother 
had been brutally murdered for ethnopolitical reasons, had rigid 
psychological defenses against discussing his emotions about his brother’s 
death, even when other group members shared about their losses. About 
midway through the group cycle, Burhan, though he still had great difficulty 
talking about his feelings directly, shared the following passage from a poem 
by Al-Khansa, a renowned seventh-century Arab female poet whose brother 
had been killed in war in the year 615 A.D. Burhan had memorized the poem, 
and as he read it aloud it became clear that by sharing the poem, Burhan was 
able to express his own feelings more fully and precisely than he had been 
able to do on his own: 
Every sunrise reminds me of my brother, Sakhar 
And I continue remembering him until the sun descends 
And if it were not for the presence, all around me, of so many other people 
who are also mourning their brothers 
I would kill myself. 
Hearing this preexisting poem led to a fruitful group discussion of the 
experience of grief, and of the ways that forming connections with others 
who are grieving, and thereby feeling less alone in one’s sorrow, somehow 
made the anguish more bearable. Though the above examples used 
preexisting literary sources as a catalyst, oral and written self-expression are 
also important components of the counseling groups. Therapeutic letter-
writing is an expressive technique that can be systematically incorporated 
into group sessions. Usually, the counselors give the clients a suggestion 
regarding to whom the letter should be directed and/or what issues it should 
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explore. In Jordan, we used letter-writing in a variety of ways, particularly as 
a tool for working with traumatic grief. It is important that clients not only 
write a letter in which they express their own thoughts and feelings, but also 
that they imagine how the person receiving the letter would reply.  
There appears to be an archetypal healing function in the psyche that is 
activated during the imagined reply. More specifically, almost always, the 
responses are reparative and life-affirming. Typical messages include 
remarks such as “Take good care of the children”, “I want you to be happy”, 
“I forgive you”, “I’m sorry”, “I am not with you physically but I remain with 
you spiritually”, and so forth.  
Below is an example of a letter that a client, “Nafeeza”, wrote to her 
deceased brother, “Zafir”, who had been tortured and killed in Iraq. After 
composing the letter and the imagined reply, the client read both letters aloud 
in the sixth session of a women’s counseling group (the excerpt below was 
originally published in Stepakoff et al., 2011): 
My beloved and dear brother: 
First of all I wish to tell you that I’ve been missing you very very much. I miss 
your laughter and gentle joking, I miss seeing your beautiful and bright face and 
how you always entered the house with the tastiest of foods even if it cost you all 
the money you had on you. I want to tell you that I am sorry that I was not there 
with you when they captured you and took you away. I cannot stop thinking about 
you and of how they tortured you. I remember how sometimes you used to say the 
phrase “Oh Brother!” if something hurt you, and this time something hurt you 
and none of your brothers was with you to respond. Why has all this happened? 
What is your crime? Is your crime your name, or your love for people, or your 
high morals or your tenderness? I wish I knew why they did this to you, for you 
were like a blossoming flower spreading your fragrance to everyone around 
you….I tell you that I remember you every day and I shall never forget you and 
the same goes for my son, who always asks when you’ll be back whenever he sees 
your picture that is hanging on the wall. Even though he only remembers a little 
about you as he was young at the time [you were captured], he will never forget 
your love for him or your compassion.  
“Nafeeza” 
Nafeeza’s imagined reply from her brother: 
My dearest sister:  
I wish you knew how much I miss you and how sorry I am for…all the pain I have 
caused you, and especially for the pain of my mother and father. But this is what 
God had in store for us and we must bear His will. I want you to always be strong 
and to endure and to keep your faith in God, and I want you to know that I am 
comfortable, though I miss seeing you, and this will happen one day, God willing, 
sooner or later, for we will meet [in paradise]. I send my kisses to you and also to 
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Mom, Dad, all my brothers and friends, and especially to my beloved nephew, 
your son. 
“Zafir”  
We also used letter-writing in counseling groups for child survivors of torture 
and war trauma. In one such group, the children were invited to use the letter-
writing as an opportunity to address anyone to whom they had something to 
express. Some of the children chose to write to their perpetrator, articulating 
in the letters their feelings of anger and betrayal. Others chose to write to 
their lost loved ones, giving voice to their feelings of grief and longing. In 
one group, a particularly creative and precocious 12-year-old boy decided to 
write the letter to himself (the excerpt below was originally published in 
Stepakoff et al., 2011):  
Dear “Talib”, 
You’ve lost everyone who you like, toys, love, freedom, and friends, you’ve lost the 
person who was the most beloved and important to you. You have been beaten, 
and cursed, and you’ve been made to feel ashamed…You’ve been displaced, you 
had to leave your country, and your heart was very close to your country….I wish 
for you a pleasant life, and to overcome all the obstacles and problems, and for 
you to find someone who can help you to solve those problems….I wish for you 
new friends, like the friends you have found in this group. I wish you a happy life, 
and I wish peace and renewal for your country, and I wish you success in your 
hobbies. Thank you my secret friend, I know that you live in my heart. 
Conclusion 
In the aftermath of mass trauma, survivors from a wide range of cultures 
appear to have a psychological need to tell their stories and share their truths. 
Though nearly all human beings seek to give symbolic form to the emotions 
and images they carry inside, and to tell of their experiences of suffering and 
violation, the ways that these needs are channeled may be culturally specific. 
In this chapter, I have attempted to show that by drawing on a creative 
combination of Western and indigenous approaches, survivors of torture and 
war find wider possibilities for overcoming the silence and isolation that are 
among the most destructive sequelae of ethnopolitical trauma. By 
diversifying the pathways by which healing can occur, to encompass the best 
of contemporary and traditional healing methods, we can maximize the 
opportunities for recovery from the wounds of war. 
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Performance and Social Healing 
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Juniata College, Pennsylvania 
“In effect, we human beings act together because the meaning of our lives springs 
from our relationships with others.” (Febres, 2011, p. ix) 
 
“My desire to join the theatre during the sunset of the last military regime stems 
directly from the realization that only through creative work would I be able to heal 
and rebuild after so much destruction.” (Varea, 2011, p. 155)  
Introduction 
The quotations above illuminate the entanglement of interrelatedness, 
creativity and healing. Drawing on these concepts, this chapter explores the 
role of performance in the collective healing of social groups that have been 
fragmented by intense and protracted violence. Performance, in the form of 
ritual and theatre, is uniquely situated to collective healing. Ritual and theatre 
are collective endeavours: leaders of ritual, theatre artists and directors have a 
long history of crafting performances that engage audiences and participants 
in bringing injustices to light, envisioning more peaceful societies, and 
providing healing for those who have been traumatized by violence. 
Performance engages more than verbal, rational analysis: it engages people’s 
bodies, emotions, and sense of spirituality and has the potential to facilitate 
more holistic experiences of healing. Nevertheless, it is only recently that 
theatre artists and scholars have joined with scholar-practitioners of 
peacebuilding to develop a conceptual framework that would facilitate a 
more rigorous engagement with the transformative potential of performance. 
This has occurred in part through the international collaboration known as the 
Acting Together network.  
The seeds of the Acting Together peacebuilding performance project were 
sown through a collaboration in 2005 between Roberta Levitow of Theatre 
Without Borders and Jessica Berns, director of Coexistence International at 
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Brandeis University, who joined forces to explore ways in which theatre 
builds peace in divided societies around the world (Levitow, 2011, p. xv). 
Levitow and Berns soon brought Cynthia Cohen (1997) into the network, 
building on her seminal work on the aesthetic mediation of conflict. Under 
the direction of Cohen, the Acting Together Project was born, bringing 
together 24 theatre artists, directors and peacebuilding scholar-practitioners to 
create a two-volume anthology on the creative transformation of conflict. The 
texts include 13 multi-vocal chapters from more than 15 different countries, 
curated by authors who integrated a wide range of case studies and 
highlighted a number of diverse voices. In conjunction with the anthology, 
Cohen (2011b) also produced a related documentary Acting Together on the 
World Stage in collaboration with filmmaker Alison Lund and members of 
the acting together network.  
The Acting Together Project drew on John Paul Lederach’s (2005) 
concept of the moral imagination, defined as the ability to stay grounded in 
the realities of ongoing violence while at the same time envisioning a more 
peaceful future. Lederach maintains that peacebuilding requires four essential 
disciplines: acknowledging interdependence even between opponents, 
engaging with paradoxical curiosity, making space for the creative act and 
the willingness to risk moving beyond conflict toward peace (pp. 34-39). 
The editorial team of Acting Together, Cynthia Cohen, Roberto Varea 
and myself, engaged with chapter curators over six years, facilitating 
dialogues, workshops, and collaborative writing and editing sessions. We 
were seeking a deeper understanding of both the strengths and limitations of 
performance in transforming conflict in the midst of violent conflict, in the 
aftermath of violent conflict, and in building just and sustainable 
communities. Through an analysis of the many performances featured in the 
anthology, we found that peacebuilding performances facilitated: the 
expression of silenced and repressed experiences, the restoration of capacities 
damaged by violence, and the enacting of the moral imagination in relation to 
issues of identity, through acts of resistance and memory, and in the quest for 
justice (Cohen, 2011, pp. 171-182).  
We did not focus specifically on healing as a central aspect of the 
analytical framework in the Acting Together Project. Nevertheless, there is 
ample evidence that performances can be skilfully crafted to disrupt 
repetitive cycles of violence and trauma. A number of scholars emphasize the 
healing potential of performance. Richard Shechner (1988), one of the 
founders of performance studies, names healing as one of the central 
functions of performance. Healing of self, others, and social groups, what 
Varea (2011) calls “mending the torn social fabric,” (p. 154) has become a 
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persistent thread in the project as the Acting Together network continues to 
work with the assembled materials and with the wider network of artists and 
scholars.  
In this chapter, I analyse some of the performances featured in Acting 
Together in relation to social healing, “the capacity of communities and their 
respective individuals to survive, locate voice, and resiliently innovate spaces 
of interaction that nurture meaningful conversation and purposeful action in 
the midst and aftermath of escalated and structural violence” (Lederach & 
Lederach, 2010, p. 208). Lederach and Lederach (2010) maintain that this 
collective voice “creates social echo that simultaneously moves inward and 
out,” linking individual processes of healing with wider national processes of 
reconciliation (p. 208). 
Resiliently Innovating Spaces for Meaningful Conversation 
Creating innovative spaces of meaningful communication in settings of 
intense and protracted violence involves the creation of safe space for 
communication between enemies and/or former opponents; the restoration of 
meaning to societies reeling from the senselessness of mass atrocities, and the 
expression of formerly unspeakable experiences. These are neither easy nor 
straightforward tasks, particularly for opponents or former enemies living 
side by side in the same communities. Nevertheless, this proximity requires 
that people meet face to face with members from all sides of the conflict in 
order to engage with the legacies of violence and to find ways to work toward 
justice, reconciliation and sustainable peace. Performances provide such 
spaces, and the artists and scholars in the Acting Together network describe 
both ways of creating safe space and the kinds of meaningful dialogue that 
can take place within those containers. The discourse within those spaces 
would often not be considered as ‘safe’ outside the performance space; 
rather, the aesthetic excellence and discipline of the performers seem to 
create a sense of beauty and resonance that removes the performers, at least 
to some extent, from the legal sanctions that exist outside the performances. 
In creating safe space, peacebuilding artists and scholars stress the 
importance of integrating “symbolic distance,” innovative ways of engaging 
with the reality of people’s experiences of violence without recreating the 
immediacy and trauma those events have occasioned. For example, Jo Salas 
(2011), one of the founders of Playback Theatre, maintains that stories which 
include traumatic experiences should not be enacted literally. In contrast, 
symbols, gestures or other indirect means can be utilised to maintain a safer 
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distance from the violent events for audience members and performers. 
Another example of using symbols to create some emotional distance from 
the violence portrayed in performances can be seen in the work of Grupo 
Cultural Yuyachkani in Peru. Yuyachkani created the performance piece Kay 
Puncu to address the culture of impunity surrounding Peruvian soldiers’ rape 
of women. Lepri (2008) explains that when Yuyachkani presented street 
performances of Kay Puncu, the rape scene depicted a group of uniformed 
soldiers, each one yanking a strip of scarlet cloth from beneath the legs of the 
many women lying prostrate before them. The scene was powerful, 
evocative, and beautiful, clearly depicting the violent assault in a symbolic 
way that has enhanced witnesses’ capacities to speak about and work toward 
ending sexual violence in the military. Another powerful example of the 
creation of innovative spaces of social healing can be seen in the work of 
DAH Theatre in the former Yugoslavia. Dijana Milosović (2011) founder of 
the theatre company, describes a piece, This Babylonian Confusion, that they 
performed in the streets of Belgrade to draw attention to the fact that their 
country was engaged in a war, although the public was forbidden by the 
government at that time to use that term in regard to the violence that was 
occurring (pp. 30-32). Up to a third of the audience for these street 
performances were armed militia, yet not one of them turned their guns on 
the actors in the streets (Kneživić, cited in Milosović, 2011, p. 31). Milosović 
(2011) maintains that this safe space was created through the “commitment 
and the artistry of the actors” protecting them from the violence they might 
have otherwise expected (p. 32).  
The safe space of peacebuilding performances creates a container in 
which performers and audience members may strengthen their willingness 
and capacity to resist violence and injustice and to disrupt ongoing cycles of 
violence. Artists and audience members have engaged in critiques of 
government policies that would be disallowed, or even illegal, outside the 
performance space. Performance scholar Mads Palihaptiya (2011) explains 
that in Sri Lanka some theatre pieces performed after the war between 
Sinhalese and Tamil groups allowed artists and audience members to engage 
with biting critiques of public figures and government policies. Although 
these kinds of public expression were technically illegal, no performers were 
punished. Palihaptiya describes these spaces as “…an oasis―in which people 
could interact on physical, intellectual, and spiritual levels, and explore their 
values and their perspectives on the war” (p. 75-77), engaging in discourse 
that was silenced in other arenas.  
Pauline Ross (2011) founder of the Derry Playhouse, describes the safe 
spaces created within the Theatre of Witness in Northern Ireland in which 
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performers explored the violence that plagued communities during The 
Troubles: “…It was as if the performance had prepared the ground, a safe, 
sacred place for public discussion of very private stories of grief and pain. 
Performers and police officers all faced death threats for participating in 
performances” but none were ever killed or attacked for performing in, or 
witnessing the plays (pp. xiii-xvi).  
Concerns for the safety and wellbeing of performers and audience 
members are of the highest importance when creating performances in the 
midst of, and in the aftermath of, intense and protracted violence. High 
aesthetic quality, symbolic distance from violence and finely honed 
performances attuned to the deeper needs of audience members seem to 
provide some level of protection from the kinds of sanctions that may be 
exercised outside of performance spaces.  
In addition to the creation of safe space, peacebuilding performances have 
demonstrated ability to restore meaning destroyed by war and other mass 
atrocities. Varea (2011) explains how violence disrupts the processes that 
give meaning to our lives: “Perhaps nothing threatens our ability to create 
meaning more than becoming victims of violence. In its many shapes and 
forms, violence interrupts the telling of the story and our ability, as survivors, 
to make sense of it, rendering us helpless” (p. 154). Intense, protracted 
violence affects the ability of societies and individuals to understand the 
complex dynamics of conflict, making it even more likely that violent 
conflict will continue: “…the peoples or social groups who have suffered 
deaths, genocide, slavery, or other forms of oppression carry with them the 
stigma of having been erased from history. Thus we understand that violence 
is the destruction of meaning, a disorder that contaminates the very symbols 
with which we build our lives in communion with others. And because it 
corrupts meaning and reduces our humanity, violence often appears as an 
inexplicable act, almost impossible to understand at the very time it occurs” 
(Febres, 2011, p. x). In contrast, performance builds artists’, ritual leaders’, 
audience members’ and participants’ ability to build a deeper, more nuanced, 
collective understanding of the violence they have experienced, enhancing 
their agency to heal, rebuild relationships and reform structures that are 
keeping violence in place.  
Restoring meaning to situations of seemingly meaningless suffering, 
alienation and despair involves more than language. One aspect of 
performance that makes it uniquely suited to this restoration is that it is 
embodied, engaging memories that are not always easily recalled verbally but 
that may be accessed through “creative work that engages the body” (Cohen, 
2011, p. 166). Performances’ restoration of meaning happens in part in the 
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out-of-awareness aspects of human experience, as conflict resolution scholar 
Michelle LeBaron (2003) explains: “ritual and ceremony touch the 
unconscious parts of the self where identities breathe, and meaning is made” 
(p. 276). 
The restoration of meaning through performance is in part accomplished 
through giving expression to the atrocities and horrors of violent conflict that 
people may be unwilling, or unable, to discuss. Varea (2011) further explains 
that “Performance creates a complex but accessible language to speak the 
seemingly unspeakable. The capacity to continue on with the construction of 
meaning after traumatic violence is a founding principle of theatre, ritual, and 
also of peacebuilding” (p. 154). 
The restoration of meaning can also be seen in rituals that restore respect 
and honour to ways of knowing and being that have been disrupted by mass 
violence. An example of these processes can be seen in the Nez Perce 
Memorial Ceremonies which take place annually in the United States at Ft. 
Vancouver, Washington, where members of the Native American Nez Perce 
Nation join with non-Native settlers, local government officials and members 
of the United States Army stationed at Ft. Vancouver. Meaning is restored in 
part through respectful engagement with Native American religious 
ceremonies which were banned, and made illegal in the United States until 
1978. This marginalization of many cultural rituals that were meaningful to 
Native Americans meant the ceremonies were disrupted or driven 
underground, some no longer performed, others not spoken about publicly. 
The Nez Perce Memorial includes a number of these Native rituals: the pipe 
ceremony, signifying peaceful relations; gift giving, signifying interdepend-
ence and generosity of spirit; and the empty saddle ceremony, paying respect 
to those who have died. The empty saddle ceremony involves a number of 
Nez Perce warriors in full regalia, who honour the dead of all those present at 
the ceremony, bringing into symbolic relationship descendants of both Native 
and Settler peoples who opposed each other in the War of 1877.  
These public rituals that engage former enemy groups in collaborative 
endeavours have assisted in restoring the Nez Perce ‘way of the horse’ At the 
end of the War of 1877 the United States Army shot and killed over 6,000 
Nez Perce horses in an attempt to destroy the military might of the tribe. To 
the Nez Perce, this loss was much more than a blow to their military strength. 
They did not consider their horses to be weapons, rather relatives, with 
reciprocal relationships of respect and care similar to those they had with 
their human relations (Axtell, personal communication, March 13, 2009; 
Scott, personal communication, March 13, 2009). This loss, carried over the 
ensuing years, had broken the younger generations’ connection to the ‘Great 
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Horse Nation.’ Nez Perce spiritual leader Horace Axtell (personal 
communication, March 13, 2009) and Wilfried Scott (personal communica-
tion, March 13, 2009), chairman of the tribe at the time of the first memorial, 
explain that the ceremonies and related activities have restored the younger 
generations’ involvement with the ‘way of the horse’, restoring meaning to 
their connections with their more-than-human relationships, which were 
disrupted by the war.  
In addition to restoring meaning, performances have been crafted to 
literally restore some losses sustained in mass atrocities. Varea (2011) 
describes performances in Argentina that restored children of the disappeared 
to their grandparents, the wider community, and to the nation as a whole, 
mending the social fabric in tangible ways. HIJOS, an organization of young 
Argentinian men and women, joined forces with Mothers and Grandmothers 
of the Plaza Mayor, identifying the biological parents of over a hundred 
children and reuniting these children with their birth families (pp. 160-163). 
Social healing also requires processes that allow audience members and 
ritual participants to talk about what was formerly unspeakable. Catherine 
Filloux (2011) created a performance, Photographs from S-21, which has 
allowed audience members to discuss formerly repressed experiences of the 
Cambodian genocide that took place at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. She 
created the play in part to give voice to people who were represented in a de-
contextualised installation of photos from S- 21, which was a notorious site 
for the execution of people being held there. In Filloux’s play, a young man 
and woman, who have been murdered in the detention centre, come down 
from their photos at night when the museum is closed, and begin to share 
their experiences that had never been voiced. Filloux explains that in 
dialogue sessions after the performance, audience members also have shared 
their stories of trauma during the Cambodian genocide, experiences which 
they had been unable to share previously. For example, when the play was 
performed at Brandeis University in 2006, the Cambodian-American who 
played the part of the young man told the audience that after the play, for the 
first time his parents had spoken with him about the genocide. These shared 
memories re-connect audience members with the past, allowing them to 
grieve and to move into the future (pp. 207-211). 
Purposeful Action  
The previous section of this chapter explores ways in which peacebuilding 
performances have created safe spaces, restored some measures of meaning 
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to individuals and societies damaged by violence, and facilitated the 
expression of experiences that formerly had been unspeakable. The social 
healing effected through performance also builds people’s capacities for 
purposeful action designed to enhance their capacity and will to effect some 
measures of justice and to move beyond fixed, polarized identities, creating 
possibilities for relationships with former opponents. 
There are a number of ways in which performance facilitates audience 
members and ritual participants’ engagement with restorative justice. The 
public performance of one’s story, if handled well, may itself be an act of 
justice. Through restoring meaning and collective memory, performance at 
times is “a form of justice that cleanses and vindicates our species in a 
universal way” (Febres, 2011, p. xi). Judith Hermann (cited in Salas, 2011) 
explains that this type of performance “represents a transition toward the 
judicial, public aspect of testimony” (p. 119). Witnessing people’s lived 
experiences enacted on stage encourages listeners to take action to redress the 
injustices they now understand more fully (Rivers, cited in Salas, 2011, p. 
119). Perhaps this is due, in part, to the enhanced capacities of the witnesses 
of the testimonies, to connect in a personal and embodied way with those 
experiences, to empathize as if the pain of the stories also belongs to them 
(O’Neal, 2011, p. 126).  
The shared experience of pain facilitated through performance may also 
unite audience members with performers, building solidarity and thus 
capacities for effecting social change. This process is eloquently described by 
Salomon Lerner Febres (cited in Varea, 2011), the President of the Peruvian 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission:  
The experience of theatre is also for the spectator, who is as much a part of the 
event. Just as in art, if there is no observer, the work of art remains just here like 
another object. In some way, this ‘objectifying’ of pain through the agency of art 
can cut the knot that ties it to us, and also that silences us. Because ultimately we 
understand that, even if unfortunately, this is not just our personal experience, but 
a shared experience. It does not belong only to us. The search for justice in our 
own personal matters implies the externalization of what was felt, what was lived, 
and what occurred. (p. 175) 
The kinds of justice effected through performance address losses and traumas 
that retributive justice processes are unable to fully redress. For example, in 
performances, loved ones who have been killed may be symbolically restored 
to their families and communities. Ana Correa (cited in Varea, 2011), a 
founding member of Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani, created a theatre piece that 
has helped to effect justice and heal trauma through a form of symbolic 
restoration. Her play Rosa Cuchillo is the story of an alma viva, a living soul, 
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who travels to the land of the dead, searching for her son who has been 
disappeared. Rosa is reunited with him and at the end of the play she returns 
to the living to share her testimony. Correa explains that this play is one of 
solidarity, healing, memory and agency: “a way to help people overcome fear 
and begin to heal from forgetfulness … and create space to contextualize the 
possibility to deal with the forces that hurt us” (pp. 171 -173). 
Performances have facilitated engagement with other, more formal justice 
process. For example, Varea (2011) describes how Yuyachkani’s work has 
supported transitional justice through a collaboration with the Peruvian Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC enlisted Yuyachkani to 
create performances designed to facilitate more effective encounters between 
them and the remote Andean communities who had suffered the most 
violence and trauma. Yuyachkani’s performances created a stage for the 
restoration of public memory of atrocities and trauma that had occurred 
during the dictatorship, and held these memories within rituals of 
remembrance that provided some measures of individual and social healing. 
Yuyachkani’s performances were able to support justice initiatives through 
dignifying and honouring victims, and empowering people to speak publicly, 
first in response to the performance, and then to the TRC (Varea, 2011, pp. 
166 -167). 
Another act of restorative justice effected through Yuyachkani’s 
performances involves the symbolic restoration of a dismembered person, 
both to his own body and to the social imaginary of his community. Augusto 
Casafranca created the play Adios Ayacucho as the story of a peasant who 
had been disappeared, dismembered and buried beside the road. In search of 
justice, the man’s spirit inhabits the body of a Quechua ritual dancer and 
travels to the capital to demand justice. This play illuminates the wounds 
sustained in protracted violent conflict, “the layers of personal, societal, and 
mythical trauma involved in the disappearances. A person is denied his 
bones, and a whole people is denied inclusion in the body politic of the 
nation” (Varea, 2011, pp. 169-170). At the end of the play, the peasant 
through his symbolic re-membering finds a dignified death. Casafrana (cited 
in Varea, 2011) explains that he created the play to encourage the people 
most affected by the violence to voice their own truths, strengthening their 
ability and willingness to testify before the TRC and supporting efforts to 
bring perpetrators to justice. Performances that transform individual 
memories of trauma into collectively held memories have also been acts of 
restorative justice, restoring a sense of collective agency to groups 
immobilized by trauma. Hjalmar-Jorge Jaffre-Eichorn (2011), working with 
playback theatre in war-torn Afghanistan, describes the ways in which 
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playback theatre deals with memories. He argues that storytellers’ memories, 
when they are publicly enacted by skilled, trained actors, “transgress the 
boundaries” of the individual and are relocated in the bodies and minds of 
performers and audience members. Although these stories are painful, the 
public performance of traumatic experiences may help victims reconnect with 
the wider society. When governments and other ruling powers have been the 
source of, or complicit in, mass atrocities, performance has the potential “to 
create spaces of trust and respect in which those who have been silenced by 
the historical narrative can legitimize and document their own experiences” 
(pp. 114 -115). This more immediate and personal connection contrasts with 
the more objectified processes of formal justice processes that may seem 
remote and relatively meaningless to those living face to face with 
perpetrators of violence. 
A type of restorative justice can also be seen in performances that re-
centre an oppressed people’s ways of knowing and being. For example, in 
Uganda, theatre pieces have been created that integrate local, indigenous 
ontologies and epistemologies into professional theatre, disrupting the 
hegemony of the colonial influence in that country (Mulekwa, 2011, pp. 46-
49). Charles Mulekwa (2011) describes the ways that he and other Ugandan 
playwrights are redressing the “epistemological assault” of the British 
marginalisation and suppression of Ugandan forms of performance that 
impacted negatively on Ugandans’ well-being and identity (pp. 54-55). 
Similarly, performance scholar Daniel Banks (2011) explores the ways in 
which hip hop theatre in Ghana and South Africa creates a “new psychic 
space in which to work, one owned by the participants, often in contrast to 
hegemonic and/or Eurocentric practices,” drawing on “a porous pedagogy 
that relies on local knowledge, practices, values, and concerns” (pp. 68-69). 
These ways of restoring respect and agency to local, indigenous ways of 
knowing and being have been significant justice endeavours to oppressed 
peoples, impacting in positive ways on the wellbeing of their societies. 
Purposeful action related to performance and social healing in situations 
of racism, genocide or other atrocities also requires redressing power 
imbalances and unacknowledged privileges. John O’Neal (2011) one of the 
founders of the Free Southern Theatre during the Civil Rights Era in the 
United States, explains the importance of critiquing power structures that 
keep injustices in place and that perpetuate trauma: “Our idea was that we 
had a larger mission than simply to entertain those who had achieved a 
certain measure of comfort in a hostile environment. The larger purpose of art 
in the context of injustice is to challenge the norms of those who are 
benefiting from the injustice” (p. 138). O’Neal claims that social healing 
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must be designed to disrupt complacency and hopelessness, awakening a 
sense of agency among members of oppressed groups. Alex Mukulu’s 
Ugandan play Thirty Years of Bananas critiqued the apathy and complicity of 
the Ugandan populace, as well as the corruption of their leaders, and called 
for individual and collective agency in healing and rebuilding after years of 
despotic rule (Mulekwa, 2011, pp. 57-62). Facilitating a stronger sense of 
agency assists oppressed or marginalised people to create a vision for 
engaging more actively with justice initiatives, as Sri Lankan playwright and 
scholar Ranjini Obeysekere (cited in Palihapitya, 2011) explains: “The 
seemingly ‘passive’ participation of audiences in a dramatic performance 
gives them a sense of power, however temporary and symbolic, over the 
political evils in the world outside. They can laugh at them, and in the 
laughter reaffirm that the world can be different from what it is now” (p. 75). 
This sense of empowerment also translates into purposeful engagement with 
issues of justice outside the performance space.  
Restorative justice is also seen in performances that re-story people by 
replacing dominant, external narratives with personal, authentic stories of 
their experiences. Re-storying returns a fuller sense of agency, and resists the 
marginalisation and suppression inherent in many official government 
accounts. Nora Strejilevich (cited in Varea, 2011) describes the restorative 
justice effected through rewriting and publicly performing her story of being 
disappeared by the Argentinian dictatorship:  
I was not only sharing the account of my kidnapping in the very place where I had 
become a desaparecida, I was basically re-writing myself. Terror had wanted to 
turn me into a victim and, instead, I had turned into a creator of my own life/text. 
A story that had been imposed on us in order to destroy our humanity was being 
turned upside down… ( pp. 156-157) 
Social healing through performance facilitates engagement with fluid and 
interdependent identities that contrast starkly with the kinds of fixed, 
oppositional identities that characterise intractable conflict. Victor Turner 
(1977), one of the seminal scholars of ritual, maintains that ritual 
performance creates a liminal space in which the participants are able to 
move from one state of being to another. Within this liminal space, people 
can temporarily set aside their own identities, and try on another, even that of 
enemy or former opponent. In so doing, performance facilitates audience 
members’ and ritual participants’ ability to move beyond dualistic and 
alienated identities, exploring interconnections with ‘the other.’ There are a 
number of ways performances facilitate awareness of and engagement with 
interdependence: through developing rigorous empathy and through creating 
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interdependent relationships that continue to exist outside the performance 
space.  
Rigorous empathy is recognizing the humanity of former opponents or 
members of enemy groups, acknowledging the complicity of members of 
one’s own group in violence, and yet at the same decrying and redressing 
injustices. Palihaptiya (2011, pp. 83-86) describes a performance in Sri 
Lanka designed to facilitate empathy. After the civil war, Dharmasiri created 
a rendition of the Trojan Women that allowed Sir Lankans to grieve with 
women, as mothers, wives and sisters of those who had been killed in the 
area. Many had become numbed to the violence, and unable to empathize 
with the ways in which women are adversely impacted by the losses of war. 
It also served to encourage the development of a superordinate identity in 
which both Sinhalese and Tamils could see themselves as people who had 
been adversely impacted by war and who were committed to redressing 
injustice and building peace. 
Identifying solely with fixed, rigid identities is a characteristic of 
intractable conflict and repeated cycles of violence and trauma. In contrast, 
engaging with fluid, multiple identities is a crucial aspect of conflict 
transformation. Ruth Margreff (2011), performance studies scholar, describes 
awareness of, and engagement with, multiple identities as a crucial aspect of 
redressing ethnic and sectarian violence. Margreff describes what she terms 
as a Ziskian split which allows audience members to identify both with 
members of their own group and those of opposing groups. She analyses the 
performance Hidden Fires that was created to address the Gujarat massacres 
of 2002, in which Hindu extremists killed around two thousand Muslims. 
Hidden Fires challenges audience members to complexify their allegiances 
and to grapple with their own complicity in violence rather than identifying 
an “evil other” to whom to ascribe the violence.  
The ‘split’ then is the experience of holding both ethnic identities within the 
actor’s one body at the same time, so that the actor is saying (with her body) ‘I am 
a Hindu artist, I am a Hindu extremist/rioter/complacent-media-person, and I am 
also a Muslim victim.’ And to the extent that the acting is convincing and the 
audiences are identifying with the characters, audience members experience these 
splits as well (p. 194).  
This more complex engagement with the identities of the actors, and by 
extension audience member’s identities and allegiances, strengthens audience 
members’ agency to address acts of violence that they previously may have 
ignored.  
Relationships that are ‘performed’ in the liminal space of rituals may 
continue to exist outside the performance space, creating alliances and 
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collaborations aimed at disrupting historical and contemporary cycles of 
violence. In reconciliation ceremonies involving Indigenous and Settler peoples 
in Australia and the United States, participants have moved beyond identities of 
descendants of victims and perpetrators into more interrelated identities 
(Walker, 2011). For example, in regard to the Nez Perce Memorial 
Ceremonies, Royce Pollard (personal communication, April 14, 2009), former 
commander of Fort Vancouver stated, “We have moved beyond reconciliation, 
we are in relationship.” More fluid identities regarding Indigenous and Settler 
peoples can also be seen in the rituals of the Myall Creek Massacre Memorial 
in Australia. Sue Blacklock, descendant of the Aboriginal survivors, extended a 
kinship relationship to Beulah Adams, descendant of one of the perpetrators of 
the massacre, saying “We are now sisters” (Adams, personal communication, 
June 11, 2008). Likewise, in the Two Rivers Powwow, Methow Indians have 
conducted naming ceremonies for two non-Natives, inducting them into a 
relationship of rights and responsibilities within their community. These 
individuals who formerly identified as white Australians or white Americans 
are now also adopted members of Indigenous groups. 
Limitations of Performance in Social Healing 
Performances have demonstrated strengths in terms of social healing, as seen 
in the numerous case studies in the Acting Together Project. Nevertheless 
they also have a number of limitations in this regard. The outcomes of 
performance are neither linear nor causal, and in situations of violence where 
a specific outcome is needed quickly, the more liminal spaces of performance 
may prove ineffective and/or dangerous. 
The outcome of performances is unknown, relying on the resonances of 
interaction that occur between audience member and actors, or between 
participants and leaders of ritual. Performance therefore, facilitates a 
transformation of some type, but not always in the direction of social healing 
or peace. Performances, with their abilities to engage powerful emotions, 
build resistance and strengthen participants’ agency, have also been used to 
exacerbate and to legitimate violence. There is therefore no guarantee that a 
performance will disrupt cycles of violence and trauma. 
Even when performances are crafted with strong peacebuilding 
frameworks, the outcomes are in part reliant on audience members’ openness 
and readiness to engage the issues raised in the performance. Attempting to 
humanize the experiences of diverse peoples may resonate very differently 
with members of opposing groups, some of whom may see such 
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performances “as a threat to the personal, cultural, or national narrative they 
hold dear” (Nasrallah & Perlman, 2011, p. 141). In such cases, enmity 
divides may be exacerbated or maintained by performances. 
Another limitation of performance in social healing is the relative 
difficulty of addressing ways in which members of a performance group are 
themselves constrained by institutionalised violence such as racism, gender 
bias or homophobia. In his chapter on theatre and racism in the United States, 
O’Neal (2011) describes his struggles to address racist dynamics and other 
forms of power imbalances within theatre collaborations in which he has 
been involved (pp. 130-133). At times theatre companies and participants in 
rituals find it easier to address direct and structural violence that occurs in the 
world outside the performance space, while finding it threatening and 
distressing to address such forms of violence within performance groups. 
There are also tensions between a healing exchange of stories and the 
potential for re-traumatizing the participants by bringing complex, vivid 
emotions and experiences to the stage. In her work with playback theatre 
Salas (2011) points out that given the fluidity of the liminal spaces of 
performance, it can be challenging to ensure that audience members are not 
re-traumatized. In the aftermath of genocide and other mass atrocities, 
performance alone is not capable of effecting the kinds of social healing 
needed to disrupt ongoing cycles of violence. Performances designed to 
address injustices and facilitate social healing need to be linked with wider 
societal process of justice, healing and conflict transformation. Nevertheless, 
restrictions from funders and policy makers often limit the kinds of 
interdisciplinary endeavours that would support a more robust engagement 
with sustainable peace and justice processes. 
Also, performances may be resisted by social groups when those 
performances challenge chosen narratives and deeply held beliefs, increasing 
peoples’ resistance to change and encouraging them to elide engagement with 
issues of healing and justice. Performance scholars Aida Nasrallah and Lee 
Perlaman (2011) explain that peacebuilding performances “… require a 
willingness on the part of audiences to confront unsettling questions about 
the society in which they live and their role in perpetuating the status quo. 
For the citizens, theatre artists, and theatregoers in Israel, as in most other 
societies, it is easiest just not to know” (p. 116). 
Furthermore, rituals that are performed for the social healing of one group 
to a conflict, although often necessary and effective, may be perceived by 
opposing groups as efforts to strengthen the enemy. Palihiptiya (2011) 
describes Tamil rituals that were held in Sri Lanka after the civil war where 
Kandasamy Sithamparanathan formed the Theatre Action Group (TAG) 
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which created seven day intensive ceremonies for Tamils. TAG’s rituals 
strengthened participants’ capacities to mourn losses, deal with traumas build 
solidarity, and restore agency. “Instead of telling people what to think, TAG 
helped people who had been politically divided and badly traumatized regain 
their ability to think clearly for themselves” (p. 89). Nevertheless, some 
Sinhalese perceived the power that Tamil participants developed through the 
performances as a threat of renewed violence.  
At times, performances are crafted in such ways that the worldviews of 
the artists or ritual leaders’ obscure issues that are of critical importance in 
audience members or ritual participants’ worldviews. The marginalisation of 
a people’s worldview is a form of epistemic violence that may render 
performances less meaningful. Even the terminology employed in this 
chapter, that of social healing, may obscure many interrelationships that are 
critical in a number of Indigenous worldviews. For example, in traditional 
Native American and Aboriginal Australian worldviews, one’s ‘self’ is not a 
discrete, skin-bounded individual, rather is embodied both in a number of 
human kin (both living, deceased and not yet born humans), and in 
relationships with other living beings and features of the natural world. In 
these worldviews, the concept of healing extends beyond human beings into 
what philosopher Dave Abram (1997) calls the more-than-human-world. 
People holding these worldviews tend to conceptualise healing as relational 
healing which extends the processes of meaningful interaction and purposeful 
action to include ancestors, generations to come, and to the natural world. 
Examples of relational healing can be seen in rituals of the Two Rivers 
Powwow, a collaborative performance of both traditional Native rituals and 
newly designed reconciliation rituals involving both Settlers and Natives. It 
occurs annually in Twisp, Washington in the USA. The Powwow is a form of 
cyclical restorative justice, in which Methow Indians are formally welcomed by 
descendants of Settlers into places from which, in 1866, the Methow were 
forcibly removed by the United States Army. In the Powwow, traditional 
Methow rituals involving drumming, gift giving, and giveaway ceremonies are 
interwoven with new rituals that integrate both Methow and Settler 
descendants: telling the silenced histories of the Methow people and their 
removal from the valley, apologies on the part of Settlers, and the enacting of 
new relationships through symbolic gift giving and through public affirmations 
of new relationships. John GrosVenor (cited in Stamper, 2009), an Echota 
Cherokee, describes the reconnections that the rituals establish with the more 
than human community: “When we dance, in theory, every time a foot hits the 
earth, it’s a prayer, and the singing, eating and drinking are also part of that 
spiritual connection to the land.” The rituals in the Two Rivers Powwow also 
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renew connections between Native peoples and their ancestors, as well as to the 
coming generations. Stephen Iukes (as cited in Mitchell, 2007), a Colville 
Indian elder, describes the role of departed loved ones in the contemporary 
reconciliation processes: “The Ancestors of these ones from the valley are still 
here, the Spirits are still here. By singing these songs we sing that they might 
be awakened again, to know that they are not forgotten.” These rituals of 
reconnection with land, animals, and plants of significance to Native peoples 
effect some measures of relational healing.  
Purposeful action to redress injustices can also extend to the more than 
human world. Participants in Indigenous/Settler reconciliation ceremonies in 
Australia and the United States describe the ways in sites of violence 
themselves can be transformed through rituals and ceremonies of healing and 
reconciliation. The places where these ceremonies are held have been 
described as “wounded space,” as places that have “been torn and fractured 
by violence” (Rose, 1997). In relational healing, these spaces that have 
suffered violence can also be transformed. For example, John Brown 
(personal communication, June 12, 2008), one of the settler Australian 
founders of the Myall Creek Memorial explains the healing that has taken 
place through the rituals at the massacre site as reconnecting participants with 
the spirits of those who have died, and with the land itself.  
Conclusion 
In the aftermath of violence, societies must create spaces and processes of 
social healing, which require “that losses be mourned, and adversaries invited 
to empathize with each other’s suffering, even across lines of enmity and 
power. Memories must be dignified, but at the same time, people need to 
begin to imagine and create a safer, more secure future, where conflicts can 
be addressed constructively” (Cohen, Varea & Walker 2011b, p. 147). These 
kinds of interdependent relationships can be facilitated through well-crafted 
performances of high aesthetic quality that create a kind of resonance 
between performers and audience members and between leaders and 
participants of ritual. These resonances are one example of what Lederach 
and Lederach (2010) call “social echo”: linking collective healing of social 
groups with individual healing and national justice and reconciliation 
initiatives (pp. 211-224.) 
Social healing incorporates action aimed at both justice and the 
coexistence of former opponents. Performances have been shown to build 
people’s agency and capacity to disrupt cycles of violence and trauma. 
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Performance can, as Charles Mulekwa (2011) states, “put a knife through the 
matter and cut it open, helping people who have been oppressed, traumatized, 
or broken to face their condition and imagine something better ….. when 
people think critically about their lives, they can be activated” (p. 62). As 
Salomon Lerner Febres (2011), maintains, performances designed to witness 
the evils of mass atrocities, to develop collective narratives and deeper 
understandings are “a sort of therapy that returns to us, mended and sensible, 
a broken and stunned reality” (p. xi). 
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 Epilogue 
“They Did Not See the Bodies”: Confronting and 
Embracing in the Post-Apartheid University 
Confronting and Embracing in the Post-Apartheid University 
Jonathan Jansen 
University of the Free State Bloemfontein 
Introduction 
I want to conclude this outstanding anthology of research and thought on the 
subjects of trauma, forgiveness, reconciliation and justice where Donna 
Orange’s brilliant Prologue to this book started, with a gut-wrenching story 
about bodies. The author makes reference to a horrific film made by Alfred 
Hitchcock that was never shown but is now available. When the allies entered 
the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp towards the end of the Second World 
War they found well-fed Germans in their quarters living alongside the dying 
and decaying corpses of Jews succumbing to hunger and disease. You 
literally see the bones pushing out against the off-white skin, and swollen 
heads with large eye sockets and sunken eyeballs. Jewish inmates were 
literally dying on each other within walking distance of the quarters of the 
Nazi officers. 
Even more striking is that the film first takes the viewer into and through 
the surrounding town with its manicured lawns and peaceful suburban 
housing where ordinary Germans lived. They must have known of the 
miniature Holocaust down the road, but life went on as normal. On the camp 
site and around it, there was another world even though the chimney smoke 
going up from burning bodies and the smell of decaying human flesh in the 
open air must surely have betrayed the genocide down the road. 
Then something remarkable happens. The Allied forces require the Nazi 
officers to touch, lift and carry the dead bodies against their own bodies to 
deposit into trenches dug by the German soldiers themselves. It is a gut-
wrenching site to witness on this black and white video the emotionless 
guards of the Reich loading bodies onto trucks and carrying them against 
their naked upper bodies, arms and legs dangled around their warm necks, 
flailing, and then slid down the sand embankment into a hole. 
But it is the next set of slides that took my breath away. The public 
officials and elders from the town of Bergen-Belsen, as well as ordinary 
German citizens, are lined up around the open trenches with layers of Jewish 
bodies, forced to see the bodies killed. In that moment neat conceptual 
344 Jonathan Jansen  
distinctions between perpetrator and bystander become grey and dark, and the 
redeeming excuse “I did not know” is no longer available to the Germans. 
They saw the bodies. 
The Knowledge of Evil 
Here is the problem of white South Africans at large, the defensive claim that 
“I did not know” or, in the carrying metaphor of this story, they did not see 
the bodies. In many ways this is true. State censorship of all the main media, 
including print media and television, not only sought to discourage black 
people and the black resistance in particular from knowing about white losses 
and grief in the battlefield, it also shielded white citizens from the horrors 
perpetrated by so-called civilized Christian men against black and white 
opponents of the regime. 
It is clear to me that the parents of the white “born-frees,” as they are 
erroneously called, did not know fathers were raping civilians on the 
Namibian border while fighting SWAPO and the ANC; ordinary white 
citizens had no knowledge of the brutality of torture routinely conducted in 
John Vorster Square police station in Johannesburg or Caledon Square police 
station in Cape Town. The gunning down of defenceless school youth from 
Atteridgeville in the North to Athlone in the South largely bypassed white 
consciousness. Inside the censored world of apartheid, everything looked 
normal. They did not see the bodies. 
When these stories of conflict did break in the news it was in the form of 
unrelenting propaganda. “Terrorists” were killed and “terrorist attacks” 
thwarted. Prisoners jumped to their death or slipped on soap and fell down 
stairs or hanged themselves all on their own. Every encounter of war was a 
victory over godless communists wanting to destroy white civilization and “our 
Christian way of life”—the stock response even today to state terror on 
opponents. 
Yet to present the “no knowledge” response in such clear and absolute 
terms is of course disingenuous. Here the memorable response to this 
problem by a former apartheid cabinet Minister turned Human Rights 
Commissioner is revealing when he declared that “the defence that I did not 
know is not available to me, for in many ways I did not want to know.” This 
is an important insight for as much as the apartheid state censored white 
reality, black and white lived too closely together in the intimacy of their 
intertwined lives not to have seen the bodies, in the manner of speaking. 
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White lecturers who taught on black campuses saw the bodies; white 
teachers who taught in black high schools bore witness to police brutality. 
White madams saw the grief of the domestic whose children were shadowed 
away in the dark of night. White employers of black labour saw the beaten 
bodies from weekends in detention. White policemen, soldiers, spies, 
volunteers killed directly and came home with the scars of war on the streets 
of the townships or the infiltration of homes in neighbouring states. 
Still, it was only during the TRC’s open sessions that many South Africans 
“saw” the bodies of victims so openly day after day. Yet I do not believe that 
ordinary white citizens dwelt on that channel or read the reports of mainly 
black bodies shaking and wanting to know what happen to their children. Not 
only did white citizens not show up at the TRC to own up to the dead and 
disappeared bodies, many flatly dismissed the commission as biased against 
them, an ANC plot to make whites feel guilty about something they did not do. 
Back to the Future 
As the black Rector of a former white university two decades after apartheid, 
this is the heart of the dilemma. How do you deal with white alumni (parents 
from the apartheid era) who behave as if there were no bodies? How do you 
teach white students (children born after apartheid) who become very angry 
and aggressive, especially young white males, at the slightest hint of any 
reference to historical bodies? Not only do many white students and their 
parents not want to talk about bodies, they want things to remain as they were 
under apartheid, especially in relation to apartheid symbolism. 
The problem with symbols in the post-apartheid university is that they are 
visual reminders of our divided past. In a place like the University of the Free 
State (UFS), those symbolic reminders are everywhere. When I flip open the 
university’s graduation programme in 2014, there is a long list of every man 
(until recently, only males) who received an honorary doctorate from our 
university. On that list appears the most destructive apartheid politicians like 
HF Verwoerd, PW Botha and BJ Vorster, but also every major and minor 
administrator of the apartheid government, including Geoff Cronje who was 
the academic architect of apartheid’s racial classification system. The main 
building of the Law School is named after CR Swart, an apartheid President. 
Student residences bear the names of white supremacists and segregationists 
like JBM Hertzog and NJ van der Merwe. 
For those singular universities which, believe it or not, still run majority 
white campuses in South Africa, the question of bodies is less likely to come 
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up. But at an institution like the University of the Free State, where a 
majority of students are black, the question is posed all the time and in the 
following way—those symbols are divisive, they remind us of our violent 
past, and they makes us feel excluded even in the present. Put differently, 
even if you did not want to talk about bodies those symbols bring up the 
subject in the minds of especially black students. 
The Political and Pedagogical Project 
South Africa did not have a revolution. We entered into a negotiated 
settlement where the white apartheid government sat down with the black 
liberation movements and drafted a Constitution that ensured a place for all 
in the future of the country. Led by Nelson Mandela, the reconciliation 
narrative was written prominently across the political script that birthed the 
new South Africa. Invariably, this was taken to mean that while a black 
majority would lead the country, the kind of governance and administration 
would be generous and inclusive, and give due recognition to the rights of 
white citizens in respect of things like culture, language and property. The 
very anthem, containing lines in Afrikaans from the apartheid volkslied 
(national anthems), is a clear if awkward example of the extent to which 
recognition and reconciliation was carried forward in the symbolism of this 
new country.  
The problem is that Mandela did not leave behind a manual or a guide 
book for how we work out the grand narrative of reconciliation and social 
justice in the day-to-day encounters between black and white South Africans 
as we shave up against each other in places of learning, living and labouring. 
We have to do that work ourselves within the broad framework set by 
Mandela and others, and this is the challenge of post-apartheid leadership in a 
public institution like the University of the Free State. 
It is impossible, as the chapters in this book show, to build and sustain a 
post-conflict society without talking about those invisible bodies. This 
requires extraordinary skills of teaching across the disciplines. Such skills of 
compassion when there are “bodies in the middle of the room” (Elbaz-
Luwisch, 2004) and competence in the discipline cannot come easily from 
professors whom themselves were military conscripts on behalf of the 
apartheid regime. While many have come to terms with the new country, and 
are indeed committed to teaching black students with passion and dedication, 
deep belief systems do not change that easily and academics across the world 
are not prepared as teachers, let alone teachers in a post-conflict society. 
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In this respect the UFS established an Institute for Reconciliation and 
Social Justice as well as a Centre for Teaching and Learning tasked, in part, 
to begin building a campus of compassion and embrace, on the one hand, and 
on the other, a teaching corps of academics versed in the facilitation of 
difficult dialogues. Those who become part of these two entities benefit 
greatly, but it is a minority in a voluntary suite of programs on offer. Still, 
there is a place where students and faculty can come to confront historical 
and present “bodies” that otherwise remain unspeakable. The many seminars, 
conferences, workshops, special lectures, and more, are all designed to create 
open spaces for constructive dialogue about how we deal with the bodies. 
All first-year students taking the core curriculum called UFS 101, 
encounter the bodies of both young white men executed in the Anglo-Boer 
War, as it was called, and young black men executed in the anti-apartheid 
struggles. This history module, which I teach with hopefully both empathy 
and challenge, generated considerable anger among young white men 
especially in the smaller tutorial sessions. No matter how the subject matter 
was presented, the very mention of bodies from the past is enough to evoke 
deep, deep anger among those who were born after apartheid. Why? Because 
they had already learnt from their parents and peer groups, from dominees 
(ministers in the Afrikaans churches), rugby coaches, and other significant 
adults in their lives, to react negatively, sometimes violently, against any 
mention of historical bodies. This makes the pedagogical task of teaching 
difficult, it makes the psychological burden of healing hard, and it makes the 
political task of social cohesion very challenging.  
Here institutional context matters. It would be much easier, though not 
without difficulties, taking on discussion of bodies in historically black 
universities or the liberal white universities. But in century-old institutions 
like the UFS, where white Afrikaans speaking students and black students 
occupy common ground, the children of historical enemies do not come to 
the table easily or without angst for they have inherited memories that come 
as divided and divisive as those who have direct knowledge of the bodies. 
And that is what makes the discussion of symbolic reparation such a 
challenge. 
Should JBM Go? 
One of the old male residences with a significant number of white Afrikaans 
students is named after a prime minister of the then Boer republic, the Orange 
Free State, one JBM Hertzog. It was this residence which welcomed me as 
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new Rector in 2009 with a swastika painted against the wall visible from 
where I was sitting during the introductions. 
My Dean of Students had started a discussion with the residence and 
during one of those visits to JBM Hertzog, he told a house meeting that their 
name would change. A student with a hidden recorder taped this message and 
sent it to the local Afrikaans newspaper. All hell broke loose. What in 
another context would have been a non-event became a fiery attack on the 
Dean and the university leadership in general; how dare we even consider 
changing that name? The regional Afrikaans newspapers picked up the story 
and angry, vicious letters followed for weeks on end.  
I received a set of anonymous letters with some of the worst racist bile I 
had ever encountered in my life; it was cutting, and personal with racist and 
ethnic insults against my person that I had not even encountered during the 
worst of the apartheid years. Death threats came with the correspondence. All 
because one of my Deans dared to express his view that the name of the 
residence should change. His view, because name changes are in fact made 
by the governing body of the university and not by an individual in the 
middle management of a large, multi-campus institution. 
A few white men demanded a meeting of Convocation, a derelict body 
that had last met in 2007 to vote against racial integration on campus. It 
turned into an evening of abuse as right-wing men spat abuse and insult at the 
university leadership on all kinds of things but, at its heart, was the 
transformation of the institution and, in particular, the threat of name changes 
to a men’s residence. 
What would unleash such a torrent of intolerance and barely concealed 
racist abuse from a few white, Afrikaans men? Quite simply, they did not see 
the bodies. Here racial arrogance stalks the land among a few who clearly do 
not believe there was a violent, apartheid past captured and retained in these 
alienating symbols on a changing campus. These are men who generated the 
bodies as military service men and as civilian policemen. They saw the 
bodies, and yet these bodies do not exist because of their emotional, physical 
and spiritual distancing from those events. 
At a psychological level what you witness in such public behaviour is a 
profound sense of loss and receding sense of control over “their” last 
remaining institutions on which they can claim ownership―the white 
university. They lost control over the institutions of state; before you could 
call your Member of Parliament, now you call your local Afrikaans 
newspaper which outlet I have often described as a receptacle for white 
anxiety. You feel vulnerable in this new country where you live with the 
Afrikaans press telling daily, front-page stories of the horror of farm murders 
 Confronting and Embracing in the Post-Apartheid University 349 
and home invasions as if the target is white Afrikaans citizens as opposed to 
all South Africans. You witness ongoing stories about government 
corruption, and there is nothing you can do about it except that it confirms for 
the racists everything they knew about black people.  
That anger is now inflected inwards on the one Afrikaans institution also 
threatening to slip forever beyond your control―the university. This is the 
place that formed you and where you have deep emotional, spiritual and 
ethnic bonds. And it wants to challenge and change the memories and 
remembrances of that treasured past. 
The Leadership of Change and Conciliation 
What then is the pedagogical task inside former white institutions in a black 
majority country that came into being through a negotiated settlement that 
sought to balance reconciliation and social justice? In this formulation of the 
question lays three critical variables for change leadership. 
First, in a black majority country, unlike the United States of America, for 
example, it is a matter of time before institutional change happens anyway. 
The still-white dominant professorship will change in all 25 public 
universities and most of the students in the few still-white dominant 
campuses will be black. This means that the leadership of change requires 
patience but also generosity.  
Second, the spirit of reconciliation exemplified in our first president, 
Nelson Mandela, demands an approach that does not steamroller over the 
memories and emotions of the vanquished. Our national anthem with its 
clumsy but necessary language and ideological blend is the most glaring 
example of such an approach. What this means in an institution such as the 
UFS is that there needs to be a delicate balance between changing and 
retaining the symbols that mark this century-old institution. We have 
maintained Afrikaans as a university language, alongside English. 
We continue to engage this challenge through leadership actions that “add 
to” the extant symbolism of an old university in meaningful rather than 
contradictory ways (such as the new African artworks along campus 
pathways); to withdraw offensive symbols and exclusive traditions (such as 
practices of Dutch Reformed Calvinism in public ceremonies); and to 
establish conciliatory traditions (such as the annual Reconciliation Lecture). 
It will remain an uneasy truce with pressure from black and progressive white 
students to change all, and pressure from white alumni to hold onto treasured 
symbols from the past.  
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Third, the devastating history of colonialism and apartheid demands 
social justice especially in a white-exclusive university that was central to the 
maintenance of white supremacy over a century. This means being clear, 
from the top down, about what the university stands for in terms of social 
justice and institutional reparation. The employment of senior black 
professors and administrators is not simply a matter of compliance with 
government legislation but communicated through the logic of social justice. 
The same applies to acts of symbolic reparation and social responsibility 
towards disadvantaged communities. Community outreach, always done in 
the ideological framework of religious upliftment of the uncivilized is now 
done in the political context of social justice for the oppressed; this is a 
significant shift in institutional motivation and requires further elaboration in 
another place. 
Conclusion 
The challenges for leadership in the aftermath of conflict are many, such as 
how to manage the lingering claims to martyr memories on both sides of a 
conflict (chapter 3) or how to conduct “second generation” journeys into the 
past in ways that create more promising futures (chapter 5) or how to build 
shared spaces out of volatile segregated ones (chapter 8). The question these 
chapters pose, in various ways, is whether there is a future, and if so what 
kind of future, after traumatic conflict? 
South Africa has not yet escaped inclusion in the lament of Leon Uris 
(1976: p. 751) in Trinity—“Ireland has no future only the past happening 
over and over.” This book, on the other hand, offers a wealth of comparative 
research and knowledge on how post-conflict states everywhere can yet build 
promising futures out of broken pasts. 
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